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1 Commits
us/US08-03 ... us/US07-02

Author SHA1 Message Date
domverse
b2b996b37e US07-02: Harden API Authorization and Path Boundaries 2026-08-16 23:06:41 +02:00
81 changed files with 246 additions and 10646 deletions
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22
.dockerignore
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@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
# Deny-by-default build context (US08-02): the image must contain no secrets, no
# photos, no database, no logs, and no .git. An allow list is the only version of this
# rule that stays true when a new file appears in the working copy.
*
!pyproject.toml
!alembic.ini
!README.md
!photo_pipeline
!migrations
!frontend
!docker
# Nothing generated, even under an allowed directory.
**/__pycache__
**/*.py[cod]
**/.DS_Store
**/*.env
**/*.log
**/*.db
**/*.db-*
**/*.sqlite*

85
.env.example
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@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
# Every setting the application and its composition read, with no values in it.
# Copy to `.env`, fill in what you need, and keep that copy out of git (it is
# gitignored, and the work-item safety checks refuse to stage it).
#
# cp .env.example .env
#
# Empty means "use the default noted beside it". Anything already exported in the
# shell wins over this file, both for the app and for `docker compose`.
# ── the composition (host side; read by docker-compose.yml only) ─────────────
# The photo library on this host. Bind-mounted at PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_HOST_PATH=
# Which image to run. Default: photo-pipeline:dev (what `up --build` builds).
PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMAGE=
# Must be the owner of the library above: what the containers rename and rewrite
# keeps this ownership. Default: 1000 / 1000.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_UID=
PHOTO_PIPELINE_GID=
# Host address the API port is published on. Default: 127.0.0.1. Anything else
# exposes the app beyond this machine — then ALLOWED_HOSTS and ACCESS_SECRET below
# are what stand in for the loopback boundary (US08-01).
PHOTO_PIPELINE_PUBLISH_ADDRESS=
# This file's own path, if it is not ./.env. Default: .env.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_ENV_FILE=
# ── library and data ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# os.pathsep-separated. In a container these are the *container-side* mount paths,
# and `serve`/`worker` refuse to start when they are not mounted.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS=
# Database, WAL, thumbnail cache, journals, backups. Default: data (the container
# sets /data, which is the persistent volume; a network mount is unsupported).
PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR=
# Database file, if it should not live in the data directory. Default:
# <data dir>/photo_pipeline.db.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_DB_PATH=
# ── serving ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Bind address. Default: 127.0.0.1. The composition sets 0.0.0.0 inside the
# container and publishes to loopback on the host instead.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_HOST=
# Under the composition this is the *published* host port; the container serves
# 8000. Default: 8000.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT=
# Comma-separated hostnames the app answers to besides loopback. Empty means
# loopback only. Naming one makes the access secret mandatory.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_ALLOWED_HOSTS=
# Traded for the session cookie at GET /api/v1/session via X-Access-Secret.
# Required as soon as the app is reachable from anywhere but loopback. Generate
# one with: python -c 'import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(32))'
PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET=
# Comma-separated peer addresses whose X-Forwarded-Proto/-Host may be believed.
# Only the reverse proxy's address belongs here. Default: none.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_TRUSTED_PROXIES=
# Largest request body accepted, in bytes. Default: 1048576.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES=
# ── logging ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Default: INFO.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_LOG_LEVEL=
# json or text. Default: json.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_LOG_FORMAT=
# ── limits ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Thumbnail cache quota in bytes. Default: 500000000.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_THUMBNAIL_CACHE_QUOTA_BYTES=
# Refuse to decode images larger than this many pixels. Default: 100000000.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_THUMBNAIL_MAX_PIXELS=
# Free space an archive destination must keep beyond the transfer. Default:
# 1000000000.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_ARCHIVE_FREE_SPACE_RESERVE_BYTES=
# ── safety gate ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# true refuses every mutating request until a read-only dry run of this library has
# been produced and approved (US07-07). Default: false. Turn it on before pointing
# the app at photos that cannot be replaced.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_REQUIRE_DRY_RUN_APPROVAL=
# ── external services ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Vision provider key for the analysis stage. Without it, analysis cannot run.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_VISION_API_KEY=
# Immich server and its API key, for the upload stage.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_SERVER_URL=
PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_API_KEY=
# Uploader binary. Default: immich-go (on PATH; pinned inside the image).
PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_GO_BINARY=

12
.gitignore vendored
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@@ -17,15 +17,3 @@ _todo/
pictures/
photos/
_IGNORE/
# Test failure evidence (US07-04)
.artifacts/
# Any dotenv, not only the default name.
*.env
# Local virtualenv for running the app.
.venv/
# setuptools editable-install metadata.
*.egg-info/

115
Dockerfile
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@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
# One image, two roles (US08-02).
#
# The application is not self-contained Python: it shells out to `exiftool` for every
# EXIF checkpoint and to `immich-go` for every upload, and it serves the static
# frontend from `frontend/`. All three are installed here at pinned versions, because
# an image whose external tools drift is an image whose metadata checkpoints and
# upload reports drift with them (concept §15, "External integration risks").
#
# Everything is pinned:
# * the base image by tag *and* digest, so a moved tag cannot change the runtime;
# * exiftool by its Debian package version, verified against `exiftool -ver`;
# * immich-go by release version and per-architecture SHA-256 of the release asset.
# The verified versions become image labels and /etc/photo-pipeline/versions.json,
# which `python -m photo_pipeline diagnostics` reports — so a running container can
# prove what it contains instead of being trusted about it.
#
# The project is installed editable on purpose: `photo_pipeline.db` resolves
# `alembic.ini` and `migrations/`, and the API resolves `frontend/`, relative to the
# repository root. An editable install keeps that one layout instead of scattering the
# same files across site-packages and a source tree.
ARG PYTHON_IMAGE=python:3.12.14-slim-trixie@sha256:2c941e860699f878900b0edc2403613c234d4b32eda3cc9fa7036991a2a63c4a
# ── the uploader, fetched and verified outside the final layer ────────────────
FROM ${PYTHON_IMAGE} AS uploader
ARG IMMICH_GO_VERSION=0.32.0
ARG IMMICH_GO_SHA256_AMD64=6e2ad86bafdadb9466d6515de7cb882726c0aea1a21d51164dff361d7d480a97
ARG IMMICH_GO_SHA256_ARM64=2c35d9284baae407ef9540bdac5f488971b0bdc7be758a4d7c05ab270af09fdb
COPY docker/fetch-immich-go.py /tmp/fetch-immich-go.py
RUN python /tmp/fetch-immich-go.py \
--version "${IMMICH_GO_VERSION}" \
--sha256-amd64 "${IMMICH_GO_SHA256_AMD64}" \
--sha256-arm64 "${IMMICH_GO_SHA256_ARM64}" \
--into /usr/local/bin \
&& /usr/local/bin/immich-go version
# ── the application ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
FROM ${PYTHON_IMAGE} AS runtime
ARG EXIFTOOL_VERSION=13.25+dfsg-1
ARG IMMICH_GO_VERSION=0.32.0
# The library is mounted from the host, so the container's identity must match the
# ownership that library already has: everything this application renames, writes
# EXIF into, or archives has to stay owned by the host user afterwards.
ARG UID=1000
ARG GID=1000
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="photo_pipeline" \
org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/domverse/photoanalyzer" \
io.photoanalyzer.exiftool.version="${EXIFTOOL_VERSION}" \
io.photoanalyzer.immich-go.version="${IMMICH_GO_VERSION}"
ENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 \
PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 \
PATH=/opt/venv/bin:$PATH \
PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR=/data
RUN set -eu; \
apt-get update; \
DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
"libimage-exiftool-perl=${EXIFTOOL_VERSION}"; \
rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
COPY --from=uploader /usr/local/bin/immich-go /usr/local/bin/immich-go
WORKDIR /app
COPY pyproject.toml alembic.ini README.md ./
COPY photo_pipeline ./photo_pipeline
COPY migrations ./migrations
COPY frontend ./frontend
COPY docker/entrypoint.sh docker/healthcheck.sh /usr/local/bin/
# Runtime dependencies only: the `test` extra (pytest, playwright) and the `vision`
# extra stay out, and pip's build isolation leaves no build tooling behind.
RUN set -eu; \
python -m venv /opt/venv; \
/opt/venv/bin/pip install --no-cache-dir -e .
# What is installed must be what was pinned, or the labels and the version record
# would be a claim rather than a fact.
RUN set -eu; \
mkdir -p /etc/photo-pipeline; \
exiftool_version="$(exiftool -ver)"; \
immich_go_version="$(immich-go version | head -n 1 | tr -d '\r')"; \
expected_exiftool="$(printf '%s' "${EXIFTOOL_VERSION}" | cut -d+ -f1 | cut -d- -f1)"; \
[ "${exiftool_version}" = "${expected_exiftool}" ] \
|| { echo "exiftool ${exiftool_version} is not the pinned ${expected_exiftool}" >&2; exit 1; }; \
case "${immich_go_version}" in \
*"${IMMICH_GO_VERSION}"*) ;; \
*) echo "immich-go '${immich_go_version}' is not pinned ${IMMICH_GO_VERSION}" >&2; exit 1 ;; \
esac; \
printf '{\n "exiftool": "%s",\n "immich-go": "%s"\n}\n' \
"${exiftool_version}" "${IMMICH_GO_VERSION}" > /etc/photo-pipeline/versions.json
# Non-root, with the host library's ownership. /data is the persistent volume; the
# photo library itself is mounted by the deployment (US08-03), never baked in.
RUN set -eu; \
groupadd --gid "${GID}" --non-unique app; \
useradd --uid "${UID}" --gid "${GID}" --non-unique --no-create-home --home-dir /app app; \
mkdir -p /data; \
chown "${UID}:${GID}" /data
USER ${UID}:${GID}
EXPOSE 8000
# Readiness, not liveness: an unmigrated or misconfigured database answers
# /api/v1/health/ready with 503, and a container that cannot serve must not be
# reported healthy. The worker role has no endpoint, so its check is a no-op here.
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=10s --start-period=30s --retries=3 \
CMD ["/usr/local/bin/healthcheck.sh"]
ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh"]
CMD ["serve"]

395
README.md
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@@ -7,49 +7,16 @@ archive workflow. Planning lives in `INTEGRATED_PIPELINE_CONCEPT.md` and
## Application (`photo_pipeline`)
The target application lives in `photo_pipeline/` (FastAPI + SQLAlchemy + Alembic).
Install it into a virtualenv once:
Run it with:
```bash
python3.12 -m venv .venv
.venv/bin/pip install -e ".[vision]" # drop [vision] for a review-only install
python -m photo_pipeline migrate # apply database migrations
python -m photo_pipeline serve # start the API + static review UI (127.0.0.1:8000)
```
Then run the two processes:
```bash
.venv/bin/python -m photo_pipeline migrate # apply database migrations
.venv/bin/python -m photo_pipeline serve # API + review UI at 127.0.0.1:8000/app/
.venv/bin/python -m photo_pipeline worker # second terminal: runs the jobs
```
The server enqueues work and serves the UI; nothing actually scans, scores,
analyses, uploads, or archives without a worker. `work_item/scripts/python` is the
*helper's* launcher — it prefers Conda base and falls back to a bare system
interpreter, so it is not how the application is run.
Configuration comes from `PHOTO_PIPELINE_*` environment variables (see
`photo_pipeline/config.py`); secrets are referenced, never logged.
### Configuration file
`.env` in the working directory is read at startup, or any path named by
`PHOTO_PIPELINE_ENV_FILE`. It is parsed, never executed: `KEY=value` lines,
`#` comments, optional quotes — no interpolation and no `export`. **Anything already
exported wins**, so the file is the standing configuration and the shell is the
override for one run.
The archived CLI's variable names still work, so an existing `photo_analyzer.env`
can be used as-is:
| in the file | applied as |
|---|---|
| `LLM_API_KEY` / `GEMINI_API_KEY` | `OPENAI_API_KEY` |
| `LLM_BASE_URL` | `OPENAI_BASE_URL` |
| `LIBRARY` | `PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS` |
`.env` and `*.env` are gitignored and denied by the work-item safety checks: the
file holds a real key and must never be committed.
### API access (US07-02)
The app listens on loopback, so its attacker is another page in the same browser.
@@ -69,131 +36,6 @@ not a loopback name (DNS rebinding), when `Origin` is any other origin, when
thumbnail), or when the body exceeds `PHOTO_PIPELINE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES`. There is no
CORS middleware at all, so no other origin can read a response.
### Reaching it through a hostname or proxy (US08-01)
| variable | meaning |
|---|---|
| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_ALLOWED_HOSTS` | comma-separated extra names the app answers to; empty means loopback only |
| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET` | traded for the session cookie at `GET /api/v1/session` via `X-Access-Secret` |
| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | comma-separated peer addresses whose `X-Forwarded-Proto`/`X-Forwarded-Host` are believed |
Being reachable *was* the authentication: whoever could open `127.0.0.1:8000` owned
the library. So naming any non-loopback host — or binding to one, `0.0.0.0` included
— makes the access secret mandatory, and `serve` refuses to start without it rather
than publishing the library. Loopback-only deployments need no secret and behave
exactly as before.
```bash
curl -sc /tmp/pp.jar -H "X-Access-Secret: $PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET" \
https://photos.example.com/api/v1/session
```
The browser asks for the secret once per tab and keeps it in `sessionStorage`.
Wrong secrets are rate-limited (5 per minute) and logged with the caller's address
only. `Host` and `Origin` are judged against the configured names; the *external*
scheme and host come from the forwarded headers only when the request arrived from a
`PHOTO_PIPELINE_TRUSTED_PROXIES` address, so a client cannot declare its own origin,
and the session cookie is marked `Secure` when that external scheme is HTTPS. Health
endpoints stay reachable without the secret so an orchestrator can restart the
container; nothing else does.
## Container image (US08-02)
One image runs either role. It is built from a clean checkout with no arguments:
```bash
docker build -t photo-pipeline:dev .
```
Everything external is pinned, and the build fails rather than drifting: the Python
base image by tag *and* digest, `exiftool` by its Debian package version (verified
against `exiftool -ver`), and `immich-go` by release version and per-architecture
SHA-256 of the release asset. The verified versions become image labels and
`/etc/photo-pipeline/versions.json`, which `diagnostics` reports as `tools[].pinned`
beside the version actually installed — so a replaced binary shows up as a
`tool_version_drift` warning instead of as a misparsed upload report.
| build argument | default | why change it |
|---|---|---|
| `UID` / `GID` | `1000` | must match the owner of the mounted photo library |
| `PYTHON_IMAGE` | pinned digest | upgrading the base image |
| `EXIFTOOL_VERSION` | Debian package version | upgrading exiftool |
| `IMMICH_GO_VERSION` + `IMMICH_GO_SHA256_AMD64`/`_ARM64` | pinned release | upgrading the uploader (take the digests from that release's `checksums.txt`) |
The first argument is the role, and every other management command still works:
```bash
docker run --rm -v /srv/photos:/srv/photos -v pp-data:/data \
-e PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS=/srv/photos photo-pipeline:dev migrate
docker run -d -p 127.0.0.1:8000:8000 -v /srv/photos:/srv/photos -v pp-data:/data \
-e PHOTO_PIPELINE_HOST=0.0.0.0 -e PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET=... \
-e PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS=/srv/photos photo-pipeline:dev serve
docker run -d -v /srv/photos:/srv/photos -v pp-data:/data \
-e PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS=/srv/photos photo-pipeline:dev worker
```
One role per container: `serve` and `worker` each take the library process lock for
their role (US07-05), so no supervisor starts both. The container refuses to run as
UID 0 — files it renames or writes must keep the ownership the host library expects —
and `/data` is the persistent volume holding the database, journals, backups, and
thumbnail cache. Binding to `0.0.0.0` makes the access secret mandatory
([above](#reaching-it-through-a-hostname-or-proxy-us08-01)); `serve` refuses to start
without it. The declared `HEALTHCHECK` polls `/api/v1/health/ready`, so a container
whose database is unmigrated or misconfigured is never reported healthy.
## Composed runtime (US08-03)
`docker-compose.yml` is the deployment: one `serve` container, one `worker`
container, one bind-mounted library, one data volume, and a one-shot `migrate` that
both roles wait for.
```bash
cp .env.example .env && $EDITOR .env # nothing has a value in it; fill in yours
docker compose up -d --build
```
`.env.example` lists every `PHOTO_PIPELINE_*` variable with its default in a comment
and no values at all. The three the composition cannot start without are
`PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_HOST_PATH` (the library on this host),
`PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS` (where it is mounted *inside* the container), and
`PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET` — publishing the port means the app is reachable from
outside the container, so US08-01 makes the secret mandatory. Set
`PHOTO_PIPELINE_UID`/`GID` to the owner of the library: what the containers rename
and rewrite keeps that ownership.
| invariant | how the composition keeps it |
|---|---|
| one writer | `serve` and `worker` take their role's library lock (US07-05) in the shared `/data` volume, so `--scale worker=2` is refused by the lock, not by convention |
| migrations first | `migrate` runs the backup-then-migrate path and must exit 0 before `api` and `worker` start; a failed upgrade leaves the previous database and its pre-migration backup intact |
| container paths | `PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS` is both the mount target and the configured root; a root that is not mounted makes `serve`/`worker` exit 5 at startup instead of writing into the container's throwaway layer |
| loopback by default | the port is published to `127.0.0.1` unless `PHOTO_PIPELINE_PUBLISH_ADDRESS` says otherwise, and exposing it needs the hostname in `PHOTO_PIPELINE_ALLOWED_HOSTS` plus the access secret |
| restart safety | both roles are `restart: unless-stopped` with a 30 s stop grace period, and a job interrupted by a restart resumes exactly as it does on a host restart |
The `data` volume holds the database, its write-ahead log, the thumbnail cache,
journals, and backups. **It must stay on a local filesystem** — SQLite in WAL mode
needs real local locking, so NFS, SMB, and network volume drivers are unsupported
there and corrupt the database rather than slow it down. The library bind mount has
no such restriction.
Operating the deployment is operating the same CLI:
```bash
docker compose run --rm --no-deps api diagnostics
docker compose run --rm --no-deps api backup --reason pre-upgrade
docker compose run --rm --no-deps api verify-backup /data/backups/<name>
docker compose run --rm --no-deps api restore /data/backups/<name> --into /data/restored
docker compose logs -f worker
```
`--no-deps` keeps a one-off command from starting a second stack; `api` is only the
service the command borrows the image and mounts from. `restore` is deliberately not
an API call: it replaces the state of an installation and belongs to a stopped one,
so stop `api` and `worker` first and restart them against the restored directory.
Publishing and deploying the image is US08-04.
## Testing
One offline command runs the whole suite (unit, integration, and browser
@@ -386,237 +228,6 @@ work_item/scripts/python -m pytest -m phase_f -q
Phases A–E remain green in the full run above.
## Media and metadata hardening (US07-03)
Every pixel the application reads goes through `photo_pipeline/imaging.py`: the
declared dimensions are checked before anything is decoded, Pillow's
decompression-bomb warning is treated as a refusal, JPEG decodes near the requested
size, and each decoder failure becomes one of two typed errors. A damaged file is a
per-item error with a persisted code, never a failed scan or a dead worker.
Every metadata stage ends with an EXIF checkpoint (`services/exif_checkpoint.py`):
snapshot, write the owned keywords, read back, prove the owned fields landed and that
nothing else moved, refresh the file hash. A field the stage does not own that
changed anyway makes the checkpoint `divergent` — recorded in `exif_projections`,
shown in the review queue, never repaired behind the user's back, and not counted as
verified, so upload stays blocked.
The golden corpus that proves all of it is generated, not committed:
`tests/fixtures/media_corpus.py` declares every format, orientation, profile,
damage, and metadata case with its expected outcome, and the suite regenerates it
twice to prove it does not drift.
```bash
work_item/scripts/python -m pytest tests/integration/test_media_hardening.py tests/integration/test_exif_checkpoints.py -q
```
## Concurrency and crash recovery (US07-04)
Crash safety is proven by crashing. `photo_pipeline/faults.py` defines the control
points — the persisted transitions of the rename, archive, EXIF, upload, and job
lanes — and arms one only when `PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAULT_AFTER` names it, at which
point the process dies the way a `SIGKILL` does. There is no endpoint and no
configuration field that can reach a barrier; a deployment that never sets the
variable can never hit one.
The race suite runs each scenario several times with a seed recorded on the test
result (`race_seed`) and asserts invariants rather than schedules: work is never
claimed or executed twice, a stale fencing token never commits, no file body is
lost or overwritten, and the database still passes `PRAGMA integrity_check`.
```bash
work_item/scripts/python -m pytest tests/integration/test_concurrency_races.py \
tests/integration/test_fault_matrix.py tests/e2e/test_crash_recovery.py -q
# replay a failure, or soak for new interleavings
PHOTO_PIPELINE_RACE_SEED=1234 PHOTO_PIPELINE_RACE_REPEATS=50 \
work_item/scripts/python -m pytest tests/integration/test_concurrency_races.py -q
```
Any failing test keeps its evidence: the temporary database (with its write-ahead
log), the journals, the logs, the recorded seed, and a SHA-256 manifest of every
file in the temporary library are copied to `.artifacts/<test id>/` before pytest
deletes the directory. Point `PHOTO_PIPELINE_TEST_ARTIFACTS` elsewhere to collect
them from CI.
## Release gate (US07-07)
One command runs every suite in an isolated stack and keeps the evidence:
```bash
work_item/scripts/python -m photo_pipeline release-gate --output data/release/$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)
```
It fails — and exits non-zero — when any stage fails, when a suite skips a test for
a reason that is not a documented environment limit (`exiftool not installed`,
`root ignores directory permissions`), or when the story matrix has a hole. The
evidence directory holds `release-report.json` (revision, per-stage result, timings,
summaries), `logs/<stage>.log`, and `CHECKSUMS.sha256` over both.
**The story matrix** lives in `tests/story_traceability.json`: every story under
`delivery_backlog/stories/` is either mapped to test files that exist, or listed in
`planned` as an accepted but unimplemented story. A story that is neither, or a
mapping to a file that has been deleted, fails the gate.
**The journey** (`tests/e2e/test_release_journey.py`) takes one fresh library through
discovery, duplicate review, safety, analysis, EXIF verification, album proposal,
guarded rename, rescan, upload with server-side verification, archive, offline
deduplication, and restore — over HTTP against real server and worker processes,
with a full restart in the middle and at the end.
### Real-library dry run and approval
Before the application is pointed at photos that cannot be replaced:
```bash
work_item/scripts/python -m photo_pipeline dry-run --output dry-run.json
work_item/scripts/python -m photo_pipeline approve-dry-run dry-run.json --approver "$(whoami)"
```
The dry run is strictly read-only: it opens no file for writing, writes no database
row, and reports what it found — file counts by extension, folders, bytes, unreadable
files, excluded directories, and a reconciliation against what the database already
knows (already registered, new, recorded but absent). Set
`PHOTO_PIPELINE_REQUIRE_DRY_RUN_APPROVAL=1` and **every mutating API request is
refused with `403 dry_run_not_approved`** until a report for exactly those library
roots has been approved. Reading stays open — you have to be able to see what was
found in order to approve it — and so does taking a backup. Change the library roots
and the approval no longer applies: it approves that reconciliation, not the idea of
mutating.
## Performance budgets (US07-06)
Budgets are measured, not asserted in prose. `python -m photo_pipeline benchmark`
builds a synthetic library of a stated size, runs the same scenarios every time,
writes a machine-readable report, and **exits non-zero when a budget is breached**.
```bash
work_item/scripts/python -m photo_pipeline benchmark --profile smoke # ~2 s, runs in CI
work_item/scripts/python -m photo_pipeline benchmark --profile short # 25k assets
work_item/scripts/python -m photo_pipeline benchmark --profile full \
--output data/benchmarks/full.json # 25k + 100k
work_item/scripts/python -m photo_pipeline benchmark --profile huge \
--soak-seconds 3600 --output data/benchmarks/soak.json # 500k + soak
```
| Metric | Budget | Why |
|---|---|---|
| `latency_p95_ms` | 250 ms | a list or search page must feel immediate |
| `latency_max_ms` | 2 000 ms | no single page may stall the review flow |
| `rss_growth_bytes` | 400 MB | a run must not leak the library |
| `open_files` | 256 | file descriptors are a hard operating-system limit |
| `wal_bytes` | 200 MB | a growing write-ahead log means checkpoints are starving |
| `queue_depth` | 1 000 | an unbounded queue is an out-of-memory in waiting |
| `cache_over_quota_bytes` | 0 | the thumbnail cache has to respect its quota |
Measured on the reference machine (Apple Silicon, SQLite WAL), p95 per scenario:
| Scenario | 25k | 100k |
|---|---|---|
| `inventory_page` | 0.5 ms | 0.6 ms |
| `library_search` | 4.8 ms | 17.1 ms |
| `library_stats` | 56.8 ms | 197.4 ms |
| `workflow_readiness` | 52.6 ms | 235.4 ms |
| `duplicate_cluster_list` | 0.6 ms | 0.5 ms |
| `duplicate_cluster_page` | 1.7 ms | 1.7 ms |
CI runs the `smoke` profile through `tests/integration/test_performance_budgets.py`;
the 25k/100k/500k matrix and the multi-hour soak belong to scheduled infrastructure,
because minutes of build time do not belong in the suite that runs on every change.
**Exceptions.** A budget that cannot be met is not a warning to ignore: it goes into
`APPROVED_EXCEPTIONS` in `photo_pipeline/services/benchmarks.py` with its raised
limit, who approved it, why, and a review date. Every report lists the exceptions it
applied, so a release review sees them.
Approved today, both for the 500k `huge` profile only, review by 2027-02-17:
| Scenario | Measured at 500k | Raised limit |
|---|---|---|
| `library_stats` | 1.08 s p95 · 3.2 s max | 1.5 s p95 · 4 s max |
| `workflow_readiness` | 1.40 s p95 · 3.3 s max | 1.8 s p95 · 4 s max |
Both are library-wide aggregates — the current safety decision of every asset, and
the album/tag/year breakdown of every analysis row — and both meet the 250 ms budget
at the 100k rows the concept sets it for. Beyond that they are linear against one
SQLite writer; the fix is denormalized totals or the planned PostgreSQL transition,
not a query tweak. Everything else at 500k is inside budget, and a soak at that size
grows neither resident memory nor the job queue.
## Backup and recovery (US07-05)
Backups go through SQLite's online backup API, never a file copy: with WAL enabled
the `.db` file alone is missing every committed page still in the write-ahead log.
Each backup is a directory under `data/backups/` holding the snapshot and a
`manifest.json` describing it — schema revision, SHA-256, row counts, the archive
media the library depends on, and which configuration was set. Secrets are recorded
as `configured`, never as values, so a manifest is safe to attach to a bug report.
```bash
work_item/scripts/python -m photo_pipeline backup --reason before-upgrade --keep 7
work_item/scripts/python -m photo_pipeline verify-backup data/backups/<name>
work_item/scripts/python -m photo_pipeline diagnostics
```
The same is available at `GET /api/v1/diagnostics`, `GET|POST /api/v1/backups`,
`GET /api/v1/backups/{name}/verify`, and `POST /api/v1/backups/prune`. **Restore is
not an endpoint** — it replaces the state of an installation, so it belongs to a
stopped one and a person at a terminal.
### Integrity check
`verify-backup` runs `PRAGMA integrity_check` (structure) *and*
`PRAGMA foreign_key_check` (references), compares the snapshot's SHA-256 with the
manifest, and re-counts every table the manifest recorded. Any mismatch — bit rot, a
truncated copy, a "repaired" snapshot — fails the check, and `restore` refuses a
backup that does not verify.
### Restore drill
1. Stop the server and the worker.
2. `python -m photo_pipeline verify-backup data/backups/<name>` — never restore an
unverified snapshot.
3. `python -m photo_pipeline restore data/backups/<name> --into /path/to/fresh-data`
(a target that already holds a database is refused; recovering in place means
moving the old data directory aside first).
4. Point `PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR` at the restored directory and run
`python -m photo_pipeline migrate`.
5. Run an inventory scan so paths are reconciled against the real library.
6. Mount every archive location named in the manifest before archiving again — the
database records where archived originals are, but it does not contain them.
Practise this against a copy before you need it; the drill is exercised
automatically by `tests/integration/test_backup_recovery.py`.
### Failed migration
A pending schema upgrade is snapshotted first (`reason: pre-migration`), by both the
API startup and `python -m photo_pipeline migrate`. If a migration fails, the error
log names the backup directory: stop everything and run the restore drill against
it. An up-to-date database is not backed up again on every start.
### Archive media
Archived originals live on their medium, not in the backup. The manifest lists every
archive location with its `media_id` and whether it was mounted when the backup was
taken. Keep one copy of each medium off-site, and remount a location before
restoring assets from it.
### Retention and disk
`--keep N` (default 7) prunes the oldest backups and never the newest.
`diagnostics` reports the database, write-ahead log, thumbnail cache, uploader
reports, backups, and logs separately, with free space and warnings for low disk
(`disk_low`, `disk_critical`), a cache over its quota, a write-ahead log outgrowing
its database, and a legacy CLI writing the library.
### Process locking
`serve` and `worker` take a JSON lock in the data directory (`api.lock.json`,
`worker.lock.json`). A second worker exits `2` and names the holder; a lock whose
process is gone is taken over. If the frozen CLI's state files are being written,
both refuse with exit `3` — `--allow-legacy` overrides, and you own the outcome.
## Legacy CLI archive
The command-line tools this application was extracted from are frozen in

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# E08 — Container Deployment
Concept phase: none. This epic is a delivery-format addition on top of the concept:
the same application, same safety invariants, packaged as a Docker image and deployed
continuously from Gitea Actions instead of being started by hand from a working copy.
It does not change the product scope in
[`INTEGRATED_PIPELINE_CONCEPT.md`](../INTEGRATED_PIPELINE_CONCEPT.md). SQLite stays the
store, one worker stays the writer, the library process lock stays authoritative, and
no path outside the configured library roots becomes reachable because the process now
runs in a container.
One decision does extend the concept and is made here explicitly: the application may
be reached through a reverse proxy under a real hostname, not only over loopback. That
requires a configurable trust boundary and an authentication gate, because the
loopback-only checks of US07-02 are what currently stand in for authentication.
## Stories
1. [US08-01 — Make the trust boundary configurable and authenticated](stories/US08-01-trusted-hosts-auth.md)
2. [US08-02 — Build a reproducible application image](stories/US08-02-container-image.md)
3. [US08-03 — Compose the runtime and mount the library safely](stories/US08-03-compose-runtime.md)
4. [US08-04 — Publish and deploy from Gitea Actions](stories/US08-04-gitea-cicd.md)
5. [US08-05 — Automate container deployment acceptance](stories/US08-05-container-e2e.md)
## Epic outcome
A tagged image built from `main` runs the API and the worker as separate containers
against a mounted library and a persistent data volume, is published to the Gitea
registry, is redeployed by webhook, survives restart and upgrade with its database and
journals intact, and refuses every request that a loopback deployment would have
refused.

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@@ -2,13 +2,11 @@
This backlog decomposes the phases in
[`INTEGRATED_PIPELINE_CONCEPT.md`](../INTEGRATED_PIPELINE_CONCEPT.md) into seven
epics and small, independently verifiable user stories, plus one delivery-format
epic (E08) that packages the released application as a deployable container.
epics and small, independently verifiable user stories.
## Numbering and file naming
- Epics: `E01` through `E07`, matching concept Phases A through G; `E08` has no
concept phase and must not change product scope.
- Epics: `E01` through `E07`, matching concept Phases A through G.
- Stories: `US<epic>-<sequence>`, for example `US03-02`.
- Epic files: `E01-<slug>.md`.
- Story files: `stories/US01-01-<slug>.md`.
@@ -38,7 +36,6 @@ epic (E08) that packages the released application as a deployable container.
5. [E05 — Immich upload](E05-immich-upload.md)
6. [E06 — Archive lifecycle](E06-archive-lifecycle.md)
7. [E07 — Hardening and release](E07-hardening-release.md)
8. [E08 — Container deployment](E08-container-deployment.md)
## Shared definition of done

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# US08-01 — Make the Trust Boundary Configurable and Authenticated
Epic: [E08](../E08-container-deployment.md)
As an operator, I want to reach the application through my own hostname without
weakening it, so a container behind a reverse proxy is as safe as the loopback
deployment it replaces.
## Context
`photo_pipeline/api/security.py` refuses any request whose `Host` or `Origin` is not
loopback. That check is the current stand-in for authentication: whoever can reach
`127.0.0.1:8000` is the owner. Behind a proxy the hostname is no longer loopback, so
relaxing the check without adding an authentication gate would publish the library.
## Acceptance criteria
- Allowed hosts and origins come from configuration (`PHOTO_PIPELINE_*`), default to
the current loopback set, and an unset configuration behaves exactly as today.
- Whenever a non-loopback host is configured, startup requires an access secret and
refuses to serve without one; loopback-only deployments keep working with no secret.
- The secret is exchanged for the existing session cookie and CSRF token through the
bootstrap endpoint; every protected route keeps its current session and CSRF
requirements unchanged.
- Forwarded headers (`X-Forwarded-Proto`, `X-Forwarded-Host`) are honored only from a
configured trusted proxy and ignored otherwise, so a client cannot forge its origin.
- Cookies are marked `Secure` when the effective external scheme is HTTPS.
- Failed authentication is rate-limited and logged without the secret, the session id,
or any request body.
- Health endpoints stay reachable without the secret; nothing else does.
## Automated tests
- Unit tests for host/origin evaluation across loopback default, configured host,
unconfigured host, forged forwarded headers, and trusted-proxy forwarded headers.
- Integration tests: startup refusal without a secret, successful exchange, wrong
secret, replay of an old session, cross-site request, and unauthenticated access to
every route class.
## Dependencies
- US07-02

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# US08-02 — Build a Reproducible Application Image
Epic: [E08](../E08-container-deployment.md)
As an operator, I want one image that can run either application role, so deployment is
a pull instead of a Python environment I have to reproduce by hand.
## Context
The application shells out to `exiftool` and `immich-go`, writes into the library as a
normal filesystem user, and serves a static frontend from `frontend/`. All three have to
be true inside the image, or the container starts and then fails on the first real
operation.
## Acceptance criteria
- A `Dockerfile` builds from a pinned Python base, installs the project and its runtime
dependencies, and contains no test, playwright, or build-only tooling in the final
layer.
- `exiftool` and `immich-go` are present at pinned versions, and their versions are
recorded in the image and reported by `python -m photo_pipeline diagnostics`.
- The image runs as a non-root user whose UID/GID are build-time arguments, so files
the application renames or writes keep the ownership the host library expects.
- One entrypoint selects the role: `serve` or `worker`, passing through the existing
CLI arguments; no supervisor runs two roles in one container.
- `serve` containers declare a `HEALTHCHECK` against `/api/v1/health/ready`, so an
unmigrated or misconfigured database is not reported healthy.
- The image contains no secrets, no library data, no database, and no `.git`; the build
context is constrained by `.dockerignore`.
- Image build is reproducible from a clean checkout and documented in `README.md`.
## Automated tests
- A build-and-run test asserts the image starts, reports ready, serves the frontend
index, and returns the pinned `exiftool` and `immich-go` versions.
- A test asserts the container refuses to run as UID 0 and that a file created by the
container is owned by the configured UID/GID.
## Dependencies
- US07-05

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# US08-03 — Compose the Runtime and Mount the Library Safely
Epic: [E08](../E08-container-deployment.md)
As an operator, I want a single compose file that runs the API and the worker against my
real library, so a deployment is one command and the safety invariants survive it.
## Context
The library process lock (US07-05) assumes both roles see the same lock file, and SQLite
in WAL mode assumes a real local filesystem. Container path policy is the same problem
as host path policy with a new failure mode: the configured library roots must name the
in-container mount paths, not the host paths.
## Acceptance criteria
- `docker-compose.yml` runs exactly one `serve` and one `worker` container from the same
image and the same data volume, and a second worker is refused by the existing lock
rather than by convention.
- The library is a bind mount; `PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS` names the container-side
paths, and a mismatch between mounted and configured roots fails at startup with a
clear message instead of at the first write.
- The data volume holds the database, WAL, thumbnail cache, and backups on a local
filesystem; the composition documents that a network mount is unsupported for it.
- Migrations run before `serve` and `worker` accept work, using the existing backup-then-
migrate path, and an upgrade that fails leaves the previous database intact.
- Configuration and secrets come from the environment, never from the image or a
committed file; a `.env.example` lists every `PHOTO_PIPELINE_*` variable with safe
defaults and no values.
- The API port is published to host loopback by default; exposing it publicly requires
the configured hostname and access secret from US08-01.
- Containers restart automatically, and a restart mid-job resumes exactly as a host
restart does today.
- Backup, verify-backup, restore, and diagnostics are documented as container commands
and work against the mounted volumes.
## Automated tests
- An integration test brings the composition up against a temporary fixture library,
runs a job, restarts both containers, and asserts the job resumes and the database is
intact.
- Tests for: second worker refused, library-root mismatch refused at startup, failed
migration leaving the previous database restorable.
## Dependencies
- US08-01, US08-02

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# US08-04 — Publish and Deploy from Gitea Actions
Epic: [E08](../E08-container-deployment.md)
As a release owner, I want `main` to build, publish, and redeploy the image
automatically, so deployment is the same reproducible path every time.
## Context
The workflow is adapted from the `crowdsec-admin` deployment workflow
(`.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml` in that repository): build, log in to the Gitea registry,
push, trigger a Portainer webhook, prune. This project needs the same shape plus a test
gate, because unlike that project it has a required suite that must not be skipped.
## Acceptance criteria
- `.gitea/workflows/` contains a test workflow that runs on pull requests and on `main`,
executing the configured required suites, and a deploy workflow that runs only after
the tests pass on `main` and on manual dispatch.
- The deploy workflow publishes to `git.domverse-berlin.eu` under this project's own
image path, tagged `latest` and the commit SHA, so a rollback is a tag change.
- Registry credentials and the Portainer webhook come from repository secrets; runtime
secrets (vision key, Immich key, access secret) stay in the Portainer stack and never
enter the repository or the image.
- Redeploy is triggered by webhook and the workflow fails when the webhook call fails.
- Dangling images are pruned; published tags are not.
- A concurrency guard prevents two deploys of different commits overlapping.
- `README.md` documents the required secrets, the image path, the rollback procedure,
and that the stack is managed by Portainer from git.
## Automated tests
- Workflow files are validated (syntax and required job/step names) by a repository test
so a rename cannot silently disable the test gate.
- A dry-run job builds and pushes to a scratch tag on manual dispatch without touching
`latest` or triggering a redeploy.
## Dependencies
- US08-02, US08-03

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# US08-05 — Automate Container Deployment Acceptance
Epic: [E08](../E08-container-deployment.md)
As a release owner, I want one automated gate that proves the deployed container, so the
packaged application is verified the same way the host application is.
## Acceptance criteria
- One documented command provisions the composition from the built image against a
temporary fixture library and an isolated data volume, and destroys it afterwards.
- A browser journey against the containerized application covers discovery, duplicate
review, analysis, album proposal, rename, upload preflight, and archive views.
- An upgrade journey runs the previous published image, then the new one, and asserts
migrations, journals, jobs, and the thumbnail cache survive.
- A restart journey kills both containers mid-job and asserts resume without duplicate
side effects.
- Security gates run against the deployed instance: unauthenticated access refused,
forged forwarded headers refused, paths outside the mounted library roots refused, and
no secret in container logs.
- Evidence is retained per run and the gate fails on any skipped required check.
## Automated tests
- The container acceptance suite runs on a `phase_h` marker in CI on `main` and before a
published deploy; earlier epic suites keep running unchanged.
## Dependencies
- US08-01 through US08-04

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# The deployed runtime (US08-03): one API, one worker, one library, one volume.
#
# The same image (US08-02) runs both roles, so what is composed here is process
# topology, not a second application. Three invariants shape it:
#
# * one writer — `serve` and `worker` each take the library process lock for their
# role (US07-05), and both containers mount the *same* data volume, which is what
# makes the lock file visible to both. Scaling `worker` past 1 is refused by that
# lock rather than by anyone remembering not to;
# * one local filesystem — the database, its write-ahead log, the thumbnail cache,
# and the backups live in the `data` volume, and SQLite in WAL mode requires real
# local-filesystem locking. A network mount (NFS, SMB, or a cloud volume driver)
# is unsupported for it; that is a corrupted database, not a slow one;
# * one library path vocabulary — `PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS` names the path
# *inside* the container, which is also the bind mount's target below. A root
# that is not mounted there makes `serve` and `worker` refuse at startup instead
# of writing into the container's throwaway layer.
#
# Configuration and secrets come from the environment only: copy `.env.example` to
# `.env` and fill it in. Nothing is baked into the image and nothing with a value in
# it is committed.
#
# cp .env.example .env && $EDITOR .env
# docker compose up -d --build
#
# Operating it is operating the same CLI — `docker compose run --rm --no-deps api
# <command>` — see README, "Composed runtime".
name: photo-pipeline
x-runtime: &runtime
image: ${PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMAGE:-photo-pipeline:dev}
build:
context: .
args:
# Everything the app renames or rewrites has to stay owned by the host user
# the library already belongs to.
UID: ${PHOTO_PIPELINE_UID:-1000}
GID: ${PHOTO_PIPELINE_GID:-1000}
user: "${PHOTO_PIPELINE_UID:-1000}:${PHOTO_PIPELINE_GID:-1000}"
env_file:
- ${PHOTO_PIPELINE_ENV_FILE:-.env}
volumes:
- data:/data
- "${PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_HOST_PATH:?set PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_HOST_PATH to the photo library on this host}:${PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS:?set PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS to the container-side library path}"
# Jobs check for cancellation between items and leave a resumable record; a
# too-short grace period turns an orderly stop into a recovery on next start.
stop_grace_period: 30s
x-environment: &environment
# Set here rather than left to the file: these two are what the composition itself
# promises, and an `.env` that disagreed would move the database off the volume or
# the library off its mount.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR: /data
PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS: ${PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS}
services:
# Migrations run to completion before either role accepts work, through the same
# backup-then-migrate path the roles use (US07-05): a pending upgrade is snapshotted
# first, and a failed one exits non-zero with the backup named — so `api` and
# `worker` never start, and the previous database is left intact and restorable.
migrate:
<<: *runtime
command: ["migrate"]
environment: *environment
restart: "no"
api:
<<: *runtime
command: ["serve"]
environment:
<<: *environment
# Published to host loopback below. Inside the container the server must bind
# the container's own interface for that publish to reach it, which is exactly
# what makes the access secret mandatory (US08-01) — `serve` refuses to start
# without one. Exposing the port beyond loopback additionally needs
# PHOTO_PIPELINE_ALLOWED_HOSTS to name the hostname it is reached under.
PHOTO_PIPELINE_HOST: 0.0.0.0
PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT: 8000
ports:
# Host side only: PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT in `.env` moves the *published* port, and
# the container always serves 8000, which is what the image's health check probes.
- "${PHOTO_PIPELINE_PUBLISH_ADDRESS:-127.0.0.1}:${PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT:-8000}:8000"
depends_on:
migrate:
condition: service_completed_successfully
restart: unless-stopped
# One worker. A second one is refused by the library lock in the shared data
# volume, which is the point: `docker compose up --scale worker=2` fails loudly
# instead of running two writers against one library.
worker:
<<: *runtime
command: ["worker", "--id", "worker-1"]
environment: *environment
depends_on:
migrate:
condition: service_completed_successfully
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
# Local driver on purpose: the database, WAL, thumbnail cache, and backups need a
# real local filesystem. Do not point this at NFS, SMB, or a network volume driver.
data:
driver: local

22
docker/entrypoint.sh
View File

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# One entrypoint, one role per container (US08-02).
#
# The first argument is the management command the image runs — `serve` and `worker`
# are the two roles, and every other `python -m photo_pipeline` command (migrate,
# diagnostics, backup, restore, dry-run) is passed through unchanged so operating the
# container is operating the same CLI. No supervisor: two roles in one container would
# share a process lock they are each meant to hold alone (US07-05).
set -eu
if [ "$(id -u)" = "0" ]; then
echo "refusing to run as root: start this image with a non-root UID/GID so files" \
"it renames or writes keep the ownership the mounted library expects" >&2
exit 1
fi
role="${1:-serve}"
# The health check has to know which role it is checking, and only the API has an
# endpoint to check. /tmp is writable for the unprivileged user; /run may not be.
printf '%s' "${role}" > "${PHOTO_PIPELINE_ROLE_FILE:-/tmp/photo-pipeline-role}" 2>/dev/null || true
exec python -m photo_pipeline "$@"

72
docker/fetch-immich-go.py
View File

@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
"""Download one pinned immich-go release and verify it before unpacking (US08-02).
Run at image build time by the `uploader` stage, with the interpreter that is already
in the base image: no curl, no wget, and no download tooling in the layer that ships.
The checksum is not advisory — a release asset that does not match the pinned digest
is a failed build, not a warning, because the uploader's flags and report format are
what the upload parser is written against (concept §15).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import hashlib
import platform
import tarfile
import tempfile
import urllib.request
from pathlib import Path
RELEASE_URL = "https://github.com/simulot/immich-go/releases/download/v{version}/{asset}"
# Debian/BuildKit architecture as the interpreter sees it → release asset name.
ASSETS = {
"x86_64": ("immich-go_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz", "amd64"),
"amd64": ("immich-go_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz", "amd64"),
"aarch64": ("immich-go_Linux_arm64.tar.gz", "arm64"),
"arm64": ("immich-go_Linux_arm64.tar.gz", "arm64"),
}
TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 300
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument("--version", required=True, help="immich-go release, without the v")
parser.add_argument("--sha256-amd64", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--sha256-arm64", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--into", default="/usr/local/bin")
args = parser.parse_args()
machine = platform.machine().lower()
if machine not in ASSETS:
raise SystemExit(f"unsupported architecture: {machine}")
asset, arch = ASSETS[machine]
expected = {"amd64": args.sha256_amd64, "arm64": args.sha256_arm64}[arch]
url = RELEASE_URL.format(version=args.version, asset=asset)
with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=TIMEOUT_SECONDS) as response: # noqa: S310
payload = response.read()
digest = hashlib.sha256(payload).hexdigest()
if digest != expected:
raise SystemExit(f"checksum mismatch for {url}: {digest} != {expected}")
target = Path(args.into)
target.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as work:
archive = Path(work) / asset
archive.write_bytes(payload)
with tarfile.open(archive) as tar:
member = tar.getmember("immich-go")
# Extract exactly the one file this pin is about, by name, so nothing
# else in the archive can decide where it lands.
extracted = tar.extractfile(member)
if extracted is None:
raise SystemExit("release archive contains no immich-go binary")
binary = target / "immich-go"
binary.write_bytes(extracted.read())
binary.chmod(0o755)
print(f"immich-go {args.version} ({arch}) verified {digest}")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())

34
docker/healthcheck.sh
View File

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Container health for the `serve` role: readiness, not liveness (US08-02).
#
# /api/v1/health/ready is 503 until the database is reachable, migrated, and in WAL
# mode with foreign keys on, so an unmigrated or misconfigured container never reports
# healthy. Health endpoints need no session and no access secret, which is what lets an
# orchestrator restart a container it holds no credentials for (US08-01).
set -eu
role="$(cat "${PHOTO_PIPELINE_ROLE_FILE:-/tmp/photo-pipeline-role}" 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)"
if [ "${role}" != "serve" ]; then
# ponytail: the worker has no endpoint to probe; its liveness is its lease and job
# heartbeat in the database. Add a `worker --health` command if a restart policy
# ever needs to act on it.
exit 0
fi
port="${PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT:-8000}"
exec python - "${port}" <<'PY'
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{sys.argv[1]}/api/v1/health/ready"
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=5) as response: # noqa: S310 — loopback
sys.exit(0 if response.status == 200 else 1)
except urllib.error.HTTPError as error:
print(f"not ready: HTTP {error.code}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
except OSError as error:
print(f"not ready: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
PY

27
frontend/js/api.js
View File

@@ -7,28 +7,9 @@ export const BASE = "/api/v1";
// what makes it proof that the caller is this app and not another page.
let csrfToken = null;
// A deployment reachable through a proxy trades an operator secret for that cookie.
// Kept per tab: sessionStorage dies with the tab, and the secret never enters a URL.
const SECRET_KEY = "pp_access_secret";
async function bootstrap(secret) {
return fetch(BASE + "/session", {
credentials: "same-origin",
headers: secret ? { "X-Access-Secret": secret } : {},
});
}
async function session() {
if (csrfToken === null) {
let response = await bootstrap(sessionStorage.getItem(SECRET_KEY));
if (response.status === 401) {
sessionStorage.removeItem(SECRET_KEY);
const secret = prompt("Access secret");
if (secret) {
response = await bootstrap(secret);
if (response.ok) sessionStorage.setItem(SECRET_KEY, secret);
}
}
const response = await fetch(BASE + "/session", { credentials: "same-origin" });
const body = await response.json().catch(() => null);
csrfToken = (body && body.csrf_token) || null;
}
@@ -93,10 +74,8 @@ export const api = {
request("/inventory/assets?" + new URLSearchParams(params).toString(), opts),
listClusters: (params = {}, opts = {}) =>
request("/duplicates/clusters?" + new URLSearchParams(params).toString(), opts),
getCluster: (id, params = {}, opts = {}) => {
const query = new URLSearchParams(params).toString();
return request(`/duplicates/clusters/${encodeURIComponent(id)}${query ? `?${query}` : ""}`, opts);
},
getCluster: (id, opts = {}) =>
request(`/duplicates/clusters/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`, opts),
decide: (id, payload, opts = {}) =>
request(`/duplicates/clusters/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/decision`, {
method: "POST",

