US08-03: Compose the Runtime and Mount the Library Safely (#98)

This commit was merged in pull request #98.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-19 19:47:42 +02:00
parent 888d859e93
commit 1632544132
10 changed files with 1007 additions and 30 deletions

85
.env.example Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
# Every setting the application and its composition read, with no values in it.
# Copy to `.env`, fill in what you need, and keep that copy out of git (it is
# gitignored, and the work-item safety checks refuse to stage it).
#
# cp .env.example .env
#
# Empty means "use the default noted beside it". Anything already exported in the
# shell wins over this file, both for the app and for `docker compose`.
# ── the composition (host side; read by docker-compose.yml only) ─────────────
# The photo library on this host. Bind-mounted at PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_HOST_PATH=
# Which image to run. Default: photo-pipeline:dev (what `up --build` builds).
PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMAGE=
# Must be the owner of the library above: what the containers rename and rewrite
# keeps this ownership. Default: 1000 / 1000.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_UID=
PHOTO_PIPELINE_GID=
# Host address the API port is published on. Default: 127.0.0.1. Anything else
# exposes the app beyond this machine — then ALLOWED_HOSTS and ACCESS_SECRET below
# are what stand in for the loopback boundary (US08-01).
PHOTO_PIPELINE_PUBLISH_ADDRESS=
# This file's own path, if it is not ./.env. Default: .env.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_ENV_FILE=
# ── library and data ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# os.pathsep-separated. In a container these are the *container-side* mount paths,
# and `serve`/`worker` refuse to start when they are not mounted.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS=
# Database, WAL, thumbnail cache, journals, backups. Default: data (the container
# sets /data, which is the persistent volume; a network mount is unsupported).
PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR=
# Database file, if it should not live in the data directory. Default:
# <data dir>/photo_pipeline.db.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_DB_PATH=
# ── serving ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Bind address. Default: 127.0.0.1. The composition sets 0.0.0.0 inside the
# container and publishes to loopback on the host instead.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_HOST=
# Under the composition this is the *published* host port; the container serves
# 8000. Default: 8000.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT=
# Comma-separated hostnames the app answers to besides loopback. Empty means
# loopback only. Naming one makes the access secret mandatory.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_ALLOWED_HOSTS=
# Traded for the session cookie at GET /api/v1/session via X-Access-Secret.
# Required as soon as the app is reachable from anywhere but loopback. Generate
# one with: python -c 'import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(32))'
PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET=
# Comma-separated peer addresses whose X-Forwarded-Proto/-Host may be believed.
# Only the reverse proxy's address belongs here. Default: none.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_TRUSTED_PROXIES=
# Largest request body accepted, in bytes. Default: 1048576.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES=
# ── logging ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Default: INFO.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_LOG_LEVEL=
# json or text. Default: json.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_LOG_FORMAT=
# ── limits ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Thumbnail cache quota in bytes. Default: 500000000.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_THUMBNAIL_CACHE_QUOTA_BYTES=
# Refuse to decode images larger than this many pixels. Default: 100000000.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_THUMBNAIL_MAX_PIXELS=
# Free space an archive destination must keep beyond the transfer. Default:
# 1000000000.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_ARCHIVE_FREE_SPACE_RESERVE_BYTES=
# ── safety gate ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# true refuses every mutating request until a read-only dry run of this library has
# been produced and approved (US07-07). Default: false. Turn it on before pointing
# the app at photos that cannot be replaced.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_REQUIRE_DRY_RUN_APPROVAL=
# ── external services ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Vision provider key for the analysis stage. Without it, analysis cannot run.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_VISION_API_KEY=
# Immich server and its API key, for the upload stage.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_SERVER_URL=
PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_API_KEY=
# Uploader binary. Default: immich-go (on PATH; pinned inside the image).
PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_GO_BINARY=

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@@ -143,8 +143,56 @@ thumbnail cache. Binding to `0.0.0.0` makes the access secret mandatory
without it. The declared `HEALTHCHECK` polls `/api/v1/health/ready`, so a container
whose database is unmigrated or misconfigured is never reported healthy.
Composing the runtime and mounting the library is US08-03; publishing and deploying
the image is US08-04.
## Composed runtime (US08-03)
`docker-compose.yml` is the deployment: one `serve` container, one `worker`
container, one bind-mounted library, one data volume, and a one-shot `migrate` that
both roles wait for.
```bash
cp .env.example .env && $EDITOR .env # nothing has a value in it; fill in yours
docker compose up -d --build
```
`.env.example` lists every `PHOTO_PIPELINE_*` variable with its default in a comment
and no values at all. The three the composition cannot start without are
`PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_HOST_PATH` (the library on this host),
`PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS` (where it is mounted *inside* the container), and
`PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET` — publishing the port means the app is reachable from
outside the container, so US08-01 makes the secret mandatory. Set
`PHOTO_PIPELINE_UID`/`GID` to the owner of the library: what the containers rename
and rewrite keeps that ownership.
| invariant | how the composition keeps it |
|---|---|
| one writer | `serve` and `worker` take their role's library lock (US07-05) in the shared `/data` volume, so `--scale worker=2` is refused by the lock, not by convention |
| migrations first | `migrate` runs the backup-then-migrate path and must exit 0 before `api` and `worker` start; a failed upgrade leaves the previous database and its pre-migration backup intact |
| container paths | `PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS` is both the mount target and the configured root; a root that is not mounted makes `serve`/`worker` exit 5 at startup instead of writing into the container's throwaway layer |
| loopback by default | the port is published to `127.0.0.1` unless `PHOTO_PIPELINE_PUBLISH_ADDRESS` says otherwise, and exposing it needs the hostname in `PHOTO_PIPELINE_ALLOWED_HOSTS` plus the access secret |
| restart safety | both roles are `restart: unless-stopped` with a 30 s stop grace period, and a job interrupted by a restart resumes exactly as it does on a host restart |
The `data` volume holds the database, its write-ahead log, the thumbnail cache,
journals, and backups. **It must stay on a local filesystem** — SQLite in WAL mode
needs real local locking, so NFS, SMB, and network volume drivers are unsupported
there and corrupt the database rather than slow it down. The library bind mount has
no such restriction.
