"""US07-02 black-box security tests: authorization and path boundaries.

Everything here talks to a real ``photo_pipeline serve`` child process over HTTP with
its own ``httpx.Client``, deliberately outside the session helper the rest of the
suite uses — an attacker does not get a bootstrapped client.

The threat is a page in the user's browser, not a remote attacker: the app listens on
127.0.0.1, so any site the user visits can send requests to it and can point an
``<img>`` at its media endpoints. Each journey below is one of those attempts.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import json
from contextlib import contextmanager
from pathlib import Path

import httpx
import pytest

from tests.e2e._pipeline_harness import Server, image, seed_library

TIMEOUT = 20
SENTINEL_KEY = "immich-sentinel-9f3a2b"
SESSION_COOKIE = "pp_session"
CSRF_HEADER = "X-CSRF-Token"

# A GET, a mutation, and a media endpoint: the three shapes the policy must cover.
PROTECTED = [
    ("GET", "/api/v1/workflow", None),
    ("POST", "/api/v1/albums/proposals", {}),
    ("GET", "/api/v1/assets/{asset}/thumbnail?size=256", None),
]


@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def stack(tmp_path_factory):
    """One server, one album of two photos, and a credential sentinel in its config."""
    tmp_path = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("security")
    seeded = seed_library(tmp_path, {"a": 1, "b": 2}, {"a": "sfw", "b": "sfw"})
    outside = tmp_path / "outside"
    outside.mkdir()
    image(outside / "secret.jpg", 99)
    server = Server(
        seeded,
        extra_env={
            "PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_API_KEY": SENTINEL_KEY,
            "PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_SERVER_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:1",
        },
    ).start()
    yield server, seeded, outside
    server.stop()


@contextmanager
def anonymous(server):
    with httpx.Client(base_url=server.base, timeout=TIMEOUT) as client:
        yield client


@contextmanager
def authenticated(server):
    """A browser that has loaded the app: session cookie in the jar, token in a header."""
    with httpx.Client(base_url=server.base, timeout=TIMEOUT) as client:
        client.headers[CSRF_HEADER] = client.get("/api/v1/session").json()["csrf_token"]
        yield client


def call(client, method, path, body, asset):
    return client.request(method, path.format(asset=asset), json=body)


def test_the_api_refuses_every_caller_without_a_session(stack):
    server, seeded, _ = stack
    with anonymous(server) as client:
        for method, path, body in PROTECTED:
            response = call(client, method, path, body, seeded.asset_ids["a"])
            assert response.status_code == 401, path
            assert response.json()["error"]["code"] == "unauthenticated"
        # Liveness and readiness stay open: an orchestrator holds no session.
        assert client.get("/api/v1/health/ready").status_code == 200
        assert client.get("/api/v1/health/live").status_code == 200


def test_a_guessed_session_cookie_is_refused(stack):
    server, _, _ = stack
    with anonymous(server) as client:
        client.cookies.set(SESSION_COOKIE, "guessed", domain="127.0.0.1")
        response = client.get("/api/v1/workflow")
        assert response.status_code == 401
        assert response.json()["error"]["code"] == "unauthenticated"


def test_the_bootstrap_issues_a_strict_httponly_cookie(stack):
    server, _, _ = stack
    with anonymous(server) as client:
        response = client.get("/api/v1/session")
        cookie = response.headers["set-cookie"].lower()
        assert "httponly" in cookie and "samesite=strict" in cookie and "path=/" in cookie
        assert response.json()["csrf_token"]
        # The token is in the body, which no other origin may read: no CORS header
        # grants access to it.
        assert "access-control-allow-origin" not in response.headers


def test_a_session_without_the_csrf_token_may_read_but_not_mutate(stack):
    server, _, _ = stack
    with authenticated(server) as client:
        del client.headers[CSRF_HEADER]
        assert client.get("/api/v1/albums/proposals").status_code == 200

        response = client.post("/api/v1/albums/proposals", json={})
        assert response.status_code == 403
        assert response.json()["error"]["code"] == "csrf_failed"

        response = client.post(
            "/api/v1/albums/proposals", json={}, headers={CSRF_HEADER: "guessed"}
        )
        assert response.status_code == 403
    # And nothing was created behind the refusal.
    with authenticated(server) as client:
        assert client.get("/api/v1/albums/proposals").json()["items"] == []


def test_a_foreign_origin_cannot_mutate_even_with_a_session(stack):
    server, _, _ = stack
    with authenticated(server) as client:
        for origin in ("http://evil.example", "http://127.0.0.1:1", "null"):
            response = client.post(
                "/api/v1/albums/proposals", json={}, headers={"Origin": origin}
            )
            assert response.status_code == 403, origin
            assert response.json()["error"]["code"] == "origin_not_allowed"
        # This app's own origin is accepted, so the check is not simply refusing all.
        allowed = client.post(
            "/api/v1/albums/proposals", json={}, headers={"Origin": server.base}
        )
        assert allowed.status_code == 200


def test_a_rebinding_host_is_refused(stack):
    """A name that resolves to 127.0.0.1 makes the browser treat the attacker's page
    as same-origin. The Host header still carries that name, so it is checked."""
    server, _, _ = stack
    with authenticated(server) as client:
        response = client.get("/api/v1/workflow", headers={"Host": "photos.evil.example"})
        assert response.status_code == 403
        assert response.json()["error"]["code"] == "host_not_allowed"