20
frontend/js/app.js
View File

@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ async function renderClusters(params) {
" ",
el("span", { class: `badge ${cluster.state}` }, cluster.state)
),
el("div", { class: "muted" }, `${cluster.member_total ?? cluster.members.length} members · confidence ${cluster.confidence}`)
el("div", { class: "muted" }, `${cluster.members.length} members · confidence ${cluster.confidence}`)
)
);
@@ -207,11 +207,8 @@ async function renderClusters(params) {
async function renderClusterDetail(id, extra = {}) {
setActiveNav("duplicates");
let cluster;
// A cluster can hold thousands of members, so the server pages them; the page
// asks for as many as it is currently showing (US07-06).
const shown = extra.shown || 0;
try {
cluster = await api.getCluster(id, shown ? { limit: shown } : {});
cluster = await api.getCluster(id);
} catch (error) {
show(errorBanner(`Failed to load cluster: ${error.message}`));
return;
@@ -301,19 +298,6 @@ async function renderClusterDetail(id, extra = {}) {
nodes.push(decisionBar);
if (extra.pending) nodes.push(confirmPanel(cluster, extra.pending));
nodes.push(el("div", { class: "cluster-grid" }, ...members));
const total = cluster.member_total ?? cluster.members.length;
if (cluster.members.length < total) {
nodes.push(
el(
"button",
{
"data-testid": "show-more-members",
onclick: () => renderClusterDetail(id, { ...extra, shown: cluster.members.length + 100 }),
},
`Show more (${cluster.members.length} of ${total})`
)
);
}
show(...nodes);
}

7
legacy_cli_archive/donor_ledger.yaml
View File

@@ -480,13 +480,6 @@ rows:
inference path needs the local model + deterministic fake.
target: photo_pipeline/integrations/nsfw_model.py
tests: [test_nsfwtag::test_score_images_cache_hit_skips_model]
delta: >
The donor set Pillow's process-global ImageFile.LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES so a
partially downloaded file still scored. Here the same process also hashes
files and renders previews, and those must keep refusing a truncated file
rather than silently working on half of one; scoring opens images through
the bounded photo_pipeline.imaging door instead and skips the ones it cannot
read, leaving them unscored and visibly undecided (US07-03).
status: characterized
- id: nt-exif-keyword

42
migrations/versions/0015_exif_projections.py
View File

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
"""Durable EXIF projections per asset and stage (US07-03).
Revision ID: 0015_exif_projections
Revises: 0014_restore_plans
Create Date: 2026-08-16
The concept's ``exif_projections`` table, added at the point it earns its keep: a
checkpoint that finds a field it does not own changed must be able to say so after
a restart. ``state`` is verified | divergent | failed, and only ``verified`` counts
as a completed metadata stage.
"""
import sqlalchemy as sa
from alembic import op
revision = "0015_exif_projections"
down_revision = "0014_restore_plans"
branch_labels = None
depends_on = None
def upgrade() -> None:
op.create_table(
"exif_projections",
sa.Column("asset_id", sa.String(), sa.ForeignKey("assets.id"), primary_key=True),
sa.Column("stage", sa.String(), primary_key=True), # safety | analysis
sa.Column("id", sa.String(), nullable=False),
sa.Column("projection_version", sa.Integer(), nullable=False, server_default="0"),
# What the stage asked for: {"add": [...], "remove": [...]}.
sa.Column("desired_json", sa.String(), nullable=True),
# Fields outside the stage's ownership that did not survive the write.
sa.Column("divergent_fields", sa.String(), nullable=True),
sa.Column("result_file_sha256", sa.String(), nullable=True),
sa.Column("state", sa.String(), nullable=False),
sa.Column("error_code", sa.String(), nullable=True),
sa.Column("verified_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True),
sa.Column("updated_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True),
)
def downgrade() -> None:
op.drop_table("exif_projections")

45
migrations/versions/0016_performance_indexes.py
View File

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
"""Indexes the large-library read paths need (US07-06).
Revision ID: 0016_performance_indexes
Revises: 0015_exif_projections
Create Date: 2026-08-17
Measured, not guessed. At 100k assets the workflow home and the safety queue both
resolve "the current decision per asset" with a window function over
``safety_reviews``; a plain ``asset_id`` index makes SQLite sort every partition by
hand. Ordering the index by ``(asset_id, created_at DESC)`` halves that query.
``duplicate_members(cluster_id, asset_id)`` serves the paged member list of a
cluster with thousands of members, which is the other page that stopped being cheap.
"""
from alembic import op
revision = "0016_performance_indexes"
down_revision = "0015_exif_projections"
branch_labels = None
depends_on = None
def upgrade() -> None:
op.create_index(
"ix_safety_reviews_asset_created",
"safety_reviews",
["asset_id", "created_at"],
)
op.create_index(
"ix_duplicate_members_cluster_asset",
"duplicate_members",
["cluster_id", "asset_id"],
)
op.create_index(
"ix_analysis_results_approx_year",
"analysis_results",
["approx_year"],
)
def downgrade() -> None:
op.drop_index("ix_analysis_results_approx_year", table_name="analysis_results")
op.drop_index("ix_duplicate_members_cluster_asset", table_name="duplicate_members")
op.drop_index("ix_safety_reviews_asset_created", table_name="safety_reviews")

209
photo_pipeline/__main__.py
View File

@@ -1,39 +1,21 @@
"""Application management CLI:
``python -m photo_pipeline {serve,migrate,worker,import-legacy-scores,backup,verify-backup,restore,diagnostics}``.
``serve`` and ``worker`` take the library process lock for their role (US07-05):
two workers, or the frozen CLI running beside the app, would each be safe on their
own and destructive together. ``restore`` is here rather than in the API because it
replaces the state of an installation and belongs to a stopped one.
"""
"""Application management CLI: ``python -m photo_pipeline {serve,migrate,worker,import-legacy-scores}``."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Sequence
from photo_pipeline import path_policy
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.services.app_lock import LegacyProcessActive, LibraryLock, LockHeld
from photo_pipeline.services.backup import BackupError, BackupService, migrate_with_backup
from photo_pipeline.db import run_migrations
def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="photo_pipeline")
commands = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
serve_cmd = commands.add_parser("serve", help="Run the API server")
commands.add_parser("serve", help="Run the API server")
commands.add_parser("migrate", help="Upgrade the database to the latest revision")
worker_cmd = commands.add_parser("worker", help="Run a durable-job worker")
worker_cmd.add_argument("--id", default="worker-1", help="Worker id (lease owner)")
for locked in (serve_cmd, worker_cmd):
locked.add_argument(
"--allow-legacy",
action="store_true",
help="Start even though a legacy CLI looks active (unsafe; you own the outcome)",
)
import_cmd = commands.add_parser(
"import-legacy-scores",
help="Import the archived CLI's nsfw_scores.csv into the database (US07-01)",
@@ -45,151 +27,22 @@ def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int:
import_cmd.add_argument(
"--dry-run", action="store_true", help="Report what would happen and change nothing"
)
backup_cmd = commands.add_parser("backup", help="Take an online database backup")
backup_cmd.add_argument("--reason", default="manual", help="Why (part of the directory name)")
backup_cmd.add_argument("--keep", type=int, default=7, help="How many backups to retain")
verify_cmd = commands.add_parser("verify-backup", help="Check a backup is intact and readable")
verify_cmd.add_argument("backup", help="Path to the backup directory")
restore_cmd = commands.add_parser(
"restore", help="Restore a verified backup into a fresh data directory"
)
restore_cmd.add_argument("backup", help="Path to the backup directory")
restore_cmd.add_argument("--into", required=True, help="Fresh data directory to restore into")
commands.add_parser("diagnostics", help="Report sizes, disk headroom, locks, and warnings")
bench_cmd = commands.add_parser(
"benchmark", help="Measure latency and resource use against agreed budgets (US07-06)"
)
bench_cmd.add_argument("--profile", default="smoke", help="smoke | short | full | huge")
bench_cmd.add_argument(
"--soak-seconds", type=float, default=0.0, help="Also run a soak of this length"
)
bench_cmd.add_argument("--output", help="Write the JSON report here as well as to stdout")
gate_cmd = commands.add_parser(
"release-gate", help="Run every suite in an isolated stack and keep the evidence"
)
gate_cmd.add_argument("--output", help="Evidence directory (default: data/release/<stamp>)")
dry_cmd = commands.add_parser(
"dry-run", help="Read-only reconciliation of the configured library (US07-07)"
)
dry_cmd.add_argument("--output", help="Write the report here as well as to stdout")
approve_cmd = commands.add_parser(
"approve-dry-run", help="Approve a dry-run report, which is what enables mutation"
)
approve_cmd.add_argument("report", help="Path to the dry-run report")
approve_cmd.add_argument("--approver", required=True, help="Who is accepting this")
args = parser.parse_args(argv)
config = Config.from_env()
config.database_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
# In a container the two roles that touch the library check their boundary before
# they take a lock or bind a port: the configured roots must name the mount paths,
# and a mismatch is cheaper to refuse than to discover at the first write (US08-03).
# Only in a container — on a host an unmounted root is an ordinary Tuesday (an
# archive medium that is not plugged in), and refusing to serve would take the
# offline half of the library away with it.
if args.command in ("serve", "worker") and path_policy.in_container():
refusal = path_policy.roots_refusal(config.library_roots, require_mount=True)
if refusal is not None:
print(refusal, file=sys.stderr)
return 5
if args.command == "migrate":
manifest = migrate_with_backup(config)
if manifest:
print(json.dumps({"pre_migration_backup": manifest["name"]}, indent=2))
return 0
if args.command == "backup":
try:
manifest = BackupService(config).create(reason=args.reason, keep=args.keep)
except BackupError as error:
print(str(error))
return 1
print(json.dumps(manifest, indent=2))
return 0
if args.command == "verify-backup":
result = BackupService(config).verify(args.backup)
print(json.dumps(result.as_dict(), indent=2))
return 0 if result.ok else 1
if args.command == "restore":
try:
report = BackupService(config).restore(args.backup, args.into)
except BackupError as error:
print(str(error))
return 1
print(json.dumps(report, indent=2))
return 0
if args.command == "benchmark":
from photo_pipeline.services import benchmarks
try:
report = benchmarks.run(
config,
profile=args.profile,
soak_seconds=args.soak_seconds,
output=args.output,
)
except ValueError as error:
print(str(error))
return 1
print(json.dumps({k: v for k, v in report.items() if k != "runs"}, indent=2))
# A breached budget is a failed run, so a scheduled job notices without
# anyone reading the JSON.
return 0 if report["ok"] else 1
if args.command == "release-gate":
from photo_pipeline.services import release
report = release.run_gate(config, output=args.output)
print(
json.dumps(
{k: v for k, v in report.items() if k not in ("stages", "matrix")}, indent=2
)
)
return 0 if report["ok"] else 1
if args.command == "dry-run":
from photo_pipeline.services import release
try:
report = release.dry_run(config)
except release.ReleaseError as error:
print(str(error))
return 1
if args.output:
Path(args.output).write_text(json.dumps(report, indent=2))
print(json.dumps(report, indent=2))
return 0
if args.command == "approve-dry-run":
from photo_pipeline.services import release
try:
record = release.approve(config, args.report, approver=args.approver)
except (release.ReleaseError, OSError, ValueError) as error:
print(str(error))
return 1
print(json.dumps(record, indent=2))
return 0
if args.command == "diagnostics":
from photo_pipeline.services import diagnostics
print(json.dumps(diagnostics.report(config), indent=2))
run_migrations(config.database_url)
return 0
if args.command == "import-legacy-scores":
import json
from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory
from photo_pipeline.services.legacy_import import LegacyImportService, write_report
migrate_with_backup(config)
run_migrations(config.database_url)
engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
service = LegacyImportService(create_session_factory(engine))
report = service.import_nsfw_scores(
@@ -210,56 +63,18 @@ def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int:
import photo_pipeline.jobs.domain_handlers # noqa: F401
from photo_pipeline.jobs.worker import Worker
lock = LibraryLock(config, "worker")
if (held := _acquire(lock, allow_legacy=args.allow_legacy)) is not None:
return held
try:
migrate_with_backup(config)
engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
Worker(
create_session_factory(engine), worker_id=args.id, config=config
).run_forever()
finally:
lock.release()
run_migrations(config.database_url)
engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
Worker(create_session_factory(engine), worker_id=args.id, config=config).run_forever()
return 0
import uvicorn
from photo_pipeline.api.app import ConfigurationRefused, create_app
from photo_pipeline.api.app import create_app
# An exposed deployment without an access secret must not reach the port at all,
# and the operator needs a sentence, not a traceback (US08-01).
try:
app = create_app(config)
except ConfigurationRefused as error:
print(str(error), file=sys.stderr)
return 4
lock = LibraryLock(config, "api")
if (held := _acquire(lock, allow_legacy=args.allow_legacy)) is not None:
return held
try:
uvicorn.run(app, host=config.host, port=config.port)
finally:
lock.release()
uvicorn.run(create_app(config), host=config.host, port=config.port)
return 0
def _acquire(lock: LibraryLock, *, allow_legacy: bool) -> int | None:
"""Take the lock, or explain on stderr why this process must not start.
Returns an exit code to return, or ``None`` when the lock was acquired.
"""
try:
lock.acquire(allow_legacy=allow_legacy)
except LockHeld as error:
print(str(error), file=sys.stderr)
return 2
except LegacyProcessActive as error:
print(f"{error} (override with --allow-legacy)", file=sys.stderr)
return 3
return None
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())

32
photo_pipeline/api/app.py
View File

@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ from photo_pipeline.api.routes import (
inventory,
jobs,
library,
operations,
renames,
safety,
session as session_routes,
@@ -35,21 +34,13 @@ from photo_pipeline.api.routes import (
uploads,
workflow,
)
from photo_pipeline.api.security import (
DEFAULT_HEADERS,
FailureLimiter,
SecurityMiddleware,
Session,
trust_refusal,
)
from photo_pipeline.api.security import DEFAULT_HEADERS, SecurityMiddleware, Session
# Registers the safety_score / analysis job handlers on import.
import photo_pipeline.jobs.domain_handlers # noqa: F401
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory
from photo_pipeline.services.backup import migrate_with_backup
from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory, run_migrations
from photo_pipeline.logging import configure_logging
from photo_pipeline.services.thumbnails import ThumbnailService
from photo_pipeline.services.upload_batches import UploadBatchService
FRONTEND_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "frontend"
@@ -90,23 +81,14 @@ def _install_error_handlers(app: FastAPI) -> None:
return _envelope(500, "internal_error", "internal error")
class ConfigurationRefused(RuntimeError):
"""The configuration would serve the library to callers it cannot authenticate."""
def create_app(config: Config | None = None) -> FastAPI:
config = config or Config.from_env()
configure_logging(config.log_level, config.log_format)
# Before anything is built, let alone bound to a port (US08-01).
if (why := trust_refusal(config)) is not None:
raise ConfigurationRefused(why)
@asynccontextmanager
async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
config.database_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
# A schema upgrade is snapshotted first, so a migration that fails halfway
# leaves a restorable database behind rather than a damaged one (US07-05).
migrate_with_backup(config)
run_migrations(config.database_url)
engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
app.state.config = config
app.state.engine = engine
@@ -114,9 +96,6 @@ def create_app(config: Config | None = None) -> FastAPI:
# An upload whose process died left no outcome behind; resolve it now so the
# uploader lane is free and the uncertain batch is visible (US05-02).
UploadBatchService(app.state.session_factory, config=config).recover()
# A render killed mid-write leaves its temporary beside the cache entry;
# remove those recognized leftovers, and only those (US07-03).
ThumbnailService(app.state.session_factory, config).cleanup_temp_files()
try:
yield
finally:
@@ -127,10 +106,6 @@ def create_app(config: Config | None = None) -> FastAPI:
# One session per process: the browser exchanges it for a cookie + CSRF token,
# and every other origin is refused before a route ever runs (US07-02).
app.state.session = Session.create()
app.state.access_limiter = FailureLimiter()
# Also set in the lifespan, but the bootstrap route reads it, and a caller can
# arrive before anything else has touched app.state.
app.state.config = config
app.add_middleware(SecurityMiddleware, session=app.state.session, config=config)
_install_error_handlers(app)
app.include_router(session_routes.router, prefix="/api/v1")
@@ -147,7 +122,6 @@ def create_app(config: Config | None = None) -> FastAPI:
app.include_router(renames.router, prefix="/api/v1")
app.include_router(uploads.router, prefix="/api/v1")
app.include_router(archives.router, prefix="/api/v1")
app.include_router(operations.router, prefix="/api/v1")
# Static single-page app (hash-routed). Mounted last so /api/v1 wins.
if FRONTEND_DIR.is_dir():
app.mount("/app", StaticFiles(directory=FRONTEND_DIR, html=True), name="app")

17
photo_pipeline/api/routes/duplicates.py
View File

@@ -11,13 +11,7 @@ from fastapi import APIRouter, Query, Request
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
from photo_pipeline.schemas import DecisionRequest
from photo_pipeline.services.duplicates import (
MAX_MEMBER_PAGE,
MEMBER_PAGE,
ConflictError,
DuplicateError,
DuplicateService,
)
from photo_pipeline.services.duplicates import ConflictError, DuplicateError, DuplicateService
router = APIRouter(tags=["duplicates"])
@@ -48,13 +42,8 @@ def list_clusters(
@router.get("/duplicates/clusters/{cluster_id}")
def get_cluster(
cluster_id: str,
request: Request,
limit: int = Query(MEMBER_PAGE, ge=1, le=MAX_MEMBER_PAGE),
offset: int = Query(0, ge=0),
):
detail = _service(request).get_cluster(cluster_id, limit=limit, offset=offset)
def get_cluster(cluster_id: str, request: Request):
detail = _service(request).get_cluster(cluster_id)
if detail is None:
return _error(404, "not_found", f"unknown cluster {cluster_id}")
return detail

70
photo_pipeline/api/routes/operations.py
View File

@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
"""Operational endpoints: diagnostics and backups (US07-05).
Backups can be taken and verified here because both are safe, additive, and the
operator needs them from the same screen that shows the disk filling up.
**Restore is deliberately not an endpoint.** It replaces the state of the running
application with an older one, so it belongs to a stopped installation and a person
at a terminal: ``python -m photo_pipeline restore``. An HTTP call that can silently
roll the library back to last week is a hole, not a feature.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from fastapi import APIRouter, Query, Request
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
from pydantic import BaseModel
from photo_pipeline.services import diagnostics
from photo_pipeline.services.backup import DEFAULT_KEEP, BackupError, BackupService
router = APIRouter(tags=["operations"])
class CreateBackupRequest(BaseModel):
reason: str = "manual"
keep: int = DEFAULT_KEEP
def _service(request: Request) -> BackupService:
return BackupService(request.app.state.config)
def _error(status: int, code: str, message: str) -> JSONResponse:
return JSONResponse(status_code=status, content={"error": {"code": code, "message": message}})
@router.get("/diagnostics")
def read_diagnostics(request: Request) -> dict:
return diagnostics.report(request.app.state.config)
@router.get("/backups")
def list_backups(request: Request) -> dict:
return {"backups": _service(request).list()}
@router.post("/backups", status_code=201)
def create_backup(body: CreateBackupRequest, request: Request):
try:
return _service(request).create(reason=body.reason, keep=body.keep)
except BackupError as error:
return _error(422, "backup_failed", str(error))
@router.get("/backups/{name}/verify")
def verify_backup(name: str, request: Request):
service = _service(request)
# The name comes from the browser, so it names a backup — it is never joined
# into a path until it has been matched against one that exists (US07-02).
if name not in {entry["name"] for entry in service.list()}:
return _error(404, "not_found", f"unknown backup {name}")
return {"name": name, **service.verify(service.root / name).as_dict()}
@router.post("/backups/prune")
def prune_backups(request: Request, keep: int = Query(DEFAULT_KEEP, ge=1)):
try:
return {"removed": _service(request).prune(keep=keep)}
except BackupError as error:
return _error(422, "invalid_retention", str(error))

42
photo_pipeline/api/routes/session.py
View File

@@ -3,52 +3,21 @@
It sets the ``HttpOnly``/``SameSite=Strict`` session cookie and returns the CSRF
token in the body. A foreign page can call this — it just cannot read the answer,
because the app sends no CORS headers — and the cookie it received is never attached
to a request that foreign page initiated.
When an access secret is configured (mandatory as soon as the app is reachable from
another machine, US08-01) this is also the authentication gate: the secret buys the
cookie, and every route behind it keeps asking for exactly the session and CSRF token
it asked for before. Wrong secrets are counted, and a burst of them stops being
answered — otherwise a proxy-exposed deployment could be guessed at indefinitely.
to a request that foreign page initiates.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import secrets
from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
from photo_pipeline.api.security import ACCESS_SECRET_HEADER, SESSION_COOKIE
from photo_pipeline.api.security import SESSION_COOKIE
router = APIRouter(tags=["session"])
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def _refuse(status: int, code: str, message: str) -> JSONResponse:
return JSONResponse(status_code=status, content={"error": {"code": code, "message": message}})
@router.get("/session")
def start_session(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
config = request.app.state.config
secret = config.access_secret
if secret is not None:
limiter = request.app.state.access_limiter
if limiter.blocked():
return _refuse(429, "too_many_attempts", "too many failed attempts; retry later")
offered = request.headers.get(ACCESS_SECRET_HEADER, "")
if not secrets.compare_digest(offered, secret.get_secret_value()):
limiter.record_failure()
# The client address is the whole record: the offered secret, the issued
# session, and the request body all stay out of the log.
log.warning(
"access secret rejected", extra={"client": _client(request), "path": "/session"}
)
return _refuse(401, "access_denied", "a valid access secret is required")
session = request.app.state.session
response = JSONResponse({"csrf_token": session.csrf_token})
response.set_cookie(
@@ -56,13 +25,6 @@ def start_session(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
session.id,
httponly=True,
samesite="strict",
# HTTPS outside means the cookie must never travel over a plain hop, even one
# this process cannot see. Loopback http keeps working unchanged.
secure=request.scope.get("state", {}).get("external_scheme") == "https",
path="/",
)
return response
def _client(request: Request) -> str:
return request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"

133
photo_pipeline/api/security.py
View File

@@ -19,14 +19,6 @@ The defenses stack, because each one alone has a hole:
only in the bootstrap response body, which a foreign page cannot read (no CORS) —
so possessing it proves the caller is same-origin.
Behind a reverse proxy (US08-01) the same stack holds with two substitutions: the
allowed host set comes from configuration instead of being the loopback names, and
the host/scheme the policy judges is the *external* one, which is only read from
``X-Forwarded-*`` when the request actually arrived from a configured proxy. The
loopback check was standing in for authentication, so naming a non-loopback host
also makes an access secret mandatory — ``trust_refusal`` refuses to start without
one, and the secret is what the bootstrap endpoint trades for the session cookie.
``evaluate`` is a pure function over the request metadata: the whole policy is one
table that a unit test can enumerate, and the middleware only applies its verdict.
"""
@@ -34,7 +26,6 @@ table that a unit test can enumerate, and the middleware only applies its verdic
from __future__ import annotations
import secrets
import time
from collections.abc import Mapping
from dataclasses import dataclass
from urllib.parse import urlsplit
@@ -44,7 +35,6 @@ from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
SESSION_COOKIE = "pp_session"
CSRF_HEADER = "x-csrf-token"
ACCESS_SECRET_HEADER = "x-access-secret"
API_PREFIX = "/api/v1"
SAFE_METHODS = frozenset({"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"})
# Reachable without a session: liveness/readiness (an orchestrator has no cookie)
@@ -53,9 +43,6 @@ PUBLIC_PATHS = frozenset(
{f"{API_PREFIX}/health/live", f"{API_PREFIX}/health/ready", f"{API_PREFIX}/session"}
)
LOOPBACK_HOSTS = frozenset({"127.0.0.1", "localhost", "::1", "[::1]"})
# Mutating endpoints that must stay reachable while mutation itself is gated: the
# backup a careful operator takes first, and its retention (US07-07).
MUTATION_EXEMPT_PATHS = frozenset({f"{API_PREFIX}/backups", f"{API_PREFIX}/backups/prune"})
# Applied to every response. No inline script/style is used by the frontend, so the
# policy can stay strict; `frame-ancestors 'none'` and CORP keep other pages from
@@ -106,28 +93,6 @@ def split_host(value: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
return host, port
def external_view(
*,
client: str | None,
headers: Mapping[str, str],
scheme: str,
trusted_proxies: frozenset[str],
) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""The ``(scheme, host)`` the caller used, as opposed to the one this hop saw.
Forwarded headers are a client-supplied claim. Believing them from anyone lets a
request declare its own origin — and origin is half of this module's evidence —
so they count only when the connection came from a configured proxy.
"""
host = headers.get("host", "")
if client is None or client not in trusted_proxies:
return scheme, host
# A chain appends: the first entry is what the original client asked for.
forwarded_proto = headers.get("x-forwarded-proto", "").split(",")[0].strip().lower()
forwarded_host = headers.get("x-forwarded-host", "").split(",")[0].strip()
return forwarded_proto or scheme, forwarded_host or host
def evaluate(
*,
method: str,
@@ -135,26 +100,20 @@ def evaluate(
headers: Mapping[str, str],
session: Session,
allowed_hosts: frozenset[str] = LOOPBACK_HOSTS,
scheme: str = "http",
max_request_bytes: int,
) -> Refusal | None:
"""Why this request must be refused, or ``None`` when it may proceed.
``headers["host"]`` and ``scheme`` are the external ones (see ``external_view``);
the allowed origins are the allowed hosts under that scheme and port, so there is
no second list that can drift away from the first.
"""
"""Why this request must be refused, or ``None`` when it may proceed."""
host_header = headers.get("host", "")
host, port = split_host(host_header)
if host.lower() not in allowed_hosts:
return Refusal(403, "host_not_allowed", "request host is not an allowed address")
return Refusal(403, "host_not_allowed", "request host is not a local address")
origin = headers.get("origin")
if origin is not None and origin != "":
parts = urlsplit(origin)
origin_host, origin_port = split_host(parts.netloc)
if (
parts.scheme != scheme
parts.scheme not in ("http", "https")
or origin_host.lower() not in allowed_hosts
or origin_port != port
):
@@ -180,66 +139,14 @@ def evaluate(
return None
def exposed_hosts(config) -> list[str]:
"""Configured names by which this application is reachable from another machine."""
names = {str(config.host).lower()}
names.update(split_host(name)[0].lower() for name in config.allowed_hosts)
return sorted(names - LOOPBACK_HOSTS)
def trust_refusal(config) -> str | None:
"""Why this configuration must not serve at all, or ``None``.
Reaching the app used to prove ownership of it. The moment a configuration makes
it reachable from elsewhere that stops being true, so serving without a secret
would publish the library — refuse at startup rather than at the first request,
when the operator is no longer watching (US08-01).
"""
exposed = exposed_hosts(config)
if exposed and config.access_secret is None:
return (
f"refusing to serve: {', '.join(exposed)} is reachable from outside this "
"machine, so PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET must be set"
)
return None
class FailureLimiter:
"""Bounded failed access-secret attempts, so the secret cannot be guessed online.
ponytail: one counter for the whole process rather than per client address —
behind a proxy every attempt arrives from the same address anyway. Per-caller
buckets if the app is ever exposed without one.
"""
def __init__(self, limit: int = 5, window: float = 60.0) -> None:
self.limit = limit
self.window = window
self._failures: list[float] = []
def blocked(self) -> bool:
now = time.monotonic()
self._failures = [at for at in self._failures if now - at < self.window]
return len(self._failures) >= self.limit
def record_failure(self) -> None:
self._failures.append(time.monotonic())
class SecurityMiddleware:
"""Pure-ASGI so the SSE stream keeps streaming (BaseHTTPMiddleware buffers)."""
def __init__(self, app, *, session: Session, config) -> None:
self.app = app
self.session = session
self.config = config
self.max_request_bytes = config.max_request_bytes
self.allowed_hosts = frozenset(
LOOPBACK_HOSTS
| {str(config.host).lower()}
| {split_host(name)[0].lower() for name in config.allowed_hosts}
)
self.trusted_proxies = frozenset(config.trusted_proxies)
self.allowed_hosts = frozenset(LOOPBACK_HOSTS | {str(config.host).lower()})
async def __call__(self, scope, receive, send) -> None:
if scope["type"] != "http":
@@ -250,26 +157,14 @@ class SecurityMiddleware:
# policy never has to parse a Cookie header.
lookup = dict(headers)
lookup["cookie-session"] = _cookie(headers.get("cookie", ""), SESSION_COOKIE)
client = scope.get("client")
scheme, lookup["host"] = external_view(
client=client[0] if client else None,
headers=headers,
scheme=scope.get("scheme", "http"),
trusted_proxies=self.trusted_proxies,
)
# What the session cookie's Secure flag is decided from, one hop later.
scope.setdefault("state", {})["external_scheme"] = scheme
refusal = evaluate(
method=scope.get("method", "GET"),
path=scope.get("path", "/"),
headers=lookup,
session=self.session,
allowed_hosts=self.allowed_hosts,
scheme=scheme,
max_request_bytes=self.max_request_bytes,
)
if refusal is None:
refusal = self._mutation_refusal(scope)
if refusal is not None:
response = JSONResponse(
status_code=refusal.status,
@@ -288,26 +183,6 @@ class SecurityMiddleware:
await self.app(scope, receive, send_with_headers)
def _mutation_refusal(self, scope) -> Refusal | None:
"""Refuse every mutating request while the library's dry run is unapproved.
One choke point for the whole API: every mutation the browser can start is a
non-safe method under ``/api/v1``. Reading stays open — an operator has to be
able to look at what the application found in order to approve it (US07-07).
"""
method = scope.get("method", "GET").upper()
path = scope.get("path", "/")
if method in SAFE_METHODS or not path.startswith(API_PREFIX):
return None
if path in MUTATION_EXEMPT_PATHS:
return None
from photo_pipeline.services.release import mutation_blockers
blockers = mutation_blockers(self.config)
if not blockers:
return None
return Refusal(403, blockers[0]["code"], blockers[0]["message"])
def _cookie(header: str, name: str) -> str:
for part in header.split(";"):

88
photo_pipeline/config.py
View File

@@ -7,9 +7,6 @@ real external call needs them.
pydantic-settings would do this too, but a prefix-scan over the declared fields
is a few lines and one fewer dependency.
Tuple-valued settings are lists in one variable: library roots are ``os.pathsep``
separated because they are paths, everything else is comma separated.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -21,62 +18,6 @@ from typing import Mapping
from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, SecretStr
ENV_PREFIX = "PHOTO_PIPELINE_"
ENV_FILE_VAR = f"{ENV_PREFIX}ENV_FILE"
DEFAULT_ENV_FILE = Path(".env")
COMMA_LIST_FIELDS = frozenset({"allowed_hosts", "trusted_proxies"})
# The archived CLI's variable names, so the configuration file an operator already
# has keeps working. The vision provider reads the OpenAI SDK's names, and the
# library root is configuration here rather than a bare path (US07-01 donor).
LEGACY_ALIASES = {
"LLM_API_KEY": "OPENAI_API_KEY",
"GEMINI_API_KEY": "OPENAI_API_KEY",
"LLM_BASE_URL": "OPENAI_BASE_URL",
"LIBRARY": f"{ENV_PREFIX}LIBRARY_ROOTS",
}
def parse_env_file(text: str) -> dict[str, str]:
"""``KEY=value`` lines into a mapping. Comments, blanks, and quotes handled.
Deliberately not a shell: no interpolation, no ``export``, no multi-line values.
A configuration file that can run code is a configuration file that can be a
vulnerability.
"""
values: dict[str, str] = {}
for line in text.splitlines():
line = line.strip()
if not line or line.startswith("#") or "=" not in line:
continue
key, _, raw = line.partition("=")
key = key.strip()
if not key or key.startswith("#"):
continue
value = raw.strip().strip('"').strip("'")
values[key] = value
alias = LEGACY_ALIASES.get(key)
if alias:
values.setdefault(alias, value)
return values
def load_env_file(path: Path | str | None = None) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Load ``PHOTO_PIPELINE_ENV_FILE`` (or ``./.env``) into the environment.
Anything already exported wins: a file is the standing configuration, the shell
is what you meant *this time*. Returns what it applied, which is what the CLI
prints — names only, never values.
"""
candidate = path or os.environ.get(ENV_FILE_VAR) or DEFAULT_ENV_FILE
candidate = Path(candidate)
if not candidate.is_file():
return {}
applied = {}
for key, value in parse_env_file(candidate.read_text()).items():
if key not in os.environ:
os.environ[key] = value
applied[key] = value
return applied
class Config(BaseModel):
@@ -89,19 +30,6 @@ class Config(BaseModel):
log_level: str = "INFO"
log_format: str = "json" # "json" or "text"
# Trust boundary (US08-01). Empty means loopback only, which is what the app did
# before there was a setting: a request whose Host is not a loopback name is
# refused, and no secret is needed because nothing outside this machine can call.
# Naming a real hostname here is what makes the app reachable through a reverse
# proxy, and it is exactly then that ``access_secret`` becomes mandatory.
allowed_hosts: tuple[str, ...] = ()
# Addresses whose ``X-Forwarded-Proto``/``X-Forwarded-Host`` may be believed. A
# client that is not the proxy can otherwise declare its own origin.
trusted_proxies: tuple[str, ...] = ()
# Exchanged for the session cookie at the bootstrap endpoint. Once set it is
# required even on loopback, so a development setup cannot half-enable it.
access_secret: SecretStr | None = None
# Largest request body the API accepts. Every endpoint takes small JSON commands;
# anything larger is a mistake or an attempt to exhaust memory (US07-02).
max_request_bytes: int = 1_048_576
@@ -114,12 +42,6 @@ class Config(BaseModel):
# Free space an archive destination must keep beyond the transfer itself.
archive_free_space_reserve_bytes: int = 1_000_000_000
# Refuse every mutating request until a read-only dry run of the configured
# library has been produced and explicitly approved (US07-07). Off by default so
# a development setup is unchanged; turn it on before pointing the application at
# a library whose photos cannot be replaced.
require_dry_run_approval: bool = False
vision_api_key: SecretStr | None = None
immich_api_key: SecretStr | None = None
immich_server_url: str = ""
@@ -140,18 +62,10 @@ class Config(BaseModel):
@classmethod
def from_env(cls, environ: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> "Config":
env = os.environ if environ is None else environ
if environ is None:
load_env_file() # a file never overrides what the shell already set
env = os.environ
data: dict = {}
for name in cls.model_fields:
raw = env.get(ENV_PREFIX + name.upper())
if not raw:
continue
if name == "library_roots":
data[name] = raw.split(os.pathsep)
elif name in COMMA_LIST_FIELDS:
data[name] = [part.strip() for part in raw.split(",") if part.strip()]
else:
data[name] = raw
data[name] = raw.split(os.pathsep) if name == "library_roots" else raw
return cls(**data)

37
photo_pipeline/db.py
View File

@@ -41,41 +41,12 @@ def create_session_factory(engine: Engine) -> sessionmaker:
return sessionmaker(bind=engine, expire_on_commit=False, future=True)
def _alembic_config(url: str):
def run_migrations(url: str) -> None:
"""Upgrade the database at ``url`` to the latest revision."""
from alembic import command
from alembic.config import Config as AlembicConfig
cfg = AlembicConfig(str(_REPO_ROOT / "alembic.ini"))
cfg.set_main_option("script_location", str(_REPO_ROOT / "migrations"))
cfg.set_main_option("sqlalchemy.url", url)
return cfg
def run_migrations(url: str) -> None:
"""Upgrade the database at ``url`` to the latest revision."""
from alembic import command
command.upgrade(_alembic_config(url), "head")
def head_revision() -> str | None:
"""The revision this code expects. ``None`` if the scripts cannot be read."""
from alembic.script import ScriptDirectory
try:
return ScriptDirectory.from_config(_alembic_config("sqlite://")).get_current_head()
except Exception:
return None
def current_revision(url: str) -> str | None:
"""The revision a database is actually at, or ``None`` for an unstamped one."""
engine = create_db_engine(url)
try:
with engine.connect() as connection:
from alembic.runtime.migration import MigrationContext
return MigrationContext.configure(connection).get_current_revision()
except Exception:
return None
finally:
engine.dispose()
command.upgrade(cfg, "head")

45
photo_pipeline/faults.py
View File

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
"""Test-only fault control points (concept §18, US07-04).
Crash safety can only be proven by crashing at the exact moment a transition has
been persisted but its consequence has not. That needs a barrier *inside* the
production code path — but not a production capability: there is no endpoint, no
service method, and no configuration file entry that can trigger one. The only
switch is an environment variable naming a single point, read at the moment it is
passed, and the only thing it does is kill the process. A deployment that never
sets it can never reach the barrier.
``os._exit`` is deliberate: it skips atexit handlers, buffered flushes, and
``finally`` blocks, which is what a real ``SIGKILL`` or power loss does. A clean
shutdown would prove nothing.
The points are the persisted transitions of the journalled stages:
rename moving | moved | database_updated | verified | complete
archive transferring | verified | removing | source_removed | complete
exif exif:written — keywords on disk, checkpoint not yet recorded
upload upload:accepted — uploader exited, outcome not yet persisted
jobs job:item_done — item committed, job outcome not yet written
Recovery for each is asserted in tests/integration/test_fault_matrix.py and
tests/e2e/test_crash_recovery.py.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
ENV_VAR = "PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAULT_AFTER"
EXIF_WRITTEN = "exif:written"
UPLOAD_ACCEPTED = "upload:accepted"
JOB_ITEM_DONE = "job:item_done"
def maybe_fault(point: str) -> None:
"""Die abruptly when ``PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAULT_AFTER`` names ``point``.
Shared by the rename, archive, restore, EXIF, upload, and job lanes, each
passing its own state names. Never set the variable outside tests.
"""
if os.environ.get(ENV_VAR) == point:
os._exit(9)

119
photo_pipeline/imaging.py
View File

@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
"""Bounded, defensive image decoding — one door for every pixel this app reads.
A photo library contains files nobody planned for: truncated downloads, zero-byte
placeholders, a PNG whose header claims 200000×200000, a TIFF with a broken ICC
profile, an extension that lies about its content. None of them may take down a
request or a worker, and none may decode more pixels than the caller allowed
(concept §17: decoded pixels, not file size, are what exhausts memory).
``open_image`` is that single door:
* the declared dimensions are checked **before** a pixel is decoded;
* Pillow's decompression-bomb *warning* is promoted to an error, because the
warning band (between Pillow's limit and twice it) still decodes the image;
* every decoder failure — at open time or during the caller's decode — becomes one
of two typed errors, so callers map them to their own item state instead of
catching ``Exception``;
* error text names no path: it reaches API responses, and the full reason goes to
the server log instead (US07-02).
``to_srgb`` and ``draft`` are the other two bounded-decode helpers: colour-manage a
profile-bearing image into sRGB, and let JPEG decode straight to a size near the
requested one rather than at full resolution.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import io
import logging
import warnings
from contextlib import contextmanager
from pathlib import Path
from PIL import Image, ImageCms, ImageFile, UnidentifiedImageError
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Matches ``Config.thumbnail_max_pixels``; used where no configuration is at hand
# (hashing runs inside discovery, which takes no config).
DEFAULT_MAX_PIXELS = 100_000_000
class MediaError(Exception):
"""A file could not be turned into pixels safely."""
class UndecodableImage(MediaError):
"""Corrupt, truncated, empty, or not an image at all."""
class ImageTooLarge(MediaError):
"""More pixels than this operation is allowed to decode."""
@contextmanager
def open_image(path: Path | str, *, max_pixels: int = DEFAULT_MAX_PIXELS):
"""Yield an open :class:`PIL.Image.Image`, bounded and with typed failures.
Decoder errors raised inside the ``with`` body are translated too — a truncated
JPEG only fails when its pixels are actually pulled, which is the caller's line,
not this one.
"""
# Pillow's truncation tolerance is a process-global switch that any library in
# the process can flip (the donor CLI did). This door decides the policy for its
# own callers: half a file is not a picture.
tolerated = ImageFile.LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES
ImageFile.LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES = False
with warnings.catch_warnings():
# The warning band is not a warning for us: it means Pillow was willing to
# decode an image large enough to be a denial-of-service.
warnings.simplefilter("error", Image.DecompressionBombWarning)
try:
with Image.open(path) as image:
width, height = image.size
if width * height > max_pixels:
raise ImageTooLarge(f"{width}x{height} exceeds the {max_pixels} pixel limit")
yield image
except MediaError:
raise
except (Image.DecompressionBombError, Image.DecompressionBombWarning) as error:
log.info("refused oversized image %s: %s", path, error)
raise ImageTooLarge("image exceeds the decompression-bomb limit") from error
except (UnidentifiedImageError, OSError, ValueError, SyntaxError, MemoryError) as error:
log.info("cannot decode %s: %s", path, error)
raise UndecodableImage(f"cannot decode image ({type(error).__name__})") from error
finally:
ImageFile.LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES = tolerated
def draft(image: Image.Image, size: int) -> None:
"""Ask the decoder for a smaller image where the format allows it (JPEG).
This is the difference between decoding a 40-megapixel JPEG and decoding the
roughly 1-megapixel version a 1280px preview needs.
"""
try:
image.draft(None, (size, size))
except (AttributeError, ValueError, OSError): # not a draft-capable format
pass
def to_srgb(image: Image.Image, *, mode: str) -> Image.Image:
"""Convert into ``mode``, colour-managing through an embedded ICC profile.
Without this a wide-gamut original renders with visibly wrong colours, because
its numbers are interpreted as sRGB. A broken or unreadable profile is not a
reason to fail a preview — the plain conversion is still a correct picture.
"""
profile = image.info.get("icc_profile")
if profile:
try:
return ImageCms.profileToProfile(
image,
ImageCms.ImageCmsProfile(io.BytesIO(profile)),
ImageCms.createProfile("sRGB"),
outputMode=mode,
)
except Exception as error: # noqa: BLE001 - any ICC failure falls back
log.info("ignoring unusable ICC profile on %s: %s", getattr(image, "filename", "?"), error)
return image.convert(mode)

75
photo_pipeline/integrations/exiftool.py
View File

@@ -12,48 +12,11 @@ nt-apply-list, pa-nsfw-filter). No dependency on the archived entry points.
from __future__ import annotations
import functools
import json
import os
import shutil
import subprocess
from collections.abc import Iterable
# A hung exiftool must not hang the worker with it: every call is bounded, and a
# call that runs out of time is treated exactly like a failed one — no metadata
# answer, nothing marked verified (US07-04). The knob exists because "slow" is a
# property of the machine, not of the code: huge files on a slow network volume
# legitimately take longer than the default.
DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 120.0
def _timeout() -> float:
try:
return float(os.environ.get("PHOTO_PIPELINE_EXIFTOOL_TIMEOUT", DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS))
except ValueError:
return DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
def find_binary(binary: str = "exiftool") -> str | None:
"""Absolute path of exiftool, or ``None`` when it is not installed."""
return shutil.which(binary)
@functools.lru_cache(maxsize=1)
def version() -> str | None:
"""Reported exiftool version, or ``None`` when it is missing or unusable.
Cached: it cannot change inside a running process, and diagnostics asks for it
on every report (US08-02, where a container image pins this version).
"""
try:
result = subprocess.run(
["exiftool", "-ver"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=_timeout()
)
except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
return None
return (result.stdout or "").strip() or None
def read_keyword_sets(paths: Iterable[str]) -> dict[str, set[str]]:
"""Map each path to its lowercased set of ``Keywords`` + ``Subject`` values.
@@ -71,9 +34,8 @@ def read_keyword_sets(paths: Iterable[str]) -> dict[str, set[str]]:
input="\n".join(paths),
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=_timeout(),
)
except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
except FileNotFoundError:
return {}
out: dict[str, set[str]] = {}
try:
@@ -94,33 +56,6 @@ def read_keyword_sets(paths: Iterable[str]) -> dict[str, set[str]]:
return out
def read_all(path: str) -> dict | None:
"""Every tag exiftool can read from ``path``, or ``None`` when it cannot answer.
This is the snapshot an EXIF checkpoint compares against: proving that a write
preserved the fields it does not own requires knowing all of them, not just the
ones being written (US07-03). ``None`` (exiftool missing, unreadable file,
unparsable output) is not an empty snapshot — a caller must not read it as
"nothing was there".
"""
try:
result = subprocess.run(
["exiftool", "-m", "-j", "-G0:1", path],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=_timeout(),
)
except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
return None
try:
records = json.loads(result.stdout or "[]")
except ValueError:
return None
if not records:
return None
return {k: v for k, v in records[0].items() if k != "SourceFile"}
def apply_keywords(path: str, *, add: Iterable[str] = (), remove: Iterable[str] = ()) -> bool:
"""Idempotently add/remove keywords in Keywords + Subject; preserve all else."""
args = ["exiftool", "-m", "-overwrite_original"]
@@ -132,10 +67,4 @@ def apply_keywords(path: str, *, add: Iterable[str] = (), remove: Iterable[str]
if len(args) == 3:
return True
args.append(path)
try:
return subprocess.run(
args, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=_timeout()
).returncode == 0
except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
# A write that never returned is not a write that succeeded.
return False
return subprocess.run(args, capture_output=True, text=True).returncode == 0

23
photo_pipeline/integrations/nsfw_model.py
View File

@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
from pathlib import Path
from photo_pipeline import imaging
MODEL_ID = "AdamCodd/vit-base-nsfw-detector"
BATCH = 16
@@ -56,17 +54,13 @@ class NsfwModel:
self._ensure_loaded()
import numpy as np
import torch
from PIL import Image
from PIL import Image, ImageFile
# The donor set ``ImageFile.LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES = True`` here. That flag is
# process-global: in this application the same process also hashes files and
# renders previews, and those must keep failing loudly on a truncated file
# rather than quietly working on half of one (US07-03). An unreadable image
# is skipped instead — it stays unscored, and therefore visibly undecided.
def preprocess(path):
with imaging.open_image(path) as image:
small = image.convert("RGB").resize((self._size, self._size), Image.BILINEAR)
array = (np.asarray(small, dtype="float32") / 255.0 - 0.5) / 0.5
ImageFile.LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES = True
def preprocess(image):
image = image.convert("RGB").resize((self._size, self._size), Image.BILINEAR)
array = (np.asarray(image, dtype="float32") / 255.0 - 0.5) / 0.5
return torch.from_numpy(array).permute(2, 0, 1)
results: list[tuple[str, float]] = []
@@ -75,10 +69,9 @@ class NsfwModel:
tensors, batch_paths = [], []
for path in items[start : start + self.batch]:
try:
tensors.append(preprocess(path))
tensors.append(preprocess(Image.open(path)))
batch_paths.append(path)
except (imaging.MediaError, OSError, ValueError):
# One bad file must not cost the batch its other fifteen.
except Exception:
continue
if not tensors:
continue

4
photo_pipeline/jobs/worker.py
View File

@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ from collections.abc import Mapping, Sequence
from sqlalchemy import select
from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
from photo_pipeline.faults import JOB_ITEM_DONE, maybe_fault
from photo_pipeline.jobs.handlers import REGISTRY, Cancelled, Handler, JobContext
from photo_pipeline.models import JobItem
from photo_pipeline.services.jobs import ItemState, JobConflict, JobService, JobState
@@ -87,9 +86,6 @@ class Worker:
)
else:
self.service.set_item(job_id, item_key, ItemState.SUCCEEDED, fencing_token=token)
# One item is durably done, the job outcome is not: the control point
# for a crash mid-batch (US07-04). Recovery must not re-run this item.
maybe_fault(JOB_ITEM_DONE)
self.service.heartbeat(job_id, self.worker_id, lease_seconds=self.lease_seconds)
self._finalize(job_id, token, cancelled=cancelled, any_failed=any_failed)

2
photo_pipeline/models/__init__.py
View File

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ Alembic environment relies on.
from photo_pipeline.models.albums import AlbumProposal
from photo_pipeline.models.archives import ArchiveLocation, ArchiveOperation, ArchivePlan
from photo_pipeline.models.assets import Asset, AssetPath
from photo_pipeline.models.exif import ExifProjection
from photo_pipeline.models.duplicates import (
DuplicateCluster,
DuplicateMember,
@@ -29,7 +28,6 @@ __all__ = [
"DuplicateCluster",
"DuplicateMember",
"DuplicateNegativeLink",
"ExifProjection",
"Job",
"JobItem",
"JobEvent",

33
photo_pipeline/models/exif.py
View File

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
"""The durable EXIF projection per asset and stage (concept §3, US07-03).
One row per ``(asset_id, stage)``: what the stage wanted written, what the file
looked like afterwards, and whether anything outside the stage's ownership moved.
``state = divergent`` is the whole point of the table — it survives restarts, keeps
the asset out of stages that require verified metadata, and gives a human something
to look at instead of a silent repair.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from datetime import datetime
from sqlalchemy import DateTime, ForeignKey, Integer, String
from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column
from photo_pipeline.db import Base
class ExifProjection(Base):
__tablename__ = "exif_projections"
asset_id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(ForeignKey("assets.id"), primary_key=True)
stage: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, primary_key=True) # safety | analysis
id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False)
projection_version: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=0)
desired_json: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
divergent_fields: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String) # JSON array
result_file_sha256: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
state: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False) # verified|divergent|failed
error_code: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
verified_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))
updated_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))

61
photo_pipeline/path_policy.py
View File

@@ -15,7 +15,9 @@ import os
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Iterable, Iterator
SUPPORTED_EXTENSIONS = {".jpg", ".jpeg", ".png", ".webp", ".heic", ".heif", ".tiff", ".tif"}
SUPPORTED_EXTENSIONS = {
".jpg", ".jpeg", ".png", ".webp", ".heic", ".heif", ".tiff", ".tif"
}
EXCLUDED_DIR_NAMES = {"_IGNORE", ".@__thumb"}
@@ -70,63 +72,6 @@ def resolve_in_roots(roots: Iterable[os.PathLike | str], path: os.PathLike | str
raise PathPolicyError("path is outside the configured library roots")
def in_container() -> bool:
"""Whether this process is running inside a container image build of the app."""
return Path("/.dockerenv").exists()
def _under_mount(path: Path) -> bool:
"""Whether ``path`` or one of its parents below ``/`` is a mounted filesystem."""
current = path.resolve()
while current != current.parent:
if os.path.ismount(current):
return True
current = current.parent
return False
def roots_refusal(roots: Iterable[os.PathLike | str], *, require_mount: bool = False) -> str | None:
"""Why the configured library roots cannot be worked with, or ``None`` (US08-03).
The roots name the directories this installation renames folders in, rewrites
EXIF in, and archives from. Container path policy is the same problem as host
path policy with one new failure mode: the configured roots must name the
*container-side* mount paths. A host path configured inside a container is
either absent or an ordinary directory of the image, so the library looks empty
and the first write lands in the container's throwaway layer instead of in the
library. That is worth refusing at startup, while an operator is still watching,
rather than at the first write.
``require_mount`` is the container-only half of that: inside a container a real
library arrives through a bind mount, so a root that is not on (or under) a
mount point is not the library the deployment meant.
Writability is deliberately *not* checked: a bind mount's ownership is
virtualised by Docker Desktop and Colima (it arrives as ``root:root``), so
``os.access`` there is evidence about the virtio layer rather than about the
library. A wrong UID/GID surfaces as a refused rename with the real errno, which
is at least true; a refusal here would be false on two supported platforms.
"""
for root in roots:
path = Path(root)
if not path.exists():
return (
f"library root {path} does not exist: PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS must "
"name paths that exist here, and in a container that means the mount path"
)
if not path.is_dir():
return f"library root {path} is not a directory"
if not os.access(path, os.R_OK | os.X_OK):
return f"library root {path} is not readable by this process"
if require_mount and not _under_mount(path):
return (
f"library root {path} is not on a mounted filesystem in this container: "
"the library was not bind-mounted there, so PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS "
"names a directory of the image rather than the library"
)
return None
def iter_supported_files(root: os.PathLike | str) -> Iterator[Path]:
"""Yield supported, non-excluded files under ``root`` in deterministic order.

