Ports the safety review and the Photo Analyzer Library/Analyze/Stats experiences onto the shared API + service layer, and adds the Workflow home, enforcing the pipeline gates and the one-mutating-job policy. Backend - migration 0005 + models: safety_reviews (append-only, latest row is the current decision) and analysis_results (donor photos schema re-keyed to asset_id). - SafetyService: persist scores/decisions, review queue with filters, and the EXIF safety checkpoint (mutually-exclusive sfw/nsfw keyword written, read back, current_sha256 refreshed) that upload eligibility depends on. - AnalysisService: the privacy gate — the vision provider is called ONLY for canonical, confirmed-SFW assets; nsfw/undecided are recorded skipped without a request. Provider is an injected adapter (real OpenAI-compatible Gemini call extracted from photo_analyzer.analyze_image; a fake in tests). - LibraryService: Library search + Stats read model ported from webapp/query.py (LIKE search in place of FTS5; facets, top tags, years, albums, people). - WorkflowService + GET /api/v1/workflow: per-stage readiness derived from the source tables — counts, blockers, last-run, action, and an active_job that drives read-only-during-jobs. Safety scoring and analysis run as durable jobs under the library_write lock via new domain handlers, so a second mutating job is refused. - routes: workflow, safety (queue/counts/decisions/jobs), analysis (counts/results/jobs), library (assets/facets/stats). Frontend - five views (frontend/js/views.js) on the US02-05 shell: Workflow stepper (status text+icon, not colour alone; actions disabled with a reason while a job runs), Safety review (filter tabs, decide, persists across reload), Library (search + cards), Analyze (counts + live job log via the SSE adapter), Stats. Shared DOM helpers extracted to dom.js; Workflow is the home route. Tests - integration: provider-call privacy (nsfw never reaches the provider), sfw→nsfw flip drops analysis eligibility, decision persistence, one-mutating- job rejection, workflow counts, and the exiftool safety-keyword write/verify. - e2e: Workflow cards, actions disabled+explained during a job, safety decide-persists-across-reload, Library search, Stats, Analyze counts. - traceability map updated for US02-05 and US02-06. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
51 lines
1.7 KiB
Python
51 lines
1.7 KiB
Python
"""Content-analysis API: results, counts, and the analysis job.
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The privacy gate lives in AnalysisService: enqueuing only ever targets confirmed-SFW
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assets, and the handler re-checks the gate per item, so an NSFW asset can never reach
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the provider even if its decision changes between enqueue and run.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
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from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
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from photo_pipeline.jobs.domain_handlers import ANALYSIS, LIBRARY_WRITE_LOCK
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from photo_pipeline.services.analysis import AnalysisService
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from photo_pipeline.services.jobs import JobBlocked, JobService
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router = APIRouter(tags=["analysis"])
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def _service(request: Request) -> AnalysisService:
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return AnalysisService(request.app.state.session_factory)
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def _error(status: int, code: str, message: str) -> JSONResponse:
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return JSONResponse(status_code=status, content={"error": {"code": code, "message": message}})
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@router.get("/analysis/counts")
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def counts(request: Request) -> dict:
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return _service(request).counts()
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@router.get("/analysis/results/{asset_id}")
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def result(asset_id: str, request: Request):
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data = _service(request).get(asset_id)
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if data is None:
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return _error(404, "not_found", f"no analysis for {asset_id}")
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return data
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@router.post("/analysis/jobs")
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def enqueue_analysis(request: Request):
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ids = _service(request).eligible_asset_ids()
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if not ids:
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return _error(409, "nothing_eligible", "no confirmed-SFW assets ready for analysis")
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jobs = JobService(request.app.state.session_factory)
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try:
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return jobs.enqueue(ANALYSIS, lock=LIBRARY_WRITE_LOCK, items=ids)
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except JobBlocked as error:
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return _error(409, error.code, str(error))
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