Operating the deployment is operating the same CLI:
```bash
docker compose run --rm --no-deps api diagnostics
docker compose run --rm --no-deps api backup --reason pre-upgrade
docker compose run --rm --no-deps api verify-backup /data/backups/<name>
docker compose run --rm --no-deps api restore /data/backups/<name> --into /data/restored
docker compose logs -f worker
```
`--no-deps` keeps a one-off command from starting a second stack; `api` is only the
service the command borrows the image and mounts from. `restore` is deliberately not
an API call: it replaces the state of an installation and belongs to a stopped one,
so stop `api` and `worker` first and restart them against the restored directory.
Publishing and deploying the image is US08-04.
## Testing

105
docker-compose.yml Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
# The deployed runtime (US08-03): one API, one worker, one library, one volume.
#
# The same image (US08-02) runs both roles, so what is composed here is process
# topology, not a second application. Three invariants shape it:
#
# * one writer — `serve` and `worker` each take the library process lock for their
# role (US07-05), and both containers mount the *same* data volume, which is what
# makes the lock file visible to both. Scaling `worker` past 1 is refused by that
# lock rather than by anyone remembering not to;
# * one local filesystem — the database, its write-ahead log, the thumbnail cache,
# and the backups live in the `data` volume, and SQLite in WAL mode requires real
# local-filesystem locking. A network mount (NFS, SMB, or a cloud volume driver)
# is unsupported for it; that is a corrupted database, not a slow one;
# * one library path vocabulary — `PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS` names the path
# *inside* the container, which is also the bind mount's target below. A root
# that is not mounted there makes `serve` and `worker` refuse at startup instead
# of writing into the container's throwaway layer.
#
# Configuration and secrets come from the environment only: copy `.env.example` to
# `.env` and fill it in. Nothing is baked into the image and nothing with a value in
# it is committed.
#
# cp .env.example .env && $EDITOR .env
# docker compose up -d --build
#
# Operating it is operating the same CLI — `docker compose run --rm --no-deps api
# <command>` — see README, "Composed runtime".
name: photo-pipeline
x-runtime: &runtime
image: ${PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMAGE:-photo-pipeline:dev}
build:
context: .
args:
# Everything the app renames or rewrites has to stay owned by the host user
# the library already belongs to.
UID: ${PHOTO_PIPELINE_UID:-1000}
GID: ${PHOTO_PIPELINE_GID:-1000}
user: "${PHOTO_PIPELINE_UID:-1000}:${PHOTO_PIPELINE_GID:-1000}"
env_file:
- ${PHOTO_PIPELINE_ENV_FILE:-.env}
volumes:
- data:/data
- "${PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_HOST_PATH:?set PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_HOST_PATH to the photo library on this host}:${PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS:?set PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS to the container-side library path}"
# Jobs check for cancellation between items and leave a resumable record; a
# too-short grace period turns an orderly stop into a recovery on next start.
stop_grace_period: 30s
x-environment: &environment
# Set here rather than left to the file: these two are what the composition itself
# promises, and an `.env` that disagreed would move the database off the volume or
# the library off its mount.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR: /data
PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS: ${PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS}
services:
# Migrations run to completion before either role accepts work, through the same
# backup-then-migrate path the roles use (US07-05): a pending upgrade is snapshotted
# first, and a failed one exits non-zero with the backup named — so `api` and
# `worker` never start, and the previous database is left intact and restorable.
migrate:
<<: *runtime
command: ["migrate"]
environment: *environment
restart: "no"
api:
<<: *runtime
command: ["serve"]
environment:
<<: *environment
# Published to host loopback below. Inside the container the server must bind
# the container's own interface for that publish to reach it, which is exactly
# what makes the access secret mandatory (US08-01) — `serve` refuses to start
# without one. Exposing the port beyond loopback additionally needs
# PHOTO_PIPELINE_ALLOWED_HOSTS to name the hostname it is reached under.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_HOST: 0.0.0.0
PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT: 8000
ports:
# Host side only: PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT in `.env` moves the *published* port, and
# the container always serves 8000, which is what the image's health check probes.
- "${PHOTO_PIPELINE_PUBLISH_ADDRESS:-127.0.0.1}:${PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT:-8000}:8000"
depends_on:
migrate:
condition: service_completed_successfully
restart: unless-stopped
# One worker. A second one is refused by the library lock in the shared data
# volume, which is the point: `docker compose up --scale worker=2` fails loudly
# instead of running two writers against one library.
worker:
<<: *runtime
command: ["worker", "--id", "worker-1"]
environment: *environment
depends_on:
migrate:
condition: service_completed_successfully
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
# Local driver on purpose: the database, WAL, thumbnail cache, and backups need a
# real local filesystem. Do not point this at NFS, SMB, or a network volume driver.
data:
driver: local

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@@ -11,9 +11,11 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Sequence
from photo_pipeline import path_policy
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.services.app_lock import LegacyProcessActive, LibraryLock, LockHeld
from photo_pipeline.services.backup import BackupError, BackupService, migrate_with_backup
@@ -83,6 +85,18 @@ def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int:
config = Config.from_env()
config.database_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
# In a container the two roles that touch the library check their boundary before
# they take a lock or bind a port: the configured roots must name the mount paths,
# and a mismatch is cheaper to refuse than to discover at the first write (US08-03).
# Only in a container — on a host an unmounted root is an ordinary Tuesday (an
# archive medium that is not plugged in), and refusing to serve would take the
# offline half of the library away with it.
if args.command in ("serve", "worker") and path_policy.in_container():
refusal = path_policy.roots_refusal(config.library_roots, require_mount=True)
if refusal is not None:
print(refusal, file=sys.stderr)
return 5
if args.command == "migrate":
manifest = migrate_with_backup(config)
if manifest:
@@ -209,8 +223,6 @@ def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int:
lock.release()
return 0
import sys
import uvicorn
from photo_pipeline.api.app import ConfigurationRefused, create_app
@@ -238,8 +250,6 @@ def _acquire(lock: LibraryLock, *, allow_legacy: bool) -> int | None:
Returns an exit code to return, or ``None`` when the lock was acquired.
"""
import sys
try:
lock.acquire(allow_legacy=allow_legacy)
except LockHeld as error:

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@@ -15,9 +15,7 @@ import os
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Iterable, Iterator
SUPPORTED_EXTENSIONS = {
".jpg", ".jpeg", ".png", ".webp", ".heic", ".heif", ".tiff", ".tif"
}
SUPPORTED_EXTENSIONS = {".jpg", ".jpeg", ".png", ".webp", ".heic", ".heif", ".tiff", ".tif"}
EXCLUDED_DIR_NAMES = {"_IGNORE", ".@__thumb"}
@@ -72,6 +70,63 @@ def resolve_in_roots(roots: Iterable[os.PathLike | str], path: os.PathLike | str
raise PathPolicyError("path is outside the configured library roots")
def in_container() -> bool:
"""Whether this process is running inside a container image build of the app."""
return Path("/.dockerenv").exists()
def _under_mount(path: Path) -> bool:
"""Whether ``path`` or one of its parents below ``/`` is a mounted filesystem."""
current = path.resolve()
while current != current.parent:
if os.path.ismount(current):
return True
current = current.parent
return False
def roots_refusal(roots: Iterable[os.PathLike | str], *, require_mount: bool = False) -> str | None:
"""Why the configured library roots cannot be worked with, or ``None`` (US08-03).
The roots name the directories this installation renames folders in, rewrites
EXIF in, and archives from. Container path policy is the same problem as host
path policy with one new failure mode: the configured roots must name the
*container-side* mount paths. A host path configured inside a container is
either absent or an ordinary directory of the image, so the library looks empty
and the first write lands in the container's throwaway layer instead of in the
library. That is worth refusing at startup, while an operator is still watching,
rather than at the first write.
``require_mount`` is the container-only half of that: inside a container a real
library arrives through a bind mount, so a root that is not on (or under) a
mount point is not the library the deployment meant.
Writability is deliberately *not* checked: a bind mount's ownership is
virtualised by Docker Desktop and Colima (it arrives as ``root:root``), so
``os.access`` there is evidence about the virtio layer rather than about the
library. A wrong UID/GID surfaces as a refused rename with the real errno, which
is at least true; a refusal here would be false on two supported platforms.
"""
for root in roots:
path = Path(root)
if not path.exists():
return (
f"library root {path} does not exist: PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS must "
"name paths that exist here, and in a container that means the mount path"
)
if not path.is_dir():
return f"library root {path} is not a directory"
if not os.access(path, os.R_OK | os.X_OK):
return f"library root {path} is not readable by this process"
if require_mount and not _under_mount(path):
return (
f"library root {path} is not on a mounted filesystem in this container: "
"the library was not bind-mounted there, so PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS "
"names a directory of the image rather than the library"
)
return None
def iter_supported_files(root: os.PathLike | str) -> Iterator[Path]:
"""Yield supported, non-excluded files under ``root`` in deterministic order.

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@@ -15,9 +15,17 @@ package:
"started_at": "...", "library_roots": ["..."]}
One holder per role: an API and a worker are designed to run together, a second
worker is not. A lock whose process is gone is stale and is taken over with the
takeover recorded — refusing to start because of a crashed predecessor would turn
one outage into two.
worker is not. A lock whose process is gone is stale and is taken over — refusing
to start because of a crashed predecessor would turn one outage into two.
Ownership is an advisory ``flock`` on that file, not the record inside it. The
record says *who*; the kernel says *whether*. That distinction is what makes the
lock work in containers (US08-03), where a PID and a hostname are namespaced: a
lock left behind by a container that no longer exists names a pid that still
"exists" in the new container and a host that cannot be probed, so believing the
file would deadlock every restart. A flock is released when its holder dies however
it dies, and is seen by every process that can open the file — which for a local
data directory is every container of this deployment.