def test_media_cannot_be_embedded_by_another_page(stack):
    server, seeded, _ = stack
    url = f"/api/v1/assets/{seeded.asset_ids['a']}/thumbnail?size=256"
    with authenticated(server) as client:
        # What an <img> on another site produces: no Origin, but a cross-site marker.
        blocked = client.get(url, headers={"Sec-Fetch-Site": "cross-site"})
        assert blocked.status_code == 403
        assert blocked.json()["error"]["code"] == "cross_site_blocked"

        served = client.get(url, headers={"Sec-Fetch-Site": "same-origin"})
        assert served.status_code == 200
        assert served.headers["content-type"] == "image/webp"
        assert served.headers["cross-origin-resource-policy"] == "same-origin"
        # Photos must never land in a shared cache.
        assert served.headers["cache-control"].startswith("private")


def test_every_response_carries_the_default_headers_and_no_cors(stack):
    server, seeded, _ = stack
    with authenticated(server) as client:
        responses = [
            client.get("/api/v1/workflow"),
            client.get(f"/api/v1/assets/{seeded.asset_ids['a']}/thumbnail?size=256"),
            client.get("/app/"),
            client.get("/api/v1/does-not-exist"),
        ]
    for response in responses:
        assert response.headers["x-content-type-options"] == "nosniff"
        assert response.headers["x-frame-options"] == "DENY"
        assert response.headers["referrer-policy"] == "no-referrer"
        assert "frame-ancestors 'none'" in response.headers["content-security-policy"]
        assert "access-control-allow-origin" not in response.headers
        assert "access-control-allow-credentials" not in response.headers


def test_a_traversal_attempt_addresses_nothing(stack):
    """Identifiers are database keys, not paths: traversal has nowhere to land."""
    server, _, _ = stack
    with authenticated(server) as client:
        for path in (
            "/api/v1/albums/proposals/..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd",
            "/api/v1/albums/proposals/../../../etc/passwd",
            "/api/v1/assets/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd/thumbnail?size=256",
            "/api/v1/assets/%2Fetc%2Fpasswd/thumbnail?size=256",
        ):
            response = client.get(path)
            assert response.status_code in (404, 422), path
            assert "root:" not in response.text, path


def test_an_oversized_request_is_refused_before_it_is_parsed(stack):
    server, _, _ = stack
    with authenticated(server) as client:
        response = client.post(
            "/api/v1/albums/proposals",
            content=json.dumps({"albums": ["x" * 2_000_000]}),
            headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
        )
        assert response.status_code == 413
        assert response.json()["error"]["code"] == "payload_too_large"


def test_a_malformed_request_reports_the_field_and_nothing_else(stack):
    server, _, _ = stack
    with authenticated(server) as client:
        for content in ("{", '{"albums": 5}', ""):
            response = client.post(
                "/api/v1/albums/proposals",
                content=content,
                headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
            )
            assert response.status_code == 422, content
            error = response.json()["error"]
            assert error["code"] == "invalid_request"
            assert "Traceback" not in response.text and "photo_pipeline/" not in response.text


def test_errors_reveal_neither_the_credential_nor_an_internal(stack):
    """The API key is configured but must appear nowhere; failures additionally say
    nothing about where the library lives or how the server is built.

    Successful responses are a different matter: path previews are the point of the
    rename and archive views, and the operator is the one who owns those paths.
    """
    server, seeded, _ = stack
    with authenticated(server) as client:
        responses = [
            client.post("/api/v1/upload-preflight", json={}),
            client.get("/api/v1/workflow"),
            client.get("/api/v1/upload-batches"),
            client.get("/api/v1/assets/unknown-asset/thumbnail?size=256"),
            client.get("/api/v1/archive-plans/unknown-plan"),
            client.post("/api/v1/archive-locations", json={"name": "x", "root": "/nope"}),
            client.get("/api/v1/does-not-exist"),
        ]
    for response in responses:
        assert SENTINEL_KEY not in response.text
        assert "Traceback" not in response.text
        if response.status_code >= 400:
            assert str(seeded.lib) not in response.text
            assert "photo_pipeline/" not in response.text
            assert "sqlite" not in response.text.lower()


def test_a_symlink_swapped_under_an_asset_cannot_be_served(stack):
    """TOCTOU on the media path: the file the database points at is replaced by a
    link to something outside the library between the scan and the request."""
    server, seeded, outside = stack
    secret = outside / "secret.jpg"
    original = seeded.lib / "b.jpg"
    original.unlink()
    original.symlink_to(secret)

    with authenticated(server) as client:
        response = client.get(f"/api/v1/assets/{seeded.asset_ids['b']}/thumbnail?size=256")
    assert response.status_code == 403
    assert response.json()["error"]["code"] == "path_not_allowed"
    # The refusal names no filesystem location, and no bytes escaped with it.
    assert str(outside) not in response.text and str(seeded.lib) not in response.text
    assert secret.read_bytes()[:16] not in response.content


def test_the_frontend_shell_stays_reachable_without_a_session(stack):
    """It must load before any JavaScript can ask for a session."""
    server, _, _ = stack
    with anonymous(server) as client:
        response = client.get("/app/", headers={"Sec-Fetch-Site": "none"})
        assert response.status_code == 200
        assert response.headers["content-type"].startswith("text/html")
        assert Path("frontend/index.html").exists()