domverse
457dd5bd90
Ports the safety review and the Photo Analyzer Library/Analyze/Stats experiences onto the shared API + service layer, and adds the Workflow home, enforcing the pipeline gates and the one-mutating-job policy. Backend - migration 0005 + models: safety_reviews (append-only, latest row is the current decision) and analysis_results (donor photos schema re-keyed to asset_id). - SafetyService: persist scores/decisions, review queue with filters, and the EXIF safety checkpoint (mutually-exclusive sfw/nsfw keyword written, read back, current_sha256 refreshed) that upload eligibility depends on. - AnalysisService: the privacy gate — the vision provider is called ONLY for canonical, confirmed-SFW assets; nsfw/undecided are recorded skipped without a request. Provider is an injected adapter (real OpenAI-compatible Gemini call extracted from photo_analyzer.analyze_image; a fake in tests). - LibraryService: Library search + Stats read model ported from webapp/query.py (LIKE search in place of FTS5; facets, top tags, years, albums, people). - WorkflowService + GET /api/v1/workflow: per-stage readiness derived from the source tables — counts, blockers, last-run, action, and an active_job that drives read-only-during-jobs. Safety scoring and analysis run as durable jobs under the library_write lock via new domain handlers, so a second mutating job is refused. - routes: workflow, safety (queue/counts/decisions/jobs), analysis (counts/results/jobs), library (assets/facets/stats). Frontend - five views (frontend/js/views.js) on the US02-05 shell: Workflow stepper (status text+icon, not colour alone; actions disabled with a reason while a job runs), Safety review (filter tabs, decide, persists across reload), Library (search + cards), Analyze (counts + live job log via the SSE adapter), Stats. Shared DOM helpers extracted to dom.js; Workflow is the home route. Tests - integration: provider-call privacy (nsfw never reaches the provider), sfw→nsfw flip drops analysis eligibility, decision persistence, one-mutating- job rejection, workflow counts, and the exiftool safety-keyword write/verify. - e2e: Workflow cards, actions disabled+explained during a job, safety decide-persists-across-reload, Library search, Stats, Analyze counts. - traceability map updated for US02-05 and US02-06. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
37 lines
1.3 KiB
Python
37 lines
1.3 KiB
Python
"""Domain job handlers: safety scoring and content analysis (US02-06).
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Importing this module registers the ``safety_score`` and ``analysis`` job types so
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the generic worker can run them per item (one item = one ``asset_id``). Each handler
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delegates to its service, which owns the real work and the privacy gate. Handlers
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are idempotent: re-scoring or re-analyzing one asset is safe after an interrupted
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attempt.
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Providers/models are the service defaults here (real NsfwModel / vision provider);
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tests exercise the services directly with injected fakes rather than the worker.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from photo_pipeline.jobs.handlers import JobContext, register
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SAFETY_SCORE = "safety_score"
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ANALYSIS = "analysis"
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# Both mutate the library's metadata/derived state; one at a time (concept §one job).
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LIBRARY_WRITE_LOCK = "library_write"
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def _safety_score_item(asset_id: str, ctx: JobContext) -> None:
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from photo_pipeline.services.safety import SafetyService
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SafetyService(ctx.session_factory).score_assets([asset_id])
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def _analysis_item(asset_id: str, ctx: JobContext) -> None:
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from photo_pipeline.services.analysis import AnalysisService
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AnalysisService(ctx.session_factory).run([asset_id])
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register(SAFETY_SCORE, _safety_score_item)
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register(ANALYSIS, _analysis_item)
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