115
photo_pipeline/services/analysis.py
View File

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Protocol
@@ -25,9 +26,10 @@ from sqlalchemy import func, select
from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
from photo_pipeline import path_policy
from photo_pipeline.models import AnalysisResult, Asset
from photo_pipeline.services import exif_checkpoint
from photo_pipeline.services.safety import SFW, latest_reviews
from photo_pipeline.integrations import exiftool
from photo_pipeline.models import AnalysisResult, Asset, SafetyReview
from photo_pipeline.services import hashing
from photo_pipeline.services.safety import SFW
MODEL = "gemini-2.5-flash"
PROMPT_VERSION = "1"
@@ -71,31 +73,11 @@ class AnalysisService:
def _sfw_asset_ids(self, session) -> set[str]:
"""Asset ids whose latest safety decision is ``sfw`` — the ONLY assets that
may reach the provider.
The "latest row wins" rule is applied in SQL (US07-06); loading every review
to fold it in Python made the gate cost grow with the review history rather
than with the work being gated.
"""
latest = latest_reviews().subquery()
return set(
session.scalars(select(latest.c.asset_id).where(latest.c.decision == SFW))
)
def _sfw_count(self, session) -> int:
"""How many assets the gate currently allows, without listing them."""
latest = latest_reviews().subquery()
return int(
session.scalar(
select(func.count()).select_from(latest).where(latest.c.decision == SFW)
)
or 0
)
def _is_still_sfw(self, asset_id: str) -> bool:
"""Re-read the current safety decision straight from the database."""
with self._session_factory() as session:
return asset_id in self._sfw_asset_ids(session)
may reach the provider."""
latest: dict[str, str | None] = {}
for review in session.scalars(select(SafetyReview).order_by(SafetyReview.created_at)):
latest[review.asset_id] = review.decision
return {aid for aid, decision in latest.items() if decision == SFW}
def eligible_asset_ids(self) -> list[str]:
"""Confirmed-SFW canonical active assets without a completed analysis."""
@@ -118,12 +100,9 @@ class AnalysisService:
)
return [a.id for a in assets if a.id not in done]
def counts(self, *, eligible: int | None = None) -> dict[str, int]:
"""Analysis progress. ``eligible`` may be passed by a caller that has just
counted confirmed-SFW assets, so the workflow home does not resolve the
latest decision of every asset twice on one page load (US07-06)."""
def counts(self) -> dict[str, int]:
with self._session_factory() as session:
eligible = self._sfw_count(session) if eligible is None else eligible
sfw = self._sfw_asset_ids(session)
rows = dict(
session.execute(
select(AnalysisResult.status, func.count()).group_by(AnalysisResult.status)
@@ -132,10 +111,10 @@ class AnalysisService:
analyzed = int(rows.get("analyzed", 0))
errored = int(rows.get("error", 0))
return {
"eligible": eligible,
"eligible": len(sfw),
"analyzed": analyzed,
"error": errored,
"pending": max(eligible - analyzed - errored, 0),
"pending": max(len(sfw) - analyzed - errored, 0),
}
def run(self, asset_ids: list[str] | None = None) -> dict:
@@ -183,22 +162,6 @@ class AnalysisService:
self._store(asset_id, status="error", result=None, error=str(error), tokens=0, raw="")
errors += 1
continue
# Third gate, after the call: a provider request takes seconds, and the
# reviewer may have flipped this asset to NSFW while it was in flight.
# The result describes an asset that is no longer analysable, so it is
# discarded — not stored, and above all not written into its EXIF
# (concept §18 scenario 7, US07-04).
if not self._is_still_sfw(asset_id):
self._store(
asset_id,
status="skipped_nsfw",
result=None,
error="the safety decision changed while analysis was in flight",
tokens=0,
raw="",
)
skipped += 1
continue
self._store(
asset_id,
status="analyzed",
@@ -207,7 +170,7 @@ class AnalysisService:
tokens=int(result.get("_tokens", 0)) if isinstance(result, dict) else 0,
raw=json.dumps(result, ensure_ascii=False),
)
self._write_analysis_exif(asset_id, path, result)
_write_analysis_exif(path, result)
analyzed += 1
return {"analyzed": analyzed, "skipped": skipped, "errors": errors}
@@ -232,45 +195,10 @@ class AnalysisService:
row.location_hint = result.get("location_hint")
row.approx_year = result.get("approx_year")
row.analyzed_at = now
row.exif_written_at = now
session.add(row)
session.commit()
def _write_analysis_exif(self, asset_id: str, path: str, result: dict) -> None:
"""The analysis EXIF checkpoint: additive keywords, then prove the rest held.
Additive by design — safety keywords and the user's own keywords are merged
with, never replaced (concept §3). ``exif_written_at`` is set only when the
read-back verified both the new keywords and every field this stage does not
own; a divergent result is recorded and left for a human (US07-03).
ponytail: the managed ``AI:`` caption segment, once captions are owned here.
"""
tags = tuple(str(tag) for tag in (result.get("tags") or []))
if not tags:
return
checkpoint = exif_checkpoint.run(path, add=tags)
exif_checkpoint.record(
self._session_factory,
asset_id=asset_id,
stage="analysis",
result=checkpoint,
add=tags,
)
if not checkpoint.verified:
return
with self._session_factory() as session:
row = session.get(AnalysisResult, asset_id)
if row is not None:
row.exif_written_at = checkpoint.verified_at
asset = session.get(Asset, asset_id)
if asset is not None and checkpoint.sha256:
# The bytes changed when the container was rewritten; upload must use
# the hash of what is actually on disk now (concept §3), and the
# recorded size has to move with it (US07-07).
asset.current_sha256 = checkpoint.sha256
if checkpoint.byte_size is not None:
asset.byte_size = checkpoint.byte_size
session.commit()
def get(self, asset_id: str) -> dict | None:
with self._session_factory() as session:
row = session.get(AnalysisResult, asset_id)
@@ -283,6 +211,17 @@ def _album_hint(path: str) -> str:
return Path(path).parent.name
def _write_analysis_exif(path: str, result: dict) -> None:
"""Additive analysis keywords into EXIF (Keywords/Subject), preserving safety
and user keywords. The donor also wrote a managed caption; only keywords are
written here via the shared adapter.
ponytail: add the managed ``AI:`` caption segment + read-back preservation check
when the analysis EXIF checkpoint is hardened."""
tags = result.get("tags") if isinstance(result, dict) else None
if tags:
exiftool.apply_keywords(path, add=[str(t) for t in tags])
def _result_dict(row: AnalysisResult) -> dict:
data = {field: getattr(row, field) for field in RESULT_FIELDS}
data["tags"] = json.loads(row.tags) if row.tags else []

256
photo_pipeline/services/app_lock.py
View File

@@ -1,256 +0,0 @@
"""Library-level process lock, and detection of an incompatible legacy run
(US07-05, concept §15 "migration and operational risks").
Every safety this application has — durable job leases, rename journals, archive
manifests — assumes that one installation owns the library. Two workers, or the
frozen CLI running beside the app, break that assumption *below* the level those
mechanisms can see: the second process simply does not know the first one's
database exists.
So mutation requires a file lock in the data directory, shaped as JSON so any
future or migrated entry point can read and honour it without importing this
package:
{"lock_version": 1, "role": "worker", "pid": 4242, "host": "...",
"started_at": "...", "library_roots": ["..."]}
One holder per role: an API and a worker are designed to run together, a second
worker is not. A lock whose process is gone is stale and is taken over — refusing
to start because of a crashed predecessor would turn one outage into two.
Ownership is an advisory ``flock`` on that file, not the record inside it. The
record says *who*; the kernel says *whether*. That distinction is what makes the
lock work in containers (US08-03), where a PID and a hostname are namespaced: a
lock left behind by a container that no longer exists names a pid that still
"exists" in the new container and a host that cannot be probed, so believing the
file would deadlock every restart. A flock is released when its holder dies however
it dies, and is seen by every process that can open the file — which for a local
data directory is every container of this deployment.
Legacy detection is deliberately a heuristic, not a promise: the archived CLI has
no lock of its own, so what can be observed is its state files being written right
now. Recent writes to them mean something else is mutating this library, and every
mutating stage should refuse until it stops.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import fcntl
import json
import os
import socket
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
LOCK_VERSION = 1
LOCK_SUFFIX = ".lock.json"
# State files only the archived CLIs write. Their presence is history; a *recent*
# modification is a running process.
# ponytail: the real fix is a lock the migrated CLI paths take too — this catches
# the frozen archive, which has no lock and cannot be changed (US07-01).
LEGACY_ARTIFACTS = (
"photo_analyzer.db",
"nsfw_scores.csv",
"photo_analyzer_history.jsonl",
"photo_analyzer.log",
"photo_analyzer_debug.log",
)
LEGACY_ACTIVE_SECONDS = 300
class LockHeld(RuntimeError):
"""Another live process of the same role owns this library."""
def __init__(self, holder: "Holder") -> None:
super().__init__(
f"{holder.role} is already running for this library "
f"(pid {holder.pid} on {holder.host}, since {holder.started_at})"
)
self.holder = holder
class LegacyProcessActive(RuntimeError):
"""A legacy CLI appears to be mutating the same library right now."""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Holder:
role: str
pid: int
host: str
started_at: str
lock_version: int = LOCK_VERSION
library_roots: tuple[str, ...] = ()
@property
def alive(self) -> bool:
"""Whether the recorded process still exists on this host.
A lock from another host cannot be probed, so it is believed: assuming a
remote holder is dead is how two machines end up renaming the same folder.
"""
if self.host != socket.gethostname():
return True
try:
os.kill(self.pid, 0)
except ProcessLookupError:
return False
except PermissionError:
return True # exists, owned by someone else
return True
def as_dict(self) -> dict:
return {
"lock_version": self.lock_version,
"role": self.role,
"pid": self.pid,
"host": self.host,
"started_at": self.started_at,
"library_roots": list(self.library_roots),
"alive": self.alive,
}
def _now() -> datetime:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
def _in_container() -> bool:
from photo_pipeline import path_policy
return path_policy.in_container()
def legacy_activity(config: Config) -> dict:
"""Legacy state files written within the activity window, if any."""
seen: list[dict] = []
cutoff = _now().timestamp() - LEGACY_ACTIVE_SECONDS
roots = [Path(root) for root in config.library_roots] + [Path(config.data_dir)]
for root in roots:
for name in LEGACY_ARTIFACTS:
path = root / name
try:
modified = path.stat().st_mtime
except OSError:
continue
if modified >= cutoff:
seen.append(
{
"path": str(path),
"modified_at": datetime.fromtimestamp(modified, timezone.utc).isoformat(),
}
)
return {"active": bool(seen), "artifacts": seen, "window_seconds": LEGACY_ACTIVE_SECONDS}
class LibraryLock:
"""One holder per role for one library. Used as a context manager."""
def __init__(self, config: Config, role: str = "worker") -> None:
self._config = config
self.role = role
self.path = Path(config.data_dir) / f"{role}{LOCK_SUFFIX}"
self._acquired = False
self._handle = None
# ── inspection ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def holder(self) -> Holder | None:
try:
payload = json.loads(self.path.read_text())
except (OSError, ValueError):
return None
try:
return Holder(
role=payload["role"],
pid=int(payload["pid"]),
host=payload["host"],
started_at=payload["started_at"],
lock_version=int(payload.get("lock_version", LOCK_VERSION)),
library_roots=tuple(payload.get("library_roots", ())),
)
except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
# An unreadable lock is not an absent lock: something wrote it.
return Holder(role=self.role, pid=-1, host="unknown", started_at="unknown")
# ── acquire / release ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def acquire(self, *, allow_legacy: bool = False) -> Holder:
"""Take the lock for this role, or explain who has it.
Raises ``LockHeld`` when a live process of the same role owns the library,
and ``LegacyProcessActive`` when the archived CLI looks like it is running
against it.
"""
if not allow_legacy:
legacy = legacy_activity(self._config)
if legacy["active"]:
raise LegacyProcessActive(
"a legacy CLI is writing this library "
f"({', '.join(item['path'] for item in legacy['artifacts'])}); "
"stop it before running the application"
)
self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
# The kernel decides, because the file cannot: a container's PID and hostname
# are namespaced, so a lock left by a container that no longer exists names a
# pid that "exists" and a host that cannot be probed (US08-03). An advisory
# flock is held by a live process or by nobody, is released when that process
# dies however it dies, and is shared by every process that can open this
# file — which, for a local data directory, is every role in every container
# of this deployment.
handle = open(self.path, "a+", encoding="utf-8")
try:
fcntl.flock(handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB)
except OSError:
handle.close()
raise LockHeld(self.holder() or Holder(self.role, -1, "unknown", "unknown")) from None
current = self.holder()
if current is not None and current.host != socket.gethostname() and not _in_container():
# We hold the kernel's lock, so nothing on *this* machine holds the file.
# On a host that still leaves one case open: a data directory shared with
# another machine, whose flock we cannot trust. Believe its record rather
# than run two writers. In a container the data volume is local by
# construction (US08-03), and a foreign hostname is only a dead container.
fcntl.flock(handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
handle.close()
raise LockHeld(current)
mine = Holder(
role=self.role,
pid=os.getpid(),
host=socket.gethostname(),
started_at=_now().isoformat(),
library_roots=tuple(str(root) for root in self._config.library_roots),
)
payload = {k: v for k, v in mine.as_dict().items() if k != "alive"}
handle.seek(0)
handle.truncate()
json.dump(payload, handle, indent=2)
handle.flush()
# Held open on purpose: closing it is what releases the lock, and that must
# happen when this process ends, not when this method returns.
self._handle = handle
self._acquired = True
return mine
def release(self) -> None:
"""Give up a lock this process owns. Another holder's lock is left alone."""
if not self._acquired:
return
self.path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
if self._handle is not None:
self._handle.close() # closing the descriptor releases the kernel lock
self._handle = None
self._acquired = False
def __enter__(self) -> "LibraryLock":
self.acquire()
return self
def __exit__(self, *_) -> None:
self.release()

3
photo_pipeline/services/archive_transfer.py
View File

@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ from sqlalchemy import select
from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.faults import maybe_fault
from photo_pipeline.models import ArchiveLocation, ArchiveOperation, ArchivePlan, Asset, AssetPath
from photo_pipeline.services.archive_journal import (
ARCHIVE,
@@ -64,7 +63,7 @@ from photo_pipeline.services.archive_journal import (
from photo_pipeline.services.archives import MARKER_NAME, ArchiveError, ArchiveService
from photo_pipeline.services.duplicates import DuplicateService
from photo_pipeline.services.hashing import sha256_file
from photo_pipeline.services.rename_apply import PreconditionFailed
from photo_pipeline.services.rename_apply import PreconditionFailed, maybe_fault
from photo_pipeline.services.thumbnails import ThumbnailService
# The per-medium manifest: one JSON line per archived file, appended and fsynced

413
photo_pipeline/services/backup.py
View File

@@ -1,413 +0,0 @@
"""Online backups, verification, retention, and restore drills (US07-05).
A backup taken by copying a live SQLite file is not a backup: with WAL enabled the
file on disk is missing every committed page still in the write-ahead log, and a
writer mid-transaction makes the copy inconsistent. So every backup here goes
through SQLite's online backup API, which takes a consistent snapshot of a database
that is still being used (concept §3).
A backup directory holds exactly two things:
photo_pipeline.db the snapshot
manifest.json what it is, what it came from, and how to check it
The manifest is what makes the snapshot restorable by someone who was not there
when it was taken: the schema revision, the snapshot's SHA-256, the row counts it
should still have, the archive locations whose media the library depends on, and
which configuration values were set — **names and non-secret values only**. A
secret is recorded as "configured", never as its value, so a manifest can be
attached to a bug report.
Restore never writes into a live installation: it refuses a target that already
holds a database, because the one thing worse than a lost library is a half-merged
one. The drill is documented in README ("Backup and recovery").
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import json
import shutil
import sqlite3
from contextlib import closing
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from sqlalchemy import text
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory
SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
DB_NAME = "photo_pipeline.db"
MANIFEST_NAME = "manifest.json"
# How many backups the retention helper keeps by default. Small on purpose: a
# backup is a snapshot of state that is itself recoverable from the library, and
# the disk it lives on is the same one the low-disk warning watches.
DEFAULT_KEEP = 7
# Tables whose row counts are worth proving after a restore. Not the whole schema —
# these are the ones whose loss would be silent.
COUNTED_TABLES = (
"assets",
"asset_paths",
"safety_reviews",
"analysis_results",
"exif_projections",
"upload_batches",
"upload_items",
"archive_locations",
"archive_plans",
"archive_operations",
"rename_plans",
"rename_operations",
)
class BackupError(RuntimeError):
"""The backup could not be created, read, verified, or restored."""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class VerifyResult:
ok: bool
issues: tuple[str, ...] = ()
revision: str | None = None
counts: dict | None = None
def as_dict(self) -> dict:
return {
"ok": self.ok,
"issues": list(self.issues),
"revision": self.revision,
"counts": self.counts,
}
def _now() -> datetime:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
def sha256_file(path: Path) -> str:
digest = hashlib.sha256()
with path.open("rb") as handle:
for chunk in iter(lambda: handle.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
digest.update(chunk)
return digest.hexdigest()
def _revision(database: Path) -> str | None:
with closing(sqlite3.connect(database)) as connection:
try:
row = connection.execute("SELECT version_num FROM alembic_version").fetchone()
except sqlite3.Error:
return None
return row[0] if row else None
def _counts(database: Path) -> dict:
counts: dict[str, int] = {}
with closing(sqlite3.connect(database)) as connection:
for table in COUNTED_TABLES:
try:
counts[table] = connection.execute(f"SELECT count(*) FROM {table}").fetchone()[0]
except sqlite3.Error:
continue # a table this revision does not have yet
return counts
def _integrity(database: Path) -> tuple[str, list[str]]:
"""``PRAGMA integrity_check`` plus ``foreign_key_check`` — structure and links.
Structural soundness is not referential soundness: a database can pass
``integrity_check`` and still hold an upload item pointing at an asset that
is gone.
"""
issues: list[str] = []
with closing(sqlite3.connect(database)) as connection:
try:
result = connection.execute("PRAGMA integrity_check").fetchone()[0]
if result != "ok":
issues.append(f"integrity_check: {result}")
violations = connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_key_check").fetchall()
if violations:
issues.append(f"foreign_key_check: {len(violations)} violation(s)")
except sqlite3.DatabaseError as error:
issues.append(f"unreadable: {error}")
return "error", issues
return "ok" if not issues else "damaged", issues
def configuration_references(config: Config) -> dict:
"""Which configuration a restore has to reproduce — never the secrets themselves.
Paths and URLs are recorded because a restore into a fresh root has to be told
where the library and the Immich server were; API keys are recorded as
``configured`` so an operator knows one is required without the manifest ever
carrying it.
"""
return {
"data_dir": str(config.data_dir),
"database_path": str(config.database_path),
"library_roots": [str(root) for root in config.library_roots],
"thumbnail_cache_dir": str(config.thumbnail_cache_dir),
"immich_server_url": config.immich_server_url,
"immich_go_binary": config.immich_go_binary,
"secrets": {
"immich_api_key": "configured" if config.immich_api_key else "unset",
"vision_api_key": "configured" if config.vision_api_key else "unset",
},
}
def migrate_with_backup(config: Config) -> dict | None:
"""Upgrade the schema, with a snapshot first when there is state to lose.
A migration is the one routine operation that can damage every record at once,
and Alembic's own transaction does not cover SQLite DDL reliably. So a pending
upgrade is preceded by an online backup, and a failed upgrade names it in the
error: recovery is "restore that directory", not "reconstruct the library".
Returns the manifest of the backup it took, or ``None`` when none was needed.
"""
import logging
from photo_pipeline.db import run_migrations
service = BackupService(config)
manifest = service.pre_migration() if service.migration_pending() else None
try:
run_migrations(config.database_url)
except Exception:
if manifest is not None:
logging.getLogger(__name__).error(
"migration failed; restore the pre-migration backup at %s",
service.root / manifest["name"],
)
raise
return manifest
class BackupService:
def __init__(self, config: Config) -> None:
self._config = config
@property
def root(self) -> Path:
return self._config.data_dir / "backups"
# ── create ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def create(self, *, reason: str = "manual", keep: int | None = DEFAULT_KEEP) -> dict:
"""Take an online snapshot and describe it. Returns the manifest."""
source = self._config.database_path
if not source.exists():
raise BackupError(f"no database at {source}")
stamp = _now().strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
safe_reason = "".join(c for c in reason if c.isalnum() or c in "-_") or "manual"
directory = self.root / f"{stamp}-{safe_reason}"
if directory.exists(): # same second, same reason
directory = self.root / f"{stamp}-{safe_reason}-{len(list(self.root.iterdir()))}"
directory.mkdir(parents=True)
target = directory / DB_NAME
try:
with closing(sqlite3.connect(source)) as src, closing(sqlite3.connect(target)) as dst:
src.backup(dst) # the online backup API, not a file copy
except (sqlite3.Error, OSError) as error:
shutil.rmtree(directory, ignore_errors=True)
raise BackupError(f"backup failed: {error}") from error
state, issues = _integrity(target)
manifest = {
"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
"name": directory.name,
"created_at": _now().isoformat(),
"reason": reason,
"revision": _revision(target),
"database": {
"name": DB_NAME,
"bytes": target.stat().st_size,
"sha256": sha256_file(target),
"integrity": state,
"issues": issues,
},
"counts": _counts(target),
"archive_locations": self._archive_locations(),
"configuration": configuration_references(self._config),
"retention": {
"keep": keep,
"guidance": (
"Keep the newest snapshot on a different disk than data_dir, and one "
"off-site copy per archive medium. A backup only covers the database: "
"the photos themselves live in the library and archive locations named "
"above, which need their own copies."
),
},
}
(directory / MANIFEST_NAME).write_text(json.dumps(manifest, indent=2))
if keep is not None:
manifest["pruned"] = self.prune(keep=keep)
return manifest
def migration_pending(self) -> bool:
"""True when the database exists and is not at the revision this code wants."""
from photo_pipeline.db import current_revision, head_revision
if not self._config.database_path.exists():
return False
return current_revision(self._config.database_url) != head_revision()
def pre_migration(self) -> dict | None:
"""Snapshot before a schema change, when there is something to lose.
Returns ``None`` when the database does not exist yet (a fresh install has
no state a failed migration could damage).
"""
if not self._config.database_path.exists():
return None
return self.create(reason="pre-migration")
def _archive_locations(self) -> list[dict]:
"""The media the library's archived originals live on.
A restored database still points at these; if they are not restored too,
the pictures are gone even though every record survived.
"""
engine = create_db_engine(self._config.database_url)
try:
factory = create_session_factory(engine)
with factory() as session:
rows = session.execute(
text("SELECT id, name, root, media_id, state FROM archive_locations")
).mappings().all()
except Exception:
return []
finally:
engine.dispose()
return [
{
"id": row["id"],
"name": row["name"],
"root": row["root"],
"media_id": row["media_id"],
"last_state": row["state"],
"mounted": Path(row["root"]).is_dir(),
}
for row in rows
]
# ── inspect ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def list(self) -> list[dict]:
"""Every backup, newest first, with what is known about it."""
if not self.root.is_dir():
return []
entries = []
for directory in sorted(self.root.iterdir(), reverse=True):
if not directory.is_dir():
continue
manifest = self.manifest(directory)
database = directory / DB_NAME
entries.append(
{
"name": directory.name,
"path": str(directory),
"created_at": (manifest or {}).get("created_at"),
"reason": (manifest or {}).get("reason"),
"revision": (manifest or {}).get("revision"),
"bytes": database.stat().st_size if database.exists() else 0,
"complete": bool(manifest) and database.exists(),
}
)
return entries
def manifest(self, directory: Path) -> dict | None:
path = Path(directory) / MANIFEST_NAME
if not path.exists():
return None
try:
return json.loads(path.read_text())
except ValueError:
return None
def verify(self, directory: Path | str) -> VerifyResult:
"""Prove a snapshot is still the one that was taken and still readable."""
directory = Path(directory)
if not directory.is_dir():
return VerifyResult(False, (f"no backup at {directory}",))
manifest = self.manifest(directory)
if manifest is None:
return VerifyResult(False, ("manifest is missing or unreadable",))
database = directory / manifest["database"]["name"]
if not database.exists():
return VerifyResult(False, ("the snapshot file is missing",), manifest.get("revision"))
issues: list[str] = []
if sha256_file(database) != manifest["database"]["sha256"]:
# Bit rot, a truncated copy, or an edited snapshot: all three mean the
# bytes are not the ones that were verified when the backup was made.
issues.append("sha256 does not match the manifest")
state, structural = _integrity(database)
issues.extend(structural)
counts = _counts(database) if state != "error" else None
if counts is not None and manifest.get("counts") and counts != manifest["counts"]:
issues.append(f"row counts changed: {manifest['counts']} -> {counts}")
return VerifyResult(not issues, tuple(issues), manifest.get("revision"), counts)
# ── retention ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def prune(self, *, keep: int = DEFAULT_KEEP) -> list[str]:
"""Delete the oldest backups beyond ``keep``. Never deletes the newest one."""
if keep < 1:
raise BackupError("retention must keep at least one backup")
removed = []
for entry in self.list()[keep:]:
shutil.rmtree(entry["path"], ignore_errors=True)
removed.append(entry["name"])
return removed
# ── restore ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def restore(self, directory: Path | str, target_data_dir: Path | str) -> dict:
"""Restore a verified snapshot into a **fresh** data directory.
Refuses a target that already holds a database. Restoring on top of a live
installation would merge two histories that disagree about which files were
renamed, uploaded, and archived — the one failure this whole story exists to
prevent. Recovering in place is: stop everything, move the old data
directory aside, restore into a new one.
"""
directory = Path(directory)
result = self.verify(directory)
if not result.ok:
raise BackupError(f"refusing to restore an unverified backup: {result.issues}")
target = Path(target_data_dir)
target.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
destination = target / DB_NAME
if destination.exists():
raise BackupError(
f"{destination} already exists; restore into a fresh data directory"
)
shutil.copy2(directory / DB_NAME, destination)
# The write-ahead log of the *source* installation must not travel with a
# snapshot: the backup API already folded every committed page into it.
for leftover in (target / f"{DB_NAME}-wal", target / f"{DB_NAME}-shm"):
leftover.unlink(missing_ok=True)
restored = _integrity(destination)
return {
"backup": directory.name,
"restored_to": str(destination),
"revision": result.revision,
"counts": _counts(destination),
"integrity": restored[0],
"issues": restored[1],
"next_steps": [
"point PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR at the restored directory",
"run `python -m photo_pipeline migrate` to reach the current revision",
"run an inventory scan so paths are reconciled against the real library",
"mount every archive location listed in the manifest before archiving again",
],
}

502
photo_pipeline/services/benchmarks.py
View File

@@ -1,502 +0,0 @@
"""Load, soak, and resource-budget harness (US07-06, concept §17 and §18).
Performance here is not "it felt fast on my library". It is a set of agreed budgets,
measured the same way every time against synthetic databases of a stated size, and a
breach fails the run. The numbers come out as JSON so a scheduled run can keep a
series rather than a screenshot.
python -m photo_pipeline benchmark --profile smoke # seconds; runs in CI
python -m photo_pipeline benchmark --profile short # 25k assets
python -m photo_pipeline benchmark --profile full # 25k + 100k
python -m photo_pipeline benchmark --profile huge --soak-seconds 3600
What is measured is the service layer plus SQLite — the same queries the API routes
call — because that is where the time and the memory of a large library actually go.
The route/HTTP overhead is asserted separately, over a real client, in
tests/integration/test_performance_budgets.py.
An exceeded budget is a failure, not a note, unless it is listed in
``APPROVED_EXCEPTIONS`` with who approved it and why. That list is deliberately
empty: an exception has to be added, reviewed, and merged like any other change.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import gc
import json
import os
import resource
import statistics
import sqlite3
import time
import uuid
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from sqlalchemy import func, insert, select
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory, run_migrations
from photo_pipeline.models import (
AnalysisResult,
Asset,
DuplicateCluster,
DuplicateMember,
Job,
JobEvent,
SafetyReview,
)
from photo_pipeline.services.duplicates import DuplicateService
from photo_pipeline.services.inventory import InventoryService
from photo_pipeline.services.jobs import ACTIVE_STATES, JobService
from photo_pipeline.services.library import LibraryService
from photo_pipeline.services.workflow import WorkflowService
SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
# ── profiles ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PROFILES: dict[str, dict] = {
# Small enough to run on every change, large enough that an O(n) mistake in a
# list query still shows up.
"smoke": {"sizes": [2_000], "cluster_members": 500, "iterations": 20},
"short": {"sizes": [25_000], "cluster_members": 2_000, "iterations": 30},
"full": {"sizes": [25_000, 100_000], "cluster_members": 5_000, "iterations": 30},
# Scheduled infrastructure only: half a million assets takes minutes to build.
"huge": {"sizes": [500_000], "cluster_members": 5_000, "iterations": 20},
}
# ── budgets ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Budget:
metric: str
limit: float
unit: str
why: str
BUDGETS: tuple[Budget, ...] = (
Budget("latency_p95_ms", 250, "ms", "a list or search page must feel immediate"),
Budget("latency_max_ms", 2_000, "ms", "no single page may stall the review flow"),
Budget("rss_growth_bytes", 400_000_000, "bytes", "a run must not leak the library"),
Budget("open_files", 256, "count", "file descriptors are a hard operating-system limit"),
Budget("wal_bytes", 200_000_000, "bytes", "a growing WAL means checkpoints are starving"),
Budget("queue_depth", 1_000, "count", "an unbounded queue is an out-of-memory in waiting"),
Budget("cache_over_quota_bytes", 0, "bytes", "the thumbnail cache has to respect its quota"),
)
# Measured, documented, approved. An entry is ``("<profile>", "<scenario>",
# "<metric>"): {"limit": …, "approved_by": …, "reason": …, "review_by":
# "YYYY-MM-DD"}``; the report always lists which exceptions it applied, so a release
# review sees them.
#
# The two below are the half-million-asset scale point. The concept sets the 250 ms
# budget at 100k rows, which both pages meet (235 ms and 197 ms). At 500k the two
# library-wide aggregates — every asset's current safety decision, and every
# analysis row's album/tag/year breakdown — are inherently linear, and SQLite has
# one writer and no parallel scan. Fixing them properly means either denormalized
# totals (derived state the concept deliberately keeps out of the schema) or the
# planned PostgreSQL transition, not a query tweak. Everything else at 500k is
# inside budget, and the soak at that size grows neither memory nor queue.
APPROVED_EXCEPTIONS: dict[tuple[str, str, str], dict] = {
("huge", "library_stats", "latency_p95_ms"): {
"limit": 1_500,
"approved_by": "domverse",
"reason": "measured 1.08 s at 500k; the 250 ms budget is set at 100k rows (concept §18)",
"review_by": "2027-02-17",
},
("huge", "library_stats", "latency_max_ms"): {
"limit": 4_000,
"approved_by": "domverse",
"reason": "measured 3.2 s worst case at 500k, on a cold page cache",
"review_by": "2027-02-17",
},
("huge", "workflow_readiness", "latency_p95_ms"): {
"limit": 1_800,
"approved_by": "domverse",
"reason": "measured 1.40 s at 500k; resolving the current decision of every asset",
"review_by": "2027-02-17",
},
("huge", "workflow_readiness", "latency_max_ms"): {
"limit": 4_000,
"approved_by": "domverse",
"reason": "measured 3.3 s worst case at 500k, on a cold page cache",
"review_by": "2027-02-17",
},
}
def _now() -> datetime:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
# ── resource sampling ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def rss_bytes() -> int:
"""Resident set size of this process, without a psutil dependency."""
usage = resource.getrusage(resource.RUSAGE_SELF).ru_maxrss
# Linux reports kilobytes, BSD/macOS bytes.
return usage if usage > 1 << 32 or os.uname().sysname == "Darwin" else usage * 1024
def open_files() -> int:
"""Open descriptors, counted from the kernel's own view where it exposes one."""
for directory in ("/proc/self/fd", "/dev/fd"):
try:
return len(os.listdir(directory))
except OSError:
continue
return -1
def _file_bytes(path: Path) -> int:
try:
return path.stat().st_size
except OSError:
return 0
def _tree_bytes(path: Path) -> int:
if not path.is_dir():
return 0
return sum(p.stat().st_size for p in path.rglob("*") if p.is_file())
def sample_resources(config: Config, session_factory) -> dict:
"""One snapshot of everything a budget is written against."""
database = config.database_path
with session_factory() as session:
queue_depth = int(
session.scalar(select(func.count()).select_from(Job).where(Job.state.in_(ACTIVE_STATES)))
or 0
)
events = int(session.scalar(select(func.count()).select_from(JobEvent)) or 0)
cache_bytes = _tree_bytes(config.thumbnail_cache_dir)
return {
"at": _now().isoformat(),
"rss_bytes": rss_bytes(),
"open_files": open_files(),
"db_bytes": _file_bytes(database),
"wal_bytes": _file_bytes(Path(f"{database}-wal")),
"cache_bytes": cache_bytes,
"cache_over_quota_bytes": max(0, cache_bytes - config.thumbnail_cache_quota_bytes),
"queue_depth": queue_depth,
"event_rows": events,
}
# ── synthetic library ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def synthesize(config: Config, *, assets: int, cluster_members: int, batch: int = 5_000) -> dict:
"""Build a database of ``assets`` rows and one cluster of ``cluster_members``.
Rows only — no image files. What is being measured is the cost of reading a
large library's *records*: decoding is bounded separately (US07-03) and is
per-file, not per-library.
"""
config.database_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
run_migrations(config.database_url)
engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
factory = create_session_factory(engine)
started = time.monotonic()
root = config.library_roots[0] if config.library_roots else Path("/library")
now = _now()
asset_ids: list[str] = []
try:
with factory() as session:
existing = int(session.scalar(select(func.count()).select_from(Asset)) or 0)
for start in range(existing, assets, batch):
rows = []
reviews = []
analyses = []
for index in range(start, min(start + batch, assets)):
asset_id = f"asset-{index:08d}"
asset_ids.append(asset_id)
album = index % 500
path = str(root / f"album-{album:04d}" / f"photo-{index:08d}.jpg")
rows.append(
{
"id": asset_id,
"original_path": path,
"current_path": path,
"discovered_at": now - timedelta(seconds=index % 86_400),
"hash_version": 1,
"byte_size": 2_000_000 + index,
"current_sha256": f"{index:064x}",
"pixel_sha256": f"{index:064x}",
"phash": f"{index % (1 << 60):016x}",
"availability_state": "active",
}
)
reviews.append(
{
"id": str(uuid.uuid4()),
"asset_id": asset_id,
"decision": "sfw" if index % 10 else "nsfw",
"created_at": now,
}
)
if index % 2 == 0: # half the library analysed, as in a real run
analyses.append(
{
"asset_id": asset_id,
"status": "analyzed",
"description": f"a synthetic scene number {index}",
"tags": '["synthetic", "bench"]',
"setting": "outdoor" if index % 3 else "indoor",
"analyzed_at": now,
}
)
with factory() as session:
session.execute(insert(Asset), rows)
session.execute(insert(SafetyReview), reviews)
if analyses:
session.execute(insert(AnalysisResult), analyses)
session.commit()
if cluster_members:
with factory() as session:
cluster_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
session.add(
DuplicateCluster(
id=cluster_id,
method="perceptual",
confidence="near",
state="open",
version=1,
)
)
session.flush()
members = [
{
"cluster_id": cluster_id,
"asset_id": f"asset-{index:08d}",
"role": "member",
"distance": index % 6,
}
for index in range(min(cluster_members, assets))
]
session.execute(insert(DuplicateMember), members)
session.commit()
# A checkpoint here means the measurements start from a settled database
# rather than from a write-ahead log the size of the whole build.
with sqlite3.connect(config.database_path) as connection:
connection.execute("PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE)")
finally:
engine.dispose()
return {"assets": assets, "cluster_members": cluster_members, "seconds": time.monotonic() - started}
# ── scenarios ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@dataclass
class Scenario:
name: str
call: object
iterations: int
samples: list[float] = field(default_factory=list)
def run(self) -> dict:
for _ in range(self.iterations):
started = time.perf_counter()
self.call()
self.samples.append((time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000)
ordered = sorted(self.samples)
index = max(0, int(round(0.95 * len(ordered))) - 1)
return {
"scenario": self.name,
"iterations": self.iterations,
"latency_p50_ms": round(statistics.median(ordered), 3),
"latency_p95_ms": round(ordered[index], 3),
"latency_max_ms": round(ordered[-1], 3),
}
def scenarios(config: Config, session_factory, *, iterations: int) -> list[Scenario]:
inventory = InventoryService(session_factory)
library = LibraryService(session_factory)
duplicates = DuplicateService(session_factory)
workflow = WorkflowService(session_factory)
with session_factory() as session:
cluster_id = session.scalar(select(DuplicateCluster.id))
built = [
Scenario("inventory_page", lambda: inventory.list_assets(limit=50, offset=1_000), iterations),
Scenario("library_search", lambda: library.search(q="synthetic", limit=60), iterations),
Scenario("library_stats", lambda: library.stats(), iterations),
Scenario("workflow_readiness", lambda: workflow.readiness(), iterations),
Scenario(
"duplicate_cluster_list",
lambda: duplicates.list_clusters(limit=50, offset=0),
iterations,
),
]
if cluster_id:
built.append(
Scenario(
"duplicate_cluster_page",
lambda: duplicates.get_cluster(cluster_id, limit=100, offset=0),
iterations,
)
)
return built
# ── budget evaluation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def evaluate(profile: str, measurements: list[dict]) -> tuple[list[dict], list[dict]]:
"""Compare measurements with the budgets. Returns ``(breaches, exceptions_used)``."""
breaches: list[dict] = []
used: list[dict] = []
for measurement in measurements:
scope = measurement.get("scenario", "resources")
for budget in BUDGETS:
if budget.metric not in measurement:
continue
value = measurement[budget.metric]
if value is None or value < 0:
continue
limit = budget.limit
exception = APPROVED_EXCEPTIONS.get((profile, scope, budget.metric))
if exception:
limit = exception["limit"]
used.append({"scope": scope, "metric": budget.metric, **exception})
if value > limit:
breaches.append(
{
"scope": scope,
"metric": budget.metric,
"value": value,
"limit": limit,
"unit": budget.unit,
"why": budget.why,
}
)
return breaches, used
# ── soak ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def soak(config: Config, session_factory, *, seconds: float, interval: float = 1.0) -> dict:
"""Browse, queue, cancel, and retry for a while; watch what grows.
The question a soak answers is not "is it fast" but "does anything only ever go
up" — resident memory, the queue, the write-ahead log, open descriptors.
"""
library = LibraryService(session_factory)
inventory = InventoryService(session_factory)
jobs = JobService(session_factory)
samples = [sample_resources(config, session_factory)]
deadline = time.monotonic() + seconds
last_sample = time.monotonic()
cycles = 0
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
offset = (cycles * 50) % 1_000
library.search(q="synthetic", limit=60, offset=offset)
inventory.list_assets(limit=50, offset=offset)
job = jobs.enqueue("scan", items=[f"soak-{cycles}"])
jobs.cancel(job["id"]) # queued work cancels outright: the lane stays free
cycles += 1
if time.monotonic() - last_sample >= interval:
gc.collect() # so a growth reading is real, not just uncollected garbage
samples.append(sample_resources(config, session_factory))
last_sample = time.monotonic()
samples.append(sample_resources(config, session_factory))
third = max(1, len(samples) // 3)
early = statistics.mean(sample["rss_bytes"] for sample in samples[:third])
late = statistics.mean(sample["rss_bytes"] for sample in samples[-third:])
return {
"scenario": "soak",
"seconds": seconds,
"cycles": cycles,
"samples": samples,
"rss_growth_bytes": max(0, int(late - early)),
"queue_depth": max(sample["queue_depth"] for sample in samples),
"wal_bytes": max(sample["wal_bytes"] for sample in samples),
"open_files": max(sample["open_files"] for sample in samples),
"cache_over_quota_bytes": max(sample["cache_over_quota_bytes"] for sample in samples),
}
# ── the run ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def run(
config: Config,
*,
profile: str = "smoke",
soak_seconds: float = 0.0,
output: Path | str | None = None,
) -> dict:
"""Build, measure, evaluate. Returns the report; the caller decides the exit code."""
if profile not in PROFILES:
raise ValueError(f"unknown profile {profile!r}; try one of {sorted(PROFILES)}")
settings = PROFILES[profile]
report = {
"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
"profile": profile,
"started_at": _now().isoformat(),
"budgets": [
{"metric": b.metric, "limit": b.limit, "unit": b.unit, "why": b.why} for b in BUDGETS
],
"runs": [],
}
measurements: list[dict] = []
for size in settings["sizes"]:
sized = config.model_copy(update={"data_dir": Path(config.data_dir) / f"bench-{size}"})
before = None
build = synthesize(
sized, assets=size, cluster_members=settings["cluster_members"]
)
engine = create_db_engine(sized.database_url)
factory = create_session_factory(engine)
try:
before = sample_resources(sized, factory)
results = [
scenario.run()
for scenario in scenarios(sized, factory, iterations=settings["iterations"])
]
after = sample_resources(sized, factory)
after["scenario"] = "resources"
after["rss_growth_bytes"] = max(0, after["rss_bytes"] - before["rss_bytes"])
soaked = (
soak(sized, factory, seconds=soak_seconds) if soak_seconds > 0 else None
)
finally:
engine.dispose()
measurements.extend(results)
measurements.append(after)
if soaked:
measurements.append(soaked)
report["runs"].append(
{
"assets": size,
"build": build,
"before": before,
"scenarios": results,
"resources": after,
"soak": soaked,
}
)
breaches, exceptions_used = evaluate(profile, measurements)
report["breaches"] = breaches
report["exceptions_applied"] = exceptions_used
report["ok"] = not breaches
report["finished_at"] = _now().isoformat()
if output:
path = Path(output)
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path.write_text(json.dumps(report, indent=2))
return report

223
photo_pipeline/services/diagnostics.py
View File

@@ -1,223 +0,0 @@
"""Operational diagnostics: what the application is using, and what is about to
run out (US07-05, concept §17).
Every mutating stage in this application writes something before it is safe to
continue — a journal, an EXIF rewrite, an archive copy, a backup. All of them fail
badly on a full disk, so the sizes that grow (database, write-ahead log, thumbnail
cache, uploader reports, backups, logs) are reported separately rather than as one
opaque total, and each is compared against the free space actually left.
This is a read-only report. It never deletes, rotates, or prunes anything: what to
do about a warning is an operator's decision, and the tools for it are the
thumbnail cache quota, the backup retention helper, and log rotation outside the
application.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import functools
import json
import shutil
from pathlib import Path
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.integrations import exiftool, immich_go
from photo_pipeline.services import app_lock
# Below this much free space, mutating stages should stop rather than risk a
# half-written journal, EXIF container, or archive copy.
LOW_DISK_BYTES = 1_000_000_000
CRITICAL_DISK_BYTES = 200_000_000
# Written into the container image at build time (US08-02). The image pins exiftool
# and immich-go, and this file is how a running container reports which versions it
# was built with — so a drifted or missing binary is visible here rather than in a
# failed EXIF checkpoint or a misparsed upload report.
IMAGE_VERSIONS_FILE = Path("/etc/photo-pipeline/versions.json")
def _tree_bytes(path: Path) -> int:
if not path.exists():
return 0
if path.is_file():
return path.stat().st_size
total = 0
for child in path.rglob("*"):
try:
if child.is_file() and not child.is_symlink():
total += child.stat().st_size
except OSError:
continue # vanished mid-walk; it is not using space any more
return total
def _component(name: str, path: Path, *, quota: int | None = None) -> dict:
used = _tree_bytes(path)
entry = {"name": name, "path": str(path), "bytes": used, "exists": path.exists()}
if quota is not None:
entry["quota_bytes"] = quota
entry["over_quota"] = used > quota
return entry
def disk(path: Path) -> dict:
"""Free/total for the filesystem holding ``path`` — the nearest existing parent,
so a data directory that does not exist yet still reports its future disk."""
probe = path
while not probe.exists() and probe != probe.parent:
probe = probe.parent
try:
usage = shutil.disk_usage(probe)
except OSError as error:
return {"path": str(probe), "error": str(error)}
return {
"path": str(probe),
"total_bytes": usage.total,
"free_bytes": usage.free,
"used_bytes": usage.used,
}
def _pinned_versions() -> dict[str, str]:
"""The versions this image recorded at build time; empty outside a container."""
try:
recorded = json.loads(IMAGE_VERSIONS_FILE.read_text())
except (OSError, ValueError):
return {}
if not isinstance(recorded, dict):
return {}
return {str(name): str(value) for name, value in recorded.items()}
@functools.lru_cache(maxsize=4)
def _uploader_version(binary: str) -> str | None:
"""Cached: the uploader cannot change version inside one process."""
return immich_go.version(binary)
def tools(config: Config) -> list[dict]:
"""The external executables the pipeline shells out to, and their versions.
``pinned`` is what the image was built against, ``version`` is what is actually
installed. They differ only when the binary was replaced or mounted over.
"""
return [
{
"name": "exiftool",
"path": exiftool.find_binary(),
"version": exiftool.version(),
"pinned": _pinned_versions().get("exiftool"),
},
{
"name": "immich-go",
"path": immich_go.find_binary(config.immich_go_binary),
"version": _uploader_version(config.immich_go_binary),
"pinned": _pinned_versions().get("immich-go"),
},
]
def report(config: Config) -> dict:
"""Sizes, disk headroom, tool versions, warnings, and who holds the library lock."""
database = config.database_path
components = [
_component("database", database),
_component("write_ahead_log", Path(f"{database}-wal")),
_component("shared_memory", Path(f"{database}-shm")),
_component(
"thumbnail_cache",
config.thumbnail_cache_dir,
quota=config.thumbnail_cache_quota_bytes,
),
_component("upload_reports", config.data_dir / "uploads"),
_component("backups", config.data_dir / "backups"),
_component("logs", config.data_dir / "logs"),
]
space = disk(config.data_dir)
free = space.get("free_bytes")
warnings: list[dict] = []
if free is not None and free < CRITICAL_DISK_BYTES:
warnings.append(
{
"code": "disk_critical",
"message": (
f"only {free} bytes free on {space['path']}; stop mutating stages "
"and free space before renaming, writing EXIF, or archiving"
),
}
)
elif free is not None and free < LOW_DISK_BYTES:
warnings.append(
{
"code": "disk_low",
"message": f"{free} bytes free on {space['path']}; prune backups or the cache",
}
)
for component in components:
if component.get("over_quota"):
warnings.append(
{
"code": "cache_over_quota",
"message": (
f"{component['name']} uses {component['bytes']} bytes, over its "
f"{component['quota_bytes']} byte quota"
),
}
)
# A write-ahead log that outgrows its database means checkpoints are starving —
# an operational warning, not something to ignore (concept §16).
wal = next(c for c in components if c["name"] == "write_ahead_log")
db = next(c for c in components if c["name"] == "database")
if wal["bytes"] > max(db["bytes"], 1) :
warnings.append(
{
"code": "wal_growth",
"message": (
f"the write-ahead log ({wal['bytes']} bytes) is larger than the database "
f"({db['bytes']} bytes); a long-running read may be blocking checkpoints"
),
}
)
installed_tools = tools(config)
for tool in installed_tools:
# A missing tool is reported as ``version: null`` rather than warned about: on a
# development machine the uploader is legitimately absent, and the stages that
# need it already refuse to run. A *drifted* tool is different — the image pinned
# a version and something replaced it.
if tool["version"] and tool["pinned"] and tool["pinned"] not in tool["version"]:
warnings.append(
{
"code": "tool_version_drift",
"message": (
f"{tool['name']} reports {tool['version']} but this image pinned "
f"{tool['pinned']}"
),
}
)
locks = {}
for role in ("api", "worker"):
holder = app_lock.LibraryLock(config, role).holder()
locks[role] = holder.as_dict() if holder else None
legacy = app_lock.legacy_activity(config)
if legacy["active"]:
warnings.append(
{
"code": "legacy_process_active",
"message": (
"a legacy CLI is writing this library; mutating stages are refused "
"until it stops"
),
}
)
return {
"components": components,
"total_bytes": sum(component["bytes"] for component in components),
"disk": space,
"tools": installed_tools,
"warnings": warnings,
"locks": locks,
"legacy_activity": legacy,
}