Legacy detection is deliberately a heuristic, not a promise: the archived CLI has
no lock of its own, so what can be observed is its state files being written right
@@ -27,6 +35,7 @@ mutating stage should refuse until it stops.
from __future__ import annotations
import fcntl
import json
import os
import socket
@@ -109,6 +118,12 @@ def _now() -> datetime:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
def _in_container() -> bool:
from photo_pipeline import path_policy
return path_policy.in_container()
def legacy_activity(config: Config) -> dict:
"""Legacy state files written within the activity window, if any."""
seen: list[dict] = []
@@ -139,6 +154,7 @@ class LibraryLock:
self.role = role
self.path = Path(config.data_dir) / f"{role}{LOCK_SUFFIX}"
self._acquired = False
self._handle = None
# ── inspection ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -178,12 +194,31 @@ class LibraryLock:
"stop it before running the application"
)
self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
# The kernel decides, because the file cannot: a container's PID and hostname
# are namespaced, so a lock left by a container that no longer exists names a
# pid that "exists" and a host that cannot be probed (US08-03). An advisory
# flock is held by a live process or by nobody, is released when that process
# dies however it dies, and is shared by every process that can open this
# file — which, for a local data directory, is every role in every container
# of this deployment.
handle = open(self.path, "a+", encoding="utf-8")
try:
fcntl.flock(handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB)
except OSError:
handle.close()
raise LockHeld(self.holder() or Holder(self.role, -1, "unknown", "unknown")) from None
current = self.holder()
if current is not None:
if current.alive:
raise LockHeld(current)
# Stale: its process is gone. Take over, and say so.
self.path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
if current is not None and current.host != socket.gethostname() and not _in_container():
# We hold the kernel's lock, so nothing on *this* machine holds the file.
# On a host that still leaves one case open: a data directory shared with
# another machine, whose flock we cannot trust. Believe its record rather
# than run two writers. In a container the data volume is local by
# construction (US08-03), and a foreign hostname is only a dead container.
fcntl.flock(handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
handle.close()
raise LockHeld(current)
mine = Holder(
role=self.role,
@@ -192,15 +227,14 @@ class LibraryLock:
started_at=_now().isoformat(),
library_roots=tuple(str(root) for root in self._config.library_roots),
)
self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
payload = {k: v for k, v in mine.as_dict().items() if k != "alive"}
# Exclusive create, so two processes racing here cannot both believe they won.
try:
with open(self.path, "x", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
json.dump(payload, handle, indent=2)
except FileExistsError:
winner = self.holder()
raise LockHeld(winner or mine) from None
handle.seek(0)
handle.truncate()
json.dump(payload, handle, indent=2)
handle.flush()
# Held open on purpose: closing it is what releases the lock, and that must
# happen when this process ends, not when this method returns.
self._handle = handle
self._acquired = True
return mine
@@ -208,9 +242,10 @@ class LibraryLock:
"""Give up a lock this process owns. Another holder's lock is left alone."""
if not self._acquired:
return
current = self.holder()
if current is not None and current.pid == os.getpid():
self.path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
self.path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
if self._handle is not None:
self._handle.close() # closing the descriptor releases the kernel lock
self._handle = None
self._acquired = False
def __enter__(self) -> "LibraryLock":

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@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ markers = [
"phase_d: Phase D end-to-end acceptance (US04-06) — guarded rename API, fault, and browser journeys",
"phase_e: Phase E end-to-end acceptance (US05-06) — upload preflight, uploader, and browser journeys",
"phase_f: Phase F end-to-end acceptance (US06-06) — archive destination, transfer, and restore journeys",
"container: builds and runs the container image (US08-02) — needs a Docker daemon and network",
"container: builds and runs the container image and its composition (US08-02, US08-03) — needs a Docker daemon, the compose plugin, and the network",
]

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@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
"""US08-03: the composition, actually composed.
Nothing here is faked below the process boundary: Docker builds the image, Compose
starts the migrate/API/worker containers against a temporary fixture library on a
real bind mount, and every assertion is made over HTTP or against what the stack
left in its data volume. The vision provider is the deterministic fake seam the
other end-to-end suites use, because an upload of real photos to a real model is not
what this story is about — the mount, the lock, the volume, and the restart are.
The file contract (one API, one worker, migrations first, no committed values) is
checked without a daemon in ``tests/integration/test_compose_runtime.py``; only the
running proof needs Docker, and CI is where it runs unskipped (US08-04).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import shutil
import socket
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import time
from pathlib import Path
import httpx
import pytest
from PIL import Image
REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
PROJECT = "photo-pipeline-us0803"
IMAGE = "photo-pipeline-test:us08-03"
SECRET = "compose-acceptance-secret"
CONTAINER_LIBRARY = "/library"
READY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 180
JOB_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 180
UP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30 * 60
pytestmark = pytest.mark.container
def compose_available() -> bool:
try:
return (
subprocess.run(
["docker", "compose", "version"], capture_output=True, timeout=60
).returncode
== 0
)
except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
return False
needs_compose = pytest.mark.skipif(
not compose_available(), reason="no Docker daemon with the compose plugin"
)
def free_port() -> int:
with socket.socket() as sock:
sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
return sock.getsockname()[1]
class Stack:
"""The composition under test, plus the environment it was started with."""
