US07-05: Deliver Backup and Operational Recovery (#92)
This commit was merged in pull request #92.
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delivery_backlog/stories/US08-01-trusted-hosts-auth.md
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# US08-01 — Make the Trust Boundary Configurable and Authenticated
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Epic: [E08](../E08-container-deployment.md)
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As an operator, I want to reach the application through my own hostname without
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weakening it, so a container behind a reverse proxy is as safe as the loopback
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deployment it replaces.
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## Context
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`photo_pipeline/api/security.py` refuses any request whose `Host` or `Origin` is not
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loopback. That check is the current stand-in for authentication: whoever can reach
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`127.0.0.1:8000` is the owner. Behind a proxy the hostname is no longer loopback, so
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relaxing the check without adding an authentication gate would publish the library.
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## Acceptance criteria
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- Allowed hosts and origins come from configuration (`PHOTO_PIPELINE_*`), default to
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the current loopback set, and an unset configuration behaves exactly as today.
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- Whenever a non-loopback host is configured, startup requires an access secret and
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refuses to serve without one; loopback-only deployments keep working with no secret.
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- The secret is exchanged for the existing session cookie and CSRF token through the
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bootstrap endpoint; every protected route keeps its current session and CSRF
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requirements unchanged.
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- Forwarded headers (`X-Forwarded-Proto`, `X-Forwarded-Host`) are honored only from a
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configured trusted proxy and ignored otherwise, so a client cannot forge its origin.
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- Cookies are marked `Secure` when the effective external scheme is HTTPS.
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- Failed authentication is rate-limited and logged without the secret, the session id,
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or any request body.
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- Health endpoints stay reachable without the secret; nothing else does.
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## Automated tests
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- Unit tests for host/origin evaluation across loopback default, configured host,
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unconfigured host, forged forwarded headers, and trusted-proxy forwarded headers.
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- Integration tests: startup refusal without a secret, successful exchange, wrong
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secret, replay of an old session, cross-site request, and unauthenticated access to
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every route class.
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## Dependencies
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- US07-02
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