164
photo_pipeline/services/duplicates.py
View File

@@ -52,13 +52,6 @@ from photo_pipeline.services import availability, hashing
NEAR_MAX = 5
SIMILAR_MAX = 10
# Member paging (US07-06). A burst or a re-imported folder can put thousands of
# assets in one cluster; review looks at a few at a time, so neither the list view
# nor the detail view may load them all.
MEMBER_PAGE = 100
MAX_MEMBER_PAGE = 500
SNAPSHOT_MEMBER_PREVIEW = 20
class Method(str, Enum):
EXACT = "exact"
@@ -527,65 +520,39 @@ class DuplicateService:
items = [self._snapshot(session, c.id) for c in rows]
return {"items": items, "total": int(total or 0), "limit": limit, "offset": offset}
def get_cluster(
self, cluster_id: str, *, limit: int = MEMBER_PAGE, offset: int = 0
) -> dict | None:
"""Cluster detail enriched with per-member asset evidence for comparison.
Members are paged and their evidence is loaded in batches (US07-06). A
cluster of a few thousand near-identical frames is a real shape for a phone
library, and the review screen only ever shows a handful at a time: loading
every member — each with its own asset, thumbnail, and location query — made
opening such a cluster cost thousands of round trips and megabytes of JSON.
"""
limit = max(1, min(limit, MAX_MEMBER_PAGE))
offset = max(0, offset)
def get_cluster(self, cluster_id: str) -> dict | None:
"""Cluster detail enriched with per-member asset evidence for comparison."""
with self._session_factory() as session:
cluster = session.get(DuplicateCluster, cluster_id)
if cluster is None:
return None
member_total = int(
session.scalar(
select(func.count())
.select_from(DuplicateMember)
.where(DuplicateMember.cluster_id == cluster_id)
)
or 0
)
rows = list(
session.execute(
select(DuplicateMember)
.where(DuplicateMember.cluster_id == cluster_id)
.order_by(DuplicateMember.asset_id)
.limit(limit)
.offset(offset)
).scalars()
)
evidence = self._member_evidence(session, [row.asset_id for row in rows])
members = []
for member in rows:
for member in session.execute(
select(DuplicateMember).where(DuplicateMember.cluster_id == cluster_id)
).scalars():
asset = session.get(Asset, member.asset_id)
try:
member_evidence = json.loads(member.evidence) if member.evidence else {}
evidence = json.loads(member.evidence) if member.evidence else {}
except json.JSONDecodeError:
member_evidence = {}
asset, offline = evidence[member.asset_id]
evidence = {}
members.append(
{
"asset_id": member.asset_id,
"role": member.role,
"distance": member.distance,
"evidence": member_evidence,
"evidence": evidence,
"current_path": asset.current_path if asset else None,
"byte_size": asset.byte_size if asset else None,
"phash": asset.phash if asset else None,
**offline,
**self._offline_evidence(session, asset),
}
)
members.sort(key=lambda m: m["asset_id"])
# A full-resolution comparison of an offline original is impossible; the
# UI asks for that named medium instead of guessing (concept §9). The
# answer covers the whole cluster, not just this page, so a mount is not
# discovered halfway through a review.
mount_required = self._mount_required(session, cluster_id)
# UI asks for that named medium instead of guessing (concept §9).
mount_required = sorted(
{m["archive_location"] for m in members if m["requires_mount"]}
)
return {
"id": cluster.id,
"method": cluster.method,
@@ -597,74 +564,10 @@ class DuplicateService:
"requires_confirmation": cluster.method == Method.PERCEPTUAL.value,
"mount_required": mount_required,
"members": members,
"member_total": member_total,
"limit": limit,
"offset": offset,
}
def _member_evidence(self, session, asset_ids: list[str]) -> dict:
"""``{asset_id: (asset, offline_evidence)}`` for one page, in three queries."""
if not asset_ids:
return {}
assets = {
asset.id: asset
for asset in session.execute(
select(Asset).where(Asset.id.in_(asset_ids))
).scalars()
}
previews: dict[str, list] = {}
for thumbnail in session.execute(
select(Thumbnail).where(Thumbnail.asset_id.in_(asset_ids))
).scalars():
previews.setdefault(thumbnail.asset_id, []).append(thumbnail)
location_ids = {
asset.archive_location_id for asset in assets.values() if asset.archive_location_id
}
locations = (
{
location.id: location
for location in session.execute(
select(ArchiveLocation).where(ArchiveLocation.id.in_(location_ids))
).scalars()
}
if location_ids
else {}
)
return {
asset_id: (
assets.get(asset_id),
self._offline_evidence(
assets.get(asset_id),
locations=locations,
thumbnails=previews.get(asset_id, []),
),
)
for asset_id in asset_ids
}
def _mount_required(self, session, cluster_id: str) -> list[str]:
"""Archive media whose originals this cluster needs, across every member."""
rows = session.execute(
select(ArchiveLocation.name)
.select_from(DuplicateMember)
.join(Asset, Asset.id == DuplicateMember.asset_id)
.join(ArchiveLocation, ArchiveLocation.id == Asset.archive_location_id)
.where(
DuplicateMember.cluster_id == cluster_id,
Asset.availability_state == availability.ARCHIVED_OFFLINE,
)
.distinct()
).scalars()
return sorted(rows)
def _offline_evidence(
self, asset: Asset | None, *, locations: dict, thumbnails: list
) -> dict:
"""What review can still rely on when a member's original is not readable.
Takes the already-loaded locations and thumbnails for its page rather than
querying per member (US07-06).
"""
def _offline_evidence(self, session, asset: Asset | None) -> dict:
"""What review can still rely on when a member's original is not readable."""
if asset is None:
return {
"availability_state": None,
@@ -674,8 +577,12 @@ class DuplicateService:
"preview": {"state": "missing", "protected": False},
"requires_mount": False,
}
location = locations.get(asset.archive_location_id)
preview = self._preview_evidence(thumbnails)
location = (
session.get(ArchiveLocation, asset.archive_location_id)
if asset.archive_location_id
else None
)
preview = self._preview_evidence(session, asset.id)
archived = asset.availability_state in availability.ARCHIVED
return {
"availability_state": asset.availability_state,
@@ -691,7 +598,10 @@ class DuplicateService:
}
@staticmethod
def _preview_evidence(rows: list) -> dict:
def _preview_evidence(session, asset_id: str) -> dict:
rows = list(
session.execute(select(Thumbnail).where(Thumbnail.asset_id == asset_id)).scalars()
)
ready = [r for r in rows if r.state == "ready" and r.path]
if ready:
best = max(ready, key=lambda r: (bool(r.protected), r.size or 0))
@@ -783,29 +693,11 @@ class DuplicateService:
session.delete(link)
def _snapshot(self, session, cluster_id) -> dict:
"""A cluster and a *bounded* preview of its members.
The list view shows a count and a few ids; a snapshot that loaded every
member turned one page of 200 clusters into hundreds of thousands of rows
(US07-06). ``member_total`` is the honest count either way.
"""
cluster = session.get(DuplicateCluster, cluster_id)
member_total = int(
session.scalar(
select(func.count())
.select_from(DuplicateMember)
.where(DuplicateMember.cluster_id == cluster_id)
)
or 0
)
members = session.execute(
select(DuplicateMember)
.where(DuplicateMember.cluster_id == cluster_id)
.order_by(DuplicateMember.asset_id)
.limit(SNAPSHOT_MEMBER_PREVIEW)
select(DuplicateMember).where(DuplicateMember.cluster_id == cluster_id)
).scalars()
return {
"member_total": member_total,
"id": cluster.id,
"method": cluster.method,
"confidence": cluster.confidence,

187
photo_pipeline/services/exif_checkpoint.py
View File

@@ -1,187 +0,0 @@
"""The EXIF checkpoint every metadata stage ends with (concept §3, US07-03).
A stage does not own a file's metadata; it owns a few fields in it. So writing is
never "set these tags" — it is:
snapshot everything → write only the owned fields → read everything back
→ prove the owned fields landed → prove nothing else moved
→ refresh the file hash → record the projection
Non-destructive here means *semantic* preservation: exiftool may rewrite the whole
container, so the file's bytes, size, and timestamps legitimately change. What may
not change is any field this stage does not own. When one does, the checkpoint is
``divergent``: the result is recorded, the stage is **not** marked verified, and
nothing is silently repaired — a later stage that needs verified metadata (upload)
therefore stays blocked until a human looks.
``failed`` is the third outcome and is deliberately distinct: exiftool missing, an
unreadable file, or a write that did not take is not evidence that metadata is fine.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import uuid
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from photo_pipeline.faults import EXIF_WRITTEN, maybe_fault
from photo_pipeline.integrations import exiftool
from photo_pipeline.models import ExifProjection
from photo_pipeline.services import hashing
# The tags the safety and analysis stages may change. Matched on the tag name, so
# every group carries the same rule (IPTC:Keywords, XMP:XMP-dc:Subject, ...).
OWNED_TAGS = frozenset({"Keywords", "Subject"})
# Not metadata about the picture: filesystem facts, the digest that necessarily
# moves whenever IPTC does, and the structural tags exiftool has to create the first
# time it writes an IPTC or XMP block. Comparing these would report every write as
# divergent and make the signal worthless.
VOLATILE_PREFIXES = ("File:System:", "ExifTool:")
VOLATILE_KEYS = frozenset(
{
"File:CurrentIPTCDigest",
"IPTC:ApplicationRecordVersion",
"XMP:XMP-x:XMPToolkit",
"XMP:XMP-xmp:MetadataDate",
}
)
VERIFIED = "verified"
DIVERGENT = "divergent"
FAILED = "failed"
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class CheckpointResult:
state: str # verified | divergent | failed
changed_fields: tuple[str, ...] = ()
sha256: str | None = None
# exiftool rewrites the container, so the file's size moves with its hash. Both
# are inventory facts about the current bytes and both have to be refreshed
# together, or the next stage compares against a size that no longer exists
# (US07-07: a rename plan blocked itself forever after any EXIF write).
byte_size: int | None = None
verified_at: datetime | None = None
reason: str | None = None
@property
def verified(self) -> bool:
return self.state == VERIFIED
def _now() -> datetime:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
def is_owned(key: str) -> bool:
return key.rsplit(":", 1)[-1] in OWNED_TAGS
def is_volatile(key: str) -> bool:
return key in VOLATILE_KEYS or key.startswith(VOLATILE_PREFIXES)
def compare(before: dict, after: dict) -> tuple[str, ...]:
"""Fields outside this stage's ownership whose value did not survive the write.
Additions count: a tag that appears out of nowhere is as much a divergence as a
tag that disappeared — both mean the write did more than it was asked to.
"""
keys = set(before) | set(after)
return tuple(
sorted(
key
for key in keys
if not is_owned(key)
and not is_volatile(key)
and before.get(key) != after.get(key)
)
)
def owned_values(snapshot: dict) -> set[str]:
"""Lowercased Keywords/Subject values across every group in the snapshot."""
values: set[str] = set()
for key, value in snapshot.items():
if not is_owned(key):
continue
items = value if isinstance(value, list) else [value]
values.update(str(item).strip().lower() for item in items if item is not None)
return values
def run(
path: str,
*,
add: tuple[str, ...] = (),
remove: tuple[str, ...] = (),
) -> CheckpointResult:
"""Write the owned keywords for one asset and verify the whole file around them."""
before = exiftool.read_all(path)
if before is None:
return CheckpointResult(FAILED, reason="metadata_unreadable")
if not exiftool.apply_keywords(path, add=add, remove=remove):
return CheckpointResult(FAILED, reason="write_failed")
# The file on disk has changed; nothing about it is recorded yet. A crash here
# is the worst case for metadata, so it is a fault control point (US07-04).
maybe_fault(EXIF_WRITTEN)
after = exiftool.read_all(path)
if after is None:
return CheckpointResult(FAILED, reason="readback_unreadable")
present = owned_values(after)
wanted = {value.strip().lower() for value in add}
unwanted = {value.strip().lower() for value in remove}
if not wanted <= present or (unwanted & present):
return CheckpointResult(FAILED, reason="owned_fields_not_written")
changed = compare(before, after)
sha256 = hashing.sha256_file(path)
byte_size = os.path.getsize(path)
if changed:
return CheckpointResult(
DIVERGENT, changed_fields=changed, sha256=sha256, byte_size=byte_size
)
return CheckpointResult(VERIFIED, sha256=sha256, byte_size=byte_size, verified_at=_now())
def record(
session_factory,
*,
asset_id: str,
stage: str,
result: CheckpointResult,
add: tuple[str, ...] = (),
remove: tuple[str, ...] = (),
) -> None:
"""Persist the projection for ``(asset_id, stage)`` — one current row per pair.
The row is what makes divergence durable and reviewable rather than a log line
that scrolled away.
"""
with session_factory() as session:
row = session.get(ExifProjection, (asset_id, stage))
if row is None:
row = ExifProjection(asset_id=asset_id, stage=stage, id=str(uuid.uuid4()))
session.add(row)
row.projection_version = (row.projection_version or 0) + 1
row.desired_json = json.dumps({"add": list(add), "remove": list(remove)})
row.divergent_fields = json.dumps(list(result.changed_fields))
row.result_file_sha256 = result.sha256
row.state = result.state
row.error_code = result.reason
row.verified_at = result.verified_at
row.updated_at = _now()
session.commit()
def state_for(session_factory, asset_id: str, stage: str) -> str | None:
with session_factory() as session:
row = session.get(ExifProjection, (asset_id, stage))
return row.state if row else None

12
photo_pipeline/services/hashing.py
View File

@@ -16,9 +16,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
from pathlib import Path
from PIL import ImageOps
from photo_pipeline import imaging
from PIL import Image, ImageOps
PIXEL_HASH_VERSION = 1
PHASH_VERSION = 1
@@ -43,9 +41,7 @@ def _digest_file(path: Path | str, digest) -> str:
def pixel_sha256(path: Path | str) -> str:
# Bounded decode: a header claiming a billion pixels is refused before it is
# ever turned into memory (US07-03).
with imaging.open_image(path) as image:
with Image.open(path) as image:
oriented = ImageOps.exif_transpose(image)
rgb = oriented.convert("RGB")
header = f"{PIXEL_HASH_VERSION}:{rgb.width}x{rgb.height}:".encode()
@@ -72,9 +68,7 @@ def phash(path: Path | str) -> str:
import numpy as np
from scipy.fftpack import dct
from PIL import Image
with imaging.open_image(path) as image:
with Image.open(path) as image:
small = image.convert("L").resize((32, 32), Image.LANCZOS)
matrix = np.asarray(small, dtype=np.float64)
transformed = dct(dct(matrix, axis=0), axis=1)

29
photo_pipeline/services/jobs.py
View File

@@ -236,32 +236,17 @@ class JobService:
raise InvalidTransition(f"{job.state} -> {to_state}")
if worker_id is not None and job.lease_owner not in (None, worker_id):
raise JobConflict(f"job {job_id} owned by {job.lease_owner}, not {worker_id}")
# Compare-and-set on the version this decision was made against. Without
# it a transition validated against a row that has since been claimed,
# cancelled, or finished would overwrite that newer state (concept §16
# database rule 6) — a cancel racing a claim used to un-claim a running
# job and leave the worker finalizing a job it no longer owned.
values = {
"state": to_state,
"version": job.version + 1,
"updated_at": now,
}
job.state = to_state
job.version += 1
job.updated_at = now
if error:
values["error_code"], values["error_message"] = error
job.error_code, job.error_message = error
if to_state in TERMINAL_STATES:
values.update(finished_at=now, lease_owner=None, lease_expires_at=None)
result = session.execute(
update(Job).where(Job.id == job_id, Job.version == job.version).values(**values)
)
if result.rowcount != 1:
session.rollback()
raise JobConflict(
f"job {job_id} changed while transitioning to {to_state}; retry"
)
job.finished_at = now
job.lease_owner = None
job.lease_expires_at = None
self._event(session, job_id, f"state:{to_state}", error[1] if error else None)
session.commit()
session.expire_all() # the core UPDATE bypassed the identity map
return self._snapshot(session, job_id)
def cancel(self, job_id: str) -> dict:

84
photo_pipeline/services/library.py
View File

@@ -15,9 +15,10 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import json
import re
from collections import Counter
from pathlib import Path
from sqlalchemy import String, and_, case, cast, func, or_, select, text
from sqlalchemy import and_, func, or_, select
from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
from photo_pipeline.models import AnalysisResult, Asset
@@ -70,75 +71,38 @@ class LibraryService:
return {"rows": rows, "total": total, "offset": offset, "limit": limit}
def stats(self) -> dict:
"""Library-wide totals, aggregated in SQL (US07-06).
This page used to load every analysis row — object, tags, and all — to count
them in Python, which cost half a second at 100k assets and grew from there.
Only the album breakdown still walks rows, and only their path and status:
SQLite has no ``dirname``, and two short strings per asset is cheap.
"""
with self._session_factory() as session:
status = dict(
session.execute(
select(AnalysisResult.status, func.count()).group_by(AnalysisResult.status)
).all()
)
albums: dict[str, dict] = {}
for path, row_status in session.execute(
select(Asset.current_path, AnalysisResult.status).join(
Asset, Asset.id == AnalysisResult.asset_id
rows = list(
session.execute(
select(AnalysisResult, Asset.current_path).join(
Asset, Asset.id == AnalysisResult.asset_id
)
)
):
)
albums: dict[str, dict] = {}
tag_counts: Counter = Counter()
year_counts: Counter = Counter()
people: Counter = Counter()
errors = []
for result, path in rows:
album = _album_of(path)
bucket = albums.setdefault(album, {"album": album, "done": 0, "total": 0})
bucket["total"] += 1
if row_status in DONE:
if result.status in DONE:
bucket["done"] += 1
year_counts = dict(
session.execute(
select(AnalysisResult.approx_year, func.count())
.where(AnalysisResult.approx_year.is_not(None))
.group_by(AnalysisResult.approx_year)
).all()
)
people = dict(
session.execute(
select(
case(
(AnalysisResult.people_count >= 3, "3+"),
else_=cast(AnalysisResult.people_count, String),
),
func.count(),
)
.where(AnalysisResult.people_count.is_not(None))
.group_by(
case(
(AnalysisResult.people_count >= 3, "3+"),
else_=cast(AnalysisResult.people_count, String),
)
)
).all()
)
# SQLite's JSON1 counts the tag arrays where they are: parsing 50k JSON
# strings in Python to keep the top 40 is the definition of doing work
# the database already does. Malformed tags are skipped, not fatal.
tag_counts = session.execute(
text(
"SELECT tag.value AS value, count(*) AS total "
"FROM analysis_results, json_each(analysis_results.tags) AS tag "
"WHERE analysis_results.tags IS NOT NULL "
"AND json_valid(analysis_results.tags) "
"GROUP BY tag.value ORDER BY total DESC, value LIMIT 40"
)
).all()
errors = [
{"path": path, "error": message}
for path, message in session.execute(
select(Asset.current_path, AnalysisResult.error_message)
.join(Asset, Asset.id == AnalysisResult.asset_id)
.where(AnalysisResult.status == "error")
)
]
for tag in _tags(result.tags):
tag_counts[tag] += 1
if result.approx_year is not None:
year_counts[result.approx_year] += 1
if result.people_count is not None:
people["3+" if result.people_count >= 3 else str(result.people_count)] += 1
if result.status == "error":
errors.append({"path": path, "error": result.error_message})
return {
"total": sum(status.values()),
"status": status,
@@ -147,7 +111,7 @@ class LibraryService:
"season": self._facet("season"),
"people": [{"value": v, "count": n} for v, n in sorted(people.items())],
"years": [{"value": y, "count": year_counts[y]} for y in sorted(year_counts)],
"top_tags": [{"value": t, "count": n} for t, n in tag_counts],
"top_tags": [{"value": t, "count": n} for t, n in tag_counts.most_common(40)],
"albums": sorted(albums.values(), key=lambda d: d["album"]),
"errors": sorted(errors, key=lambda e: e["path"] or ""),
}

399
photo_pipeline/services/release.py
View File

@@ -1,399 +0,0 @@
"""The release gate, the real-library dry run, and the approval that unlocks
mutation (US07-07, concept §18 release gates).
Three things live here because they are one decision:
1. **The gate** — one command that provisions an isolated stack, runs every suite in
a fixed order, and retains versioned evidence with checksums. A release is not
"the tests passed on my machine last Tuesday"; it is a report that says which
revision, which suites, how long, and what the artefacts hash to.
2. **The dry run** — a strictly read-only pass over the real photo library that
answers "what would this application do to it?" before it is allowed to do
anything. It opens no file for writing, creates no database rows, and touches no
metadata; it counts, classifies, and reconciles against whatever the database
already knows.
3. **The approval** — a person reads that report and signs it off for exactly the
library roots it describes. Until then, with
``PHOTO_PIPELINE_REQUIRE_DRY_RUN_APPROVAL`` set, every mutating request is
refused. Change the roots, or produce a newer report, and the approval no longer
matches: it approves *that* reconciliation, not the idea of mutating.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import json
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import time
from collections import Counter
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from photo_pipeline import path_policy
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
APPROVAL_NAME = "dry-run-approval.json"
CHECKSUMS_NAME = "CHECKSUMS.sha256"
REPORT_NAME = "release-report.json"
# The suites, in the order a failure is cheapest to read: units before the stacks
# they compose. ``label`` is what the report and the operator see.
STAGES: tuple[tuple[str, tuple[str, ...]], ...] = (
("unit", ("tests/unit",)),
("characterization", ("tests/characterization",)),
("integration", ("tests/integration",)),
("browser", ("tests/e2e",)),
)
# Skips the gate accepts, because they describe the machine rather than the code. The
# container ones (US08-02) belong here for the same reason exiftool does: the image
# build needs a Docker daemon and the network, and its definition is still checked
# offline in tests/integration/test_container_image.py.
ALLOWED_SKIP_REASONS = (
"exiftool not installed",
"root ignores directory permissions",
"no Docker daemon available",
"bind-mount ownership is virtualised",
)
class ReleaseError(RuntimeError):
pass
def _now() -> datetime:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
def sha256_file(path: Path) -> str:
digest = hashlib.sha256()
with path.open("rb") as handle:
for chunk in iter(lambda: handle.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
digest.update(chunk)
return digest.hexdigest()
def sha256_bytes(payload: bytes) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(payload).hexdigest()
def revision() -> str | None:
"""The commit this gate ran against, when the tree is a git checkout."""
try:
result = subprocess.run(
["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=10,
cwd=str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]),
)
except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
return None
return result.stdout.strip() or None
# ── the story matrix ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def story_matrix(repo: Path | None = None) -> dict:
"""Every backlog story, and how it is covered.
A story is ``delivered`` (mapped to test files that exist) or ``planned`` (an
accepted, not-yet-implemented story). Anything else — a story file nobody
mapped, or a mapping to a file that is gone — is a hole in the matrix, and the
gate fails on it rather than reporting a green run over missing coverage.
"""
repo = repo or Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
traceability = json.loads((repo / "tests" / "story_traceability.json").read_text())
mapped: dict[str, list[str]] = traceability["stories"]
planned: list[str] = traceability.get("planned", [])
stories = sorted(
"-".join(path.stem.split("-")[:2])
for path in (repo / "delivery_backlog" / "stories").glob("US*.md")
)
missing_tests = [
f"{story}: {rel}"
for story, files in mapped.items()
for rel in files
if not (repo / rel).is_file()
]
unmapped = [s for s in stories if s not in mapped and s not in planned]
unknown = [s for s in list(mapped) + planned if s not in stories]
overlap = sorted(set(mapped) & set(planned))
return {
"stories": len(stories),
"delivered": sorted(mapped),
"planned": sorted(planned),
"problems": [
*(f"story with no tests and not planned: {s}" for s in unmapped),
*(f"mapped test file is missing — {entry}" for entry in missing_tests),
*(f"mapped story is not in the backlog: {s}" for s in unknown),
*(f"story is both delivered and planned: {s}" for s in overlap),
],
}
# ── the gate ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@dataclass
class StageResult:
label: str
command: list[str]
returncode: int
seconds: float
summary: str
skipped: list[str]
def as_dict(self) -> dict:
return {
"stage": self.label,
"command": self.command,
"returncode": self.returncode,
"seconds": round(self.seconds, 2),
"summary": self.summary,
"skipped": self.skipped,
"ok": self.returncode == 0,
}
def _run_stage(label: str, paths: tuple[str, ...], *, repo: Path, log_dir: Path) -> StageResult:
command = [sys.executable, "-m", "pytest", *paths, "-q", "-rs"]
started = time.monotonic()
result = subprocess.run(command, cwd=str(repo), capture_output=True, text=True)
elapsed = time.monotonic() - started
output = result.stdout + result.stderr
(log_dir / f"{label}.log").write_text(output)
lines = [line for line in output.splitlines() if line.strip()]
summary = lines[-1] if lines else ""
skipped = [line for line in lines if line.startswith("SKIPPED")]
return StageResult(label, command, result.returncode, elapsed, summary, skipped)
def unexpected_skips(results: list[StageResult]) -> list[str]:
"""Skips the gate will not accept: everything but the documented environment ones."""
return [
line
for result in results
for line in result.skipped
if not any(reason in line for reason in ALLOWED_SKIP_REASONS)
]
def run_gate(
config: Config,
*,
output: Path | str | None = None,
stages: tuple[tuple[str, tuple[str, ...]], ...] = STAGES,
repo: Path | None = None,
) -> dict:
"""Run every suite in an isolated stack and retain checksummed evidence.
The stack is isolated by construction: each pytest run builds its own temporary
data directories and libraries, so the gate never reads or writes the operator's
photos. What it keeps afterwards is the report, the per-stage logs, and a
checksum file over both.
"""
repo = repo or Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
directory = Path(output) if output else Path(config.data_dir) / "release" / _now().strftime(
"%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ"
)
logs = directory / "logs"
logs.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
matrix = story_matrix(repo)
results = [_run_stage(label, paths, repo=repo, log_dir=logs) for label, paths in stages]
skips = unexpected_skips(results)
report = {
"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
"started_at": _now().isoformat(),
"revision": revision(),
"python": sys.version.split()[0],
"platform": os.uname().sysname,
"matrix": matrix,
"stages": [result.as_dict() for result in results],
"unexpected_skips": skips,
"failures": [result.label for result in results if result.returncode != 0],
}
report["ok"] = not report["failures"] and not matrix["problems"] and not skips
report["finished_at"] = _now().isoformat()
(directory / REPORT_NAME).write_text(json.dumps(report, indent=2))
# The evidence is only evidence if it can be shown to be the evidence that was
# produced. Checksums are the honest version of "signed" without a key: a real
# signature belongs to whatever key management the release actually has.
checksums = "\n".join(
f"{sha256_file(path)} {path.relative_to(directory)}"
for path in sorted(directory.rglob("*"))
if path.is_file() and path.name != CHECKSUMS_NAME
)
(directory / CHECKSUMS_NAME).write_text(checksums + "\n")
report["evidence"] = str(directory)
return report
# ── the real-library dry run ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
def dry_run(config: Config, *, roots: tuple[Path, ...] | None = None) -> dict:
"""Read-only reconciliation of the configured library. Changes nothing.
Opens no file for writing, writes no database row, and reads only what
``os.stat`` and the existing database already say. The point is to be able to
look at a real library — the one with the irreplaceable photos in it — and see
what the application believes about it before it is allowed to act.
"""
roots = roots or tuple(Path(root) for root in config.library_roots)
if not roots:
raise ReleaseError("no library roots are configured")
by_extension: Counter = Counter()
folders: set[str] = set()
files: list[str] = []
unreadable: list[str] = []
excluded = 0
total_bytes = 0
for root in roots:
if not Path(root).is_dir():
raise ReleaseError(f"library root {root} is not a directory")
for path in sorted(Path(root).rglob("*")):
if path.is_dir():
# Never traverse into an excluded directory, and never report its
# contents: proving exclusion must not require opening it.
if path_policy.is_excluded(path):
excluded += 1
continue
if path_policy.is_excluded(path):
continue
try:
stat = path.stat()
except OSError:
unreadable.append(str(path))
continue
files.append(str(path))
folders.add(str(path.parent))
by_extension[path.suffix.lower() or "(none)"] += 1
total_bytes += stat.st_size
known = _known_paths(config)
on_disk = set(files)
report = {
"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
"generated_at": _now().isoformat(),
"revision": revision(),
"library_roots": [str(root) for root in roots],
"files": len(files),
"folders": len(folders),
"bytes": total_bytes,
"excluded_directories": excluded,
"unreadable": unreadable,
"by_extension": dict(sorted(by_extension.items())),
"reconciliation": {
"known_to_database": len(known),
"already_registered": len(on_disk & known),
"new_to_the_application": len(on_disk - known),
"recorded_but_absent": sorted(known - on_disk)[:100],
"recorded_but_absent_total": len(known - on_disk),
},
"mutation": "none — this pass is read-only",
}
report["checksum"] = sha256_bytes(
json.dumps(report, sort_keys=True).encode("utf-8")
)
return report
def _known_paths(config: Config) -> set[str]:
"""Current asset paths the database holds, or an empty set if there is none."""
if not config.database_path.exists():
return set()
from sqlalchemy import select
from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory
from photo_pipeline.models import Asset
engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
try:
with create_session_factory(engine)() as session:
return {
path
for path in session.scalars(select(Asset.current_path))
if path is not None
}
except Exception:
return set()
finally:
engine.dispose()
# ── the approval ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def approval_path(config: Config) -> Path:
return Path(config.data_dir) / APPROVAL_NAME
def approve(config: Config, report: dict | Path | str, *, approver: str) -> dict:
"""Record that a person read this reconciliation and accepts mutation for it."""
if isinstance(report, (str, Path)):
report = json.loads(Path(report).read_text())
if "checksum" not in report:
raise ReleaseError("this is not a dry-run report: it has no checksum")
record = {
"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
"approved_at": _now().isoformat(),
"approved_by": approver,
"report_checksum": report["checksum"],
"library_roots": report["library_roots"],
"files": report["files"],
"revision": report.get("revision"),
}
path = approval_path(config)
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path.write_text(json.dumps(record, indent=2))
return record
def mutation_blockers(config: Config) -> list[dict]:
"""Why mutation must stay refused, or an empty list.
Only enforced when ``require_dry_run_approval`` is configured — the loopback
developer setup keeps working unchanged, and an operator turns this on before
pointing the application at the library they cannot replace.
"""
if not config.require_dry_run_approval:
return []
path = approval_path(config)
if not path.exists():
return [
{
"code": "dry_run_not_approved",
"message": (
"run `python -m photo_pipeline dry-run` and approve its report "
"before mutation is enabled"
),
}
]
try:
record = json.loads(path.read_text())
except ValueError:
return [{"code": "approval_unreadable", "message": f"{path} is not readable JSON"}]
approved_roots = [str(root) for root in record.get("library_roots", [])]
configured = [str(root) for root in config.library_roots]
if sorted(approved_roots) != sorted(configured):
return [
{
"code": "approval_scope_mismatch",
"message": (
f"the approval covers {approved_roots}, but the configured library "
f"is {configured}; run a new dry run"
),
}
]
return []

48
photo_pipeline/services/rename_apply.py
View File

@@ -46,11 +46,9 @@ from pathlib import Path
from sqlalchemy import select
from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
from photo_pipeline.faults import maybe_fault
from photo_pipeline.models import Asset, AssetPath, RenamePlan
from photo_pipeline.services import hashing
from photo_pipeline.services.rename_journal import (
ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS,
MANUAL,
RESUMABLE,
JournalState,
@@ -85,6 +83,18 @@ def _now() -> datetime:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
def maybe_fault(state: str) -> None:
"""Test-only crash barrier (concept §18 fault injection).
When ``PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAULT_AFTER`` names a journal state, the process dies
abruptly the moment that state has been persisted — modelling a real kill at
exactly that transition. Never set outside tests. Shared with the archive
transfer journal (US06-02), which uses the same env var and its own state names.
"""
if os.environ.get("PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAULT_AFTER") == state:
os._exit(9)
class RenameApplyService:
def __init__(self, session_factory: sessionmaker, *, library_roots: tuple = ()) -> None:
self._session_factory = session_factory
@@ -133,10 +143,20 @@ class RenameApplyService:
self._apply_one(operation, token=token, worker_id=worker_id)
applied += 1
except PreconditionFailed as error:
self._record_failure(operation["id"], token, error.code, str(error))
self.journal.transition(
operation["id"],
JournalState.FAILED,
fencing_token=token,
error=(error.code, str(error)),
)
failed += 1
except Exception as error: # unexpected: record and stop touching disk
self._record_failure(operation["id"], token, "apply_error", str(error))
self.journal.transition(
operation["id"],
JournalState.FAILED,
fencing_token=token,
error=("apply_error", str(error)),
)
failed += 1
state = self.journal.sync_plan_state(plan_id)
return {
@@ -147,26 +167,6 @@ class RenameApplyService:
"state": state,
}
def _record_failure(self, operation_id: str, token: int, code: str, message: str) -> None:
"""Record a failed operation in a state its journal can actually reach.
``failed`` only makes sense while nothing has moved. Once the folder is at
its destination — a postcondition failure such as bytes edited during the
move — the operation is not "failed and forgotten": the disk changed and
the database followed, so it becomes ``rollback_required`` and waits for a
human (US07-04). Guessing an unreachable transition used to raise out of
``apply`` and lose the record entirely.
"""
current = self.journal.get(operation_id)["journal_state"]
target = (
JournalState.FAILED
if JournalState.FAILED in ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS.get(current, set())
else JournalState.ROLLBACK_REQUIRED
)
self.journal.transition(
operation_id, target, fencing_token=token, error=(code, message)
)
def _apply_one(self, operation: dict, *, token: int, worker_id: str) -> None:
source = Path(operation["source_path"])
destination = Path(operation["destination_path"])

12
photo_pipeline/services/rename_journal.py
View File

@@ -81,17 +81,7 @@ ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS = {
TERMINAL_STATES = frozenset({JournalState.COMPLETE, JournalState.ROLLED_BACK})
# States where the disk may already have been touched by this operation.
# ``rollback_required`` belongs here too (US07-04): the move happened and someone
# has to decide what to do about it, so the library is not in a state another
# mutation may build on.
UNSAFE_STATES = frozenset(
{
JournalState.MOVING,
JournalState.MOVED,
JournalState.DATABASE_UPDATED,
JournalState.ROLLBACK_REQUIRED,
}
)
UNSAFE_STATES = frozenset({JournalState.MOVING, JournalState.MOVED, JournalState.DATABASE_UPDATED})
RESUMABLE = "resumable"
ROLLBACK_SAFE = "rollback_safe"

3
photo_pipeline/services/restores.py
View File

@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ from sqlalchemy import select
from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.faults import maybe_fault
from photo_pipeline.jobs.domain_handlers import ARCHIVE_LOCK, LIBRARY_WRITE_LOCK, UPLOAD_LOCK
from photo_pipeline.models import ArchiveLocation, ArchiveOperation, ArchivePlan, Asset, AssetPath
from photo_pipeline.path_policy import PathPolicyError, is_excluded, normalize_root, resolve_within
@@ -74,7 +73,7 @@ from photo_pipeline.services.archive_transfer import (
from photo_pipeline.services.archives import ArchiveError
from photo_pipeline.services.hashing import sha256_file
from photo_pipeline.services.jobs import JobService
from photo_pipeline.services.rename_apply import PreconditionFailed
from photo_pipeline.services.rename_apply import PreconditionFailed, maybe_fault
from photo_pipeline.services.rename_journal import RenameJournal
PREFLIGHT_VERSION = 1

192
photo_pipeline/services/safety.py
View File

@@ -105,11 +105,12 @@ def exif_projection(decision: str) -> dict[str, list[str]]:
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from sqlalchemy import column, func, select
from sqlalchemy import select
from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
from photo_pipeline.models import Asset, ExifProjection, SafetyReview
from photo_pipeline.services import exif_checkpoint
from photo_pipeline.integrations import exiftool
from photo_pipeline.models import Asset, SafetyReview
from photo_pipeline.services import hashing
DECISIONS = {SFW, NSFW, "deferred"}
@@ -139,8 +140,8 @@ class SafetyService:
# -- reads ----------------------------------------------------------------
def _latest_by_asset(self, session) -> dict[str, SafetyReview]:
"""The current review per asset, as ORM rows. Only for small, known sets —
every library-wide caller uses ``latest_reviews()`` in SQL instead."""
# Latest row per asset. Small local scale: order ascending, let later rows
# overwrite. ponytail: a windowed query if safety_reviews ever grows huge.
latest: dict[str, SafetyReview] = {}
for review in session.scalars(select(SafetyReview).order_by(SafetyReview.created_at)):
latest[review.asset_id] = review
@@ -148,99 +149,49 @@ class SafetyService:
def current_decision(self, asset_id: str) -> str | None:
with self._session_factory() as session:
latest = latest_reviews().subquery()
return session.scalar(
select(latest.c.decision).where(latest.c.asset_id == asset_id)
)
review = self._latest_by_asset(session).get(asset_id)
return review.decision if review else None
def counts(self) -> dict[str, int]:
"""Decision breakdown over canonical, active assets — the workflow totals.
Aggregated in SQL: the workflow home asks for this on every load, and
materialising every asset and every review to count them cost hundreds of
milliseconds at 25k assets and would scale linearly from there (US07-06).
"""
latest = latest_reviews().subquery()
"""Decision breakdown over canonical, active assets — the workflow totals."""
with self._session_factory() as session:
rows = session.execute(
select(
func.coalesce(latest.c.decision, "undecided"),
func.count(),
func.count(latest.c.score),
)
.select_from(Asset)
.join(latest, latest.c.asset_id == Asset.id, isouter=True)
.where(
Asset.canonical_asset_id.is_(None),
Asset.availability_state == "active",
)
.group_by(func.coalesce(latest.c.decision, "undecided"))
).all()
out = {SFW: 0, NSFW: 0, "deferred": 0, "undecided": 0, "scored": 0}
for decision, total, scored in rows:
if decision in (SFW, NSFW, "deferred"):
out[decision] += int(total)
else:
# Anything that is not one of the three decisions is undecided —
# including a score-only review, which is what "scored" counts.
out["undecided"] += int(total)
out["scored"] += int(scored)
return out
assets = list(session.scalars(_eligible_assets_query()))
latest = self._latest_by_asset(session)
out = {SFW: 0, NSFW: 0, "deferred": 0, "undecided": 0, "scored": 0}
for asset in assets:
review = latest.get(asset.id)
decision = review.decision if review else None
if decision in (SFW, NSFW, "deferred"):
out[decision] += 1
else:
out["undecided"] += 1
if review and review.score is not None:
out["scored"] += 1
return out
def review_queue(self, state: str = "", limit: int = 100, offset: int = 0) -> dict:
"""Assets for the review UI, filtered by ``state`` (undecided/sfw/nsfw/deferred).
Filtered, counted, and paged in SQL (US07-06): the queue for a large library
is thousands of rows and the reviewer sees one page of it.
"""
latest = latest_reviews().subquery()
projections = (
select(ExifProjection.asset_id, ExifProjection.state.label("exif_state"))
.where(ExifProjection.stage == "safety")
.subquery()
)
effective = func.coalesce(latest.c.decision, "undecided")
query = (
select(
Asset.id,
Asset.current_path,
latest.c.score,
latest.c.decision,
latest.c.exif_verified_at,
projections.c.exif_state,
)
.select_from(Asset)
.join(latest, latest.c.asset_id == Asset.id, isouter=True)
.join(projections, projections.c.asset_id == Asset.id, isouter=True)
.where(
Asset.canonical_asset_id.is_(None),
Asset.availability_state == "active",
)
)
if state:
query = query.where(effective == state)
"""Assets for the review UI, filtered by ``state`` (undecided/sfw/nsfw/deferred)."""
with self._session_factory() as session:
total = int(
session.scalar(select(func.count()).select_from(query.subquery())) or 0
)
rows = session.execute(
query.order_by(Asset.current_path).limit(limit).offset(offset)
).all()
return {
"total": total,
"items": [
{
"asset_id": asset_id,
"current_path": current_path,
"score": score,
"decision": decision,
"suggested": classify(score) if score is not None else None,
"exif_verified": bool(exif_verified_at),
"exif_state": exif_state,
}
for asset_id, current_path, score, decision, exif_verified_at, exif_state in rows
],
}
assets = list(session.scalars(_eligible_assets_query().order_by(Asset.current_path)))
latest = self._latest_by_asset(session)
rows = []
for asset in assets:
review = latest.get(asset.id)
decision = review.decision if review else None
effective = decision or "undecided"
if state and state != effective:
continue
rows.append(
{
"asset_id": asset.id,
"current_path": asset.current_path,
"score": review.score if review else None,
"decision": decision,
"suggested": classify(review.score) if review and review.score is not None else None,
"exif_verified": bool(review and review.exif_verified_at),
}
)
return {"total": len(rows), "items": rows[offset : offset + limit]}
def scorable_asset_ids(self) -> list[str]:
"""Canonical active assets with a path — the items a scoring job enqueues."""
@@ -294,28 +245,15 @@ class SafetyService:
exif_verified_at = None
result_sha256 = None
result_byte_size = None
if write_exif and decision in (SFW, NSFW) and path:
ops = exif_projection(decision)
# The full checkpoint: write the owned keyword, read the whole file back,
# and prove every field this stage does not own survived. A divergent
# result is recorded and left alone — it must not count as verified, so
# upload stays blocked until a human decides (US07-03).
result = exif_checkpoint.run(
path, add=tuple(ops["add"]), remove=tuple(ops["remove"])
)
exif_checkpoint.record(
self._session_factory,
asset_id=asset_id,
stage="safety",
result=result,
add=tuple(ops["add"]),
remove=tuple(ops["remove"]),
)
if result.verified:
exif_verified_at = result.verified_at
result_sha256 = result.sha256
result_byte_size = result.byte_size
if exiftool.apply_keywords(path, add=ops["add"], remove=ops["remove"]):
# Read back: the chosen keyword present, the opposite absent.
keywords = exiftool.read_keyword_sets([path]).get(path, set())
opposite = NSFW if decision == SFW else SFW
if decision in keywords and opposite not in keywords:
exif_verified_at = _now()
result_sha256 = hashing.sha256_file(path)
now = _now()
with self._session_factory() as session:
@@ -334,8 +272,6 @@ class SafetyService:
if result_sha256:
asset = session.get(Asset, asset_id)
asset.current_sha256 = result_sha256
if result_byte_size is not None:
asset.byte_size = result_byte_size
session.commit()
return {
"asset_id": asset_id,
@@ -345,34 +281,6 @@ class SafetyService:
}
def latest_reviews():
"""One row per asset: its current safety review, chosen in SQL.
``safety_reviews`` is append-only, so "the decision" is the newest row for an
asset. A window function picks it without loading the table; ``rowid`` breaks a
same-timestamp tie the same way the previous last-write-wins loop did.
"""
ranked = (
select(
SafetyReview.asset_id,
SafetyReview.decision,
SafetyReview.score,
SafetyReview.exif_verified_at,
func.row_number()
.over(
partition_by=SafetyReview.asset_id,
order_by=(SafetyReview.created_at.desc(), column("rowid").desc()),
)
.label("rank"),
)
.select_from(SafetyReview)
.subquery()
)
return select(
ranked.c.asset_id, ranked.c.decision, ranked.c.score, ranked.c.exif_verified_at
).where(ranked.c.rank == 1)
def _eligible_assets_query():
"""Canonical, active assets — the safety stage runs only on these.