def __init__(self, library: Path, env_file: Path) -> None:
self.library = library
self.port = free_port()
self.base = f"http://127.0.0.1:{self.port}"
# Compose reads the repository's own .env for substitution; the process
# environment wins over it, so the test's values are the ones that apply.
self.env = {
**os.environ,
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMAGE": IMAGE,
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_ENV_FILE": str(env_file),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_HOST_PATH": str(library),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": CONTAINER_LIBRARY,
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT": str(self.port),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_UID": str(os.getuid()),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_GID": str(os.getgid()),
}
def compose(self, *args: str, check: bool = True, timeout: int = 300):
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "compose", "-p", PROJECT, "-f", str(REPO / "docker-compose.yml"), *args],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
env=self.env,
cwd=REPO,
timeout=timeout,
)
if check and result.returncode != 0:
raise AssertionError(
f"docker compose {' '.join(args)} failed:\n{result.stdout}\n{result.stderr}\n"
f"{self.compose('logs', '--tail', '80', check=False).stdout}"
)
return result
def wait_until_ready(self) -> None:
deadline = time.monotonic() + READY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
try:
if httpx.get(f"{self.base}/api/v1/health/ready", timeout=5).status_code == 200:
return
except httpx.HTTPError:
pass
time.sleep(0.5)
logs = self.compose("logs", "--tail", "120", check=False)
raise AssertionError(f"the stack never became ready:\n{logs.stdout}\n{logs.stderr}")
def client(self) -> httpx.Client:
client = httpx.Client(base_url=f"{self.base}/api/v1", timeout=60)
bootstrap = client.get("/session", headers={"X-Access-Secret": SECRET})
assert bootstrap.status_code == 200, bootstrap.text
client.headers["X-CSRF-Token"] = bootstrap.json()["csrf_token"]
return client
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def library() -> Path:
"""A small fixture library on the host, mounted into both containers.
Not under pytest's ``tmp_path``: on macOS that is ``/var/folders/...``, which a
Docker VM (Colima, Docker Desktop) does not share, so the bind mount would arrive
empty and every assertion below would be about nothing. ``$HOME`` is shared by
every default configuration.
"""
base = Path(
os.environ.get("PHOTO_PIPELINE_TEST_MOUNT_BASE", Path.home() / ".cache" / "photo-pipeline")
)
base.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="library-", dir=base))
for album, count in (("01_day", 2), ("02_night", 1)):
(root / album).mkdir()
for index in range(count):
colour = (40 * (index + 1), 90, 160)
Image.new("RGB", (64, 48), colour).save(root / album / f"{album}_{index}.jpg")
# The exclusion sentinel: it must never be discovered, counted, or analyzed.
(root / "_IGNORE").mkdir()
Image.new("RGB", (32, 32), (0, 0, 0)).save(root / "_IGNORE" / "sentinel.jpg")
try:
yield root
finally:
shutil.rmtree(root, ignore_errors=True)
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def env_file(tmp_path_factory) -> Path:
"""Configuration and secrets come from the environment, so the test writes its
own file rather than borrowing the operator's."""
path = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("config") / "compose.env"
path.write_text(
"\n".join(
[
f"PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET={SECRET}",
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LOG_FORMAT=text",
# The deterministic vision seam, in the data volume so both roles and
# the test can see it (concept §18).
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAKE_VISION_LOG=/data/vision.log",
]
)
+ "\n"
)
return path
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def stack(library, env_file):
if not compose_available():
pytest.skip("no Docker daemon with the compose plugin")
running = Stack(library, env_file)
running.compose("down", "--volumes", "--remove-orphans", check=False)
running.compose("up", "--detach", "--build", timeout=UP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
try:
running.wait_until_ready()
yield running
finally:
running.compose("down", "--volumes", "--remove-orphans", check=False, timeout=300)
def await_job(client: httpx.Client, job_id: str, states=("succeeded",)) -> dict:
deadline = time.monotonic() + JOB_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
snapshot: dict = {}
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
response = client.get(f"/jobs/{job_id}")
if response.status_code == 200:
snapshot = response.json()
if snapshot["state"] in states:
return snapshot
time.sleep(0.5)
raise AssertionError(f"job {job_id} never reached {states}: {snapshot}")
# ── the mounted library ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@needs_compose
def test_the_stack_scans_the_bind_mounted_library_at_its_container_paths(stack):
client = stack.client()
try:
scanned = client.post("/inventory/scan")
assert scanned.status_code == 200, scanned.text
assets = client.get("/inventory/assets", params={"limit": 200}).json()["items"]
finally:
client.close()
assert len(assets) == 3, assets
paths = {asset["current_path"] for asset in assets}
assert all(path.startswith(CONTAINER_LIBRARY + "/") for path in paths), paths
assert not any("_IGNORE" in path or "sentinel" in path for path in paths)
# The host paths are what the operator mounted, and they are not what the
# application records: the roots are the container's.
assert not any(str(stack.library) in path for path in paths)
@needs_compose
def test_a_library_root_that_is_not_mounted_is_refused_at_startup(stack):
"""The container-specific failure: configured roots that name nothing mounted."""
refused = stack.compose(
"run",
"--rm",
"--no-deps",
"--env",
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS=/srv/photos",
"api",
"serve",
check=False,
)
assert refused.returncode == 5, refused.stdout + refused.stderr
assert "library root /srv/photos" in refused.stdout + refused.stderr
@needs_compose
def test_a_second_worker_is_refused_by_the_library_lock(stack):
"""Not by convention: the running worker's lock is in the shared data volume."""