65
photo_pipeline/services/thumbnails.py
View File

@@ -20,16 +20,15 @@ pa-imaging).
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import uuid
from pathlib import Path
from PIL import Image, ImageOps
from PIL import Image, ImageOps, UnidentifiedImageError
from sqlalchemy import select
from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
from photo_pipeline import imaging, path_policy
from photo_pipeline import path_policy
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.models import Asset, Thumbnail
from photo_pipeline.services import availability
@@ -43,9 +42,6 @@ except Exception: # pragma: no cover
pass
SIZES = (256, 512, 1280)
# Every in-flight render writes one of these beside its destination; startup
# cleanup recognises exactly this pattern and nothing else.
TEMP_SUFFIX = ".tmp"
THUMB_VERSION = 1
THUMB_FORMAT = "webp"
# The size kept as durable comparison evidence for archived assets (concept §9).
@@ -226,33 +222,28 @@ class ThumbnailService:
return self._cache_dir / safe[:2] / f"{safe}.{THUMB_FORMAT}"
def _render(self, source: str, size: int, cache_key: str) -> dict:
"""Decode bounded, orient, colour-manage, resize, and write atomically.
The temporary file is removed on every failure path: a decoder that dies
halfway through ``save`` would otherwise leave a stray ``.tmp`` in the cache
forever (US07-03).
"""
destination = self._cache_path(cache_key)
destination.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
tmp = destination.with_name(f".{destination.name}.{uuid.uuid4().hex}{TEMP_SUFFIX}")
try:
with imaging.open_image(source, max_pixels=self._config.thumbnail_max_pixels) as image:
imaging.draft(image, size) # JPEG decodes near the target size
with Image.open(source) as image:
width, height = image.size
if width * height > self._config.thumbnail_max_pixels:
raise ImageTooLarge(
f"{width}x{height} exceeds {self._config.thumbnail_max_pixels} px"
)
oriented = ImageOps.exif_transpose(image)
mode = "RGBA" if _has_alpha(oriented) else "RGB"
converted = imaging.to_srgb(oriented, mode=mode)
converted = oriented.convert(mode)
converted.thumbnail((size, size), Image.LANCZOS)
out_width, out_height = converted.size
destination = self._cache_path(cache_key)
destination.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
tmp = destination.with_name(f".{destination.name}.{uuid.uuid4().hex}.tmp")
converted.save(tmp, format="WEBP", quality=82, method=4)
except imaging.ImageTooLarge as error:
tmp.unlink(missing_ok=True)
raise ImageTooLarge(str(error)) from None
except imaging.UndecodableImage as error:
tmp.unlink(missing_ok=True)
raise UnsupportedImage(str(error)) from None
except Exception:
tmp.unlink(missing_ok=True)
except ImageTooLarge:
raise
except (UnidentifiedImageError, OSError, ValueError) as error:
raise UnsupportedImage(f"cannot decode {source}: {error}") from error
import os
os.replace(tmp, destination)
return {
@@ -262,28 +253,6 @@ class ThumbnailService:
"format": THUMB_FORMAT,
}
def cleanup_temp_files(self) -> int:
"""Remove leftover render temporaries, and only those.
Runs at startup, where the concept is explicit: clean *recognized* stale
temporary files, never arbitrary ones. The pattern is this service's own —
a dot-prefixed name inside the managed cache directory ending in
``.tmp`` — so nothing outside the cache and nothing a user put there can
match. Returns how many were removed.
"""
if not self._cache_dir.is_dir():
return 0
removed = 0
for leftover in self._cache_dir.rglob(f".*{TEMP_SUFFIX}"):
if not leftover.is_file() or leftover.is_symlink():
continue
try:
leftover.unlink()
removed += 1
except OSError: # pragma: no cover - a racing render already won
pass
return removed
# ── persistence ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _record_ready(
self, cache_key: str, asset_id: str, size: int, rendered: dict, *, protected: bool = False

5
photo_pipeline/services/upload_batches.py
View File

@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ from sqlalchemy import select, update
from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.faults import UPLOAD_ACCEPTED, maybe_fault
from photo_pipeline.integrations import immich_go
from photo_pipeline.models import UploadBatch, UploadItem
from photo_pipeline.services.hashing import sha1_file
@@ -237,10 +236,6 @@ class UploadBatchService:
error = ("uploader_failed", f"immich-go exited with {result['exit_code']}")
item_state = ItemState.FAILED
# The uploader is done and Immich may already hold every file, but nothing
# about that is durable yet — the control point for "accepted, outcome not
# recorded" (US07-04). Recovery must answer ``unknown_requires_verification``.
maybe_fault(UPLOAD_ACCEPTED)
self._finish(batch_id, token=token, state=state, error=error, result=result)
if item_state:
self._set_items(batch_id, item_state)

4
photo_pipeline/services/workflow.py
View File

@@ -47,9 +47,7 @@ class WorkflowService:
active = self._active_job(session)
safety = SafetyService(self._session_factory).counts()
# Reuse the confirmed-SFW total just computed: resolving the current decision
# of every asset is the expensive part of this page (US07-06).
analysis = AnalysisService(self._session_factory).counts(eligible=safety[_SFW])
analysis = AnalysisService(self._session_factory).counts()
undecided_clusters = cluster_states.get("open", 0) + cluster_states.get("reopened", 0)
stages = [

21
pyproject.toml
View File

@@ -8,32 +8,18 @@ dependencies = [
"sqlalchemy>=2.0",
"alembic>=1.13",
"pydantic>=2.7",
# Imaging is runtime, not test-only: thumbnails decode through Pillow, and the
# perceptual hash is a DCT over the decoded pixels (services/hashing.py).
"pillow>=10",
"numpy>=1.26",
"scipy>=1.11",
]
[project.optional-dependencies]
# The cloud vision provider. Optional because the analysis stage is the only thing
# that needs it, and a local review-only install should not pull an API client.
vision = ["openai>=1.30"]
test = [
"pytest>=8",
"httpx>=0.27",
"pillow>=10",
"numpy>=1.26",
"scipy>=1.11",
"playwright>=1.40",
"pytest-playwright>=0.4",
]
[build-system]
requires = ["setuptools>=68"]
build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
[tool.setuptools]
# The importable application. ``migrations`` and ``work_item`` live beside it but
# are not part of the package; without this, an editable install cannot guess.
packages = ["photo_pipeline"]
# Browser end-to-end tests also require: python -m playwright install chromium
[tool.ruff]
@@ -49,5 +35,4 @@ markers = [
"phase_d: Phase D end-to-end acceptance (US04-06) — guarded rename API, fault, and browser journeys",
"phase_e: Phase E end-to-end acceptance (US05-06) — upload preflight, uploader, and browser journeys",
"phase_f: Phase F end-to-end acceptance (US06-06) — archive destination, transfer, and restore journeys",
"container: builds and runs the container image and its composition (US08-02, US08-03) — needs a Docker daemon, the compose plugin, and the network",
]

96
tests/_artifacts.py
View File

@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
"""Failure artifacts for the fault and race suites (US07-04).
A randomized concurrency failure that leaves nothing behind is a failure nobody
can diagnose: the temporary library is deleted, the database goes with it, and the
seed that produced the interleaving is gone. So when a test fails, everything
needed to reproduce and read it is copied out of the temporary directory:
<artifacts>/<test id>/
seeds.json recorded properties (``race_seed``) and the failing test id
manifest.json every file under the temporary directory: path, size, sha256
files/... the databases (with -wal/-shm), journals, and logs themselves
The manifest covers the whole tree — including files too large or too private to
copy — so a missing or unexpected file is still visible afterwards. Copying is
bounded by ``MAX_COPY_BYTES``: artifacts must not turn a failing CI run into a
disk-full one.
Set ``PHOTO_PIPELINE_TEST_ARTIFACTS`` to choose the destination; the default is
``.artifacts/`` in the repository root.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import json
import os
import re
import shutil
from pathlib import Path
REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
DEFAULT_DIR = REPO / ".artifacts"
MAX_COPY_BYTES = 25 * 1024 * 1024
# Databases (and their write-ahead logs), journals exported as files, and logs.
COPY_SUFFIXES = (".db", ".db-wal", ".db-shm", ".sqlite", ".log", ".json", ".jsonl", ".argv")
def artifacts_dir() -> Path:
return Path(os.environ.get("PHOTO_PIPELINE_TEST_ARTIFACTS", DEFAULT_DIR))
def _slug(test_id: str) -> str:
return re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9._-]+", "_", test_id)[:120]
def manifest(root: Path) -> list[dict]:
"""Every file under ``root``: relative path, byte size, and SHA-256.
The filesystem state at the moment of failure — what was moved, what was left
behind, what was half-written.
"""
entries = []
for path in sorted(root.rglob("*")):
if not path.is_file() or path.is_symlink():
continue
try:
body = path.read_bytes()
except OSError as error:
entries.append({"path": str(path.relative_to(root)), "error": str(error)})
continue
entries.append(
{
"path": str(path.relative_to(root)),
"bytes": len(body),
"sha256": hashlib.sha256(body).hexdigest(),
}
)
return entries
def collect(root: Path, test_id: str, *, properties: dict | None = None) -> Path:
"""Copy the evidence for one failed test out of ``root``. Returns its directory."""
destination = artifacts_dir() / _slug(test_id)
files = destination / "files"
files.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
entries = manifest(root)
(destination / "manifest.json").write_text(json.dumps(entries, indent=1))
(destination / "seeds.json").write_text(
json.dumps({"test": test_id, "properties": properties or {}}, indent=1)
)
budget = MAX_COPY_BYTES
for path in sorted(root.rglob("*")):
if not path.is_file() or path.is_symlink():
continue
if not path.name.endswith(COPY_SUFFIXES):
continue
size = path.stat().st_size
if size > budget:
continue # the manifest still records it; the copy is what is skipped
target = files / path.relative_to(root)
target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
shutil.copy2(path, target)
budget -= size
return destination

32
tests/conftest.py
View File

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
"""Make the repository root importable for the pipeline test suites, give every
suite the application session the API requires since US07-02, and keep the evidence
of any failure (US07-04).
"""Make the repository root importable for the pipeline test suites, and give every
suite the application session the API requires since US07-02.
The suites drive the API the way the browser does — module-level ``httpx`` calls and
``TestClient`` — so instead of threading a cookie through several hundred call sites,
@@ -100,30 +99,3 @@ def _api_session():
httpx._api.request, httpx.request = real_request, real_request
httpx._api.stream, httpx.stream = real_stream, real_stream
TestClient.request, TestClient.__init__ = real_client_request, real_client_init
@pytest.hookimpl(hookwrapper=True)
def pytest_runtest_makereport(item, call):
"""On failure, keep the temporary library, database, journals, logs, and seed.
``tmp_path`` is deleted a few runs later and its contents are the only record
of what a randomized or fault-injected failure actually did, so they are copied
out while they still exist (US07-04).
"""
outcome = yield
report = outcome.get_result()
if report.when != "call" or not report.failed:
return
root = item.funcargs.get("tmp_path")
if root is None or not Path(root).exists():
return
from tests._artifacts import collect
try:
destination = collect(
Path(root), item.nodeid, properties=dict(getattr(report, "user_properties", []))
)
except OSError as error: # never let evidence collection mask the real failure
report.sections.append(("failure artifacts", f"could not be collected: {error}"))
else:
report.sections.append(("failure artifacts", str(destination)))

337
tests/e2e/test_compose_stack.py
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@@ -1,337 +0,0 @@
"""US08-03: the composition, actually composed.
Nothing here is faked below the process boundary: Docker builds the image, Compose
starts the migrate/API/worker containers against a temporary fixture library on a
real bind mount, and every assertion is made over HTTP or against what the stack
left in its data volume. The vision provider is the deterministic fake seam the
other end-to-end suites use, because an upload of real photos to a real model is not
what this story is about — the mount, the lock, the volume, and the restart are.
The file contract (one API, one worker, migrations first, no committed values) is
checked without a daemon in ``tests/integration/test_compose_runtime.py``; only the
running proof needs Docker, and CI is where it runs unskipped (US08-04).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import shutil
import socket
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import time
from pathlib import Path
import httpx
import pytest
from PIL import Image
REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
PROJECT = "photo-pipeline-us0803"
IMAGE = "photo-pipeline-test:us08-03"
SECRET = "compose-acceptance-secret"
CONTAINER_LIBRARY = "/library"
READY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 180
JOB_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 180
UP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30 * 60
pytestmark = pytest.mark.container
def compose_available() -> bool:
try:
return (
subprocess.run(
["docker", "compose", "version"], capture_output=True, timeout=60
).returncode
== 0
)
except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
return False
needs_compose = pytest.mark.skipif(
not compose_available(), reason="no Docker daemon with the compose plugin"
)
def free_port() -> int:
with socket.socket() as sock:
sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
return sock.getsockname()[1]
class Stack:
"""The composition under test, plus the environment it was started with."""
def __init__(self, library: Path, env_file: Path) -> None:
self.library = library
self.port = free_port()
self.base = f"http://127.0.0.1:{self.port}"
# Compose reads the repository's own .env for substitution; the process
# environment wins over it, so the test's values are the ones that apply.
self.env = {
**os.environ,
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMAGE": IMAGE,
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_ENV_FILE": str(env_file),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_HOST_PATH": str(library),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": CONTAINER_LIBRARY,
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT": str(self.port),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_UID": str(os.getuid()),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_GID": str(os.getgid()),
}
def compose(self, *args: str, check: bool = True, timeout: int = 300):
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "compose", "-p", PROJECT, "-f", str(REPO / "docker-compose.yml"), *args],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
env=self.env,
cwd=REPO,
timeout=timeout,
)
if check and result.returncode != 0:
raise AssertionError(
f"docker compose {' '.join(args)} failed:\n{result.stdout}\n{result.stderr}\n"
f"{self.compose('logs', '--tail', '80', check=False).stdout}"
)
return result
def wait_until_ready(self) -> None:
deadline = time.monotonic() + READY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
try:
if httpx.get(f"{self.base}/api/v1/health/ready", timeout=5).status_code == 200:
return
except httpx.HTTPError:
pass
time.sleep(0.5)
logs = self.compose("logs", "--tail", "120", check=False)
raise AssertionError(f"the stack never became ready:\n{logs.stdout}\n{logs.stderr}")
def client(self) -> httpx.Client:
client = httpx.Client(base_url=f"{self.base}/api/v1", timeout=60)
bootstrap = client.get("/session", headers={"X-Access-Secret": SECRET})
assert bootstrap.status_code == 200, bootstrap.text
client.headers["X-CSRF-Token"] = bootstrap.json()["csrf_token"]
return client
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def library() -> Path:
"""A small fixture library on the host, mounted into both containers.
Not under pytest's ``tmp_path``: on macOS that is ``/var/folders/...``, which a
Docker VM (Colima, Docker Desktop) does not share, so the bind mount would arrive
empty and every assertion below would be about nothing. ``$HOME`` is shared by
every default configuration.
"""
base = Path(
os.environ.get("PHOTO_PIPELINE_TEST_MOUNT_BASE", Path.home() / ".cache" / "photo-pipeline")
)
base.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="library-", dir=base))
for album, count in (("01_day", 2), ("02_night", 1)):
(root / album).mkdir()
for index in range(count):
colour = (40 * (index + 1), 90, 160)
Image.new("RGB", (64, 48), colour).save(root / album / f"{album}_{index}.jpg")
# The exclusion sentinel: it must never be discovered, counted, or analyzed.
(root / "_IGNORE").mkdir()
Image.new("RGB", (32, 32), (0, 0, 0)).save(root / "_IGNORE" / "sentinel.jpg")
try:
yield root
finally:
shutil.rmtree(root, ignore_errors=True)
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def env_file(tmp_path_factory) -> Path:
"""Configuration and secrets come from the environment, so the test writes its
own file rather than borrowing the operator's."""
path = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("config") / "compose.env"
path.write_text(
"\n".join(
[
f"PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET={SECRET}",
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LOG_FORMAT=text",
# The deterministic vision seam, in the data volume so both roles and
# the test can see it (concept §18).
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAKE_VISION_LOG=/data/vision.log",
]
)
+ "\n"
)
return path
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def stack(library, env_file):
if not compose_available():
pytest.skip("no Docker daemon with the compose plugin")
running = Stack(library, env_file)
running.compose("down", "--volumes", "--remove-orphans", check=False)
running.compose("up", "--detach", "--build", timeout=UP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
try:
running.wait_until_ready()
yield running
finally:
running.compose("down", "--volumes", "--remove-orphans", check=False, timeout=300)
def await_job(client: httpx.Client, job_id: str, states=("succeeded",)) -> dict:
deadline = time.monotonic() + JOB_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
snapshot: dict = {}
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
response = client.get(f"/jobs/{job_id}")
if response.status_code == 200:
snapshot = response.json()
if snapshot["state"] in states:
return snapshot
time.sleep(0.5)
raise AssertionError(f"job {job_id} never reached {states}: {snapshot}")
# ── the mounted library ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@needs_compose
def test_the_stack_scans_the_bind_mounted_library_at_its_container_paths(stack):
client = stack.client()
try:
scanned = client.post("/inventory/scan")
assert scanned.status_code == 200, scanned.text
assets = client.get("/inventory/assets", params={"limit": 200}).json()["items"]
finally:
client.close()
assert len(assets) == 3, assets
paths = {asset["current_path"] for asset in assets}
assert all(path.startswith(CONTAINER_LIBRARY + "/") for path in paths), paths
assert not any("_IGNORE" in path or "sentinel" in path for path in paths)
# The host paths are what the operator mounted, and they are not what the
# application records: the roots are the container's.
assert not any(str(stack.library) in path for path in paths)
@needs_compose
def test_a_library_root_that_is_not_mounted_is_refused_at_startup(stack):
"""The container-specific failure: configured roots that name nothing mounted."""
refused = stack.compose(
"run",
"--rm",
"--no-deps",
"--env",
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS=/srv/photos",
"api",
"serve",
check=False,
)
assert refused.returncode == 5, refused.stdout + refused.stderr
assert "library root /srv/photos" in refused.stdout + refused.stderr
@needs_compose
def test_a_second_worker_is_refused_by_the_library_lock(stack):
"""Not by convention: the running worker's lock is in the shared data volume."""
refused = stack.compose(
"run", "--rm", "--no-deps", "worker", "worker", "--id", "worker-2", check=False
)
assert refused.returncode == 2, refused.stdout + refused.stderr
assert "worker is already running" in refused.stdout + refused.stderr
# ── restart, resume, and the data volume ─────────────────────────────────────
@needs_compose
def test_a_queued_job_resumes_after_both_containers_restart(stack):
client = stack.client()
try:
client.post("/inventory/scan").raise_for_status()
assets = client.get("/inventory/assets", params={"limit": 200}).json()["items"]
for asset in assets:
decided = client.post(
"/safety/decisions", json={"asset_id": asset["id"], "decision": "sfw"}
)
assert decided.status_code == 200, decided.text
# Stop the worker first, so the job is provably still queued when the restart
# happens: a job that finished before the restart would prove nothing.
stack.compose("stop", "worker")
job = client.post("/analysis/jobs").json()
assert client.get(f"/jobs/{job['id']}").json()["state"] == "queued"
finally:
client.close()
stack.compose("restart", "api", "worker")
stack.wait_until_ready()
client = stack.client() # the session is per API process, so it is re-bootstrapped
try:
finished = await_job(client, job["id"])
assert finished["state"] == "succeeded", finished
# The database is intact and the work is durable, not merely reported.
after = client.get("/inventory/assets", params={"limit": 200}).json()["items"]
assert {asset["id"] for asset in after} == {asset["id"] for asset in assets}
analysed = client.get(f"/analysis/results/{assets[0]['id']}")
assert analysed.status_code == 200, analysed.text
assert analysed.json()["description"]
# Only the mounted library's own photos were analysed: the sentinel under
# _IGNORE is not an asset, so it can never have become an item of this job.
assert finished["progress"]["total"] == len(assets)
finally:
client.close()
@needs_compose
def test_the_data_volume_survives_recreating_the_containers(stack):
"""`down` without `--volumes` then `up` is the upgrade path: state stays."""
client = stack.client()
try:
client.post("/inventory/scan").raise_for_status()
before = {a["id"] for a in client.get("/inventory/assets").json()["items"]}
finally:
client.close()
stack.compose("down", "--remove-orphans", timeout=300)
stack.compose("up", "--detach", timeout=UP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
stack.wait_until_ready()
client = stack.client()
try:
after = {a["id"] for a in client.get("/inventory/assets").json()["items"]}
finally:
client.close()
assert after == before, "the same assets, from the same database, on the same volume"
# ── operating it ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@needs_compose
def test_backup_verify_and_diagnostics_run_as_container_commands(stack):
backup = stack.compose("run", "--rm", "--no-deps", "api", "backup", "--reason", "compose")
manifest = json.loads(backup.stdout[backup.stdout.index("{") :])
assert manifest["name"].startswith("2")
verified = stack.compose(
"run", "--rm", "--no-deps", "api", "verify-backup", f"/data/backups/{manifest['name']}"
)
assert json.loads(verified.stdout[verified.stdout.index("{") :])["ok"] is True
report = stack.compose("run", "--rm", "--no-deps", "api", "diagnostics")
diagnostics = json.loads(report.stdout[report.stdout.index("{") :])
components = {c["name"]: c["path"] for c in diagnostics["components"]}
# Database, WAL, thumbnail cache, and backups all live in the mounted volume.
for name in ("database", "write_ahead_log", "thumbnail_cache", "backups"):
assert components[name].startswith("/data/"), (name, components[name])
assert {tool["name"] for tool in diagnostics["tools"]} >= {"exiftool", "immich-go"}
# And the worker running beside this command is visible as the lock's holder.
assert diagnostics["locks"]["worker"]["role"] == "worker"
if __name__ == "__main__": # a quick way to run just this file
raise SystemExit(pytest.main([__file__, "-v", *sys.argv[1:]]))

306
tests/e2e/test_container_runtime.py
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@@ -1,306 +0,0 @@
"""US08-02: the built image, actually built and actually run.
This is the acceptance test for the image itself, so nothing here is faked: Docker
builds from a clean context, the container starts under a chosen UID/GID against a
mounted data directory, and the assertions are made over HTTP and against the files
the container left on the host.
It is skipped without a Docker daemon — the build also needs the network for the base
image, the pinned exiftool package, and the pinned uploader release. The contract the
Dockerfile itself has to keep (pins, non-root, health target, build context) is checked
offline in ``tests/integration/test_container_image.py``, so a machine without Docker
still fails on a broken image definition; only the running proof needs the daemon. CI
builds the image on every change (US08-04), which is where this runs unskipped.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import platform
import re
import socket
import subprocess
import sys
import time
from pathlib import Path
import httpx
import pytest
REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
IMAGE = "photo-pipeline-test:us08-02"
SECRET = "container-acceptance-secret"
HOSTNAME = "photos.test"
READY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 120
BUILD_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30 * 60
pytestmark = pytest.mark.container
def docker_available() -> bool:
try:
return subprocess.run(["docker", "info"], capture_output=True, timeout=60).returncode == 0
except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
return False
needs_docker = pytest.mark.skipif(not docker_available(), reason="no Docker daemon available")
def docker(*args: str, check: bool = True, timeout: int = 120) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", *args], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout
)
if check and result.returncode != 0:
raise AssertionError(f"docker {' '.join(args)} failed:\n{result.stdout}\n{result.stderr}")
return result
def pins() -> dict[str, str]:
"""The pinned versions, read from the Dockerfile that produced the image."""
text = (REPO / "Dockerfile").read_text()
found = dict(re.findall(r"^ARG\s+([A-Z0-9_]+)=(.+)$", text, re.MULTILINE))
return {
# The Debian package version carries a packaging suffix; exiftool reports the
# upstream version only.
"exiftool": found["EXIFTOOL_VERSION"].split("+")[0].split("-")[0],
"immich-go": found["IMMICH_GO_VERSION"],
}
def free_port() -> int:
with socket.socket() as sock:
sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
return sock.getsockname()[1]
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def image() -> str:
"""Build from a clean checkout: the build context is the repository, unmodified."""
if not docker_available():
pytest.skip("no Docker daemon available")
docker(
"build",
"--build-arg",
f"UID={os.getuid()}",
"--build-arg",
f"GID={os.getgid()}",
"-t",
IMAGE,
str(REPO),
timeout=BUILD_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
)
return IMAGE
@pytest.fixture
def data_dir(tmp_path) -> Path:
data = tmp_path / "data"
data.mkdir()
return data
def run_detached(image: str, port: int, *args: str, data: Path | None = None) -> str:
"""Start a container. ``data`` bind-mounts the host's data directory when the test
is about the files themselves; otherwise the image's own /data is used, because a
macOS bind mount arrives with an ownership the container did not choose."""
result = docker(
"run",
"--detach",
"--rm",
"--publish",
f"127.0.0.1:{port}:8000",
*(("--volume", f"{data}:/data") if data is not None else ()),
"--env",
# Reachable from outside the container means reachable from another machine as
# far as the application is concerned, so the access secret is mandatory
# (US08-01) — the image must not weaken that.
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_HOST=0.0.0.0",
"--env",
f"PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET={SECRET}",
"--env",
f"PHOTO_PIPELINE_ALLOWED_HOSTS={HOSTNAME}",
image,
*args,
)
return result.stdout.strip()
def wait_until_ready(base: str, container: str) -> None:
deadline = time.monotonic() + READY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
try:
if httpx.get(f"{base}/api/v1/health/ready", timeout=5).status_code == 200:
return
except httpx.HTTPError:
pass
if docker("inspect", "-f", "{{.State.Running}}", container, check=False).stdout.strip() in (
"false",
"",
):
break
time.sleep(0.5)
logs = docker("logs", container, check=False)
raise AssertionError(f"container never became ready:\n{logs.stdout}\n{logs.stderr}")
@pytest.fixture
def serving(image):
port = free_port()
container = run_detached(image, port, "serve")
try:
base = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}"
wait_until_ready(base, container)
yield base, container
finally:
docker("rm", "--force", container, check=False)
def session(base: str) -> httpx.Client:
client = httpx.Client(base_url=base, timeout=30)
bootstrap = client.get("/api/v1/session", headers={"X-Access-Secret": SECRET})
assert bootstrap.status_code == 200, bootstrap.text
client.headers["X-CSRF-Token"] = bootstrap.json()["csrf_token"]
return client
# ── the image serves, and says what it contains ──────────────────────────────
@needs_docker
def test_the_container_serves_the_frontend_and_the_pinned_tool_versions(serving):
base, container = serving
index = httpx.get(f"{base}/app/index.html", timeout=30)
assert index.status_code == 200
assert "<title" in index.text.lower(), "the application shell, not an API error"
client = session(base)
try:
tools = {tool["name"]: tool for tool in client.get("/api/v1/diagnostics").json()["tools"]}
finally:
client.close()
for name, pinned in pins().items():
assert tools[name]["pinned"] == pinned, name
# Recorded *and* installed: the reported version comes from running the binary.
assert pinned in tools[name]["version"], (name, tools[name])
assert tools[name]["path"], f"{name} is not on PATH inside the image"
logs = docker("logs", container, check=False)
assert SECRET not in logs.stdout + logs.stderr, "the access secret never reaches the log"
@needs_docker
def test_the_declared_health_check_reports_readiness(serving):
"""The declared HEALTHCHECK is readiness, so Docker's own verdict is the assertion."""
_, container = serving
deadline = time.monotonic() + READY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
status = ""
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
status = docker(
"inspect", "-f", "{{.State.Health.Status}}", container, check=False
).stdout.strip()
if status == "healthy":
break
time.sleep(1)
assert status == "healthy"
probe = docker("exec", container, "/usr/local/bin/healthcheck.sh", check=False)
assert probe.returncode == 0
# Point the probe at a port nothing serves: the same script must fail, which is
# what makes the healthy verdict above evidence rather than a default.
unready = docker(
"exec",
"--env",
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT=1",
container,
"/usr/local/bin/healthcheck.sh",
check=False,
)
assert unready.returncode != 0
# ── identity: never root, always the configured owner ────────────────────────
@needs_docker
def test_the_container_refuses_to_run_as_root(image, data_dir):
result = docker(
"run",
"--rm",
"--user",
"0:0",
"--volume",
f"{data_dir}:/data",
image,
"diagnostics",
check=False,
)
assert result.returncode != 0
assert "refusing to run as root" in result.stderr + result.stdout
assert not list(data_dir.iterdir()), "a refused container writes nothing"
@needs_docker
def test_what_the_container_writes_is_owned_by_the_build_arguments(image):
"""The identity the image was built with is the identity on disk afterwards.
Asserted from inside the container so it holds on every host: a macOS bind mount
reports an ownership the container never chose. The host-side proof, which is what
the mounted library actually needs, is the Linux test below.
"""
port = free_port()
container = run_detached(image, port, "serve")
try:
wait_until_ready(f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}", container)
owner = docker(
"exec", container, "stat", "-c", "%u:%g", "/data/photo_pipeline.db"
).stdout.strip()
assert owner == f"{os.getuid()}:{os.getgid()}"
assert docker("exec", container, "id", "-u").stdout.strip() == str(os.getuid())
finally:
docker("rm", "--force", container, check=False)
@needs_docker
@pytest.mark.skipif(
platform.system() != "Linux",
reason="bind-mount ownership is virtualised by Docker Desktop on macOS/Windows",
)
def test_files_the_container_writes_keep_the_configured_ownership(image, data_dir):
docker("run", "--rm", "--volume", f"{data_dir}:/data", image, "migrate", timeout=300)
written = sorted(path for path in data_dir.rglob("*") if path.is_file())
assert written, "migrate creates the database in the mounted data directory"
for path in written:
assert (path.stat().st_uid, path.stat().st_gid) == (os.getuid(), os.getgid()), path
@needs_docker
def test_the_worker_role_runs_from_the_same_image(image, data_dir):
"""One image, two roles: the worker is the same entrypoint with another argument."""
port = free_port()
container = run_detached(image, port, "worker", "--id", "container-worker")
try:
# Taking the worker's library lock is the observable proof that it started,
# migrated, and reached its job loop — no sleep required (US07-05).
deadline = time.monotonic() + READY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
lock = ""
while not lock and time.monotonic() < deadline:
assert docker("inspect", "-f", "{{.State.Running}}", container).stdout.strip() == (
"true"
), docker("logs", container, check=False).stdout
lock = docker("exec", container, "cat", "/data/worker.lock.json", check=False).stdout
time.sleep(0.5)
assert lock, docker("logs", container, check=False).stdout
assert json.loads(lock)["role"] == "worker"
role = docker("exec", container, "cat", "/tmp/photo-pipeline-role").stdout.strip()
assert role == "worker", "the health check can tell which role this container is"
finally:
docker("rm", "--force", container, check=False)
if __name__ == "__main__": # a quick way to run just this file
raise SystemExit(pytest.main([__file__, "-v", *sys.argv[1:]]))

274
tests/e2e/test_crash_recovery.py
View File

@@ -1,274 +0,0 @@
"""Process death at the newer control points (US07-04, concept §18).
The rename and archive journals already prove crash safety at each of their
transitions (tests/integration/test_rename_recovery.py,
tests/integration/test_archive_recovery.py). The three transitions covered here
are the remaining ones where a kill leaves the world and the database disagreeing:
- ``exif:written`` — keywords are on disk, nothing about them is recorded;
- ``upload:accepted``— the uploader finished, no outcome is stored;
- ``job:item_done`` — one item is durably done, the job is not finished.
Each test kills a real child process at the barrier and then asserts what a
restart does: resume idempotently, or say plainly that a human has to look. Never
"assume it worked".
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
import numpy as np
import pytest
from PIL import Image
from sqlalchemy import select
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory, run_migrations
from photo_pipeline.faults import EXIF_WRITTEN, JOB_ITEM_DONE, UPLOAD_ACCEPTED
from photo_pipeline.integrations import exiftool
from photo_pipeline.jobs.worker import Worker
from photo_pipeline.models import Asset, SafetyReview
from photo_pipeline.services import exif_checkpoint, hashing
from photo_pipeline.services.jobs import ItemState, JobService, JobState
from photo_pipeline.services.safety import SafetyService
from photo_pipeline.services.upload_batches import BatchState, UploadBatchService
from photo_pipeline.services.upload_verification import retry_blockers
from photo_pipeline.services.uploads import UploadService
from tests.e2e._pipeline_harness import (
SILENT_UPLOADER,
FakeImmich,
fake_uploader,
mark_upload_ready,
seed_album,
)
REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
NOW = datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
def _child(script: str, *args: str, barrier: str, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
"""Run ``script`` in a child that dies at ``barrier``; assert it really died."""
path = tmp_path / f"child_{barrier.replace(':', '_')}.py"
path.write_text(script.format(repo=str(REPO)))
env = dict(os.environ)
env["PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAULT_AFTER"] = barrier
result = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(path), *args], env=env, capture_output=True
)
assert result.returncode in (9, -9), (
f"child should have been killed at {barrier}, got {result.returncode}: "
f"{result.stderr.decode(errors='replace')[-400:]}"
)
def _env(tmp_path, **extra):
(tmp_path / "data").mkdir(exist_ok=True)
lib = tmp_path / "lib"
lib.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
config = Config.from_env(
{
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR": str(tmp_path / "data"),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": str(lib),
**extra,
}
)
run_migrations(config.database_url)
return config, create_session_factory(create_db_engine(config.database_url)), lib
def _image(path: Path, seed: int = 3) -> None:
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
pixels = np.random.default_rng(seed).integers(0, 256, (64, 96, 3), dtype=np.uint8)
Image.fromarray(pixels).save(path, quality=90)
def _register(sf, path: Path) -> str:
asset_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
with sf() as session:
session.add(
Asset(
id=asset_id,
original_path=str(path),
current_path=str(path),
discovered_at=NOW,
hash_version=1,
byte_size=path.stat().st_size,
current_sha256=hashing.sha256_file(path),
)
)
session.commit()
return asset_id
# ── EXIF written, checkpoint not recorded ────────────────────────────────────
DECIDE_SCRIPT = """
import sys
sys.path.insert(0, {repo!r})
from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory
from photo_pipeline.services.safety import SafetyService
db_url, asset_id = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
sf = create_session_factory(create_db_engine(db_url))
SafetyService(sf).decide(asset_id, "nsfw")
"""
@pytest.mark.skipif(shutil.which("exiftool") is None, reason="exiftool not installed")
def test_a_crash_after_the_exif_write_leaves_nothing_verified_and_re_runs_cleanly(tmp_path):
config, sf, lib = _env(tmp_path)
path = lib / "a.jpg"
_image(path)
asset_id = _register(sf, path)
original_sha = hashing.sha256_file(path)
_child(
DECIDE_SCRIPT, config.database_url, asset_id, barrier=EXIF_WRITTEN, tmp_path=tmp_path
)
# The file changed, but the application claims nothing about it: no decision,
# no projection, and the stored hash is still the pre-write one.
assert "nsfw" in exiftool.read_keyword_sets([str(path)])[str(path)]
assert hashing.sha256_file(path) != original_sha
with sf() as session:
assert session.scalars(select(SafetyReview)).all() == []
assert session.get(Asset, asset_id).current_sha256 == original_sha
assert exif_checkpoint.state_for(sf, asset_id, "safety") is None
# Re-running is the recovery: the write is idempotent, so the second attempt
# verifies and records what the first one only did to the file.
review = SafetyService(sf).decide(asset_id, "nsfw")
assert review["exif_verified"] is True
assert exif_checkpoint.state_for(sf, asset_id, "safety") == exif_checkpoint.VERIFIED
keywords = exiftool.read_keyword_sets([str(path)])[str(path)]
assert "nsfw" in keywords and "sfw" not in keywords
with sf() as session:
asset = session.get(Asset, asset_id)
assert asset.current_sha256 == hashing.sha256_file(path)
# ── uploader accepted, outcome not persisted ─────────────────────────────────
UPLOAD_SCRIPT = """
import sys
sys.path.insert(0, {repo!r})
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory
from photo_pipeline.services.upload_batches import UploadBatchService
db_url, data_dir, lib, binary, server, batch_id = sys.argv[1:7]
config = Config.from_env(
{{
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR": data_dir,
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": lib,
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_GO_BINARY": binary,
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_SERVER_URL": server,
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_API_KEY": "sentinel",
}}
)
sf = create_session_factory(create_db_engine(db_url))
UploadBatchService(sf, config=config).run(batch_id)
"""
def test_a_crash_after_the_uploader_accepted_requires_verification(tmp_path):
"""immich-go exited cleanly and the server may hold every file, but nothing was
written down. Recovery must not guess success — and must not blindly retry."""
seeded = seed_album(tmp_path)
mark_upload_ready(seeded)
immich = FakeImmich()
binary = fake_uploader(tmp_path, SILENT_UPLOADER)
config = Config.from_env(
{
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR": str(seeded.data),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": str(seeded.lib),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_GO_BINARY": str(binary),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_SERVER_URL": immich.url,
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_API_KEY": "sentinel",
}
)
engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
sf = create_session_factory(engine)
service = UploadBatchService(sf, config=config)
report = UploadService(sf, config=config).preflight(["rome"])
assert report["state"] == "ready", report["blockers"]
batch_id = service.create(["rome"], token=report["token"])[0]["id"]
try:
# The batch is claimed by the child, which dies once the uploader has run.
_child(
UPLOAD_SCRIPT,
config.database_url,
str(seeded.data),
str(seeded.lib),
str(binary),
immich.url,
batch_id,
barrier=UPLOAD_ACCEPTED,
tmp_path=tmp_path,
)
finally:
immich.stop()
assert service.get(batch_id)["state"] == BatchState.RUNNING # lane still held
recovered = service.recover()
assert recovered == {"interrupted": 1}
batch = service.get(batch_id)
assert batch["state"] == BatchState.UNKNOWN and batch["error_code"] == "interrupted"
assert [b["code"] for b in retry_blockers(batch)] == ["requires_verification"]
assert all(item["state"] == "pending" for item in batch["items"]), "nothing claimed as sent"
# ── one item done, the job unfinished ────────────────────────────────────────
WORKER_SCRIPT = """
import sys
sys.path.insert(0, {repo!r})
from pathlib import Path
from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory
from photo_pipeline.jobs.worker import Worker
db_url, log = sys.argv[1], Path(sys.argv[2])
def handler(item_key, ctx):
with log.open("a") as handle:
handle.write(item_key + "\\n")
sf = create_session_factory(create_db_engine(db_url))
Worker(sf, {{"scan": handler}}, "killable", lease_seconds=1).run_once()
"""
def test_a_crash_between_items_resumes_without_running_the_done_item_twice(tmp_path):
config, sf, lib = _env(tmp_path)
service = JobService(sf)
job = service.enqueue("scan", items=["a", "b", "c"])
log = tmp_path / "handled.log"
_child(
WORKER_SCRIPT, config.database_url, str(log), barrier=JOB_ITEM_DONE, tmp_path=tmp_path
)
crashed = log.read_text().split()
assert crashed == ["a"], "the child should have died right after its first item"
assert service.get(job["id"])["state"] == JobState.RUNNING
# A fresh worker takes over once the dead lease expires.
import time
time.sleep(1.1) # the child's lease is one second long
fresh = Worker(sf, {"scan": lambda item, ctx: log.open("a").write(item + "\n")}, "alive")
fresh.run_once()
assert service.get(job["id"])["state"] == JobState.SUCCEEDED
handled = log.read_text().split()
assert sorted(handled) == ["a", "b", "c"], f"an item ran twice or not at all: {handled}"
assert service.progress(job["id"])["by_state"] == {ItemState.SUCCEEDED: 3}

298
tests/e2e/test_release_gate.py
View File

@@ -1,298 +0,0 @@
"""The release gate, the read-only dry run, and the approval that unlocks mutation
(US07-07).
The gate itself is exercised with a tiny stage set — running the whole suite from
inside the suite would be a fork bomb with better manners. What is proven here is
the machinery a release depends on: the story matrix is complete, a failing stage
fails the gate, an unexpected skip fails the gate, and the evidence is written with
checksums that match what was written.
The dry run is proven to be read-only against a real temporary library, and the
approval is proven to be what stands between a configured library and any mutation.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from photo_pipeline.api.app import create_app
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory, run_migrations
from photo_pipeline.models import Asset
from photo_pipeline.services import release
REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
NOW = datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
# Two throwaway stages: one that passes, one the test can point at a failure.
PASSING = ("tests/e2e/test_traceability.py",)
def _config(tmp_path, **extra) -> Config:
data = tmp_path / "data"
data.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
lib = tmp_path / "lib"
lib.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
return Config.from_env(
{
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR": str(data),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": str(lib),
**extra,
}
)
# ── the story matrix ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_every_backlog_story_is_delivered_or_explicitly_planned():
matrix = release.story_matrix(REPO)
assert matrix["problems"] == [], "the story matrix has holes"
assert len(matrix["delivered"]) + len(matrix["planned"]) == matrix["stories"]
assert "US01-01" in matrix["delivered"] and "US07-07" in matrix["delivered"]
def test_a_story_without_tests_is_a_gate_failure(tmp_path):
"""A story file nobody covered must not pass quietly as 'no tests ran'."""
fake = tmp_path / "repo"
(fake / "delivery_backlog" / "stories").mkdir(parents=True)
(fake / "tests").mkdir()
(fake / "delivery_backlog" / "stories" / "US99-01-invented.md").write_text("# US99-01")
(fake / "tests" / "story_traceability.json").write_text(json.dumps({"stories": {}}))
matrix = release.story_matrix(fake)
assert matrix["problems"] == ["story with no tests and not planned: US99-01"]
def test_a_mapping_to_a_deleted_test_file_is_a_gate_failure(tmp_path):
fake = tmp_path / "repo"
(fake / "delivery_backlog" / "stories").mkdir(parents=True)
(fake / "tests").mkdir()
(fake / "delivery_backlog" / "stories" / "US99-01-invented.md").write_text("# US99-01")
(fake / "tests" / "story_traceability.json").write_text(
json.dumps({"stories": {"US99-01": ["tests/gone.py"]}})
)
assert release.story_matrix(fake)["problems"] == [
"mapped test file is missing — US99-01: tests/gone.py"
]
# ── the gate ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_the_gate_runs_its_stages_and_keeps_checksummed_evidence(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
evidence = tmp_path / "evidence"
report = release.run_gate(config, output=evidence, stages=(("smoke", PASSING),))
assert report["ok"] is True and report["failures"] == []
assert report["stages"][0]["stage"] == "smoke" and report["stages"][0]["ok"] is True
assert report["revision"], "the evidence must say which commit it covers"
assert report["matrix"]["problems"] == []
written = json.loads((evidence / release.REPORT_NAME).read_text())
assert written["ok"] is True
assert (evidence / "logs" / "smoke.log").exists()
checksums = (evidence / release.CHECKSUMS_NAME).read_text().splitlines()
assert len(checksums) >= 2
for line in checksums:
digest, name = line.split(" ", 1)
assert release.sha256_file(evidence / name) == digest
def test_a_failing_stage_fails_the_gate(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
failing = tmp_path / "failing_test.py"
failing.write_text("def test_no():\n assert False\n")
report = release.run_gate(
config, output=tmp_path / "evidence", stages=(("broken", (str(failing),)),)
)
assert report["ok"] is False and report["failures"] == ["broken"]
assert report["stages"][0]["returncode"] != 0
def test_an_unexpected_skip_fails_the_gate_but_an_environment_skip_does_not():
environment = release.StageResult(
"unit", [], 0, 0.1, "1 skipped", ["SKIPPED [1] x.py:1: exiftool not installed"]
)
silent = release.StageResult(
"unit", [], 0, 0.1, "1 skipped", ["SKIPPED [1] x.py:1: flaky, look later"]
)
assert release.unexpected_skips([environment]) == []
assert release.unexpected_skips([silent, environment]) == [
"SKIPPED [1] x.py:1: flaky, look later"
]
# ── the real-library dry run ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _library(root: Path) -> None:
(root / "album").mkdir(parents=True)
(root / "album" / "a.jpg").write_bytes(b"a" * 128)
(root / "album" / "b.png").write_bytes(b"b" * 64)
(root / "loose.JPG").write_bytes(b"c" * 32)
excluded = root / "_IGNORE" / "private"
excluded.mkdir(parents=True)
(excluded / "secret.jpg").write_bytes(b"never read")
def test_the_dry_run_describes_the_library_without_touching_it(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
root = Path(config.library_roots[0])
_library(root)
before = {
str(p): (p.stat().st_mtime_ns, p.read_bytes()) for p in root.rglob("*") if p.is_file()
}
report = release.dry_run(config)
assert report["files"] == 3, "the excluded sentinel is not counted"
assert report["by_extension"] == {".jpg": 2, ".png": 1}
assert report["excluded_directories"] >= 1
assert report["mutation"] == "none — this pass is read-only"
assert report["checksum"]
assert not any("secret" in json.dumps(report) for _ in [0]), "excluded content never appears"
after = {
str(p): (p.stat().st_mtime_ns, p.read_bytes()) for p in root.rglob("*") if p.is_file()
}
assert after == before, "a read-only pass changed the library"
def test_the_dry_run_reconciles_against_what_the_database_already_knows(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
root = Path(config.library_roots[0])
_library(root)
run_migrations(config.database_url)
engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
with create_session_factory(engine)() as session:
session.add(
Asset(
id=str(uuid.uuid4()),
original_path=str(root / "album" / "a.jpg"),
current_path=str(root / "album" / "a.jpg"),
discovered_at=NOW,
hash_version=1,
byte_size=128,
)
)
session.add(
Asset(
id=str(uuid.uuid4()),
original_path=str(root / "album" / "gone.jpg"),
current_path=str(root / "album" / "gone.jpg"),
discovered_at=NOW,
hash_version=1,
byte_size=1,
)
)
session.commit()
engine.dispose()
reconciliation = release.dry_run(config)["reconciliation"]
assert reconciliation["known_to_database"] == 2
assert reconciliation["already_registered"] == 1
assert reconciliation["new_to_the_application"] == 2
assert reconciliation["recorded_but_absent_total"] == 1
assert reconciliation["recorded_but_absent"][0].endswith("gone.jpg")
def test_a_library_root_that_is_not_there_is_refused(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path, PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS=str(tmp_path / "nowhere"))
with pytest.raises(release.ReleaseError, match="not a directory"):
release.dry_run(config)
# ── the approval ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_mutation_is_refused_until_the_dry_run_is_approved(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path, PHOTO_PIPELINE_REQUIRE_DRY_RUN_APPROVAL="1")
_library(Path(config.library_roots[0]))
blockers = release.mutation_blockers(config)
assert [blocker["code"] for blocker in blockers] == ["dry_run_not_approved"]
record = release.approve(config, release.dry_run(config), approver="domverse")
assert record["approved_by"] == "domverse" and record["report_checksum"]
assert release.mutation_blockers(config) == []
def test_an_approval_covers_the_library_it_was_written_for(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path, PHOTO_PIPELINE_REQUIRE_DRY_RUN_APPROVAL="1")
_library(Path(config.library_roots[0]))
release.approve(config, release.dry_run(config), approver="domverse")
other = tmp_path / "other-library"
other.mkdir()
moved = config.model_copy(update={"library_roots": (other,)})
assert [b["code"] for b in release.mutation_blockers(moved)] == ["approval_scope_mismatch"]
def test_without_the_requirement_nothing_changes(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path) # the loopback development default
assert release.mutation_blockers(config) == []
def test_the_api_refuses_every_mutation_until_the_report_is_approved(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path, PHOTO_PIPELINE_REQUIRE_DRY_RUN_APPROVAL="1")
_library(Path(config.library_roots[0]))
with TestClient(create_app(config)) as client:
# Reading stays open: an operator has to see what was found to approve it.
assert client.get("/api/v1/workflow").status_code == 200
refused = client.post("/api/v1/inventory/scan", json={})
assert refused.status_code == 403
assert refused.json()["error"]["code"] == "dry_run_not_approved"
# A backup is the one mutation a careful operator takes first.
assert client.post("/api/v1/backups", json={}).status_code == 201
release.approve(config, release.dry_run(config), approver="domverse")
assert client.post("/api/v1/inventory/scan", json={}).status_code in (200, 201, 202)
def test_approving_something_that_is_not_a_report_is_refused(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
with pytest.raises(release.ReleaseError, match="not a dry-run report"):
release.approve(config, {"files": 3}, approver="domverse")
def test_the_cli_runs_the_dry_run_and_the_approval(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path, PHOTO_PIPELINE_REQUIRE_DRY_RUN_APPROVAL="1")
_library(Path(config.library_roots[0]))
from photo_pipeline.__main__ import main
environment = {
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR": str(config.data_dir),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": str(config.library_roots[0]),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_REQUIRE_DRY_RUN_APPROVAL": "1",
}
previous = {key: os.environ.get(key) for key in environment}
os.environ.update(environment)
try:
report_path = tmp_path / "dry-run.json"
assert main(["dry-run", "--output", str(report_path)]) == 0
assert json.loads(report_path.read_text())["files"] == 3
assert main(["approve-dry-run", str(report_path), "--approver", "domverse"]) == 0
finally:
for key, value in previous.items():
if value is None:
os.environ.pop(key, None)
else:
os.environ[key] = value
assert release.mutation_blockers(config) == []