refused = stack.compose(
"run", "--rm", "--no-deps", "worker", "worker", "--id", "worker-2", check=False
)
assert refused.returncode == 2, refused.stdout + refused.stderr
assert "worker is already running" in refused.stdout + refused.stderr
# ── restart, resume, and the data volume ─────────────────────────────────────
@needs_compose
def test_a_queued_job_resumes_after_both_containers_restart(stack):
client = stack.client()
try:
client.post("/inventory/scan").raise_for_status()
assets = client.get("/inventory/assets", params={"limit": 200}).json()["items"]
for asset in assets:
decided = client.post(
"/safety/decisions", json={"asset_id": asset["id"], "decision": "sfw"}
)
assert decided.status_code == 200, decided.text
# Stop the worker first, so the job is provably still queued when the restart
# happens: a job that finished before the restart would prove nothing.
stack.compose("stop", "worker")
job = client.post("/analysis/jobs").json()
assert client.get(f"/jobs/{job['id']}").json()["state"] == "queued"
finally:
client.close()
stack.compose("restart", "api", "worker")
stack.wait_until_ready()
client = stack.client() # the session is per API process, so it is re-bootstrapped
try:
finished = await_job(client, job["id"])
assert finished["state"] == "succeeded", finished
# The database is intact and the work is durable, not merely reported.
after = client.get("/inventory/assets", params={"limit": 200}).json()["items"]
assert {asset["id"] for asset in after} == {asset["id"] for asset in assets}
analysed = client.get(f"/analysis/results/{assets[0]['id']}")
assert analysed.status_code == 200, analysed.text
assert analysed.json()["description"]
# Only the mounted library's own photos were analysed: the sentinel under
# _IGNORE is not an asset, so it can never have become an item of this job.
assert finished["progress"]["total"] == len(assets)
finally:
client.close()
@needs_compose
def test_the_data_volume_survives_recreating_the_containers(stack):
"""`down` without `--volumes` then `up` is the upgrade path: state stays."""
client = stack.client()
try:
client.post("/inventory/scan").raise_for_status()
before = {a["id"] for a in client.get("/inventory/assets").json()["items"]}
finally:
client.close()
stack.compose("down", "--remove-orphans", timeout=300)
stack.compose("up", "--detach", timeout=UP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
stack.wait_until_ready()
client = stack.client()
try:
after = {a["id"] for a in client.get("/inventory/assets").json()["items"]}
finally:
client.close()
assert after == before, "the same assets, from the same database, on the same volume"
# ── operating it ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@needs_compose
def test_backup_verify_and_diagnostics_run_as_container_commands(stack):
backup = stack.compose("run", "--rm", "--no-deps", "api", "backup", "--reason", "compose")
manifest = json.loads(backup.stdout[backup.stdout.index("{") :])
assert manifest["name"].startswith("2")
verified = stack.compose(
"run", "--rm", "--no-deps", "api", "verify-backup", f"/data/backups/{manifest['name']}"
)
assert json.loads(verified.stdout[verified.stdout.index("{") :])["ok"] is True
report = stack.compose("run", "--rm", "--no-deps", "api", "diagnostics")
diagnostics = json.loads(report.stdout[report.stdout.index("{") :])
components = {c["name"]: c["path"] for c in diagnostics["components"]}
# Database, WAL, thumbnail cache, and backups all live in the mounted volume.
for name in ("database", "write_ahead_log", "thumbnail_cache", "backups"):
assert components[name].startswith("/data/"), (name, components[name])
assert {tool["name"] for tool in diagnostics["tools"]} >= {"exiftool", "immich-go"}
# And the worker running beside this command is visible as the lock's holder.
assert diagnostics["locks"]["worker"]["role"] == "worker"
if __name__ == "__main__": # a quick way to run just this file
raise SystemExit(pytest.main([__file__, "-v", *sys.argv[1:]]))

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
"""US08-03: the composition's contract, and the library-root check it depends on.
Bringing the stack up needs a Docker daemon and the network, which is what
``tests/e2e/test_compose_stack.py`` does. What can be checked without either is
checked here, because the parts that rot silently — a second writer that is only
prevented by convention, a data volume that stopped being the same volume for both
roles, migrations that stopped running first, a committed value in a file that must
carry none — are all readable from the files.
The startup refusal is the other half: in a container the configured library roots
must name the mount paths, and a mismatch has to fail before the lock is taken, not
at the first rename.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import re
import stat
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
import yaml
from photo_pipeline import path_policy
from photo_pipeline.__main__ import main
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
COMPOSE_FILE = REPO / "docker-compose.yml"
COMPOSE = yaml.safe_load(COMPOSE_FILE.read_text())
ENV_EXAMPLE = REPO / ".env.example"
SERVICES = COMPOSE["services"]
DATA_VOLUME = "data:/data"
def env_example_keys() -> list[str]:
"""The variables the example file declares, in file order."""
return [
line.split("=", 1)[0]
for line in ENV_EXAMPLE.read_text().splitlines()
if "=" in line and not line.lstrip().startswith("#")
]
# ── one API, one worker, one library, one volume ─────────────────────────────
def test_exactly_one_serving_and_one_working_container_from_the_same_image():
roles = {name: service["command"][0] for name, service in SERVICES.items()}
assert sorted(roles.values()) == ["migrate", "serve", "worker"]
assert [name for name, role in roles.items() if role == "serve"] == ["api"]
assert [name for name, role in roles.items() if role == "worker"] == ["worker"]
images = {service["image"] for service in SERVICES.values()}
assert len(images) == 1, "both roles must run the same build of the application"
assert "latest" not in images.pop()
# No `replicas`/`scale` key promising a second worker is fine; the lock decides.
assert not any("deploy" in service for service in SERVICES.values())
def test_both_roles_share_the_data_volume_so_the_lock_is_visible_to_both():
"""A second worker is refused by the library lock (US07-05) only if it can see it."""
for name, service in SERVICES.items():
assert DATA_VOLUME in service["volumes"], name
assert COMPOSE["volumes"]["data"]["driver"] == "local"
text = COMPOSE_FILE.read_text()
# The composition has to say why, because the failure is silent corruption.
assert "WAL" in text and re.search(r"NFS|SMB|network", text)
def test_the_library_is_a_bind_mount_whose_target_is_the_configured_root():
for name, service in SERVICES.items():
mounts = [volume for volume in service["volumes"] if volume != DATA_VOLUME]
assert len(mounts) == 1, name
source, target = re.match(r"^(\$\{.*?\}):(\$\{.*?\})$", mounts[0]).groups()
# An unset host path fails the composition rather than mounting something else.
assert source.startswith("${PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_HOST_PATH:?")
# The container-side path and the configured root are one variable, so they
# cannot drift apart into a library that is mounted but not configured.
assert target.startswith("${PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS:?")
assert service["environment"]["PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS"] == (
"${PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS}"
)
assert service["environment"]["PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR"] == "/data"
def test_migrations_run_to_completion_before_either_role_accepts_work():
"""`migrate` runs the backup-then-migrate path, and a failed upgrade exits
non-zero with its pre-migration backup intact — proven in
tests/integration/test_backup_recovery.py. What the composition adds is that
neither role starts until it succeeded."""
assert SERVICES["migrate"]["command"] == ["migrate"]
assert SERVICES["migrate"]["restart"] == "no", "a one-shot that retries is not a gate"
for role in ("api", "worker"):
assert SERVICES[role]["depends_on"] == {
"migrate": {"condition": "service_completed_successfully"}
}, role
def test_the_api_port_is_published_to_host_loopback_by_default():
published = SERVICES["api"]["ports"]
assert published == [
"${PHOTO_PIPELINE_PUBLISH_ADDRESS:-127.0.0.1}:${PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT:-8000}:8000"
]
# Reachable from the host means reachable from elsewhere as far as the app is
# concerned, so the access secret stays mandatory (US08-01).
assert SERVICES["api"]["environment"]["PHOTO_PIPELINE_HOST"] == "0.0.0.0"
assert SERVICES["api"]["environment"]["PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT"] == 8000
assert "PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET" not in SERVICES["api"]["environment"]
def test_containers_restart_by_themselves_and_stop_with_time_to_drain():
for role in ("api", "worker"):
assert SERVICES[role]["restart"] == "unless-stopped", role
assert SERVICES[role]["stop_grace_period"] == "30s", role
def test_the_containers_run_as_the_library_owner_and_never_as_root():
for name, service in SERVICES.items():
assert service["user"] == "${PHOTO_PIPELINE_UID:-1000}:${PHOTO_PIPELINE_GID:-1000}", name
assert service["build"]["args"]["UID"] == "${PHOTO_PIPELINE_UID:-1000}", name
# ── configuration comes from the environment, never from a committed file ────
def test_configuration_and_secrets_come_from_the_environment_only():
for name, service in SERVICES.items():
assert service["env_file"] == ["${PHOTO_PIPELINE_ENV_FILE:-.env}"], name
for key, value in service["environment"].items():
# Every value is either a variable reference or a property of the
# composition itself (the volume path, the container's own port).
composed = isinstance(value, int) or value in ("/data", "0.0.0.0")
assert composed or value.startswith("${"), (name, key, value)
assert not (REPO / ".env").is_file() or ".env" in (REPO / ".gitignore").read_text()
def test_the_example_file_lists_every_setting_and_carries_no_values():
declared = env_example_keys()
assert declared == sorted(set(declared), key=declared.index), "no variable twice"
for line in ENV_EXAMPLE.read_text().splitlines():
if "=" in line and not line.lstrip().startswith("#"):
assert line.endswith("="), f"a value in the example file: {line}"
expected = {f"PHOTO_PIPELINE_{name.upper()}" for name in Config.model_fields}
assert expected <= set(declared), sorted(expected - set(declared))
# And every variable the composition substitutes is documented there too.
substituted = set(re.findall(r"\$\{(PHOTO_PIPELINE_[A-Z_]+)", COMPOSE_FILE.read_text()))
assert substituted <= set(declared), sorted(substituted - set(declared))
def test_the_example_file_is_not_a_dotenv_that_could_be_loaded_by_accident():
"""`.env.example` must not be what `.env` is: no values means nothing to leak."""
assert ENV_EXAMPLE.name != ".env"
parsed = {k: v for k, v in _parse(ENV_EXAMPLE.read_text()).items() if v}
assert parsed == {}
def _parse(text: str) -> dict[str, str]:
from photo_pipeline.config import parse_env_file
return parse_env_file(text)
# ── the lock across container lifetimes ──────────────────────────────────────
def test_a_lock_left_by_a_container_that_is_gone_does_not_block_the_restart(
tmp_path, monkeypatch
):
"""A restarted container is a new hostname and a recycled pid 1, so the record
in the lock file proves nothing; the kernel's flock does (US08-03)."""