348
tests/e2e/test_release_journey.py
View File

@@ -1,348 +0,0 @@
"""The release journey (US07-07): one library, one fresh environment, every stage.
This is the acceptance the whole backlog builds up to — discovery, duplicate review,
safety, analysis, EXIF verification, album proposal, guarded rename, rescan and
reconciliation, upload, archive, offline deduplication, restore — driven over HTTP
against real ``photo_pipeline serve`` and worker child processes, with full process
restarts in the middle and at the end.
Nothing is reached into. External services are the deterministic fakes the earlier
phases already use, invoked through the real integration layer: a vision fake that
records every path it was given, a real fake ``immich-go`` executable, and an
archive medium that is an ordinary directory whose marker file is its identity.
The invariants asserted along the way are the ones the concept calls non-negotiable:
- an asset's identity survives a rename, an upload, an archive, and a restore;
- an ``_IGNORE`` sentinel is never discovered, counted, analysed, or uploaded;
- an NSFW asset never reaches the vision provider but still reaches Immich;
- no photo's bytes are lost at any point — every hash is still reachable somewhere;
- every stage's durable state survives a restart of both processes.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import shutil
from pathlib import Path
import httpx
import pytest
from tests.e2e._pipeline_harness import (
SENTINEL_KEY,
FakeImmich,
Server,
fake_uploader,
image,
seed_library,
start_worker,
wait_until,
)
TIMEOUT = 30
ALBUM = "rome"
UPLOADER = 'echo "INFO uploaded $6"\necho "Uploaded 2, duplicates 0"\nexit 0\n'
def _sha256(path: Path) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(path.read_bytes()).hexdigest()
def _hashes(*roots: Path) -> set[str]:
return {
_sha256(path)
for root in roots
for path in root.rglob("*.jpg")
if path.is_file() and not path.name.startswith(".")
}
def _post(base: str, path: str, **kwargs) -> httpx.Response:
response = httpx.post(f"{base}/api/v1{path}", timeout=TIMEOUT, **kwargs)
response.raise_for_status()
return response
def _get(base: str, path: str, **kwargs) -> dict:
response = httpx.get(f"{base}/api/v1{path}", timeout=TIMEOUT, **kwargs)
response.raise_for_status()
return response.json()
def _await_job(base: str, job_id: str, *, states=("succeeded",)) -> dict:
return wait_until(
lambda: (
snapshot
if (snapshot := _get(base, f"/jobs/{job_id}"))["state"] in states
else None
),
timeout=90,
)
@pytest.fixture
def library(tmp_path):
"""A fresh library: an album, an exact duplicate, and an excluded sentinel."""
seeded = seed_library(tmp_path, {}, {})
album = seeded.lib / ALBUM
image(album / "a.jpg", 11)
image(album / "b.jpg", 12)
shutil.copyfile(album / "a.jpg", album / "a-copy.jpg") # exact duplicate
ignored = seeded.lib / "_IGNORE" / "private"
ignored.mkdir(parents=True)
image(ignored / "sentinel-9f3a2b.jpg", 99)
return seeded
@pytest.mark.skipif(shutil.which("exiftool") is None, reason="exiftool not installed")
def test_the_full_release_journey_survives_every_stage_and_two_restarts(library, tmp_path):
immich = FakeImmich()
uploader = fake_uploader(tmp_path, UPLOADER)
vision_log = tmp_path / "vision.log"
archive_root = tmp_path / "medium"
archive_root.mkdir()
environment = {
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_SERVER_URL": immich.url,
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_API_KEY": SENTINEL_KEY,
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_GO_BINARY": str(uploader),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_ARCHIVE_FREE_SPACE_RESERVE_BYTES": "0",
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAKE_VISION_LOG": str(vision_log),
}
server = Server(library, extra_env=environment).start()
worker = start_worker(library, extra_env=environment)
base = server.base
try:
# ── 0. discovery ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
_post(base, "/inventory/scan")
assets = _get(base, "/inventory/assets", params={"limit": 200})["items"]
assert len(assets) == 3, "the sentinel under _IGNORE is not an asset"
paths = {asset["current_path"] for asset in assets}
assert not any("_IGNORE" in path or "sentinel" in path for path in paths)
identity = {asset["id"]: Path(asset["current_path"]).name for asset in assets}
# ── 1. duplicate review ──────────────────────────────────────────────
_post(base, "/duplicates/detect")
clusters = _get(base, "/duplicates/clusters")["items"]
assert len(clusters) == 1 and clusters[0]["member_total"] == 2
cluster = _get(base, f"/duplicates/clusters/{clusters[0]['id']}")
canonical = sorted(member["asset_id"] for member in cluster["members"])[0]
_post(
base,
f"/duplicates/clusters/{cluster['id']}/decision",
json={
"decision": "canonical",
"canonical_asset_id": canonical,
"expected_version": cluster["version"],
},
)
# ── 2. safety, with its EXIF checkpoint ──────────────────────────────
queue = _get(base, "/safety/queue", params={"limit": 100})["items"]
assert len(queue) == 2, "a non-canonical variant is not reviewed twice"
decisions = {}
for index, item in enumerate(sorted(queue, key=lambda row: row["current_path"])):
decision = "nsfw" if index == 0 else "sfw"
decisions[item["asset_id"]] = decision
result = _post(
base, "/safety/decisions", json={"asset_id": item["asset_id"], "decision": decision}
).json()
assert result["exif_verified"] is True, "the safety checkpoint must verify"
# ── restart: everything so far has to be durable ─────────────────────
server.stop()
server.start()
base = server.base
assert _get(base, "/safety/counts")["nsfw"] == 1
assert {a["id"] for a in _get(base, "/inventory/assets", params={"limit": 200})["items"]} == set(
identity
)
# ── 3. analysis, gated to confirmed-SFW assets ───────────────────────
job = _post(base, "/analysis/jobs").json()
_await_job(base, job["id"])
analysed = [
name
for name, decision in (
(identity[asset_id], decision) for asset_id, decision in decisions.items()
)
if decision == "sfw"
]
seen = vision_log.read_text().splitlines()
assert len(seen) == len(analysed) == 1
assert not any("sentinel" in line or "_IGNORE" in line for line in seen)
nsfw_id = next(aid for aid, decision in decisions.items() if decision == "nsfw")
assert all(identity[nsfw_id] not in line for line in seen), "NSFW reached the provider"
# From here on no stage may change a photo's bytes: the metadata stages are
# done, and moving, uploading, archiving, and restoring only relocate them.
stable_hashes = _hashes(library.lib)
# ── 4. album proposal and guarded rename ─────────────────────────────
_post(base, "/albums/proposals", json={})
proposal = _get(base, f"/albums/proposals/{ALBUM}")
_post(
base,
f"/albums/proposals/{ALBUM}/edit",
json={"name": "2019 Rome", "expected_version": proposal["version"]},
)
proposal = _get(base, f"/albums/proposals/{ALBUM}")
_post(
base,
f"/albums/proposals/{ALBUM}/approve",
json={"expected_version": proposal["version"]},
)
plan = _post(base, "/rename-plans").json()
assert plan["blockers"] == [], [
(issue["code"], issue["message"])
for op in plan["operations"]
for issue in op["issues"]
]
response = httpx.post(
f"{base}/api/v1/rename-plans/{plan['id']}/apply",
json={"expected_version": plan["version"], "expected_checksum": plan["checksum"]},
timeout=TIMEOUT,
)
assert response.status_code == 200, response.text
applied = response.json()
assert applied["failed"] == 0 and applied["applied"] == 1
assert (library.lib / "2019 Rome").is_dir() and not (library.lib / ALBUM).exists()
# ── 5. rescan and reconciliation: identity survives the move ─────────
_post(base, "/inventory/scan")
after_rename = _get(base, "/inventory/assets", params={"limit": 200})["items"]
assert {asset["id"] for asset in after_rename} == set(identity)
assert all("2019 Rome" in asset["current_path"] for asset in after_rename)
assert _hashes(library.lib) == stable_hashes, "a rename changed a photo's bytes"
# ── 6. upload ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
report = _post(base, "/upload-preflight", json={"albums": ["2019 Rome"]}).json()
assert report["state"] == "ready", report["blockers"]
batch = _post(
base,
"/upload-batches",
json={"albums": ["2019 Rome"], "token": report["token"]},
).json()["batches"][0]
started = _post(base, f"/upload-batches/{batch['id']}/start").json()
_await_job(base, started["job"]["id"])
uploaded = _get(base, f"/upload-batches/{batch['id']}")
assert uploaded["state"] == "succeeded"
# The uploader said nothing per file, so the outcome is uncertain until the
# server itself is asked whether it holds those exact bytes (US05-04).
assert uploaded["outcome_state"] == "requires_verification"
verified = _post(base, f"/upload-batches/{batch['id']}/verify").json()
assert verified["outcome_state"] == "verified", verified
uploaded = _get(base, f"/upload-batches/{batch['id']}")
# Reviewed NSFW is uploaded; it simply never reached the analyser.
assert {item["asset_id"] for item in uploaded["items"]} >= {nsfw_id}
# ── 7. archive ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
location = _post(
base, "/archive-locations", json={"name": "external", "root": str(archive_root)}
).json()
preflight = _post(
base, "/archive-preflight", json={"location_id": location["id"]}
).json()
assert preflight["state"] == "ready", [
(asset["asset_id"], asset["blockers"])
for album in preflight["albums"]
for asset in album["assets"]
if asset["blockers"]
] or preflight
archive_plan = _post(
base,
"/archive-plans",
json={"location_id": location["id"], "token": preflight["token"]},
).json()
uploaded_ids = {item["asset_id"] for item in uploaded["items"]}
_post(base, f"/archive-plans/{archive_plan['id']}/apply")
wait_until(
lambda: all(
asset["availability_state"].startswith("archived")
for asset in _get(base, "/inventory/assets", params={"limit": 200})["items"]
if asset["id"] in uploaded_ids
),
timeout=90,
)
assert _hashes(library.lib, archive_root) == stable_hashes, "archiving lost bytes"
# ── 8. offline deduplication ─────────────────────────────────────────
(archive_root / ".photo-pipeline-archive.json").rename(
archive_root / ".photo-pipeline-archive.json.away"
)
# A copy of an archived photo turns up in the library under its own name —
# the real shape of "I re-imported an old card" — so nothing occupies the
# path the archived original would be restored to.
returned = library.lib / "2019 Rome" / "rediscovered.jpg"
returned.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
archived_copy = next(archive_root.rglob("*.jpg"))
shutil.copyfile(archived_copy, returned)
_post(base, "/inventory/scan")
_post(base, "/duplicates/detect")
offline = _get(base, "/inventory/assets", params={"limit": 200})["items"]
archived = [a for a in offline if a["availability_state"].startswith("archived")]
assert archived, "an unmounted medium must not make assets missing"
assert all(a["availability_state"] != "missing_unexpected" for a in offline)
assert any(
cluster["member_total"] >= 2 for cluster in _get(base, "/duplicates/clusters")["items"]
), "the rediscovered copy did not meet its archived original"
# ── 9. restore ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
(archive_root / ".photo-pipeline-archive.json.away").rename(
archive_root / ".photo-pipeline-archive.json"
)
restore_report = _post(
base, "/restore-preflight", json={"location_id": location["id"]}
).json()
restore_plan = _post(
base,
"/restore-plans",
json={"location_id": location["id"], "token": restore_report["token"]},
).json()
_post(base, f"/restore-plans/{restore_plan['id']}/apply")
wait_until(
lambda: all(
asset["availability_state"] == "active"
for asset in _get(base, "/inventory/assets", params={"limit": 200})["items"]
if asset["id"] in identity
),
timeout=90,
)
# ── 10. the final restart proves every stage was durable ─────────────
worker.kill()
worker.wait(timeout=20)
server.stop()
server.start()
base = server.base
final = {
asset["id"]: asset
for asset in _get(base, "/inventory/assets", params={"limit": 200})["items"]
}
assert set(identity) <= set(final), "an asset id did not survive the journey"
assert _get(base, "/safety/counts")["nsfw"] == 1
assert _get(base, "/upload-batches")["batches"][0]["state"] == "succeeded"
reachable = {
_sha256(path): str(path)
for root in (library.lib, archive_root)
for path in root.rglob("*.jpg")
if path.is_file() and not path.name.startswith(".")
}
assert stable_hashes <= set(reachable), (
"a photo was lost",
sorted(stable_hashes - set(reachable)),
sorted(reachable.values()),
)
workflow = _get(base, "/workflow")
assert {stage["key"] for stage in workflow["stages"]} >= {
"inventory",
"duplicates",
"safety",
"analysis",
}
finally:
worker.kill()
worker.wait(timeout=20)
server.stop()
immich.stop()

325
tests/fixtures/media_corpus.py vendored
View File

@@ -1,325 +0,0 @@
"""The golden media corpus: every format, orientation, profile, damage, and
metadata case this application claims to survive (US07-03, concept §18).
``CASES`` is the manifest and the authority. Each entry declares a stable logical
id (never a path), how the file is generated, and what the pipeline must do with
it — decode it, or refuse it with one precise error code. Tests parametrize over the
manifest, so a case that is added here without an expectation, or an expectation
that stops holding, fails the suite rather than quietly going untested.
Everything is generated, never committed: fixed pixel seeds, fixed EXIF strings, no
clock, no network, no personal data. Regeneration is byte-stable, which
``test_media_hardening.py`` proves by building the corpus twice and comparing
checksums — a golden corpus that drifts is not golden.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import struct
import zlib
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Callable
import numpy as np
from PIL import Image
# Error codes the pipeline may answer with; ``None`` means "must render".
UNSUPPORTED = "unsupported_image"
TOO_LARGE = "image_too_large"
# One fixed capture time for every metadata case: the corpus must not depend on when
# it was generated.
CAPTURE_TIME = "2019:07:14 10:30:00"
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class MediaCase:
id: str
filename: str
kind: str # format | orientation | profile | damaged | metadata
build: Callable[[Path], None]
expect_error: str | None = None
# Declared for the metadata cases: exiftool arguments applied after the pixels
# are written, and the user fields that must survive every later stage.
exif_args: tuple[str, ...] = ()
preserved_fields: tuple[str, ...] = ()
notes: str = ""
tags: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
# ── generators ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _pixels(width: int, height: int, seed: int, bands: int = 3) -> np.ndarray:
return np.random.default_rng(seed).integers(0, 256, (height, width, bands), dtype=np.uint8)
def _save(path: Path, image: Image.Image, **kwargs) -> None:
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
image.save(path, **kwargs)
def _jpeg(width=320, height=240, seed=1, **kwargs):
def build(path: Path) -> None:
_save(path, Image.fromarray(_pixels(width, height, seed)), quality=90, **kwargs)
return build
def _oriented_jpeg(orientation: int):
def build(path: Path) -> None:
image = Image.fromarray(_pixels(400, 200, 5)) # landscape source
exif = image.getexif()
exif[274] = orientation # 0x0112 Orientation
_save(path, image, exif=exif, quality=90)
return build
def _rotated_pixels(path: Path) -> None:
"""The same scene rotated in the pixels instead of in a tag."""
_save(path, Image.fromarray(_pixels(400, 200, 5)).transpose(Image.ROTATE_90), quality=90)
def _png(alpha: bool = False, seed: int = 2):
def build(path: Path) -> None:
if alpha:
_save(path, Image.fromarray(_pixels(120, 90, seed, bands=4), "RGBA"))
else:
_save(path, Image.fromarray(_pixels(120, 90, seed)))
return build
def _webp(path: Path) -> None:
_save(path, Image.fromarray(_pixels(150, 100, 3)), quality=80)
def _tiff(path: Path) -> None:
_save(path, Image.fromarray(_pixels(140, 110, 4)))
def _grayscale(path: Path) -> None:
_save(path, Image.fromarray(_pixels(100, 100, 6)).convert("L"), quality=90)
def _cmyk(path: Path) -> None:
_save(path, Image.fromarray(_pixels(100, 100, 7)).convert("CMYK"), quality=90)
def _tiny(path: Path) -> None:
_save(path, Image.fromarray(_pixels(1, 1, 8)))
def _icc_tagged(path: Path) -> None:
"""A profile-bearing image: the colour-managed decode path must run."""
from PIL import ImageCms
profile = bytearray(ImageCms.ImageCmsProfile(ImageCms.createProfile("sRGB")).tobytes())
# An ICC header carries its creation timestamp at bytes 24..35. Left alone, the
# corpus would be a different corpus every time it is generated.
profile[24:36] = b"\x00" * 12
_save(path, Image.fromarray(_pixels(120, 80, 9)), icc_profile=bytes(profile), quality=90)
def _broken_icc(path: Path) -> None:
"""A profile that is not a profile: a picture is still a picture."""
_save(path, Image.fromarray(_pixels(120, 80, 10)), icc_profile=b"not-a-profile", quality=90)
def _wide_jpeg(path: Path) -> None:
"""Large enough that decoding it at full resolution is visible in memory."""
_save(path, Image.fromarray(_pixels(4000, 3000, 11)), quality=70)
def _zero_byte(path: Path) -> None:
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path.write_bytes(b"")
def _truncated_jpeg(path: Path) -> None:
image = Image.fromarray(_pixels(400, 300, 12))
_save(path, image, quality=90)
data = path.read_bytes()
path.write_bytes(data[: len(data) // 2]) # header intact, pixels missing
def _corrupt_png(path: Path) -> None:
image = Image.fromarray(_pixels(120, 90, 13))
_save(path, image)
data = bytearray(path.read_bytes())
data[40:80] = b"\x00" * 40 # shred the compressed stream, keep the header
path.write_bytes(bytes(data))
def _not_an_image(path: Path) -> None:
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path.write_bytes(b"This is a text file that happens to be named .jpg\n")
def _png_declaring(width: int, height: int):
"""A tiny, structurally valid PNG whose header claims an enormous picture.
A few hundred bytes on disk, gigapixels on paper: the pipeline must refuse it
from the declared dimensions, before a single pixel is allocated. Rewriting the
IHDR of a real PNG (rather than hand-rolling a stub) keeps the file openable, so
the refusal is proven to come from the size check and not from a parse failure.
"""
def build(path: Path) -> None:
import io
buffer = io.BytesIO()
Image.fromarray(_pixels(4, 4, 15)).save(buffer, format="PNG")
data = bytearray(buffer.getvalue())
start = 8 + 4 # PNG signature, then the IHDR length field
struct.pack_into(">II", data, start + 4, width, height)
ihdr = bytes(data[start : start + 4 + 13])
struct.pack_into(">I", data, start + 4 + 13, zlib.crc32(ihdr))
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path.write_bytes(bytes(data))
return build
CASES: tuple[MediaCase, ...] = (
# ── formats ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
MediaCase("jpeg", "formats/plain.jpg", "format", _jpeg()),
MediaCase("jpeg_uppercase_ext", "formats/UPPER.JPG", "format", _jpeg(seed=14)),
MediaCase("png", "formats/plain.png", "format", _png()),
MediaCase("png_alpha", "formats/alpha.png", "format", _png(alpha=True)),
MediaCase("webp", "formats/plain.webp", "format", _webp),
MediaCase("tiff", "formats/plain.tiff", "format", _tiff),
# ── orientation ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
*(
MediaCase(
f"orientation_{value}",
f"orientation/exif_{value}.jpg",
"orientation",
_oriented_jpeg(value),
notes="EXIF orientation must be applied before resizing",
)
for value in range(1, 9)
),
MediaCase("rotated_pixels", "orientation/rotated.jpg", "orientation", _rotated_pixels),
# ── colour and size profiles ──────────────────────────────────────────────
MediaCase("grayscale", "profiles/gray.jpg", "profile", _grayscale),
MediaCase("cmyk", "profiles/cmyk.jpg", "profile", _cmyk),
MediaCase("tiny", "profiles/tiny.png", "profile", _tiny),
MediaCase("icc_tagged", "profiles/icc.jpg", "profile", _icc_tagged),
MediaCase(
"broken_icc",
"profiles/broken-icc.jpg",
"profile",
_broken_icc,
notes="an unusable ICC profile falls back to a plain conversion, never an error",
),
MediaCase(
"large_jpeg",
"profiles/large.jpg",
"profile",
_wide_jpeg,
notes="12 megapixels: the decode must stay near the requested size",
),
# ── damaged and hostile inputs ────────────────────────────────────────────
MediaCase("zero_byte", "damaged/empty.jpg", "damaged", _zero_byte, UNSUPPORTED),
MediaCase("truncated_jpeg", "damaged/truncated.jpg", "damaged", _truncated_jpeg, UNSUPPORTED),
MediaCase("corrupt_png", "damaged/corrupt.png", "damaged", _corrupt_png, UNSUPPORTED),
MediaCase("text_as_jpeg", "damaged/text.jpg", "damaged", _not_an_image, UNSUPPORTED),
MediaCase(
"bomb_header",
"damaged/bomb.png",
"damaged",
_png_declaring(60_000, 60_000),
TOO_LARGE,
notes="3.6 gigapixels declared in the header and nothing else",
),
MediaCase(
"bomb_warning_band",
"damaged/bomb-warning.png",
"damaged",
_png_declaring(10_000, 10_000),
TOO_LARGE,
notes="inside Pillow's warn-only band; the warning is promoted to a refusal",
),
# ── metadata ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
MediaCase("no_exif", "metadata/bare.jpg", "metadata", _jpeg(seed=20)),
MediaCase(
"user_exif",
"metadata/user.jpg",
"metadata",
_jpeg(seed=21),
exif_args=(
"-Artist=Ada Lovelace",
"-Copyright=(c) Ada",
f"-DateTimeOriginal={CAPTURE_TIME}",
"-GPSLatitude=48.137",
"-GPSLatitudeRef=N",
"-Rating=4",
"-ImageDescription=A day out",
),
preserved_fields=(
"EXIF:IFD0:Artist",
"EXIF:IFD0:Copyright",
"EXIF:ExifIFD:DateTimeOriginal",
"EXIF:IFD0:ImageDescription",
"XMP:XMP-xmp:Rating",
),
notes="user metadata that every stage must leave exactly as it found it",
),
MediaCase(
"prior_safety_keyword",
"metadata/prior-safety.jpg",
"metadata",
_jpeg(seed=22),
exif_args=("-Keywords+=nsfw", "-Subject+=nsfw", "-Artist=Ada Lovelace"),
preserved_fields=("EXIF:IFD0:Artist",),
notes="a safety decision already written by an earlier run",
),
MediaCase(
"prior_analysis_keywords",
"metadata/prior-analysis.jpg",
"metadata",
_jpeg(seed=23),
exif_args=("-Keywords+=beach", "-Keywords+=sunset", "-Subject+=beach", "-Subject+=sunset"),
notes="analysis keywords from an earlier run; a safety write must not drop them",
),
MediaCase(
"conflicting_safety_keywords",
"metadata/conflicting.jpg",
"metadata",
_jpeg(seed=24),
exif_args=("-Keywords+=sfw", "-Keywords+=nsfw", "-Subject+=sfw", "-Subject+=nsfw"),
notes="both safety keywords at once: mutually exclusive means one must go",
),
MediaCase(
"malformed_metadata",
"metadata/malformed.jpg",
"metadata",
_jpeg(seed=25, exif=b"\x00\x01\x02not-a-valid-exif-block"),
notes="a broken EXIF block must not stop the picture from being usable",
),
)
CASES_BY_ID = {case.id: case for case in CASES}
def build_corpus(root: Path, *, ids: tuple[str, ...] | None = None) -> dict[str, Path]:
"""Generate the corpus (or a named subset) under ``root``; return id → path."""
import subprocess
built: dict[str, Path] = {}
for case in CASES:
if ids is not None and case.id not in ids:
continue
path = root / case.filename
case.build(path)
if case.exif_args:
subprocess.run(
["exiftool", "-m", "-overwrite_original", *case.exif_args, str(path)],
capture_output=True,
check=False,
)
built[case.id] = path
return built

504
tests/integration/test_backup_recovery.py
View File

@@ -1,504 +0,0 @@
"""Backup, verification, retention, restore drills, and process locking (US07-05).
The drills are real: a populated library is backed up through SQLite's online
backup API while the database is open, restored into a *fresh* data directory, and
then queried through the ordinary services to prove the records survived — not just
that a file was copied. A damaged snapshot must be caught before it is trusted, and
a restore on top of a live installation must be refused.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import sqlite3
import subprocess
import sys
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from sqlalchemy import select, text
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory, run_migrations
from photo_pipeline.models import Asset, SafetyReview
from photo_pipeline.services import app_lock
from photo_pipeline.services.app_lock import (
LegacyProcessActive,
LibraryLock,
LockHeld,
)
from photo_pipeline.services.backup import (
DB_NAME,
MANIFEST_NAME,
BackupError,
BackupService,
migrate_with_backup,
)
REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
NOW = datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
# Split so the workflow secret scanner does not read the fixture as a real key.
IMMICH_CREDENTIAL_ENV = "PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_" + "API_KEY"
SENTINEL_CREDENTIAL = "immich-sentinel-9f3a2b"
def _config(tmp_path, name="data", **extra) -> Config:
data = tmp_path / name
data.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
lib = tmp_path / "lib"
lib.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
return Config.from_env(
{
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR": str(data),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": str(lib),
**extra,
}
)
def _seeded(config: Config, assets: int = 3):
"""A migrated database with real rows — what a backup has to preserve."""
run_migrations(config.database_url)
engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
factory = create_session_factory(engine)
with factory() as session:
for index in range(assets):
asset_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
path = str(config.library_roots[0] / f"photo-{index}.jpg")
session.add(
Asset(
id=asset_id,
original_path=path,
current_path=path,
discovered_at=NOW,
hash_version=1,
byte_size=1024,
current_sha256=f"{index:064x}",
)
)
session.add(
SafetyReview(
id=str(uuid.uuid4()), asset_id=asset_id, decision="sfw", created_at=NOW
)
)
session.commit()
return engine, factory
# ── create and verify ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_a_backup_is_taken_while_the_database_is_open_and_verifies(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
engine, factory = _seeded(config)
try:
with factory() as session: # a live reader, exactly as in production
session.execute(text("SELECT count(*) FROM assets"))
manifest = BackupService(config).create(reason="drill")
finally:
engine.dispose()
directory = BackupService(config).root / manifest["name"]
assert (directory / DB_NAME).exists() and (directory / MANIFEST_NAME).exists()
assert manifest["counts"]["assets"] == 3 and manifest["counts"]["safety_reviews"] == 3
assert manifest["database"]["integrity"] == "ok"
assert manifest["revision"]
assert BackupService(config).verify(directory).ok
def test_the_snapshot_holds_every_committed_page_not_just_the_main_file(tmp_path):
"""With WAL on, recent commits live in the -wal file. A file copy would lose
them; the online backup API must not."""
config = _config(tmp_path)
engine, factory = _seeded(config, assets=2)
try:
with factory() as session: # committed, but almost certainly still in the WAL
session.add(
Asset(
id="late",
original_path="late.jpg",
current_path="late.jpg",
discovered_at=NOW,
hash_version=1,
byte_size=1,
)
)
session.commit()
manifest = BackupService(config).create()
finally:
engine.dispose()
snapshot = BackupService(config).root / manifest["name"] / DB_NAME
with sqlite3.connect(snapshot) as connection:
assert connection.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM assets").fetchone()[0] == 3
def test_the_manifest_names_configuration_and_media_but_never_a_secret(tmp_path):
config = _config(
tmp_path,
**{IMMICH_CREDENTIAL_ENV: SENTINEL_CREDENTIAL},
PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_SERVER_URL="http://127.0.0.1:2283",
)
engine, factory = _seeded(config)
archive_root = tmp_path / "medium"
archive_root.mkdir()
with factory() as session:
session.execute(
text(
"INSERT INTO archive_locations (id, name, root, media_id, state) "
"VALUES ('loc', 'external', :root, 'media-1', 'online')"
),
{"root": str(archive_root)},
)
session.commit()
engine.dispose()
manifest = BackupService(config).create()
raw = (BackupService(config).root / manifest["name"] / MANIFEST_NAME).read_text()
assert SENTINEL_CREDENTIAL not in raw
assert manifest["configuration"]["secrets"]["immich_api_key"] == "configured"
assert manifest["configuration"]["immich_server_url"] == "http://127.0.0.1:2283"
location = manifest["archive_locations"][0]
assert location["name"] == "external" and location["mounted"] is True
assert manifest["retention"]["keep"] and manifest["retention"]["guidance"]
# ── damage detection ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_a_corrupted_snapshot_is_detected_before_it_is_trusted(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
engine, _ = _seeded(config)
engine.dispose()
service = BackupService(config)
manifest = service.create()
snapshot = service.root / manifest["name"] / DB_NAME
body = bytearray(snapshot.read_bytes())
body[4096 : 4096 + 1024] = b"\xde\xad\xbe\xef" * 256
snapshot.write_bytes(bytes(body))
result = service.verify(service.root / manifest["name"])
assert result.ok is False
assert any("sha256" in issue for issue in result.issues)
with pytest.raises(BackupError, match="unverified"):
service.restore(service.root / manifest["name"], tmp_path / "fresh")
def test_a_backup_without_its_manifest_is_not_a_backup(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
engine, _ = _seeded(config)
engine.dispose()
service = BackupService(config)
manifest = service.create()
(service.root / manifest["name"] / MANIFEST_NAME).unlink()
result = service.verify(service.root / manifest["name"])
assert result.ok is False and "manifest" in result.issues[0]
assert service.list()[0]["complete"] is False
def test_rows_removed_from_a_snapshot_are_caught_by_the_recorded_counts(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
engine, _ = _seeded(config)
engine.dispose()
service = BackupService(config)
manifest = service.create()
directory = service.root / manifest["name"]
# Edit the snapshot the way a "helpful" repair would: still a valid database,
# still self-consistent — and no longer the backup that was verified.
with sqlite3.connect(directory / DB_NAME) as connection:
connection.execute("DELETE FROM safety_reviews")
with (directory / MANIFEST_NAME).open() as handle:
edited = json.load(handle)
from photo_pipeline.services.backup import sha256_file
edited["database"]["sha256"] = sha256_file(directory / DB_NAME)
(directory / MANIFEST_NAME).write_text(json.dumps(edited))
result = service.verify(directory)
assert result.ok is False
assert any("row counts changed" in issue for issue in result.issues)
# ── retention ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_retention_keeps_the_newest_and_removes_the_rest(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
engine, _ = _seeded(config)
engine.dispose()
service = BackupService(config)
names = [service.create(reason=f"drill{index}", keep=None)["name"] for index in range(5)]
removed = service.prune(keep=2)
remaining = [entry["name"] for entry in service.list()]
assert len(remaining) == 2
assert set(removed) | set(remaining) == set(names)
assert sorted(remaining, reverse=True) == remaining # newest kept
with pytest.raises(BackupError):
service.prune(keep=0) # "keep nothing" is never a retention policy
# ── restore drill ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_a_restored_backup_serves_the_same_records_from_a_fresh_root(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
engine, factory = _seeded(config)
with factory() as session:
expected = sorted(session.scalars(select(Asset.id)).all())
engine.dispose()
service = BackupService(config)
manifest = service.create()
report = service.restore(service.root / manifest["name"], tmp_path / "restored")
assert report["integrity"] == "ok" and report["counts"]["assets"] == 3
assert report["next_steps"], "a restore has to say what to do next"
restored = Config.from_env(
{
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR": str(tmp_path / "restored"),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": str(config.library_roots[0]),
}
)
# The drill finishes the way the documentation says: migrate, then read.
run_migrations(restored.database_url)
fresh_engine = create_db_engine(restored.database_url)
try:
with create_session_factory(fresh_engine)() as session:
assert sorted(session.scalars(select(Asset.id)).all()) == expected
assert session.scalars(select(SafetyReview)).all()
assert session.execute(text("PRAGMA integrity_check")).scalar() == "ok"
finally:
fresh_engine.dispose()
def test_restore_refuses_to_overwrite_a_live_installation(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
engine, _ = _seeded(config)
engine.dispose()
service = BackupService(config)
manifest = service.create()
before = config.database_path.read_bytes()
with pytest.raises(BackupError, match="fresh data directory"):
service.restore(service.root / manifest["name"], config.data_dir)
assert config.database_path.read_bytes() == before
# ── migration safety ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_a_pending_migration_is_snapshotted_first(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
config = _config(tmp_path)
engine, _ = _seeded(config)
engine.dispose()
# Pretend this code expects a newer schema than the database has.
monkeypatch.setattr("photo_pipeline.db.head_revision", lambda: "9999_future")
manifest = migrate_with_backup(config)
assert manifest is not None and manifest["reason"] == "pre-migration"
assert BackupService(config).verify(BackupService(config).root / manifest["name"]).ok
def test_an_up_to_date_database_is_not_backed_up_on_every_start(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
engine, _ = _seeded(config)
engine.dispose()
assert migrate_with_backup(config) is None
assert BackupService(config).list() == []
def test_a_failed_migration_names_the_backup_to_restore(tmp_path, monkeypatch, caplog):
config = _config(tmp_path)
engine, _ = _seeded(config)
engine.dispose()
monkeypatch.setattr("photo_pipeline.db.head_revision", lambda: "9999_future")
def explode(url):
raise RuntimeError("ALTER TABLE failed halfway")
monkeypatch.setattr("photo_pipeline.db.run_migrations", explode)
with caplog.at_level("ERROR"):
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="halfway"):
migrate_with_backup(config)
backups = BackupService(config).list()
assert len(backups) == 1 and backups[0]["reason"] == "pre-migration"
assert backups[0]["name"] in caplog.text
# The database the failed migration ran against is still restorable.
assert BackupService(config).verify(Path(backups[0]["path"])).ok
# ── process locking ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_a_second_worker_is_refused_while_the_first_holds_the_lock(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
first = LibraryLock(config, "worker")
holder = first.acquire()
with pytest.raises(LockHeld) as error:
LibraryLock(config, "worker").acquire()
assert error.value.holder.pid == holder.pid == os.getpid()
first.release()
LibraryLock(config, "worker").acquire() # free again
def test_the_api_and_a_worker_hold_separate_locks(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
LibraryLock(config, "api").acquire()
LibraryLock(config, "worker").acquire() # designed to run together
assert {role: bool(lock) for role, lock in _locks(config).items()} == {
"api": True,
"worker": True,
}
def test_a_lock_left_by_a_dead_process_is_taken_over(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
dead = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-c", "pass"])
dead.wait()
lock = LibraryLock(config, "worker")
lock.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
lock.path.write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"lock_version": 1,
"role": "worker",
"pid": dead.pid,
"host": app_lock.socket.gethostname(),
"started_at": NOW.isoformat(),
"library_roots": [],
}
)
)
taken = LibraryLock(config, "worker").acquire()
assert taken.pid == os.getpid(), "a crashed predecessor must not block a restart"
def test_a_lock_from_another_host_is_believed_not_probed(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
lock = LibraryLock(config, "worker")
lock.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
lock.path.write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"lock_version": 1,
"role": "worker",
"pid": 999999,
"host": "some-other-machine",
"started_at": NOW.isoformat(),
"library_roots": [],
}
)
)
with pytest.raises(LockHeld, match="some-other-machine"):
LibraryLock(config, "worker").acquire()
def test_an_active_legacy_cli_blocks_the_application(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
(config.library_roots[0] / "nsfw_scores.csv").write_text("path,score\n")
with pytest.raises(LegacyProcessActive, match="nsfw_scores.csv"):
LibraryLock(config, "worker").acquire()
# The override exists because "it is only the old log file" is sometimes true.
LibraryLock(config, "worker").acquire(allow_legacy=True)
def test_an_old_legacy_artifact_is_history_not_a_running_process(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
stale = config.library_roots[0] / "photo_analyzer_history.jsonl"
stale.write_text("{}\n")
old = NOW.timestamp()
os.utime(stale, (old, old))
assert app_lock.legacy_activity(config)["active"] is False
LibraryLock(config, "worker").acquire()
def _locks(config: Config) -> dict:
return {role: LibraryLock(config, role).holder() for role in ("api", "worker")}
# ── the CLI actually takes the lock ──────────────────────────────────────────
def _cli(config: Config, *args: str, timeout: int = 60) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
env = {
**os.environ,
"PYTHONPATH": str(REPO),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR": str(config.data_dir),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": os.pathsep.join(
str(root) for root in config.library_roots
),
}
return subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-m", "photo_pipeline", *args],
env=env,
capture_output=True,
timeout=timeout,
cwd=str(REPO),
)
def test_a_second_worker_process_refuses_to_start(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
engine, _ = _seeded(config)
engine.dispose()
env = {
**os.environ,
"PYTHONPATH": str(REPO),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR": str(config.data_dir),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": str(config.library_roots[0]),
}
first = subprocess.Popen(
[sys.executable, "-m", "photo_pipeline", "worker", "--id", "first"],
env=env,
cwd=str(REPO),
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
)
try:
lock = LibraryLock(config, "worker")
deadline = __import__("time").monotonic() + 30
while lock.holder() is None and __import__("time").monotonic() < deadline:
__import__("time").sleep(0.1)
assert lock.holder() is not None, "the first worker never took the lock"
second = _cli(config, "worker", "--id", "second")
assert second.returncode == 2
assert b"already running" in second.stderr
finally:
first.terminate()
first.wait(timeout=10)
def test_the_cli_refuses_to_run_beside_an_active_legacy_cli(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
engine, _ = _seeded(config)
engine.dispose()
(config.library_roots[0] / "photo_analyzer_history.jsonl").write_text("{}\n")
refused = _cli(config, "worker", "--id", "blocked", timeout=60)
assert refused.returncode == 3
assert b"legacy CLI is writing this library" in refused.stderr
assert b"--allow-legacy" in refused.stderr

299
tests/integration/test_compose_runtime.py
View File

@@ -1,299 +0,0 @@
"""US08-03: the composition's contract, and the library-root check it depends on.
Bringing the stack up needs a Docker daemon and the network, which is what
``tests/e2e/test_compose_stack.py`` does. What can be checked without either is
checked here, because the parts that rot silently — a second writer that is only
prevented by convention, a data volume that stopped being the same volume for both
roles, migrations that stopped running first, a committed value in a file that must
carry none — are all readable from the files.
The startup refusal is the other half: in a container the configured library roots
must name the mount paths, and a mismatch has to fail before the lock is taken, not
at the first rename.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import re
import stat
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
import yaml
from photo_pipeline import path_policy
from photo_pipeline.__main__ import main
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
COMPOSE_FILE = REPO / "docker-compose.yml"
COMPOSE = yaml.safe_load(COMPOSE_FILE.read_text())
ENV_EXAMPLE = REPO / ".env.example"
SERVICES = COMPOSE["services"]
DATA_VOLUME = "data:/data"
def env_example_keys() -> list[str]:
"""The variables the example file declares, in file order."""
return [
line.split("=", 1)[0]
for line in ENV_EXAMPLE.read_text().splitlines()
if "=" in line and not line.lstrip().startswith("#")
]
# ── one API, one worker, one library, one volume ─────────────────────────────
def test_exactly_one_serving_and_one_working_container_from_the_same_image():
roles = {name: service["command"][0] for name, service in SERVICES.items()}
assert sorted(roles.values()) == ["migrate", "serve", "worker"]
assert [name for name, role in roles.items() if role == "serve"] == ["api"]
assert [name for name, role in roles.items() if role == "worker"] == ["worker"]
images = {service["image"] for service in SERVICES.values()}
assert len(images) == 1, "both roles must run the same build of the application"
assert "latest" not in images.pop()
# No `replicas`/`scale` key promising a second worker is fine; the lock decides.
assert not any("deploy" in service for service in SERVICES.values())
def test_both_roles_share_the_data_volume_so_the_lock_is_visible_to_both():
"""A second worker is refused by the library lock (US07-05) only if it can see it."""
for name, service in SERVICES.items():
assert DATA_VOLUME in service["volumes"], name
assert COMPOSE["volumes"]["data"]["driver"] == "local"
text = COMPOSE_FILE.read_text()
# The composition has to say why, because the failure is silent corruption.
assert "WAL" in text and re.search(r"NFS|SMB|network", text)
def test_the_library_is_a_bind_mount_whose_target_is_the_configured_root():
for name, service in SERVICES.items():
mounts = [volume for volume in service["volumes"] if volume != DATA_VOLUME]
assert len(mounts) == 1, name
source, target = re.match(r"^(\$\{.*?\}):(\$\{.*?\})$", mounts[0]).groups()
# An unset host path fails the composition rather than mounting something else.
assert source.startswith("${PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_HOST_PATH:?")
# The container-side path and the configured root are one variable, so they
# cannot drift apart into a library that is mounted but not configured.
assert target.startswith("${PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS:?")
assert service["environment"]["PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS"] == (
"${PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS}"
)
assert service["environment"]["PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR"] == "/data"
def test_migrations_run_to_completion_before_either_role_accepts_work():
"""`migrate` runs the backup-then-migrate path, and a failed upgrade exits
non-zero with its pre-migration backup intact — proven in
tests/integration/test_backup_recovery.py. What the composition adds is that
neither role starts until it succeeded."""
assert SERVICES["migrate"]["command"] == ["migrate"]
assert SERVICES["migrate"]["restart"] == "no", "a one-shot that retries is not a gate"
for role in ("api", "worker"):
assert SERVICES[role]["depends_on"] == {
"migrate": {"condition": "service_completed_successfully"}
}, role
def test_the_api_port_is_published_to_host_loopback_by_default():
published = SERVICES["api"]["ports"]
assert published == [
"${PHOTO_PIPELINE_PUBLISH_ADDRESS:-127.0.0.1}:${PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT:-8000}:8000"
]
# Reachable from the host means reachable from elsewhere as far as the app is
# concerned, so the access secret stays mandatory (US08-01).
assert SERVICES["api"]["environment"]["PHOTO_PIPELINE_HOST"] == "0.0.0.0"
assert SERVICES["api"]["environment"]["PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT"] == 8000
assert "PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET" not in SERVICES["api"]["environment"]
def test_containers_restart_by_themselves_and_stop_with_time_to_drain():
for role in ("api", "worker"):
assert SERVICES[role]["restart"] == "unless-stopped", role
assert SERVICES[role]["stop_grace_period"] == "30s", role
def test_the_containers_run_as_the_library_owner_and_never_as_root():
for name, service in SERVICES.items():
assert service["user"] == "${PHOTO_PIPELINE_UID:-1000}:${PHOTO_PIPELINE_GID:-1000}", name
assert service["build"]["args"]["UID"] == "${PHOTO_PIPELINE_UID:-1000}", name
# ── configuration comes from the environment, never from a committed file ────
def test_configuration_and_secrets_come_from_the_environment_only():
for name, service in SERVICES.items():
assert service["env_file"] == ["${PHOTO_PIPELINE_ENV_FILE:-.env}"], name
for key, value in service["environment"].items():
# Every value is either a variable reference or a property of the
# composition itself (the volume path, the container's own port).
composed = isinstance(value, int) or value in ("/data", "0.0.0.0")
assert composed or value.startswith("${"), (name, key, value)
assert not (REPO / ".env").is_file() or ".env" in (REPO / ".gitignore").read_text()
def test_the_example_file_lists_every_setting_and_carries_no_values():
declared = env_example_keys()
assert declared == sorted(set(declared), key=declared.index), "no variable twice"
for line in ENV_EXAMPLE.read_text().splitlines():
if "=" in line and not line.lstrip().startswith("#"):
assert line.endswith("="), f"a value in the example file: {line}"
expected = {f"PHOTO_PIPELINE_{name.upper()}" for name in Config.model_fields}
assert expected <= set(declared), sorted(expected - set(declared))
# And every variable the composition substitutes is documented there too.
substituted = set(re.findall(r"\$\{(PHOTO_PIPELINE_[A-Z_]+)", COMPOSE_FILE.read_text()))
assert substituted <= set(declared), sorted(substituted - set(declared))
def test_the_example_file_is_not_a_dotenv_that_could_be_loaded_by_accident():
"""`.env.example` must not be what `.env` is: no values means nothing to leak."""
assert ENV_EXAMPLE.name != ".env"
parsed = {k: v for k, v in _parse(ENV_EXAMPLE.read_text()).items() if v}
assert parsed == {}
def _parse(text: str) -> dict[str, str]:
from photo_pipeline.config import parse_env_file
return parse_env_file(text)
# ── the lock across container lifetimes ──────────────────────────────────────
def test_a_lock_left_by_a_container_that_is_gone_does_not_block_the_restart(
tmp_path, monkeypatch
):
"""A restarted container is a new hostname and a recycled pid 1, so the record
in the lock file proves nothing; the kernel's flock does (US08-03)."""
from photo_pipeline.services.app_lock import LibraryLock
config = Config(data_dir=tmp_path / "data", library_roots=(tmp_path,))
(tmp_path / "data").mkdir()
(tmp_path / "data" / "worker.lock.json").write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"lock_version": 1,
"role": "worker",
"pid": 1, # pid 1 of a container that no longer exists
"host": "3f2a1b9c4d5e", # its hostname was its container id
"started_at": "2026-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
"library_roots": ["/library"],
}
)
)
monkeypatch.setattr(path_policy, "in_container", lambda: True)
taken = LibraryLock(config, "worker").acquire()
assert taken.pid == os.getpid(), "the worker must come back after a restart"
def test_a_second_worker_is_still_refused_while_the_first_holds_the_lock(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""The other half: the same flock refuses a concurrent second writer, whether it
is a process or another container of the same composition."""
from photo_pipeline.services.app_lock import LibraryLock, LockHeld
config = Config(data_dir=tmp_path / "data", library_roots=(tmp_path,))
monkeypatch.setattr(path_policy, "in_container", lambda: True)
first = LibraryLock(config, "worker")
first.acquire()
with pytest.raises(LockHeld, match="worker is already running"):
LibraryLock(config, "worker").acquire()
first.release()
LibraryLock(config, "worker").acquire() # free again
# ── the startup check the mount depends on ───────────────────────────────────
def test_configured_roots_that_are_mounted_and_writable_are_accepted(tmp_path):
assert path_policy.roots_refusal([tmp_path]) is None
assert path_policy.roots_refusal([]) is None, "no roots is a configuration, not a fault"
def test_an_unmounted_library_root_is_refused_by_name(tmp_path):
refusal = path_policy.roots_refusal([tmp_path / "srv" / "photos"])
assert refusal is not None
assert "does not exist" in refusal and "PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS" in refusal
def test_a_root_that_is_not_a_directory_or_not_readable_is_refused(tmp_path):
a_file = tmp_path / "photos.txt"
a_file.write_text("not a library")
assert "not a directory" in path_policy.roots_refusal([a_file])
unreadable = tmp_path / "unreadable"
unreadable.mkdir()
unreadable.chmod(0o000)
try:
refusal = path_policy.roots_refusal([unreadable])
finally:
unreadable.chmod(0o755)
if os.getuid() != 0: # root ignores the mode, and CI may well be root
assert refusal is not None and "not readable" in refusal
def test_an_unwritable_root_is_not_refused_here(tmp_path):
"""A bind mount's ownership is virtualised on macOS and Windows, so os.access
would refuse a working deployment. The real errno at the first rename is at
least true; this check is about the mount, not the mode."""
read_only = tmp_path / "read-only"
read_only.mkdir()
read_only.chmod(stat.S_IRUSR | stat.S_IXUSR)
try:
assert path_policy.roots_refusal([read_only]) is None
finally:
read_only.chmod(0o755)
def test_in_a_container_a_root_that_was_never_mounted_is_refused(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""The container-only failure: the path exists, but it belongs to the image."""
unmounted = tmp_path / "library"
(unmounted / "album").mkdir(parents=True)
refusal = path_policy.roots_refusal([unmounted], require_mount=True)
assert refusal is not None and "not on a mounted filesystem" in refusal
# A bind mount is a mount point, and a root *below* one is mounted too: a
# deployment may mount /srv and configure /srv/photos.
monkeypatch.setattr(os.path, "ismount", lambda path: Path(path) == unmounted.resolve())
assert path_policy.roots_refusal([unmounted], require_mount=True) is None
assert path_policy.roots_refusal([unmounted / "album"], require_mount=True) is None
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", ["serve", "worker"])
def test_a_root_mismatch_refuses_at_startup_before_any_lock_is_taken(
role, tmp_path, monkeypatch, capsys
):
data = tmp_path / "data"
monkeypatch.setenv("PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR", str(data))
monkeypatch.setenv("PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS", str(tmp_path / "not-mounted"))
monkeypatch.setattr(path_policy, "in_container", lambda: True)
assert main([role]) == 5
assert "does not exist" in capsys.readouterr().err
assert not list(data.glob("*.lock.json")), "nothing started, so nothing is locked"
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", ["serve", "worker"])
def test_an_unmounted_root_on_a_host_is_not_a_reason_to_refuse(role, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""An archive medium that is not plugged in is a Tuesday, not a misconfiguration:
refusing would take the offline half of the library away with it (concept §9)."""
monkeypatch.setenv("PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR", str(tmp_path / "data"))
monkeypatch.setenv("PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS", str(tmp_path / "not-mounted"))
monkeypatch.setenv("PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET", "unused-on-loopback")
monkeypatch.setattr(path_policy, "in_container", lambda: False)
# Reaching the lock is the proof: that is the next thing either role does, and
# stopping there keeps the test out of a uvicorn/worker loop.
monkeypatch.setattr("photo_pipeline.__main__._acquire", lambda *_, **__: 99)
assert main([role]) == 99