from photo_pipeline.services.app_lock import LibraryLock
config = Config(data_dir=tmp_path / "data", library_roots=(tmp_path,))
(tmp_path / "data").mkdir()
(tmp_path / "data" / "worker.lock.json").write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"lock_version": 1,
"role": "worker",
"pid": 1, # pid 1 of a container that no longer exists
"host": "3f2a1b9c4d5e", # its hostname was its container id
"started_at": "2026-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
"library_roots": ["/library"],
}
)
)
monkeypatch.setattr(path_policy, "in_container", lambda: True)
taken = LibraryLock(config, "worker").acquire()
assert taken.pid == os.getpid(), "the worker must come back after a restart"
def test_a_second_worker_is_still_refused_while_the_first_holds_the_lock(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""The other half: the same flock refuses a concurrent second writer, whether it
is a process or another container of the same composition."""
from photo_pipeline.services.app_lock import LibraryLock, LockHeld
config = Config(data_dir=tmp_path / "data", library_roots=(tmp_path,))
monkeypatch.setattr(path_policy, "in_container", lambda: True)
first = LibraryLock(config, "worker")
first.acquire()
with pytest.raises(LockHeld, match="worker is already running"):
LibraryLock(config, "worker").acquire()
first.release()
LibraryLock(config, "worker").acquire() # free again
# ── the startup check the mount depends on ───────────────────────────────────
def test_configured_roots_that_are_mounted_and_writable_are_accepted(tmp_path):
assert path_policy.roots_refusal([tmp_path]) is None
assert path_policy.roots_refusal([]) is None, "no roots is a configuration, not a fault"
def test_an_unmounted_library_root_is_refused_by_name(tmp_path):
refusal = path_policy.roots_refusal([tmp_path / "srv" / "photos"])
assert refusal is not None
assert "does not exist" in refusal and "PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS" in refusal
def test_a_root_that_is_not_a_directory_or_not_readable_is_refused(tmp_path):
a_file = tmp_path / "photos.txt"
a_file.write_text("not a library")
assert "not a directory" in path_policy.roots_refusal([a_file])
unreadable = tmp_path / "unreadable"
unreadable.mkdir()
unreadable.chmod(0o000)
try:
refusal = path_policy.roots_refusal([unreadable])
finally:
unreadable.chmod(0o755)
if os.getuid() != 0: # root ignores the mode, and CI may well be root
assert refusal is not None and "not readable" in refusal
def test_an_unwritable_root_is_not_refused_here(tmp_path):
"""A bind mount's ownership is virtualised on macOS and Windows, so os.access
would refuse a working deployment. The real errno at the first rename is at
least true; this check is about the mount, not the mode."""
read_only = tmp_path / "read-only"
read_only.mkdir()
read_only.chmod(stat.S_IRUSR | stat.S_IXUSR)
try:
assert path_policy.roots_refusal([read_only]) is None
finally:
read_only.chmod(0o755)
def test_in_a_container_a_root_that_was_never_mounted_is_refused(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""The container-only failure: the path exists, but it belongs to the image."""
unmounted = tmp_path / "library"
(unmounted / "album").mkdir(parents=True)
refusal = path_policy.roots_refusal([unmounted], require_mount=True)
assert refusal is not None and "not on a mounted filesystem" in refusal
# A bind mount is a mount point, and a root *below* one is mounted too: a
# deployment may mount /srv and configure /srv/photos.
monkeypatch.setattr(os.path, "ismount", lambda path: Path(path) == unmounted.resolve())
assert path_policy.roots_refusal([unmounted], require_mount=True) is None
assert path_policy.roots_refusal([unmounted / "album"], require_mount=True) is None
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", ["serve", "worker"])
def test_a_root_mismatch_refuses_at_startup_before_any_lock_is_taken(
role, tmp_path, monkeypatch, capsys
):
data = tmp_path / "data"
monkeypatch.setenv("PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR", str(data))
monkeypatch.setenv("PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS", str(tmp_path / "not-mounted"))
monkeypatch.setattr(path_policy, "in_container", lambda: True)
assert main([role]) == 5
assert "does not exist" in capsys.readouterr().err
assert not list(data.glob("*.lock.json")), "nothing started, so nothing is locked"
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", ["serve", "worker"])
def test_an_unmounted_root_on_a_host_is_not_a_reason_to_refuse(role, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""An archive medium that is not plugged in is a Tuesday, not a misconfiguration:
refusing would take the offline half of the library away with it (concept §9)."""
monkeypatch.setenv("PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR", str(tmp_path / "data"))
monkeypatch.setenv("PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS", str(tmp_path / "not-mounted"))
monkeypatch.setenv("PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET", "unused-on-loopback")
monkeypatch.setattr(path_policy, "in_container", lambda: False)
# Reaching the lock is the proof: that is the next thing either role does, and
# stopping there keeps the test out of a uvicorn/worker loop.
monkeypatch.setattr("photo_pipeline.__main__._acquire", lambda *_, **__: 99)
assert main([role]) == 99

View File

@@ -182,10 +182,13 @@
"US08-02": [
"tests/integration/test_container_image.py",
"tests/e2e/test_container_runtime.py"
],
"US08-03": [
"tests/integration/test_compose_runtime.py",
"tests/e2e/test_compose_stack.py"
]
},
"planned": [
"US08-03",
"US08-04",
"US08-05"
],