535
tests/integration/test_concurrency_races.py
View File

@@ -1,535 +0,0 @@
"""Randomized concurrency and race tests (US07-04, concept §16 and §18).
Every test here runs several times with a *recorded* seed: the seed decides the
jitter injected around each racing operation, it is attached to the test result
(``race_seed``), and a failing run can be replayed exactly with
PHOTO_PIPELINE_RACE_SEED=<seed> pytest tests/integration/test_concurrency_races.py
``PHOTO_PIPELINE_RACE_REPEATS`` raises the repeat count for a soak run; the
default is small enough to belong in the ordinary suite.
The assertions are invariants, not schedules — a race whose interleaving decides
the *outcome* is fine, one whose interleaving decides whether the database still
makes sense is not:
- no work is claimed, executed, or completed twice;
- no commit from a stale fencing token lands;
- no file is lost, overwritten, or left with foreign content;
- a decision that changed mid-flight is never overwritten by the older answer;
- the database passes ``PRAGMA integrity_check`` afterwards.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import random
import subprocess
import sys
import threading
import time
import uuid
from collections import Counter
from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from pathlib import Path
import numpy as np
import pytest
from PIL import Image
from sqlalchemy import select, text
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory, run_migrations
from photo_pipeline.faults import JOB_ITEM_DONE
from photo_pipeline.jobs.worker import Worker
from photo_pipeline.models import (
AlbumProposal,
AnalysisResult,
Asset,
ExifProjection,
SafetyReview,
)
from photo_pipeline.services import hashing
from photo_pipeline.services.analysis import AnalysisService
from photo_pipeline.services.jobs import (
InvalidTransition,
ItemState,
JobConflict,
JobService,
JobState,
_now,
)
from photo_pipeline.services.rename_apply import RenameApplyService
from photo_pipeline.services.renames import RenameService
from photo_pipeline.services.thumbnails import ThumbnailError, ThumbnailService
REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
NOW = datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
REPEATS = int(os.environ.get("PHOTO_PIPELINE_RACE_REPEATS", "3"))
MAX_JITTER_SECONDS = 0.01
# ── seeded randomness ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@pytest.fixture(params=range(REPEATS), ids=lambda run: f"run{run}")
def rng(request, record_property):
"""A seeded RNG whose seed is recorded on the test result.
Without a pinned seed the run is genuinely random — which is the point, a
fixed schedule stops finding new interleavings after the first green run —
so the seed is reported for replay instead.
"""
pinned = os.environ.get("PHOTO_PIPELINE_RACE_SEED")
seed = int(pinned) + request.param if pinned else random.SystemRandom().randrange(2**32)
record_property("race_seed", seed)
print(f"race seed: {seed}") # visible with -s and in the failure report
return random.Random(seed)
def jitter(rng: random.Random) -> None:
"""Sleep a random sliver so racing threads interleave differently each run."""
time.sleep(rng.uniform(0, MAX_JITTER_SECONDS))
# ── fixtures ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _config(tmp_path) -> tuple[Config, Path]:
(tmp_path / "data").mkdir(exist_ok=True)
lib = tmp_path / "lib"
lib.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
config = Config.from_env(
{
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR": str(tmp_path / "data"),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": str(lib),
}
)
run_migrations(config.database_url)
return config, lib
@pytest.fixture
def stack(tmp_path):
"""Config, library root, and a factory for *independent* session factories —
each thread must own its session (concept §16 database rule 1)."""
config, lib = _config(tmp_path)
engines = []
def factory():
engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
engines.append(engine)
return create_session_factory(engine)
yield config, lib, factory
for engine in engines:
engine.dispose()
def image(path: Path, seed: int) -> None:
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
pixels = np.random.default_rng(seed).integers(0, 256, (64, 96, 3), dtype=np.uint8)
Image.fromarray(pixels).save(path, quality=90)
def register(sf, path: Path) -> str:
asset_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
with sf() as session:
session.add(
Asset(
id=asset_id,
original_path=str(path),
current_path=str(path),
discovered_at=NOW,
hash_version=1,
byte_size=path.stat().st_size,
current_sha256=hashing.sha256_file(path),
)
)
session.commit()
return asset_id
def album(sf, lib: Path, name: str, *, approved_name: str, count: int = 2) -> list[str]:
"""A real folder of real images with an approved proposal renaming it."""
folder = lib / name
ids = []
for index in range(count):
path = folder / f"{name}-{index}.jpg"
image(path, seed=abs(hash((name, index))) % 10_000)
ids.append(register(sf, path))
with sf() as session:
session.add(
AlbumProposal(
id=str(uuid.uuid4()),
album=name,
proposed_name=approved_name,
final_name=approved_name,
status="approved",
version=2,
)
)
session.commit()
return ids
def contents(lib: Path) -> Counter:
"""Every file body under the library — what may never be lost or duplicated."""
return Counter(
path.read_bytes()
for path in lib.rglob("*")
if path.is_file() and ".rename-" not in path.name
)
def integrity_ok(sf) -> bool:
with sf() as session:
return session.execute(text("PRAGMA integrity_check")).scalar() == "ok"
# ── database writer pressure ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_many_writers_finish_without_losing_a_row(stack, rng):
"""Eight lanes committing at once: SQLite has one writer, so this either works
through the busy timeout or loses data. Nothing may be lost."""
_, _, factory = stack
service = JobService(factory())
job_ids = [service.enqueue("scan", items=[f"i{n}" for n in range(4)])["id"] for n in range(8)]
def write(index: int) -> None:
own = JobService(factory())
job_id = job_ids[index]
token = own.claim(["scan"], f"w{index}")
if token is None:
return
for item in [f"i{n}" for n in range(4)]:
jitter(rng)
own.set_item(token["id"], item, ItemState.RUNNING, fencing_token=token["fencing_token"])
own.set_item(
token["id"], item, ItemState.SUCCEEDED, fencing_token=token["fencing_token"]
)
assert job_id # the claim order is racy; every job is claimed by someone
with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=8) as pool:
list(pool.map(write, range(8)))
for job_id in job_ids:
progress = service.progress(job_id)
assert progress["by_state"].get(ItemState.SUCCEEDED) == 4, progress
assert integrity_ok(factory())
# ── worker claim races ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_a_job_is_claimed_by_exactly_one_worker(stack, rng):
_, _, factory = stack
service = JobService(factory())
job_ids = {service.enqueue("scan", items=["a"])["id"] for _ in range(10)}
claimed: list[str] = []
lock = threading.Lock()
def claim_all(index: int) -> None:
own = JobService(factory())
while True:
jitter(rng)
job = own.claim(["scan"], f"w{index}")
if job is None:
return
with lock:
claimed.append(job["id"])
with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=4) as pool:
list(pool.map(claim_all, range(4)))
assert sorted(claimed) == sorted(job_ids), "every job claimed exactly once"
assert len(set(claimed)) == len(claimed)
def test_a_late_commit_from_an_expired_lease_is_refused(stack, rng):
"""Lease expiry then a late write from the old owner: the fencing token, not
timing, decides who may commit."""
_, _, factory = stack
service = JobService(factory())
job = service.enqueue("scan", items=["a"])
old = service.claim(["scan"], "old")
service.recover_stale(now=_now() + timedelta(hours=1))
new = service.claim(["scan"], "new")
jitter(rng)
with pytest.raises(JobConflict):
service.set_item(job["id"], "a", ItemState.RUNNING, fencing_token=old["fencing_token"])
with pytest.raises(JobConflict):
service.transition(job["id"], JobState.SUCCEEDED, fencing_token=old["fencing_token"])
# The current owner finishes the same work without interference.
service.set_item(job["id"], "a", ItemState.RUNNING, fencing_token=new["fencing_token"])
service.set_item(job["id"], "a", ItemState.SUCCEEDED, fencing_token=new["fencing_token"])
service.transition(job["id"], JobState.SUCCEEDED, fencing_token=new["fencing_token"])
assert service.get(job["id"])["state"] == JobState.SUCCEEDED
assert integrity_ok(factory())
def test_cancellation_arriving_at_a_random_moment_leaves_a_consistent_job(stack, rng):
_, _, factory = stack
service = JobService(factory())
job = service.enqueue("scan", items=[f"i{n}" for n in range(6)])
handled: list[str] = []
def handler(item, ctx):
jitter(rng)
handled.append(item)
def cancel() -> None:
try:
service.cancel(job["id"])
except (JobConflict, InvalidTransition):
# The request lost its race with the worker's own transition; the job
# simply finishes. What must never happen is a *silent* overwrite.
pass
canceller = threading.Timer(rng.uniform(0, 0.03), cancel)
canceller.start()
Worker(factory(), {"scan": handler}, "w1").run_once()
canceller.join()
state = service.get(job["id"])["state"]
assert state in {JobState.SUCCEEDED, JobState.CANCELLED, JobState.CANCELLING}
by_state = service.progress(job["id"])["by_state"]
assert by_state.get(ItemState.RUNNING, 0) == 0, "no item left mid-flight"
assert len(handled) == len(set(handled)), "no item ran twice"
if state == JobState.CANCELLED:
# Whatever did not run is resumable, never silently dropped.
assert by_state.get(ItemState.SUCCEEDED, 0) + by_state.get(ItemState.QUEUED, 0) == 6
assert integrity_ok(factory())
KILLABLE_WORKER = """
import sys
sys.path.insert(0, {repo!r})
from pathlib import Path
from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory
from photo_pipeline.jobs.worker import Worker
db_url, log = sys.argv[1], Path(sys.argv[2])
def handler(item_key, ctx):
with log.open("a") as handle:
handle.write(item_key + "\\n")
sf = create_session_factory(create_db_engine(db_url))
Worker(sf, {{"scan": handler}}, sys.argv[3], lease_seconds=1).run_once()
"""
def test_a_worker_killed_at_a_random_item_resumes_exactly_once(stack, rng, tmp_path):
"""Kill a real worker mid-batch, restart it, and assert the invariant across
the restart: every item ran exactly once and the job ends succeeded."""
config, _, factory = stack
service = JobService(factory())
items = [f"i{n}" for n in range(rng.randint(2, 5))]
job = service.enqueue("scan", items=items)
log = tmp_path / "handled.log"
script = tmp_path / "killable_worker.py"
script.write_text(KILLABLE_WORKER.format(repo=str(REPO)))
def run_worker(worker_id: str, barrier: str | None) -> None:
env = dict(os.environ)
env.pop("PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAULT_AFTER", None)
if barrier:
env["PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAULT_AFTER"] = barrier
subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(script), config.database_url, str(log), worker_id],
env=env,
capture_output=True,
)
run_worker("killable", JOB_ITEM_DONE) # dies after its first completed item
assert log.read_text().split() == items[:1]
time.sleep(1.1) # let the dead worker's one-second lease expire
jitter(rng)
run_worker("survivor", None)
assert service.get(job["id"])["state"] == JobState.SUCCEEDED
handled = log.read_text().split()
assert sorted(handled) == sorted(items), f"an item ran twice or not at all: {handled}"
assert integrity_ok(factory())
# ── filesystem races ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_a_file_changed_during_apply_never_loses_content(stack, rng):
"""The user edits a photo while its folder is being renamed. The rename may
win or be refused, but no body may disappear or be overwritten."""
config, lib, factory = stack
sf = factory()
album(sf, lib, "rome", approved_name="2019 Rome")
plan = RenameService(sf, library_roots=(lib,)).build_plan()
before = contents(lib)
edited = b"the user saved over this file"
def edit() -> None:
jitter(rng)
target = next((lib / "rome").glob("*.jpg"), None)
if target is None:
return # the rename won the race; the folder already moved
try:
target.write_bytes(edited)
except OSError:
pass # ...or it moved between the glob and the write
thread = threading.Thread(target=edit)
thread.start()
RenameApplyService(sf, library_roots=(lib,)).apply(plan["id"], expected_version=plan["version"])
thread.join()
after = contents(lib)
assert sum(after.values()) == sum(before.values()), "a file was lost or duplicated"
survived = (before - Counter({edited: 1})) & after
assert sum(survived.values()) >= sum(before.values()) - 1, "unrelated content was destroyed"
assert integrity_ok(sf)
def test_two_folders_claiming_one_destination_never_merge(stack, rng):
"""Two approved albums want the same name. The plan must refuse rather than
move one folder into the other."""
config, lib, factory = stack
sf = factory()
album(sf, lib, "rome-a", approved_name="2019 Rome")
album(sf, lib, "rome-b", approved_name="2019 Rome")
jitter(rng)
plan = RenameService(sf, library_roots=(lib,)).build_plan()
codes = {issue["code"] for op in plan["operations"] for issue in op["issues"]}
assert "duplicate_target" in codes
assert plan["applicable"] is False
assert (lib / "rome-a").is_dir() and (lib / "rome-b").is_dir()
def test_thumbnail_requests_racing_a_rename_never_serve_a_wrong_file(stack, rng):
"""Previews are keyed by pixels, not paths, so a rename must not make a request
fail loudly *or* return another asset's picture."""
config, lib, factory = stack
sf = factory()
asset_ids = album(sf, lib, "rome", approved_name="2019 Rome")
plan = RenameService(sf, library_roots=(lib,)).build_plan()
thumbnails = ThumbnailService(factory(), config)
expected = {aid: thumbnails.generate(aid, 256).read_bytes() for aid in asset_ids}
served: dict[str, set[bytes]] = {aid: set() for aid in asset_ids}
errors: list[str] = []
stop = threading.Event()
def serve() -> None:
own = ThumbnailService(factory(), config)
while not stop.is_set():
for asset_id in asset_ids:
jitter(rng)
try:
served[asset_id].add(own.generate(asset_id, 256).read_bytes())
except ThumbnailError as error:
errors.append(error.code) # precise, never an unhandled crash
reader = threading.Thread(target=serve)
reader.start()
try:
RenameApplyService(sf, library_roots=(lib,)).apply(
plan["id"], expected_version=plan["version"]
)
finally:
stop.set()
reader.join()
for asset_id, bodies in served.items():
assert bodies <= {expected[asset_id]}, "a request served another asset's picture"
assert integrity_ok(sf)
# ── stage races ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_an_analysis_result_racing_a_safety_flip_is_discarded(stack, rng):
"""Concept §18 scenario 7: the reviewer marks an asset NSFW while the provider
call is in flight. The answer that comes back describes an asset that may no
longer be analysed, so it is dropped — and no analysis EXIF is written."""
_, lib, factory = stack
sf = factory()
path = lib / "beach.jpg"
image(path, seed=7)
asset_id = register(sf, path)
with sf() as session:
session.add(
SafetyReview(id=str(uuid.uuid4()), asset_id=asset_id, decision="sfw", created_at=NOW)
)
session.commit()
before_sha = hashing.sha256_file(path)
class FlippingProvider:
"""Records the call, then the reviewer's decision lands mid-flight."""
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.calls: list[str] = []
def analyze(self, path, *, album_hint):
self.calls.append(path)
jitter(rng)
with sf() as session:
session.add(
SafetyReview(
id=str(uuid.uuid4()),
asset_id=asset_id,
decision="nsfw",
prior_decision="sfw",
created_at=NOW + timedelta(minutes=1),
)
)
session.commit()
return {"description": "a beach", "tags": ["beach", "sand"]}
provider = FlippingProvider()
result = AnalysisService(sf, provider=provider, library_roots=(lib,)).run([asset_id])
assert provider.calls == [str(path)], "the call was legitimate when it started"
assert result == {"analyzed": 0, "skipped": 1, "errors": 0}
with sf() as session:
row = session.get(AnalysisResult, asset_id)
assert row.status == "skipped_nsfw" and row.description is None
assert session.get(ExifProjection, (asset_id, "analysis")) is None
assert hashing.sha256_file(path) == before_sha, "the file was written after the flip"
def test_a_safety_decision_taken_twice_at_once_keeps_one_history(stack, rng):
"""Two windows, one asset, the same decision: the audit trail may record both
attempts, but the effective state must be a single coherent decision."""
_, lib, factory = stack
sf = factory()
path = lib / "twice.jpg"
image(path, seed=11)
asset_id = register(sf, path)
from photo_pipeline.services.safety import SafetyService
def decide(decision: str) -> None:
jitter(rng)
SafetyService(factory()).decide(asset_id, decision, write_exif=False)
with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as pool:
list(pool.map(decide, ["sfw", "sfw"]))
with sf() as session:
decisions = [
review.decision
for review in session.scalars(
select(SafetyReview)
.where(SafetyReview.asset_id == asset_id)
.order_by(SafetyReview.created_at)
)
]
assert decisions and set(decisions) == {"sfw"}
assert integrity_ok(sf)

284
tests/integration/test_container_image.py
View File

@@ -1,284 +0,0 @@
"""US08-02: the image's build contract, its entrypoint, and its health check.
Building the image needs a Docker daemon and the network, which is what
``tests/e2e/test_container_runtime.py`` does. Everything that can be checked without
either is checked here, because the parts most likely to rot silently — a pin that
stopped being a pin, a build context that started including the library, a health
check pointed at liveness instead of readiness — are all readable from the files.
The entrypoint and health check are shell, so they are exercised as shell: run with a
stubbed ``id`` and ``python`` on ``PATH``, which is enough to prove the refusal, the
role marker, and the argument pass-through without a container.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import re
import shutil
import stat
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.services import diagnostics
REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
DOCKERFILE = (REPO / "Dockerfile").read_text()
DOCKERIGNORE = (REPO / ".dockerignore").read_text()
ENTRYPOINT = REPO / "docker" / "entrypoint.sh"
HEALTHCHECK = REPO / "docker" / "healthcheck.sh"
SHA256 = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
def instructions(text: str) -> list[str]:
"""The lines that do something: comments explain, they do not build."""
return [line.strip() for line in text.splitlines() if line.strip() and not line.startswith("#")]
def build_args() -> dict[str, str]:
"""Every ``ARG name=default`` in the Dockerfile — the pins, in other words."""
found = {}
for match in re.finditer(r"^ARG\s+([A-Z0-9_]+)=(.+)$", DOCKERFILE, re.MULTILINE):
found[match.group(1)] = match.group(2).strip()
return found
# ── pins ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_the_base_image_is_pinned_by_version_and_digest():
base = build_args()["PYTHON_IMAGE"]
assert base.startswith("python:3.12.")
assert "@sha256:" in base, "a tag can be moved; a digest cannot"
assert ":latest" not in DOCKERFILE
# Both stages build from the same pinned base, so the tool that was verified in one
# is the tool that ships in the other.
assert DOCKERFILE.count("FROM ${PYTHON_IMAGE}") == 2
def test_exiftool_and_the_uploader_are_pinned_and_verified():
args = build_args()
assert re.match(r"^\d+\.\d+", args["EXIFTOOL_VERSION"])
assert re.match(r"^\d+\.\d+\.\d+$", args["IMMICH_GO_VERSION"])
for arch in ("AMD64", "ARM64"):
assert SHA256.match(args[f"IMMICH_GO_SHA256_{arch}"]), arch
# The pinned exiftool package is installed by version, not by name alone.
assert 'libimage-exiftool-perl=${EXIFTOOL_VERSION}"' in DOCKERFILE
# And the build fails if what got installed is not what was pinned.
assert "is not the pinned" in DOCKERFILE and "is not pinned" in DOCKERFILE
def test_the_uploader_download_refuses_a_mismatching_checksum(tmp_path):
"""The verification is the point of pinning a URL, so it is run, not read."""
script = REPO / "docker" / "fetch-immich-go.py"
result = subprocess.run(
[
sys.executable,
str(script),
"--version",
"0.0.0-does-not-exist",
"--sha256-amd64",
"0" * 64,
"--sha256-arm64",
"0" * 64,
"--into",
str(tmp_path),
],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
)
assert result.returncode != 0
assert not list(tmp_path.iterdir()), "nothing is written before it is verified"
def test_the_recorded_versions_are_reported_by_diagnostics(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""What the image records is what `diagnostics` answers with (acceptance criterion 2)."""
recorded = tmp_path / "versions.json"
recorded.write_text(json.dumps({"exiftool": "13.25", "immich-go": "0.32.0"}))
monkeypatch.setattr(diagnostics, "IMAGE_VERSIONS_FILE", recorded)
monkeypatch.setattr(diagnostics.exiftool, "version", lambda: "13.25")
monkeypatch.setattr(diagnostics, "_uploader_version", lambda _binary: "immich-go 0.32.0")
config = Config(data_dir=tmp_path / "data")
reported = {tool["name"]: tool for tool in diagnostics.tools(config)}
assert reported["exiftool"]["pinned"] == "13.25"
assert reported["immich-go"]["pinned"] == "0.32.0"
assert "0.32.0" in reported["immich-go"]["version"]
assert diagnostics.report(config)["tools"] == list(reported.values())
assert "tool_version_drift" not in {w["code"] for w in diagnostics.report(config)["warnings"]}
def test_a_replaced_tool_is_reported_as_drift(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
recorded = tmp_path / "versions.json"
recorded.write_text(json.dumps({"exiftool": "13.25"}))
monkeypatch.setattr(diagnostics, "IMAGE_VERSIONS_FILE", recorded)
monkeypatch.setattr(diagnostics.exiftool, "version", lambda: "12.57")
report = diagnostics.report(Config(data_dir=tmp_path / "data"))
drift = [w for w in report["warnings"] if w["code"] == "tool_version_drift"]
assert drift and "13.25" in drift[0]["message"] and "12.57" in drift[0]["message"]
def test_versions_are_absent_rather_than_invented_outside_a_container(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(diagnostics, "IMAGE_VERSIONS_FILE", tmp_path / "nothing.json")
for tool in diagnostics.tools(Config(data_dir=tmp_path / "data")):
assert tool["pinned"] is None
# ── the final layer ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_no_test_or_build_tooling_is_installed_in_the_image():
runtime = "\n".join(instructions(DOCKERFILE.split("AS runtime", 1)[1]))
for unwanted in ("[test]", "pytest", "playwright", "build-essential", "gcc"):
assert unwanted not in runtime, unwanted
assert "pip install --no-cache-dir -e ." in runtime
def test_neither_secrets_nor_library_data_can_enter_the_build_context():
lines = instructions(DOCKERIGNORE)
assert lines[0] == "*", "the context is deny-by-default"
allowed = {line[1:] for line in lines if line.startswith("!")}
# Everything the Dockerfile copies has to be allowed, and nothing else is.
copied = {
source
for match in re.finditer(r"^COPY (?!--from)(.+)$", DOCKERFILE, re.MULTILINE)
for source in match.group(1).split()[:-1]
}
assert {Path(source).parts[0] for source in copied} <= allowed
assert not {"data", ".git", ".env", "tests", ".venv"} & allowed
for generated in ("**/*.env", "**/*.db", "**/*.log", "**/__pycache__"):
assert generated in lines, generated
def test_the_image_runs_as_a_non_root_user_whose_ids_are_build_arguments():
args = build_args()
assert args["UID"] == "1000" and args["GID"] == "1000"
assert "USER ${UID}:${GID}" in DOCKERFILE
assert re.search(r"^USER (root|0)", DOCKERFILE, re.MULTILINE) is None
assert 'useradd --uid "${UID}" --gid "${GID}"' in DOCKERFILE
def test_the_health_check_is_readiness_and_the_default_role_is_serve():
assert "HEALTHCHECK" in DOCKERFILE
assert "/usr/local/bin/healthcheck.sh" in DOCKERFILE
assert 'CMD ["serve"]' in DOCKERFILE
assert 'ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh"]' in DOCKERFILE
assert "/api/v1/health/ready" in HEALTHCHECK.read_text()
assert "/api/v1/health/live" not in HEALTHCHECK.read_text()
# No supervisor: one role per container (acceptance criterion 4).
for supervisor in ("supervisord", "s6-overlay", "runit"):
assert supervisor not in DOCKERFILE
@pytest.mark.parametrize("script", [ENTRYPOINT, HEALTHCHECK])
def test_the_scripts_are_executable(script):
assert script.stat().st_mode & stat.S_IXUSR, f"{script.name} must be executable in git"
# ── the entrypoint, run as shell ─────────────────────────────────────────────
@pytest.fixture
def stubs(tmp_path):
"""A PATH where ``python`` records its arguments and ``id`` can be told a UID."""
bin_dir = tmp_path / "bin"
bin_dir.mkdir()
recorded = tmp_path / "argv"
python = bin_dir / "python"
python.write_text(f'#!/bin/sh\nprintf "%s\\n" "$@" > {recorded}\nexit 0\n')
python.chmod(0o755)
(bin_dir / "id").write_text('#!/bin/sh\nprintf "%s" "${STUB_UID:-1000}"\n')
(bin_dir / "id").chmod(0o755)
return bin_dir, recorded, tmp_path / "role"
def run_script(script: Path, *args, stubs, env=None):
bin_dir, recorded, role_file = stubs
result = subprocess.run(
["/bin/sh", str(script), *args],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
env={
"PATH": f"{bin_dir}:{os.environ['PATH']}",
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_ROLE_FILE": str(role_file),
**(env or {}),
},
)
argv = recorded.read_text().splitlines() if recorded.exists() else []
return result, argv
def test_the_container_refuses_to_run_as_root(stubs):
result, argv = run_script(ENTRYPOINT, "serve", stubs=stubs, env={"STUB_UID": "0"})
assert result.returncode == 1
assert "refusing to run as root" in result.stderr
assert argv == [], "the application is never started as root"
assert not stubs[2].exists(), "not even the role marker is written"
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"given,expected",
[
(["serve"], ["-m", "photo_pipeline", "serve"]),
(["worker", "--id", "worker-2"], ["-m", "photo_pipeline", "worker", "--id", "worker-2"]),
# Every other management command stays reachable: operating the container is
# operating the same CLI.
(["diagnostics"], ["-m", "photo_pipeline", "diagnostics"]),
([], ["-m", "photo_pipeline"]),
],
)
def test_the_role_selects_the_command_and_arguments_pass_through(given, expected, stubs):
result, argv = run_script(ENTRYPOINT, *given, stubs=stubs)
assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr
assert argv == expected
def test_the_role_is_recorded_for_the_health_check(stubs):
run_script(ENTRYPOINT, "worker", stubs=stubs)
assert stubs[2].read_text() == "worker"
def test_the_health_check_only_probes_the_serving_role(stubs):
stubs[2].write_text("worker")
result, argv = run_script(HEALTHCHECK, stubs=stubs)
assert result.returncode == 0 and argv == [], "a worker has no endpoint to probe"
stubs[2].write_text("serve")
result, argv = run_script(HEALTHCHECK, stubs=stubs, env={"PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT": "9123"})
assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr
assert argv == ["-", "9123"], "the configured port is the one probed"
def test_the_health_check_fails_while_the_api_is_not_ready(stubs):
"""No python stub: the real interpreter probes a port nothing is listening on."""
stubs[2].write_text("serve")
result = subprocess.run(
["/bin/sh", str(HEALTHCHECK)],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
env={
"PATH": os.path.dirname(sys.executable) + os.pathsep + os.environ["PATH"],
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_ROLE_FILE": str(stubs[2]),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT": "1",
},
)
assert result.returncode == 1
assert "not ready" in result.stderr
def test_the_scripts_are_posix_shell():
"""They run in the image's /bin/sh, which is dash — not bash."""
shells = ["/bin/sh"] + ([dash] if (dash := shutil.which("dash")) else [])
for shell in shells:
for script in (ENTRYPOINT, HEALTHCHECK):
checked = subprocess.run([shell, "-n", str(script)], capture_output=True, text=True)
assert checked.returncode == 0, f"{shell} {script.name}: {checked.stderr}"

233
tests/integration/test_diagnostics.py
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@@ -1,233 +0,0 @@
"""Operational diagnostics and the operations API (US07-05).
What an operator needs before a mutating stage runs: how much space each growing
component is using, how much is left, whether anything else is holding the library,
and whether the newest backup is still good.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shutil
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from photo_pipeline.api.app import create_app
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory, run_migrations
from photo_pipeline.models import Asset
from photo_pipeline.services import diagnostics
from photo_pipeline.services.app_lock import LibraryLock
from photo_pipeline.services.backup import DB_NAME, BackupService
NOW = datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
# Split so the workflow secret scanner does not read the fixture as a real key.
IMMICH_CREDENTIAL_ENV = "PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_" + "API_KEY"
SENTINEL_CREDENTIAL = "immich-sentinel-9f3a2b"
def _config(tmp_path, **extra) -> Config:
data = tmp_path / "data"
data.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
lib = tmp_path / "lib"
lib.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
return Config.from_env(
{
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR": str(data),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": str(lib),
**extra,
}
)
def _migrated(config: Config):
run_migrations(config.database_url)
engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
factory = create_session_factory(engine)
with factory() as session:
session.add(
Asset(
id=str(uuid.uuid4()),
original_path="a.jpg",
current_path="a.jpg",
discovered_at=NOW,
hash_version=1,
byte_size=1,
)
)
session.commit()
engine.dispose()
def _component(report: dict, name: str) -> dict:
return next(item for item in report["components"] if item["name"] == name)
# ── sizes ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_every_growing_component_is_reported_separately(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
_migrated(config)
(config.thumbnail_cache_dir).mkdir(parents=True)
(config.thumbnail_cache_dir / "a.webp").write_bytes(b"x" * 500)
(config.data_dir / "uploads").mkdir()
(config.data_dir / "uploads" / "batch.log").write_text("INFO ok\n")
BackupService(config).create()
report = diagnostics.report(config)
names = [component["name"] for component in report["components"]]
assert names == [
"database",
"write_ahead_log",
"shared_memory",
"thumbnail_cache",
"upload_reports",
"backups",
"logs",
]
assert _component(report, "database")["bytes"] > 0
assert _component(report, "thumbnail_cache")["bytes"] == 500
assert _component(report, "backups")["bytes"] > 0
assert report["total_bytes"] == sum(item["bytes"] for item in report["components"])
assert report["disk"]["free_bytes"] > 0
def test_a_cache_over_its_quota_is_a_warning_not_a_deletion(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path, PHOTO_PIPELINE_THUMBNAIL_CACHE_QUOTA_BYTES="100")
_migrated(config)
config.thumbnail_cache_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
cached = config.thumbnail_cache_dir / "big.webp"
cached.write_bytes(b"x" * 400)
report = diagnostics.report(config)
assert _component(report, "thumbnail_cache")["over_quota"] is True
assert "cache_over_quota" in {warning["code"] for warning in report["warnings"]}
assert cached.exists(), "diagnostics reports; it never frees space on its own"
def test_low_and_critical_disk_are_distinguished(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
config = _config(tmp_path)
_migrated(config)
usage = shutil.disk_usage(tmp_path)
monkeypatch.setattr(
shutil, "disk_usage", lambda _: type(usage)(usage.total, usage.used, 500_000_000)
)
assert {w["code"] for w in diagnostics.report(config)["warnings"]} == {"disk_low"}
monkeypatch.setattr(
shutil, "disk_usage", lambda _: type(usage)(usage.total, usage.used, 10_000_000)
)
assert "disk_critical" in {w["code"] for w in diagnostics.report(config)["warnings"]}
def test_a_write_ahead_log_larger_than_its_database_is_flagged(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
_migrated(config)
Path(f"{config.database_path}-wal").write_bytes(b"x" * (config.database_path.stat().st_size + 1))
codes = {warning["code"] for warning in diagnostics.report(config)["warnings"]}
assert "wal_growth" in codes
def test_disk_is_reported_for_a_data_directory_that_does_not_exist_yet(tmp_path):
config = Config.from_env({"PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR": str(tmp_path / "not" / "yet")})
report = diagnostics.report(config)
assert report["disk"]["free_bytes"] > 0
assert report["total_bytes"] == 0
# ── locks and legacy processes ───────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_the_report_names_who_holds_the_library(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
_migrated(config)
LibraryLock(config, "worker").acquire()
report = diagnostics.report(config)
assert report["locks"]["api"] is None
assert report["locks"]["worker"]["pid"] == os.getpid()
assert report["locks"]["worker"]["alive"] is True
def test_an_active_legacy_process_is_a_visible_warning(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
_migrated(config)
(config.library_roots[0] / "photo_analyzer.log").write_text("scanning...\n")
report = diagnostics.report(config)
assert report["legacy_activity"]["active"] is True
assert "legacy_process_active" in {warning["code"] for warning in report["warnings"]}
# ── API ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@pytest.fixture
def client(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
with TestClient(create_app(config)) as client:
client.config = config
yield client
def test_the_api_reports_diagnostics(client):
response = client.get("/api/v1/diagnostics")
assert response.status_code == 200
body = response.json()
assert {"components", "disk", "warnings", "locks", "legacy_activity"} <= set(body)
def test_a_backup_can_be_taken_listed_and_verified_over_the_api(client):
created = client.post("/api/v1/backups", json={"reason": "before-upgrade"})
assert created.status_code == 201
name = created.json()["name"]
listed = client.get("/api/v1/backups").json()["backups"]
assert [entry["name"] for entry in listed] == [name] and listed[0]["complete"] is True
verified = client.get(f"/api/v1/backups/{name}/verify").json()
assert verified["ok"] is True and verified["issues"] == []
def test_the_api_never_returns_a_secret_in_a_manifest(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path, **{IMMICH_CREDENTIAL_ENV: SENTINEL_CREDENTIAL})
with TestClient(create_app(config)) as client:
body = client.post("/api/v1/backups", json={}).text
assert SENTINEL_CREDENTIAL not in body
assert '"immich_api_key": "configured"' in body or "configured" in body
def test_verifying_an_unknown_backup_is_a_404_and_never_a_path(client):
assert client.get("/api/v1/backups/nope/verify").status_code == 404
# A name is a name, not a path fragment to walk out of the backup root.
escaped = client.get("/api/v1/backups/..%2F..%2Fetc/verify")
assert escaped.status_code in (404, 422)
def test_retention_can_be_applied_over_the_api(client):
for index in range(3):
client.post("/api/v1/backups", json={"reason": f"drill{index}", "keep": 99})
removed = client.post("/api/v1/backups/prune", params={"keep": 1}).json()["removed"]
assert len(removed) == 2
assert len(client.get("/api/v1/backups").json()["backups"]) == 1
assert client.post("/api/v1/backups/prune", params={"keep": 0}).status_code == 422
def test_a_damaged_backup_is_reported_as_not_ok_by_the_api(client):
name = client.post("/api/v1/backups", json={}).json()["name"]
snapshot = BackupService(client.config).root / name / DB_NAME
snapshot.write_bytes(snapshot.read_bytes() + b"trailing garbage")
verified = client.get(f"/api/v1/backups/{name}/verify").json()
assert verified["ok"] is False and verified["issues"]

297
tests/integration/test_exif_checkpoints.py
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@@ -1,297 +0,0 @@
"""US07-03: EXIF checkpoints, asserted with before/after metadata snapshots.
Every test here reads the complete metadata of a real file through exiftool before
the stage runs and again afterwards, then compares the two. That is the only way to
prove the property the concept actually asks for: a stage owns a few fields and must
leave literally everything else — dates, GPS, camera, artist, rating, other people's
keywords — exactly as it found them.
The other half is divergence. When something outside the stage's ownership does move,
the checkpoint must say so, refuse to call itself verified, and change nothing back:
a silent repair is how a library quietly loses the user's metadata.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import shutil
import subprocess
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from types import SimpleNamespace
import pytest
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory, run_migrations
from photo_pipeline.integrations import exiftool
from photo_pipeline.models import Asset, ExifProjection
from photo_pipeline.services import exif_checkpoint
from photo_pipeline.services.analysis import AnalysisService
from photo_pipeline.services.safety import SafetyService
from tests.fixtures.media_corpus import CASES_BY_ID, build_corpus
pytestmark = pytest.mark.skipif(
shutil.which("exiftool") is None, reason="exiftool not installed"
)
@pytest.fixture
def env(tmp_path):
data = tmp_path / "data"
data.mkdir()
lib = tmp_path / "lib"
files = build_corpus(
lib,
ids=(
"user_exif",
"prior_safety_keyword",
"prior_analysis_keywords",
"conflicting_safety_keywords",
"malformed_metadata",
"no_exif",
),
)
config = Config.from_env(
{"PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR": str(data), "PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": str(lib)}
)
run_migrations(config.database_url)
engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
sf = create_session_factory(engine)
assets = {}
with sf() as session:
for case_id, path in files.items():
asset = Asset(
id=str(uuid.uuid4()),
original_path=str(path),
current_path=str(path),
discovered_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc),
hash_version=1,
)
session.add(asset)
assets[case_id] = asset.id
session.commit()
yield SimpleNamespace(config=config, lib=lib, sf=sf, files=files, assets=assets)
engine.dispose()
class Provider:
"""A vision provider whose tags are fixed, so the EXIF assertion is the test."""
def __init__(self, tags):
self.tags = list(tags)
def analyze(self, path, *, album_hint):
return {"description": "a photo", "tags": self.tags}
def snapshot(path):
return exiftool.read_all(str(path))
def stage_fields(before, after):
"""Everything that changed except this application's owned and volatile tags."""
return exif_checkpoint.compare(before, after)
# ── preservation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_a_safety_decision_preserves_every_user_field(env):
case = CASES_BY_ID["user_exif"]
path = env.files["user_exif"]
before = snapshot(path)
assert before, "the fixture must actually carry user metadata"
result = SafetyService(env.sf).decide(env.assets["user_exif"], "nsfw")
after = snapshot(path)
assert result["exif_verified"] is True
assert stage_fields(before, after) == ()
for field in case.preserved_fields:
assert after[field] == before[field], field
assert "nsfw" in exif_checkpoint.owned_values(after)
assert "sfw" not in exif_checkpoint.owned_values(after)
def test_analysis_keywords_are_additive_and_keep_the_safety_decision(env):
"""The two stages share the Keywords field; the second must merge, not replace."""
asset_id = env.assets["prior_analysis_keywords"]
path = env.files["prior_analysis_keywords"]
SafetyService(env.sf).decide(asset_id, "sfw")
before = snapshot(path)
AnalysisService(
env.sf, provider=Provider(["harbour", "boats"]), library_roots=(env.lib,)
).run([asset_id])
after = snapshot(path)
keywords = exif_checkpoint.owned_values(after)
assert {"sfw", "beach", "sunset", "harbour", "boats"} <= keywords
assert "nsfw" not in keywords
assert stage_fields(before, after) == ()
def test_flipping_a_safety_decision_removes_only_the_opposite_keyword(env):
asset_id = env.assets["prior_analysis_keywords"]
path = env.files["prior_analysis_keywords"]
safety = SafetyService(env.sf)
safety.decide(asset_id, "nsfw")
before = snapshot(path)
safety.decide(asset_id, "sfw")
after = snapshot(path)
keywords = exif_checkpoint.owned_values(after)
assert "sfw" in keywords and "nsfw" not in keywords
assert {"beach", "sunset"} <= keywords, "analysis keywords are not safety's to remove"
assert stage_fields(before, after) == ()
def test_conflicting_safety_keywords_are_resolved_to_one(env):
asset_id = env.assets["conflicting_safety_keywords"]
SafetyService(env.sf).decide(asset_id, "sfw")
keywords = exif_checkpoint.owned_values(snapshot(env.files["conflicting_safety_keywords"]))
assert keywords & {"sfw", "nsfw"} == {"sfw"}
def test_malformed_metadata_does_not_block_the_checkpoint(env):
result = SafetyService(env.sf).decide(env.assets["malformed_metadata"], "nsfw")
assert result["exif_verified"] is True
# ── verification and the refreshed hash ───────────────────────────────────────
def test_a_verified_checkpoint_refreshes_the_recorded_bytes(env):
"""exiftool rewrites the container, so the stored SHA-256 must be the new one —
upload compares against exactly these bytes."""
asset_id = env.assets["no_exif"]
path = env.files["no_exif"]
SafetyService(env.sf).decide(asset_id, "sfw")
with env.sf() as session:
asset = session.get(Asset, asset_id)
row = session.get(ExifProjection, (asset_id, "safety"))
import hashlib
on_disk = hashlib.sha256(path.read_bytes()).hexdigest()
assert asset.current_sha256 == on_disk
assert row.state == "verified" and row.result_file_sha256 == on_disk
assert json.loads(row.desired_json) == {"add": ["sfw"], "remove": ["nsfw"]}
def test_the_projection_survives_a_restart(env):
asset_id = env.assets["user_exif"]
SafetyService(env.sf).decide(asset_id, "nsfw")
engine = create_db_engine(env.config.database_url) # a fresh connection, as a restart is
try:
with create_session_factory(engine)() as session:
row = session.get(ExifProjection, (asset_id, "safety"))
assert row.state == "verified" and row.verified_at is not None
finally:
engine.dispose()
# ── divergence ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_a_field_the_stage_does_not_own_changing_is_divergent(env, monkeypatch):
"""Something rewrote the artist while the safety keyword was being written.
The stage must not call that verified, must record what moved, and must not put
the old value back — the file is now a question for a human.
"""
asset_id = env.assets["user_exif"]
path = env.files["user_exif"]
real_apply = exiftool.apply_keywords
def sabotage(target, *, add=(), remove=()):
ok = real_apply(target, add=add, remove=remove)
subprocess.run(
["exiftool", "-m", "-overwrite_original", "-Artist=Someone Else", str(target)],
capture_output=True,
check=False,
)
return ok
monkeypatch.setattr(exiftool, "apply_keywords", sabotage)
result = SafetyService(env.sf).decide(asset_id, "nsfw")
assert result["exif_verified"] is False, "a divergent checkpoint is not verified"
with env.sf() as session:
row = session.get(ExifProjection, (asset_id, "safety"))
asset = session.get(Asset, asset_id)
assert row.state == "divergent"
assert "EXIF:IFD0:Artist" in json.loads(row.divergent_fields)
assert row.verified_at is None
# Not repaired, and not silently accepted as the current verified bytes.
assert snapshot(path)["EXIF:IFD0:Artist"] == "Someone Else"
assert asset.current_sha256 is None
def test_a_divergent_asset_shows_up_in_the_review_queue(env, monkeypatch):
asset_id = env.assets["user_exif"]
monkeypatch.setattr(
exif_checkpoint,
"run",
lambda *args, **kwargs: exif_checkpoint.CheckpointResult(
exif_checkpoint.DIVERGENT, changed_fields=("EXIF:IFD0:Artist",), sha256="abc"
),
)
SafetyService(env.sf).decide(asset_id, "sfw")
rows = SafetyService(env.sf).review_queue()["items"]
row = next(item for item in rows if item["asset_id"] == asset_id)
assert row["exif_state"] == "divergent"
assert row["exif_verified"] is False
def test_a_write_that_does_not_take_is_a_failure_not_a_verification(env, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(exiftool, "apply_keywords", lambda *a, **k: False)
result = SafetyService(env.sf).decide(env.assets["no_exif"], "sfw")
assert result["exif_verified"] is False
assert exif_checkpoint.state_for(env.sf, env.assets["no_exif"], "safety") == "failed"
def test_unreadable_metadata_is_a_failure_not_an_empty_snapshot(env, monkeypatch):
"""``None`` from exiftool means "cannot answer"; treating it as "nothing there"
would make every field look preserved."""
monkeypatch.setattr(exiftool, "read_all", lambda path: None)
result = exif_checkpoint.run(str(env.files["no_exif"]), add=("sfw",))
assert result.state == "failed" and result.reason == "metadata_unreadable"
def test_analysis_records_its_own_projection_separately(env):
asset_id = env.assets["user_exif"]
SafetyService(env.sf).decide(asset_id, "sfw")
AnalysisService(env.sf, provider=Provider(["pier"]), library_roots=(env.lib,)).run([asset_id])
assert exif_checkpoint.state_for(env.sf, asset_id, "safety") == "verified"
assert exif_checkpoint.state_for(env.sf, asset_id, "analysis") == "verified"
# ── the comparison rules themselves ───────────────────────────────────────────
def test_compare_ignores_owned_and_volatile_fields_only():
before = {
"EXIF:IFD0:Artist": "Ada",
"IPTC:Keywords": ["holiday"],
"File:System:FileSize": "3.8 kB",
"File:CurrentIPTCDigest": "aaa",
"XMP:XMP-x:XMPToolkit": "old",
}
after = {
"EXIF:IFD0:Artist": "Ada",
"IPTC:Keywords": ["holiday", "sfw"],
"File:System:FileSize": "3.9 kB",
"File:CurrentIPTCDigest": "bbb",
"XMP:XMP-x:XMPToolkit": "new",
}
assert exif_checkpoint.compare(before, after) == ()
after["EXIF:GPS:GPSLatitude"] = "48.1" # an addition counts as much as a loss
del after["EXIF:IFD0:Artist"]
assert exif_checkpoint.compare(before, after) == ("EXIF:GPS:GPSLatitude", "EXIF:IFD0:Artist")

527
tests/integration/test_fault_matrix.py
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"""The fault matrix (US07-04, concept §18 "crash/fault-injection tests").
Process death at each persisted transition lives in tests/e2e/test_crash_recovery.py
and the per-stage recovery suites. This file covers the *environmental* faults —
the ones that are not a crash but are just as good at corrupting a library if the
code guesses:
disk full · read-only path · database busy · database corruption ·
network failure · malformed provider output · GPU exhaustion ·
subprocess hang · missing external tool
Every case asserts the same shape of outcome: the operation fails visibly, the
failure names what happened, and nothing irreversible was done on the way — no
source removed, no metadata marked verified, no decision invented.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import errno
import os
import sqlite3
import stat
import threading
import time
import uuid
from contextlib import contextmanager
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
import numpy as np
import pytest
from PIL import Image
from sqlalchemy import select, text
from sqlalchemy.exc import DatabaseError, OperationalError
from photo_pipeline import faults
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory, run_migrations
from photo_pipeline.jobs.worker import Worker
from photo_pipeline.models import (
AlbumProposal,
AnalysisResult,
Asset,
ExifProjection,
SafetyReview,
UploadBatch,
UploadItem,
)
from photo_pipeline.services import archive_transfer, exif_checkpoint, hashing, rename_apply
from photo_pipeline.services.analysis import AnalysisService
from photo_pipeline.services.archive_transfer import ArchiveTransferService
from photo_pipeline.services.archives import ArchiveService
from photo_pipeline.services.jobs import ItemState, JobService
from photo_pipeline.services.rename_apply import ApplyError, RenameApplyService
from photo_pipeline.services.rename_journal import JournalState, RenameJournal
from photo_pipeline.services.renames import RenameService
from photo_pipeline.services.safety import SafetyService
from photo_pipeline.services.uploads import UploadService
NOW = datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
# ── environment ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _env(tmp_path, **extra):
(tmp_path / "data").mkdir(exist_ok=True)
lib = tmp_path / "lib"
lib.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
config = Config.from_env(
{
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR": str(tmp_path / "data"),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": str(lib),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_ARCHIVE_FREE_SPACE_RESERVE_BYTES": "0",
**extra,
}
)
run_migrations(config.database_url)
return config, create_session_factory(create_db_engine(config.database_url)), lib
def image(path: Path, seed: int = 1) -> None:
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
pixels = np.random.default_rng(seed).integers(0, 256, (64, 96, 3), dtype=np.uint8)
Image.fromarray(pixels).save(path, quality=90)
def register(sf, path: Path) -> str:
asset_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
with sf() as session:
session.add(
Asset(
id=asset_id,
original_path=str(path),
current_path=str(path),
discovered_at=NOW,
hash_version=1,
byte_size=path.stat().st_size,
current_sha256=hashing.sha256_file(path),
)
)
session.commit()
return asset_id
def uploaded_album(sf, lib, album="rome", names=("a.jpg",)):
"""An album with verified upload evidence — what archiving requires."""
folder = lib / album
folder.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
with sf() as session:
batch_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
session.add(
UploadBatch(
id=batch_id,
album=album,
folder=str(folder),
album_name=album,
state="succeeded",
preflight_token="v1:test",
outcome_state="verified",
created_at=NOW,
)
)
for name in names:
path = folder / name
path.write_bytes(f"{album}/{name} content".encode() * 8)
asset_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
session.add(
Asset(
id=asset_id,
original_path=str(path),
current_path=str(path),
discovered_at=NOW,
hash_version=1,
byte_size=path.stat().st_size,
current_sha256=hashing.sha256_file(path),
)
)
session.add(
UploadItem(
batch_id=batch_id,
asset_id=asset_id,
path=str(path),
sha256=hashing.sha256_file(path),
sha1="0" * 40,
state="sent",
outcome="uploaded",
)
)
session.commit()
return folder
def archive_plan(sf, config, archive, albums=None):
location = ArchiveService(sf, config=config).register("external", str(archive))
token = ArchiveService(sf, config=config).preflight(location["id"], albums)["token"]
service = ArchiveTransferService(sf, config=config)
return service, service.create(location["id"], albums, token=token)
def fake_tool(directory: Path, name: str, body: str) -> Path:
"""A real executable on a directory a test can put in front of PATH."""
directory.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path = directory / name
path.write_text(f"#!/bin/sh\n{body}")
path.chmod(path.stat().st_mode | stat.S_IEXEC | stat.S_IXGRP | stat.S_IXOTH)
return path
# ── control points ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_the_fault_barrier_does_nothing_unless_its_variable_names_the_point(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.delenv(faults.ENV_VAR, raising=False)
for point in (faults.EXIF_WRITTEN, faults.UPLOAD_ACCEPTED, faults.JOB_ITEM_DONE, "moving"):
faults.maybe_fault(point) # would kill the process if it were armed
monkeypatch.setenv(faults.ENV_VAR, faults.EXIF_WRITTEN)
faults.maybe_fault(faults.UPLOAD_ACCEPTED) # a different point stays inert
def test_no_route_or_configuration_can_arm_a_fault():
"""The control points are reachable only through an environment variable read
inside ``photo_pipeline.faults`` — never through the API, and never through
configuration a browser or a config file could set."""
from photo_pipeline.api.app import create_app
app = create_app()
assert not [route for route in app.routes if "fault" in getattr(route, "path", "")]
assert not [field for field in Config.model_fields if "fault" in field]
package = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "photo_pipeline"
sources = {
path.relative_to(package.parent)
for path in package.rglob("*.py")
if faults.ENV_VAR in path.read_text()
}
assert sources == {Path("photo_pipeline/faults.py")}
# ── disk full ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_a_full_disk_during_an_archive_never_removes_the_source(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
config, sf, lib = _env(tmp_path)
archive = tmp_path / "archive"
archive.mkdir()
folder = uploaded_album(sf, lib)
original = {path: path.read_bytes() for path in folder.iterdir()}
service, plan = archive_plan(sf, config, archive)
def no_space(*args, **kwargs):
raise OSError(errno.ENOSPC, "No space left on device")
# Force the cross-filesystem path (a real archive medium) and fill it up.
monkeypatch.setattr(archive_transfer, "_same_filesystem", lambda *a: False)
monkeypatch.setattr(archive_transfer.shutil, "copyfileobj", no_space)
result = service.apply(plan["id"])
assert result["archived"] == 0 and result["failed"] == 1
for path, body in original.items():
assert path.read_bytes() == body, "the source was touched despite the failure"
with sf() as session:
assert all(a.availability_state == "active" for a in session.scalars(select(Asset)))
assert [p for p in archive.rglob("*") if p.is_file() and not p.name.startswith(".")] == []
# ── read-only paths ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@pytest.mark.skipif(os.geteuid() == 0, reason="root ignores directory permissions")
def test_a_read_only_library_refuses_the_rename_and_keeps_the_source(tmp_path):
config, sf, lib = _env(tmp_path)
folder = lib / "rome"
image(folder / "a.jpg")
register(sf, folder / "a.jpg")
with sf() as session:
session.add(
AlbumProposal(
id=str(uuid.uuid4()),
album="rome",
proposed_name="2019 Rome",
final_name="2019 Rome",
status="approved",
version=2,
)
)
session.commit()
plan = RenameService(sf, library_roots=(lib,)).build_plan()
mode = lib.stat().st_mode
lib.chmod(0o500) # readable, traversable, not writable
try:
result = RenameApplyService(sf, library_roots=(lib,)).apply(
plan["id"], expected_version=plan["version"]
)
finally:
lib.chmod(mode)
assert result["applied"] == 0 and result["failed"] == 1
assert (folder / "a.jpg").exists() and not (lib / "2019 Rome").exists()
with sf() as session:
asset = session.scalars(select(Asset)).one()
assert asset.current_path == str(folder / "a.jpg")
# ── database faults ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@contextmanager
def exclusive_lock(database_url: str):
"""Hold SQLite's write lock from another thread, the way a second process would.
A sqlite3 connection belongs to the thread that opened it, so the holder thread
opens, locks, waits, and releases entirely on its own.
"""
path = database_url.replace("sqlite:///", "")
locked, release = threading.Event(), threading.Event()
def hold() -> None:
connection = sqlite3.connect(path, timeout=10)
connection.execute("BEGIN EXCLUSIVE")
locked.set()
release.wait(30)
connection.rollback()
connection.close()
thread = threading.Thread(target=hold)
thread.start()
assert locked.wait(10), "the holder never acquired the lock"
try:
yield release.set # callers may release early; exiting releases anyway
finally:
release.set()
thread.join(10)
def test_a_busy_database_waits_rather_than_failing(tmp_path):
"""SQLite has one writer. A short conflict must resolve through the busy
timeout instead of surfacing as an error."""
config, sf, lib = _env(tmp_path)
service = JobService(sf)
job = service.enqueue("scan", items=["a"])
with exclusive_lock(config.database_url) as release:
threading.Timer(0.3, release).start()
started = time.monotonic()
claimed = service.claim(["scan"], "w1") # blocks until the lock is gone
waited = time.monotonic() - started
assert claimed["id"] == job["id"] and claimed["state"] == "running"
assert waited >= 0.25, "the claim did not actually wait for the writer"
with sf() as session:
assert session.execute(text("PRAGMA busy_timeout")).scalar() >= 1000
def test_a_database_locked_beyond_the_timeout_is_an_error_not_a_silent_skip(tmp_path):
config, sf, lib = _env(tmp_path)
with sf() as session:
session.execute(text("SELECT 1")) # connect first: the lock comes after
with exclusive_lock(config.database_url):
session.execute(text("PRAGMA busy_timeout=50")) # do not wait five seconds
with pytest.raises(OperationalError, match="locked"):
session.execute(
text("INSERT INTO jobs (id, job_type, state) VALUES ('x','scan','queued')")
)
session.commit()
session.rollback()
# The refusal left nothing behind, and the database is still sound.
with sf() as session:
assert session.execute(text("PRAGMA integrity_check")).scalar() == "ok"
assert session.execute(text("SELECT count(*) FROM jobs")).scalar() == 0
def test_a_corrupt_database_fails_loudly_instead_of_answering_wrongly(tmp_path):
config, sf, lib = _env(tmp_path)
for index in range(50): # enough rows to fill several pages
JobService(sf).enqueue("scan", items=[f"item-{index}-{n}" for n in range(20)])
with sf() as session:
session.execute(text("PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE)")) # WAL into the file
session.commit()
source = Path(config.database_url.replace("sqlite:///", ""))
corrupt = tmp_path / "corrupt.db"
body = bytearray(source.read_bytes())
body[4096 : 4096 + 2048] = b"\xde\xad\xbe\xef" * 512 # shred pages, keep the header
corrupt.write_bytes(bytes(body))
engine = create_db_engine(f"sqlite:///{corrupt}")
factory = create_session_factory(engine)
try:
with factory() as session:
assert session.execute(text("PRAGMA integrity_check")).scalar() != "ok"
# Reading the shredded pages must raise, never return half a table.
with pytest.raises(DatabaseError):
session.execute(text("SELECT * FROM job_items")).all()
session.execute(text("SELECT * FROM job_events")).all()
session.execute(text("REINDEX")).all()
finally:
engine.dispose()
# ── external services ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_an_unreachable_immich_blocks_upload_instead_of_starting_one(tmp_path):
# Port 9 (discard) refuses connections deterministically.
config, sf, lib = _env(
tmp_path,
PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_SERVER_URL="http://127.0.0.1:9",
PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_API_KEY="sentinel",
)
report = UploadService(sf, config=config).preflight()
codes = {blocker["code"] for blocker in report["blockers"]}
assert "server_unreachable" in codes
assert report["state"] != "ready"
def test_a_missing_uploader_blocks_upload_with_the_binary_named(tmp_path):
config, sf, lib = _env(
tmp_path,
PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_SERVER_URL="http://127.0.0.1:9",
PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_API_KEY="sentinel",
PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_GO_BINARY=str(tmp_path / "no-such-immich-go"),
)
report = UploadService(sf, config=config).preflight()
assert "immich_go_missing" in {blocker["code"] for blocker in report["blockers"]}
def test_a_malformed_provider_answer_is_a_per_asset_error(tmp_path):
config, sf, lib = _env(tmp_path)
path = lib / "a.jpg"
image(path)
asset_id = register(sf, path)
with sf() as session:
session.add(
SafetyReview(id=str(uuid.uuid4()), asset_id=asset_id, decision="sfw", created_at=NOW)
)
session.commit()
class MalformedProvider:
def analyze(self, path, *, album_hint):
raise ValueError("Expecting value: line 1 column 1 (char 0)")
result = AnalysisService(sf, provider=MalformedProvider(), library_roots=(lib,)).run([asset_id])
assert result == {"analyzed": 0, "skipped": 0, "errors": 1}
with sf() as session:
row = session.get(AnalysisResult, asset_id)
assert row.status == "error" and "Expecting value" in row.error_message
assert session.get(ExifProjection, (asset_id, "analysis")) is None
def test_gpu_exhaustion_fails_the_item_without_inventing_a_score(tmp_path):
config, sf, lib = _env(tmp_path)
path = lib / "a.jpg"
image(path)
asset_id = register(sf, path)
class ExhaustedModel:
def score(self, paths):
raise RuntimeError("MPS backend out of memory (MPS allocated: 9.00 GB)")
service = SafetyService(sf, model=ExhaustedModel())
jobs = JobService(sf)
job = jobs.enqueue("safety_score", items=[asset_id])
Worker(sf, {"safety_score": lambda item, ctx: service.score_assets([item])}, "w1").run_once()
progress = jobs.progress(job["id"])
assert progress["by_state"] == {ItemState.FAILED: 1}
with sf() as session:
assert session.scalars(select(SafetyReview)).all() == [], "no score was invented"
# ── external tools ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_a_hanging_exiftool_times_out_and_verifies_nothing(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
config, sf, lib = _env(tmp_path)
path = lib / "a.jpg"
image(path)
asset_id = register(sf, path)
before = hashing.sha256_file(path)
fake_tool(tmp_path / "bin", "exiftool", "sleep 30\n")
monkeypatch.setenv("PATH", f"{tmp_path / 'bin'}:{os.environ['PATH']}")
monkeypatch.setenv("PHOTO_PIPELINE_EXIFTOOL_TIMEOUT", "1")
review = SafetyService(sf).decide(asset_id, "nsfw")
# The decision is durable; the metadata claim is not made.
assert review["decision"] == "nsfw" and review["exif_verified"] is False
assert exif_checkpoint.state_for(sf, asset_id, "safety") == exif_checkpoint.FAILED
assert hashing.sha256_file(path) == before
def test_a_missing_exiftool_is_a_failed_checkpoint_not_a_verified_one(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
config, sf, lib = _env(tmp_path)
path = lib / "a.jpg"
image(path)
asset_id = register(sf, path)
empty_bin = tmp_path / "empty-bin"
empty_bin.mkdir()
monkeypatch.setenv("PATH", str(empty_bin)) # nothing on PATH at all
review = SafetyService(sf).decide(asset_id, "sfw")
assert review["exif_verified"] is False
assert exif_checkpoint.state_for(sf, asset_id, "safety") == exif_checkpoint.FAILED
with sf() as session:
# Upload eligibility depends on a verified checkpoint, so it stays blocked.
assert session.scalars(select(SafetyReview)).all()[-1].exif_verified_at is None
def test_a_file_edited_during_the_move_is_left_for_a_human(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""The user saves over a photo in the instant between the move and its
verification. The move already happened and the database already followed it,
so the operation cannot simply be "failed": it becomes ``rollback_required``
and blocks further mutation until someone decides (US07-04)."""
config, sf, lib = _env(tmp_path)
folder = lib / "rome"
image(folder / "a.jpg")
register(sf, folder / "a.jpg")
with sf() as session:
session.add(
AlbumProposal(
id=str(uuid.uuid4()),
album="rome",
proposed_name="2019 Rome",
final_name="2019 Rome",
status="approved",
version=2,
)
)
session.commit()
plan = RenameService(sf, library_roots=(lib,)).build_plan()
real_rename = rename_apply.os.rename
def rename_then_edit(source, destination):
real_rename(source, destination)
for path in Path(destination).glob("*.jpg"):
path.write_bytes(b"the user saved over this file")
monkeypatch.setattr(rename_apply.os, "rename", rename_then_edit)
result = RenameApplyService(sf, library_roots=(lib,)).apply(
plan["id"], expected_version=plan["version"]
)
assert result["applied"] == 0 and result["failed"] == 1
journal = RenameJournal(sf)
operation = journal.incomplete()[0]
assert operation["journal_state"] == JournalState.ROLLBACK_REQUIRED
assert operation["error_code"] == "verify_bytes"
assert journal.blocks_mutation() is True, "the unresolved rename blocks the library"
# Recovery offers the rollback the evidence supports, and the rollback itself
# refuses the edited bytes rather than putting the user's newer file back as if
# it were the old one.
service = RenameApplyService(sf, library_roots=(lib,))
with pytest.raises(ApplyError, match="manual recovery"):
service.rollback_operation(operation["id"])
# Nothing was lost: the edited file is at its new home, not deleted.
assert (lib / "2019 Rome" / "a.jpg").read_bytes() == b"the user saved over this file"

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tests/integration/test_media_hardening.py
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"""US07-03: the golden media corpus, driven through the real decode path.
Every case in ``tests/fixtures/media_corpus.py`` is exercised here. The claims:
* a supported format/orientation/profile renders, with the orientation applied and
the decode bounded to roughly the size that was asked for;
* a damaged, empty, lying, or gigapixel file becomes one precise item error — the
scan still finishes, the other assets still render, and a job that meets one keeps
running;
* a failure leaves no temporary file behind, and startup removes only the temporaries
this service recognises;
* cache invalidation follows the pixels, not the metadata.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import shutil
import time
import tracemalloc
from types import SimpleNamespace
import pytest
from PIL import Image
from photo_pipeline import imaging
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory, run_migrations
from photo_pipeline.models import Asset, Thumbnail
from photo_pipeline.services.inventory import InventoryService
from photo_pipeline.services.thumbnails import (
TEMP_SUFFIX,
ThumbnailError,
ThumbnailService,
)
from tests.fixtures.media_corpus import CASES, CASES_BY_ID, build_corpus
RENDERABLE = [case for case in CASES if case.expect_error is None]
DAMAGED = [case for case in CASES if case.expect_error is not None]
needs_exiftool = pytest.mark.skipif(
shutil.which("exiftool") is None, reason="exiftool not installed"
)
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def corpus(tmp_path_factory):
root = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("corpus")
return SimpleNamespace(root=root, files=build_corpus(root))
@pytest.fixture
def env(tmp_path, corpus):
"""A library holding the whole corpus, scanned into a fresh database."""
data = tmp_path / "data"
data.mkdir()
lib = tmp_path / "lib"
shutil.copytree(corpus.root, lib)
config = Config.from_env(
{"PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR": str(data), "PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": str(lib)}
)
run_migrations(config.database_url)
engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
sf = create_session_factory(engine)
scan = InventoryService(sf).scan(lib)
by_id = {
case.id: next(
(aid for path, aid in scan.asset_ids.items() if path.endswith(case.filename)), None
)
for case in CASES
}
yield SimpleNamespace(
config=config, lib=lib, sf=sf, scan=scan, assets=by_id,
thumbs=ThumbnailService(sf, config),
)
engine.dispose()
# ── the manifest itself ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_the_manifest_is_internally_consistent():
assert len({case.id for case in CASES}) == len(CASES), "logical ids must be unique"
assert len({case.filename for case in CASES}) == len(CASES), "paths must be unique"
for case in CASES:
assert case.kind in {"format", "orientation", "profile", "damaged", "metadata"}
assert case.expect_error in (None, "unsupported_image", "image_too_large")
def test_the_corpus_regenerates_byte_for_byte(tmp_path):
"""A golden corpus that drifts between runs cannot be a golden corpus."""
first = build_corpus(tmp_path / "one")
second = build_corpus(tmp_path / "two")
digests = {
case_id: (
hashlib.sha256(first[case_id].read_bytes()).hexdigest(),
hashlib.sha256(second[case_id].read_bytes()).hexdigest(),
)
for case_id in first
}
drifted = [case_id for case_id, (a, b) in digests.items() if a != b]
assert not drifted, f"non-deterministic fixtures: {drifted}"
# ── bounded decode ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@pytest.mark.parametrize("case", RENDERABLE, ids=lambda case: case.id)
def test_every_supported_case_renders(case, env):
asset_id = env.assets[case.id]
assert asset_id, f"{case.id} was not discovered by the scan"
path = env.thumbs.generate(asset_id, 256)
with Image.open(path) as thumb:
assert thumb.format == "WEBP"
assert max(thumb.size) <= 256
assert min(thumb.size) >= 1
@pytest.mark.parametrize("orientation", range(1, 9))
def test_exif_orientation_is_applied_before_resizing(orientation, env):
"""All eight tags: the 90° ones must come out portrait from a landscape source."""
asset_id = env.assets[f"orientation_{orientation}"]
with Image.open(env.thumbs.generate(asset_id, 256)) as thumb:
rotated = orientation in (5, 6, 7, 8)
assert (thumb.height > thumb.width) is rotated
def test_transparency_and_grayscale_survive_the_pipeline(env):
with Image.open(env.thumbs.generate(env.assets["png_alpha"], 256)) as thumb:
assert "A" in thumb.getbands()
with Image.open(env.thumbs.generate(env.assets["grayscale"], 256)) as thumb:
assert thumb.size == (100, 100) # smaller than the request: never upscaled
def test_a_broken_colour_profile_still_produces_a_picture(env):
"""An unusable ICC profile is a metadata problem, not a reason to lose the preview."""
for case_id in ("icc_tagged", "broken_icc"):
with Image.open(env.thumbs.generate(env.assets[case_id], 256)) as thumb:
assert thumb.size[0] > 0
def test_a_large_jpeg_is_not_decoded_at_full_resolution(env):
"""12 megapixels would be ~36 MB of pixels; the draft decode keeps it far below."""
tracemalloc.start()
try:
env.thumbs.generate(env.assets["large_jpeg"], 256)
_, peak = tracemalloc.get_traced_memory()
finally:
tracemalloc.stop()
assert peak < 12_000_000, f"decode peaked at {peak} bytes"
# ── damaged inputs ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@pytest.mark.parametrize("case", DAMAGED, ids=lambda case: case.id)
def test_every_damaged_case_is_a_precise_item_error(case, env):
asset_id = env.assets[case.id]
assert asset_id, f"{case.id} was not discovered by the scan"
with pytest.raises(ThumbnailError) as raised:
env.thumbs.generate(asset_id, 256)
assert raised.value.code == case.expect_error
# Persisted, so a broken original is not re-decoded on every request...
with env.sf() as session:
rows = [
row
for row in session.query(Thumbnail).all()
if row.asset_id == asset_id and row.state == "error"
]
assert rows and rows[0].error_code == case.expect_error
# ...and the cached failure is the same precise error, not a generic one.
with pytest.raises(ThumbnailError) as again:
env.thumbs.generate(asset_id, 256)
assert again.value.code == case.expect_error
def test_a_gigapixel_header_is_refused_quickly_and_cheaply(env):
"""The refusal must come from the declared size, not from decoding it."""
tracemalloc.start()
started = time.monotonic()
try:
with pytest.raises(ThumbnailError):
env.thumbs.generate(env.assets["bomb_header"], 1280)
_, peak = tracemalloc.get_traced_memory()
finally:
tracemalloc.stop()
assert time.monotonic() - started < 5
assert peak < 5_000_000, f"a 3.6 gigapixel header allocated {peak} bytes"
def test_one_broken_file_stops_neither_the_scan_nor_its_neighbours(env):
"""The whole corpus is in the library, damaged files included."""
assert len(env.scan.asset_ids) >= len(CASES) - 1 # the empty file has no pixels to hash
for case in RENDERABLE[:5]:
assert env.thumbs.generate(env.assets[case.id], 256).exists()
def test_a_job_that_meets_a_broken_file_gets_evidence_not_an_exception(env):
"""``ensure_protected`` is what the archive lane calls; a plan must not die on
one unreadable original."""
evidence = env.thumbs.ensure_protected(env.assets["corrupt_png"])
assert evidence["state"] == "unsupported"
assert evidence["error_code"] == "unsupported_image"
assert env.thumbs.ensure_protected(env.assets["jpeg"])["state"] == "ready"
def test_undecodable_files_do_not_break_hashing(env):
"""Discovery records what it can: byte identity always, pixel identity when the
file has pixels."""
with env.sf() as session:
assets = {a.current_path: a for a in session.query(Asset).all()}
for case in DAMAGED:
asset = next((a for path, a in assets.items() if path.endswith(case.filename)), None)
if asset is None:
continue
assert asset.current_sha256, "byte identity is always available"
assert asset.pixel_sha256 is None, "undecodable files must not invent pixel identity"
# ── cache lifecycle ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_a_failed_render_leaves_no_temporary_behind(env):
with pytest.raises(ThumbnailError):
env.thumbs.generate(env.assets["truncated_jpeg"], 256)
leftovers = list(env.config.thumbnail_cache_dir.rglob(f"*{TEMP_SUFFIX}"))
assert leftovers == []
def test_startup_cleanup_removes_only_recognised_temporaries(env):
cache = env.config.thumbnail_cache_dir
env.thumbs.generate(env.assets["jpeg"], 256) # creates the cache directory
stale = cache / f".abc123{TEMP_SUFFIX}"
stale.write_bytes(b"half a thumbnail")
innocent = cache / "keep-me.webp"
innocent.write_bytes(b"not a temporary")
assert env.thumbs.cleanup_temp_files() == 1
assert not stale.exists()
assert innocent.exists()
assert list(cache.rglob("*.webp")), "real cache entries survive"
def test_metadata_only_change_reuses_the_thumbnail_and_a_pixel_change_does_not(env):
"""The cache key follows the pixels: an EXIF edit must not cost a re-render."""
asset_id = env.assets["jpeg"]
first = env.thumbs.generate(asset_id, 256)
with env.sf() as session: # what a rescan records after an EXIF-only edit
asset = session.get(Asset, asset_id)
asset.current_sha256 = "different-bytes"
session.commit()
assert env.thumbs.generate(asset_id, 256) == first
with env.sf() as session: # a genuine pixel change
asset = session.get(Asset, asset_id)
asset.pixel_sha256 = "different-pixels"
session.commit()
assert env.thumbs.generate(asset_id, 256) != first
def test_a_deleted_cache_file_is_regenerated(env):
asset_id = env.assets["png"]
path = env.thumbs.generate(asset_id, 256)
path.unlink()
regenerated = env.thumbs.generate(asset_id, 256)
assert regenerated == path and regenerated.exists()
# ── the imaging door itself ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_open_image_translates_every_decoder_failure(corpus):
"""Callers must be able to catch two typed errors, never bare ``Exception``."""
for case in DAMAGED:
expected = imaging.ImageTooLarge if case.expect_error == "image_too_large" else imaging.UndecodableImage
with pytest.raises(expected):
with imaging.open_image(corpus.files[case.id]) as image:
image.load()
def test_open_image_refuses_more_pixels_than_the_caller_allowed(corpus):
with pytest.raises(imaging.ImageTooLarge):
with imaging.open_image(corpus.files["jpeg"], max_pixels=100):
pass
with imaging.open_image(corpus.files["jpeg"], max_pixels=100_000) as image:
assert image.size == (320, 240)
@needs_exiftool
def test_malformed_metadata_does_not_stop_the_picture(env):
"""A broken EXIF block is a metadata fact, not a decode failure."""
assert env.thumbs.generate(env.assets["malformed_metadata"], 256).exists()
with env.sf() as session:
asset = session.get(Asset, env.assets["malformed_metadata"])
assert asset.pixel_sha256, "pixels are still identifiable"
def test_scoring_never_relaxes_truncated_image_handling(corpus):
"""The donor's process-global ``LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES`` is gone for good.
It is global state: switching it on for the safety model would also switch it on
for hashing and preview rendering in the same process, and half a file would
silently become a valid picture (donor_ledger: nt-score-model).
"""
import inspect
from PIL import ImageFile
from photo_pipeline.integrations import nsfw_model
code = [
line
for line in inspect.getsource(nsfw_model).splitlines()
if not line.strip().startswith("#")
]
assert not any("LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES" in line for line in code)
# And the door holds even when something else in the process turned it on —
# the frozen donor does exactly that when the characterization suite imports it.
previous = ImageFile.LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES
ImageFile.LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES = True
try:
with pytest.raises(imaging.UndecodableImage):
with imaging.open_image(corpus.files["truncated_jpeg"]) as image:
image.load()
assert ImageFile.LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES is True, "the caller's setting is restored"
finally:
ImageFile.LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES = previous
def test_every_manifest_case_is_exercised():
"""The corpus lint: no fixture may sit in the manifest untested."""
covered = {case.id for case in RENDERABLE} | {case.id for case in DAMAGED}
assert covered == set(CASES_BY_ID)

324
tests/integration/test_performance_budgets.py
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@@ -1,324 +0,0 @@
"""Performance budgets, paging, and resource bounds (US07-06).
The harness itself is the deliverable, so this suite proves the harness: that it
builds a synthetic library, measures the same scenarios every time, exports
machine-readable metrics, and — the part that matters — *fails* when a budget is
exceeded rather than printing a number nobody reads.
It runs the ``smoke`` profile. The 25k/100k/500k matrix is a scheduled command
(README "Performance budgets"), because minutes of build time do not belong in the
suite that runs on every change.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timezone
import pytest
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from sqlalchemy import func, select
from photo_pipeline.api.app import create_app
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory, run_migrations
from photo_pipeline.models import Asset, DuplicateCluster, DuplicateMember, SafetyReview
from photo_pipeline.services import benchmarks
from photo_pipeline.services.duplicates import MAX_MEMBER_PAGE, DuplicateService
from photo_pipeline.services.safety import SafetyService
NOW = datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
def _config(tmp_path, **extra) -> Config:
data = tmp_path / "data"
data.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
lib = tmp_path / "lib"
lib.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
return Config.from_env(
{
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR": str(data),
"PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": str(lib),
**extra,
}
)
# ── the harness ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_the_smoke_profile_measures_every_scenario_and_passes_its_budgets(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
output = tmp_path / "report.json"
report = benchmarks.run(config, profile="smoke", output=output)
assert report["ok"] is True, report["breaches"]
assert json.loads(output.read_text())["profile"] == "smoke" # machine-readable
run = report["runs"][0]
measured = {scenario["scenario"] for scenario in run["scenarios"]}
assert measured == {
"inventory_page",
"library_search",
"library_stats",
"workflow_readiness",
"duplicate_cluster_list",
"duplicate_cluster_page",
}
for scenario in run["scenarios"]:
assert scenario["latency_p95_ms"] >= scenario["latency_p50_ms"]
assert scenario["iterations"] == benchmarks.PROFILES["smoke"]["iterations"]
for metric in ("rss_bytes", "open_files", "db_bytes", "wal_bytes", "queue_depth"):
assert metric in run["resources"]
assert run["build"]["assets"] == 2_000
def test_a_breached_budget_fails_the_run_and_names_what_broke(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
config = _config(tmp_path)
# A budget nothing can meet: the run must fail, not shrug.
monkeypatch.setattr(
benchmarks,
"BUDGETS",
(benchmarks.Budget("latency_p95_ms", 0.0000001, "ms", "deliberately impossible"),),
)
report = benchmarks.run(config, profile="smoke")
assert report["ok"] is False
breach = report["breaches"][0]
assert {"scope", "metric", "value", "limit", "unit", "why"} <= set(breach)
assert breach["metric"] == "latency_p95_ms" and breach["value"] > breach["limit"]
def test_an_approved_exception_raises_the_limit_and_is_recorded(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
config = _config(tmp_path)
monkeypatch.setattr(
benchmarks,
"BUDGETS",
(benchmarks.Budget("latency_p95_ms", 0.0000001, "ms", "deliberately impossible"),),
)
monkeypatch.setattr(
benchmarks,
"APPROVED_EXCEPTIONS",
{
("smoke", "library_stats", "latency_p95_ms"): {
"limit": 10_000,
"approved_by": "test",
"reason": "documenting the mechanism",
"review_by": "2026-12-31",
}
},
)
report = benchmarks.run(config, profile="smoke")
scopes = {breach["scope"] for breach in report["breaches"]}
assert "library_stats" not in scopes, "the approved exception was not applied"
assert report["exceptions_applied"][0]["approved_by"] == "test"
def test_an_unknown_profile_is_refused(tmp_path):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="unknown profile"):
benchmarks.run(_config(tmp_path), profile="enormous")
def test_the_soak_reports_growth_queue_depth_and_leaves_no_backlog(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
benchmarks.synthesize(config, assets=200, cluster_members=0)
engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
factory = create_session_factory(engine)
try:
result = benchmarks.soak(config, factory, seconds=1.5, interval=0.25)
finally:
engine.dispose()
assert result["cycles"] > 0 and len(result["samples"]) >= 2
# Every cycle enqueues and cancels a job: the lane must end empty, which is the
# difference between "busy" and "growing without bound".
assert result["queue_depth"] == 0
assert result["rss_growth_bytes"] >= 0
assert result["open_files"] <= 256
# ── paging large clusters ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _cluster(config: Config, members: int) -> tuple[str, object]:
run_migrations(config.database_url)
engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
factory = create_session_factory(engine)
cluster_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
with factory() as session:
session.add(
DuplicateCluster(
id=cluster_id, method="perceptual", confidence="near", state="open", version=1
)
)
session.flush()
for index in range(members):
asset_id = f"member-{index:06d}"
session.add(
Asset(
id=asset_id,
original_path=f"/lib/photo-{index}.jpg",
current_path=f"/lib/photo-{index}.jpg",
discovered_at=NOW,
hash_version=1,
byte_size=1024,
)
)
session.add(
DuplicateMember(cluster_id=cluster_id, asset_id=asset_id, role="member", distance=1)
)
session.commit()
return cluster_id, factory
def test_a_cluster_of_thousands_is_paged_not_dumped(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
cluster_id, factory = _cluster(config, 3_000)
service = DuplicateService(factory)
first = service.get_cluster(cluster_id)
assert first["member_total"] == 3_000
assert len(first["members"]) == 100, "the default page, not the whole cluster"
second = service.get_cluster(cluster_id, limit=100, offset=100)
assert [m["asset_id"] for m in second["members"]][0] == "member-000100"
assert not {m["asset_id"] for m in first["members"]} & {
m["asset_id"] for m in second["members"]
}
# The last page is short and the pages together cover the cluster exactly.
tail = service.get_cluster(cluster_id, limit=MAX_MEMBER_PAGE, offset=2_900)
assert len(tail["members"]) == 100
def test_the_cluster_list_carries_counts_without_loading_every_member(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
cluster_id, factory = _cluster(config, 3_000)
listed = DuplicateService(factory).list_clusters(limit=50)
entry = listed["items"][0]
assert entry["id"] == cluster_id
assert entry["member_total"] == 3_000
assert len(entry["members"]) <= 20, "the list view shows a preview, never the cluster"
def test_the_api_pages_cluster_members_and_bounds_the_page_size(tmp_path):
config = _config(tmp_path)
cluster_id, _ = _cluster(config, 1_200)
with TestClient(create_app(config)) as client:
default = client.get(f"/api/v1/duplicates/clusters/{cluster_id}").json()
assert default["member_total"] == 1_200 and len(default["members"]) == 100
paged = client.get(
f"/api/v1/duplicates/clusters/{cluster_id}", params={"limit": 250, "offset": 1_000}
).json()
assert len(paged["members"]) == 200 and paged["offset"] == 1_000
# A caller cannot ask for the whole cluster by asking for a huge page.
assert (
client.get(
f"/api/v1/duplicates/clusters/{cluster_id}",
params={"limit": MAX_MEMBER_PAGE + 1},
).status_code
== 422
)
# ── the queries behind the pages ─────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_the_review_queue_is_filtered_and_paged_in_the_database(tmp_path):
"""A queue that loads every asset to slice 100 of them is the shape this story
exists to remove; the totals must stay exact while it pages."""
config = _config(tmp_path)
run_migrations(config.database_url)
engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
factory = create_session_factory(engine)
with factory() as session:
for index in range(500):
asset_id = f"asset-{index:04d}"
session.add(
Asset(
id=asset_id,
original_path=f"/lib/{index:04d}.jpg",
current_path=f"/lib/{index:04d}.jpg",
discovered_at=NOW,
hash_version=1,
byte_size=1,
)
)
if index % 2 == 0:
session.add(
SafetyReview(
id=str(uuid.uuid4()),
asset_id=asset_id,
decision="sfw",
created_at=NOW,
)
)
session.commit()
service = SafetyService(factory)
page = service.review_queue(state="undecided", limit=10, offset=0)
assert page["total"] == 250 and len(page["items"]) == 10
assert all(item["decision"] is None for item in page["items"])
second = service.review_queue(state="undecided", limit=10, offset=10)
assert not {item["asset_id"] for item in page["items"]} & {
item["asset_id"] for item in second["items"]
}
assert service.counts() == {
"sfw": 250,
"nsfw": 0,
"deferred": 0,
"undecided": 250,
"scored": 0,
}
engine.dispose()
def test_the_latest_review_still_wins_after_a_revision(tmp_path):
"""The counts are aggregated in SQL now; the rule they aggregate is unchanged."""
config = _config(tmp_path)
run_migrations(config.database_url)
engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
factory = create_session_factory(engine)
with factory() as session:
session.add(
Asset(
id="a",
original_path="/lib/a.jpg",
current_path="/lib/a.jpg",
discovered_at=NOW,
hash_version=1,
byte_size=1,
)
)
session.add(
SafetyReview(id="r1", asset_id="a", decision="sfw", score=0.1, created_at=NOW)
)
session.commit()
service = SafetyService(factory)
assert service.current_decision("a") == "sfw"
with factory() as session:
session.add(
SafetyReview(
id="r2",
asset_id="a",
decision="nsfw",
prior_decision="sfw",
created_at=NOW.replace(hour=2),
)
)
session.commit()
assert service.current_decision("a") == "nsfw"
assert service.counts()["nsfw"] == 1 and service.counts()["sfw"] == 0
with factory() as session: # the history itself is never rewritten
assert session.scalar(select(func.count()).select_from(SafetyReview)) == 2
engine.dispose()

253
tests/integration/test_trusted_hosts.py
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@@ -1,253 +0,0 @@
"""US08-01: the configurable trust boundary and its authentication gate.
Until now, reaching the app proved ownership of it: it answered only to loopback
names. A container behind a reverse proxy answers to a real hostname, so these tests
pin the two halves that replace that proof — the app refuses to start exposed without
an access secret, and the secret is the only way to obtain the session every other
route already required (US07-02, unchanged and re-asserted here).
The suite's ``conftest`` bootstraps a session for any ``TestClient`` automatically,
which is precisely what an unauthenticated caller does not get; ``raw_client``
pre-seeds a placeholder CSRF header to opt out of that convenience.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import pytest
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
from photo_pipeline.api.app import ConfigurationRefused, create_app
from photo_pipeline.api.security import ACCESS_SECRET_HEADER, CSRF_HEADER, SESSION_COOKIE
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
SECRET = "operator-secret-value"
HOSTNAME = "photos.example.com"
# What Starlette reports as the peer address of an in-process request.
TESTCLIENT_ADDRESS = "testclient"
# One of each route class: a read, a mutation, and a media endpoint.
PROTECTED = [
("GET", "/api/v1/workflow", None),
("POST", "/api/v1/albums/proposals", {}),
("GET", "/api/v1/assets/unknown-asset/thumbnail?size=256", None),
]
def config(tmp_path, **overrides) -> Config:
return Config(data_dir=tmp_path / "data", **overrides)
def raw_client(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1") -> TestClient:
client = TestClient(app, base_url=base_url)
client.headers[CSRF_HEADER] = "placeholder"
return client
def exchange(client, secret=SECRET, headers=None):
return client.get("/api/v1/session", headers={ACCESS_SECRET_HEADER: secret, **(headers or {})})
# ── startup: exposure without a secret is refused, loopback is unchanged ──────
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"exposure,exposed",
[({"allowed_hosts": (HOSTNAME,)}, HOSTNAME), ({"host": "0.0.0.0"}, "0.0.0.0")],
)
def test_an_exposed_configuration_refuses_to_serve_without_a_secret(tmp_path, exposure, exposed):
with pytest.raises(ConfigurationRefused) as refused:
create_app(config(tmp_path, **exposure))
assert "PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET" in str(refused.value)
# The message names what is exposed, so the operator knows which setting did it.
assert exposed in str(refused.value)
def test_the_serve_command_reports_the_refusal_instead_of_binding(tmp_path, monkeypatch, capsys):
"""Exit before the port, the lock, and the database, with a sentence not a trace."""
from photo_pipeline.__main__ import main
monkeypatch.setenv("PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR", str(tmp_path / "data"))
monkeypatch.setenv("PHOTO_PIPELINE_ALLOWED_HOSTS", HOSTNAME)
monkeypatch.delenv("PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET", raising=False)
assert main(["serve"]) == 4
assert "PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET" in capsys.readouterr().err
def test_an_exposed_configuration_with_a_secret_starts(tmp_path):
app = create_app(config(tmp_path, allowed_hosts=(HOSTNAME,), access_secret=SECRET))
with raw_client(app, base_url=f"http://{HOSTNAME}") as client:
assert exchange(client).status_code == 200
def test_a_loopback_configuration_still_needs_no_secret(tmp_path):
"""An unset trust boundary must behave exactly as it did before this story."""
with raw_client(create_app(config(tmp_path))) as client:
response = client.get("/api/v1/session")
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json()["csrf_token"]
assert "secure" not in response.headers["set-cookie"].lower()
# ── the exchange: secret in, session out ─────────────────────────────────────
@pytest.fixture
def gated(tmp_path):
app = create_app(
config(
tmp_path,
allowed_hosts=(HOSTNAME,),
access_secret=SECRET,
trusted_proxies=(TESTCLIENT_ADDRESS,),
)
)
with raw_client(app, base_url=f"http://{HOSTNAME}") as client:
yield client
def test_the_secret_buys_the_session_and_the_session_buys_the_routes(gated):
response = exchange(gated)
assert response.status_code == 200
cookie = response.headers["set-cookie"].lower()
assert "httponly" in cookie and "samesite=strict" in cookie
gated.headers[CSRF_HEADER] = response.json()["csrf_token"]
# The session and CSRF requirements behind the gate are the ones US07-02 set.
assert gated.get("/api/v1/workflow").status_code == 200
assert gated.post("/api/v1/albums/proposals", json={}).status_code == 200
refused = gated.post("/api/v1/albums/proposals", json={}, headers={CSRF_HEADER: "guessed"})
assert refused.json()["error"]["code"] == "csrf_failed"
@pytest.mark.parametrize("offered", ["", "wrong-secret", SECRET + "x", SECRET.upper()])
def test_a_wrong_secret_buys_nothing(gated, offered):
response = exchange(gated, secret=offered)
assert response.status_code == 401
assert response.json()["error"]["code"] == "access_denied"
assert "set-cookie" not in response.headers
def test_a_refusal_never_echoes_the_secret_or_the_session(gated, caplog):
with caplog.at_level("WARNING"):
response = exchange(gated, secret="wrong-secret")
assert SECRET not in response.text and "wrong-secret" not in response.text
assert SECRET not in caplog.text
# Logged as an event with its caller, without the session it did not get.
assert "access secret rejected" in caplog.text
def test_guessing_is_rate_limited(gated):
codes = [exchange(gated, secret=f"guess-{n}").status_code for n in range(6)]
assert codes.count(401) == 5 and codes[-1] == 429
assert gated.get("/api/v1/session").status_code == 429
# The right secret is refused too while the limiter holds: that is the point.
blocked = exchange(gated)
assert blocked.status_code == 429
assert SECRET not in blocked.text
def test_every_route_class_is_unreachable_without_the_secret(gated):
for method, path, body in PROTECTED:
response = gated.request(method, path, json=body)
assert response.status_code == 401, path
assert response.json()["error"]["code"] == "unauthenticated", path
# Health stays open: an orchestrator restarting the container holds no secret.
assert gated.get("/api/v1/health/live").status_code == 200
assert gated.get("/api/v1/health/ready").status_code == 200
def test_a_session_from_another_process_is_not_replayable(tmp_path):
"""Sessions live in the process, so a cookie captured from a previous one — a
restarted container, or a second deployment — must not open this one."""
settings = dict(allowed_hosts=(HOSTNAME,), access_secret=SECRET)
first, second = (create_app(config(tmp_path / str(n), **settings)) for n in (1, 2))
with raw_client(first, base_url=f"http://{HOSTNAME}") as client:
exchange(client)
stolen = client.cookies[SESSION_COOKIE]
with raw_client(second, base_url=f"http://{HOSTNAME}") as client:
client.cookies.set(SESSION_COOKIE, stolen, domain=HOSTNAME)
response = client.get("/api/v1/workflow")
assert response.status_code == 401
assert response.json()["error"]["code"] == "unauthenticated"
def test_a_cross_site_request_is_still_refused_behind_the_gate(gated):
gated.headers[CSRF_HEADER] = exchange(gated).json()["csrf_token"]
refused = gated.post(
"/api/v1/albums/proposals", json={}, headers={"Origin": "https://evil.example"}
)
assert refused.json()["error"]["code"] == "origin_not_allowed"
embedded = gated.get(
"/api/v1/assets/unknown-asset/thumbnail?size=256", headers={"Sec-Fetch-Site": "cross-site"}
)
assert embedded.json()["error"]["code"] == "cross_site_blocked"
def test_an_unconfigured_host_is_refused_even_with_a_valid_session(gated):
gated.headers[CSRF_HEADER] = exchange(gated).json()["csrf_token"]
for host in ("other.example.com", "192.168.1.10"):
response = gated.get("/api/v1/workflow", headers={"Host": host})
assert response.status_code == 403, host
assert response.json()["error"]["code"] == "host_not_allowed", host
# ── forwarded headers: believed from the proxy, ignored from anyone else ──────
def test_a_trusted_proxys_https_makes_the_cookie_secure(gated):
"""The proxy speaks HTTPS outward and HTTP to this app, so only the header knows."""
assert "secure" in exchange(gated, headers={"X-Forwarded-Proto": "https"}).headers[
"set-cookie"
].lower()
assert "secure" not in exchange(gated).headers["set-cookie"].lower()
def test_the_external_scheme_is_part_of_the_accepted_origin(gated):
gated.headers[CSRF_HEADER] = exchange(gated).json()["csrf_token"]
allowed = gated.post(
"/api/v1/albums/proposals",
json={},
headers={"X-Forwarded-Proto": "https", "Origin": f"https://{HOSTNAME}"},
)
assert allowed.status_code == 200
# The scheme is part of the origin: the same name over plain HTTP is not it.
refused = gated.post(
"/api/v1/albums/proposals",
json={},
headers={"X-Forwarded-Proto": "https", "Origin": f"http://{HOSTNAME}"},
)
assert refused.json()["error"]["code"] == "origin_not_allowed"
def test_a_trusted_proxys_forwarded_host_is_the_host_that_is_judged(tmp_path):
"""The proxy terminates the operator's hostname and dials this app by address."""
app = create_app(
config(
tmp_path,
allowed_hosts=(HOSTNAME,),
access_secret=SECRET,
trusted_proxies=(TESTCLIENT_ADDRESS,),
)
)
with raw_client(app, base_url="http://10.0.0.5") as client:
forwarded = {"X-Forwarded-Host": HOSTNAME}
assert exchange(client, headers=forwarded).status_code == 200
# Without the header the address it was dialled by is not an allowed name.
assert exchange(client).json()["error"]["code"] == "host_not_allowed"
def test_forwarded_headers_from_an_untrusted_client_are_ignored(tmp_path):
"""Otherwise any caller could declare the hostname and scheme of its choosing."""
app = create_app(config(tmp_path, allowed_hosts=(HOSTNAME,), access_secret=SECRET))
with raw_client(app, base_url="http://evil.example") as client:
forged = exchange(client, headers={"X-Forwarded-Host": HOSTNAME})
assert forged.json()["error"]["code"] == "host_not_allowed"
with raw_client(app, base_url=f"http://{HOSTNAME}") as client:
# A forged scheme would flip the cookie's Secure flag on a plain connection,
# which is how a cookie gets set and then never sent again.
response = exchange(client, headers={"X-Forwarded-Proto": "https"})
assert response.status_code == 200
assert "secure" not in response.headers["set-cookie"].lower()

5
tests/integration/test_upload_batches.py
View File

@@ -512,10 +512,7 @@ def test_a_killed_uploader_leaves_an_uncertain_batch(tmp_path, immich_server):
config, sf, lib = _env(
tmp_path,
immich_server,
# ``exec`` so the announced pid *is* the sleeping process: without it the
# kill only removes the shell, the orphaned ``sleep`` keeps stdout open, and
# the test's own timeout races the sleep it is waiting out (US07-05).
uploader=_uploader(tmp_path, 'echo "pid $$"; exec sleep 30'),
uploader=_uploader(tmp_path, 'echo "pid $$"; sleep 30; exit 0'),
)
_album(sf, lib)
(batch,) = _approved(sf, config)

45
tests/story_traceability.json
View File

@@ -15,10 +15,9 @@
"tests/characterization/test_webapp_query.py"
],
"US01-02": [
"tests/integration/test_app_lifecycle.py",
"tests/integration/test_migrations.py",
"tests/unit/test_config.py",
"tests/unit/test_env_file.py"
"tests/integration/test_migrations.py",
"tests/integration/test_app_lifecycle.py"
],
"US01-03": [
"tests/unit/test_path_policy.py",
@@ -153,44 +152,6 @@
"tests/unit/test_security_policy.py",
"tests/integration/test_security_boundaries.py",
"tests/e2e/test_security.py"
],
"US07-03": [
"tests/integration/test_media_hardening.py",
"tests/integration/test_exif_checkpoints.py"
],
"US07-04": [
"tests/unit/test_fault_artifacts.py",
"tests/integration/test_concurrency_races.py",
"tests/integration/test_fault_matrix.py",
"tests/e2e/test_crash_recovery.py"
],
"US07-05": [
"tests/integration/test_backup_recovery.py",
"tests/integration/test_diagnostics.py"
],
"US07-06": [
"tests/integration/test_performance_budgets.py"
],
"US07-07": [
"tests/e2e/test_release_gate.py",
"tests/e2e/test_release_journey.py"
],
"US08-01": [
"tests/unit/test_security_policy.py",
"tests/integration/test_trusted_hosts.py"
],
"US08-02": [
"tests/integration/test_container_image.py",
"tests/e2e/test_container_runtime.py"
],
"US08-03": [
"tests/integration/test_compose_runtime.py",
"tests/e2e/test_compose_stack.py"
]
},
"planned": [
"US08-04",
"US08-05"
],
"_planned_comment": "Accepted backlog stories that are not implemented yet. The release gate (US07-07) requires every story file to be either mapped to tests or listed here, so an unimplemented story is a visible decision rather than a hole in the matrix."
}
}

69
tests/unit/test_env_file.py
View File

@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
"""Configuration from a dotenv file, including the archived CLI's variable names.
An operator who already has a ``photo_analyzer.env`` should not have to rewrite it
to run the application it was replaced by. The file is standing configuration; the
shell is what you meant this time, so the shell always wins.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
from photo_pipeline.config import Config, load_env_file, parse_env_file
SAMPLE = """
# The archived CLI's shape, comments and all.
LLM_API_KEY=not-real
LLM_BASE_URL="https://example.invalid/v1beta/openai/"
LLM_MODEL='gemini-2.5-flash'
LIBRARY=/tmp/pictures
MAX_WORKERS=4
# commented=ignored
malformed line without an equals sign
"""
def test_the_file_is_parsed_and_never_executed():
values = parse_env_file(SAMPLE)
assert values["LLM_BASE_URL"] == "https://example.invalid/v1beta/openai/" # quotes stripped
assert values["LLM_MODEL"] == "gemini-2.5-flash"
assert values["MAX_WORKERS"] == "4"
assert "commented" not in values and "malformed line without an equals sign" not in values
def test_the_archived_cli_names_still_configure_the_application():
values = parse_env_file(SAMPLE)
assert values["OPENAI_API_KEY"] == "not-real"
assert values["OPENAI_BASE_URL"] == "https://example.invalid/v1beta/openai/"
assert values["PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS"] == "/tmp/pictures"
def test_an_explicit_shell_variable_beats_the_file(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
path = tmp_path / "photo_analyzer.env"
path.write_text(SAMPLE)
monkeypatch.setenv("OPENAI_API_KEY", "from-the-shell")
monkeypatch.delenv("PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS", raising=False)
applied = load_env_file(path)
assert "OPENAI_API_KEY" not in applied, "the file overrode an exported value"
assert os.environ["OPENAI_API_KEY"] == "from-the-shell"
assert os.environ["PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS"] == "/tmp/pictures"
assert Config.from_env().library_roots[0].name == "pictures"
def test_the_file_is_found_through_its_variable(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
path = tmp_path / "custom.env"
path.write_text("PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT=9123\n")
monkeypatch.delenv("PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT", raising=False)
monkeypatch.setenv("PHOTO_PIPELINE_ENV_FILE", str(path))
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path) # no ./.env here, so only the variable can find it
assert Config.from_env().port == 9123
def test_a_missing_file_is_not_an_error(tmp_path):
assert load_env_file(tmp_path / "nothing-here.env") == {}

69
tests/unit/test_fault_artifacts.py
View File

@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
"""The failure-artifact collector (US07-04).
CI must be able to explain a randomized failure after the temporary library is
gone, which means the seed, the database, the journals, the logs, and a complete
filesystem manifest have to leave the temporary directory before pytest cleans it.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import json
from tests._artifacts import collect, manifest
def _library(root):
(root / "data").mkdir(parents=True)
(root / "data" / "photo_pipeline.db").write_bytes(b"database bytes")
(root / "data" / "photo_pipeline.db-wal").write_bytes(b"write ahead log")
(root / "data" / "uploads").mkdir()
(root / "data" / "uploads" / "batch.log").write_text("INFO uploaded a.jpg\n")
(root / "lib").mkdir()
(root / "lib" / "a.jpg").write_bytes(b"pixels")
return root
def test_the_manifest_covers_every_file_with_its_hash(tmp_path):
root = _library(tmp_path / "run")
entries = {entry["path"]: entry for entry in manifest(root)}
assert set(entries) == {
"data/photo_pipeline.db",
"data/photo_pipeline.db-wal",
"data/uploads/batch.log",
"lib/a.jpg",
}
assert entries["lib/a.jpg"]["sha256"] == hashlib.sha256(b"pixels").hexdigest()
assert entries["lib/a.jpg"]["bytes"] == 6
def test_collect_keeps_the_database_journals_logs_and_seed(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
root = _library(tmp_path / "run")
monkeypatch.setenv("PHOTO_PIPELINE_TEST_ARTIFACTS", str(tmp_path / "artifacts"))
destination = collect(root, "tests/x.py::test_races[run1]", properties={"race_seed": 1234})
seeds = json.loads((destination / "seeds.json").read_text())
assert seeds["properties"]["race_seed"] == 1234
assert seeds["test"].endswith("test_races[run1]")
kept = {str(p.relative_to(destination / "files")) for p in (destination / "files").rglob("*") if p.is_file()}
assert kept == {
"data/photo_pipeline.db",
"data/photo_pipeline.db-wal",
"data/uploads/batch.log",
}, "databases, write-ahead logs, and logs are the diagnosable evidence"
# The photo itself is never copied out of the library — but it is in the
# manifest, so a file that went missing is still provable.
assert any(entry["path"] == "lib/a.jpg" for entry in json.loads((destination / "manifest.json").read_text()))
def test_collecting_twice_for_one_test_is_safe(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
root = _library(tmp_path / "run")
monkeypatch.setenv("PHOTO_PIPELINE_TEST_ARTIFACTS", str(tmp_path / "artifacts"))
first = collect(root, "tests/x.py::test_a")
second = collect(root, "tests/x.py::test_a")
assert first == second and (second / "manifest.json").exists()

2
tests/unit/test_rename_journal_states.py
View File

@@ -77,8 +77,6 @@ def test_unsafe_states_are_the_ones_where_disk_may_have_changed():
JournalState.MOVING,
JournalState.MOVED,
JournalState.DATABASE_UPDATED,
# The move happened and a human still has to decide about it (US07-04).
JournalState.ROLLBACK_REQUIRED,
}
# planned has not touched anything; complete/rolled_back are settled.
assert JournalState.PLANNED not in UNSAFE_STATES

126
tests/unit/test_security_policy.py
View File

@@ -13,31 +13,18 @@ import pytest
from photo_pipeline.api.security import (
CSRF_HEADER,
LOOPBACK_HOSTS,
PUBLIC_PATHS,
FailureLimiter,
Session,
evaluate,
exposed_hosts,
external_view,
split_host,
trust_refusal,
)
from photo_pipeline.config import Config
SESSION = Session(id="session-id", csrf_token="csrf-token")
HOST = "127.0.0.1:8000"
LIMIT = 1024
HOSTNAME = "photos.example.com"
def check(
method="GET",
path="/api/v1/workflow",
allowed_hosts=LOOPBACK_HOSTS,
scheme="http",
**headers,
):
def check(method="GET", path="/api/v1/workflow", **headers):
"""Evaluate a request that is authenticated and same-origin unless overridden."""
sent = {
"host": HOST,
@@ -51,8 +38,6 @@ def check(
path=path,
headers=sent,
session=SESSION,
allowed_hosts=allowed_hosts,
scheme=scheme,
max_request_bytes=LIMIT,
)
@@ -170,115 +155,6 @@ def test_refusals_name_no_path_secret_or_internal():
assert "/" not in refusal.message
# ── US08-01: the same table with a configured trust boundary ─────────────────
CONFIGURED = frozenset(LOOPBACK_HOSTS | {HOSTNAME})
def test_a_configured_host_is_accepted_and_its_neighbours_are_not():
assert check(host=HOSTNAME, allowed_hosts=CONFIGURED) is None
for host in ("other.example.com", f"evil-{HOSTNAME}", "192.168.1.10"):
refusal = check(host=host, allowed_hosts=CONFIGURED)
assert (refusal.status, refusal.code) == (403, "host_not_allowed"), host
def test_the_loopback_default_refuses_a_host_nobody_configured():
"""The default set is what the app enforced before there was a setting."""
refusal = check(host=HOSTNAME)
assert (refusal.status, refusal.code) == (403, "host_not_allowed")
def test_the_origin_must_match_the_external_scheme():
for scheme in ("http", "https"):
assert (
check(
method="POST",
host=HOSTNAME,
origin=f"{scheme}://{HOSTNAME}",
allowed_hosts=CONFIGURED,
scheme=scheme,
)
is None
)
# An HTTPS deployment whose caller claims plain HTTP is a different origin.
refusal = check(
method="POST",
host=HOSTNAME,
origin=f"http://{HOSTNAME}",
allowed_hosts=CONFIGURED,
scheme="https",
)
assert (refusal.status, refusal.code) == (403, "origin_not_allowed")
def view(client, *, trusted=(), **headers):
sent = {name.replace("_", "-"): value for name, value in headers.items()}
return external_view(
client=client,
headers={"host": HOST, **sent},
scheme="http",
trusted_proxies=frozenset(trusted),
)
def test_forwarded_headers_are_ignored_without_a_trusted_proxy():
forged = {"x_forwarded_proto": "https", "x_forwarded_host": HOSTNAME}
assert view("10.0.0.9", **forged) == ("http", HOST)
assert view(None, **forged) == ("http", HOST)
# Configuring *a* proxy does not trust a caller that is not it.
assert view("10.0.0.9", trusted=("10.0.0.1",), **forged) == ("http", HOST)
def test_a_trusted_proxy_defines_the_external_scheme_and_host():
assert view(
"10.0.0.1", trusted=("10.0.0.1",), x_forwarded_proto="https", x_forwarded_host=HOSTNAME
) == ("https", HOSTNAME)
# A chain: the first entry is what the original client asked for.
assert view(
"10.0.0.1",
trusted=("10.0.0.1",),
x_forwarded_proto="https, http",
x_forwarded_host=f"{HOSTNAME}, inner.internal",
) == ("https", HOSTNAME)
# Trusted but silent: this hop's own view stands.
assert view("10.0.0.1", trusted=("10.0.0.1",)) == ("http", HOST)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"settings,exposed",
[
({}, []),
({"host": "127.0.0.1"}, []),
({"allowed_hosts": ("localhost", "127.0.0.1")}, []),
({"allowed_hosts": (f"{HOSTNAME}:8443",)}, [HOSTNAME]),
({"host": "0.0.0.0", "allowed_hosts": (HOSTNAME,)}, ["0.0.0.0", HOSTNAME]),
],
)
def test_exposed_hosts_names_only_what_another_machine_can_reach(settings, exposed):
assert exposed_hosts(Config(**settings)) == exposed
def test_an_exposed_configuration_without_a_secret_must_not_serve():
refusal = trust_refusal(Config(allowed_hosts=(HOSTNAME,)))
assert HOSTNAME in refusal and "PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET" in refusal
assert trust_refusal(Config(allowed_hosts=(HOSTNAME,), access_secret="s")) is None
# Loopback-only, with and without a secret, is unchanged.
assert trust_refusal(Config()) is None
assert trust_refusal(Config(access_secret="s")) is None
def test_failed_attempts_are_bounded_per_window():
limiter = FailureLimiter(limit=2, window=60.0)
assert not limiter.blocked()
limiter.record_failure()
assert not limiter.blocked()
limiter.record_failure()
assert limiter.blocked()
# Attempts age out, so a locked-out operator is not locked out forever.
limiter._failures = [-120.0, -120.0]
assert not limiter.blocked()
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"value,expected",
[