337 lines
15 KiB
Markdown
337 lines
15 KiB
Markdown
# Installation and operations
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[← Documentation index](index.md)
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From nothing to a running instance pointed at your photo library, and everything you
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need afterwards: upgrading, backing up, restoring, and understanding a refusal.
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Two ways to install. **Container** is the deployment this project builds and ships;
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**host** is what you want for development or a single machine you already manage.
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Both run the same two processes against the same database.
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> Read [what it will not do](overview.md#what-it-will-not-do) first. Several of the
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> steps below only make sense once you know which rules the application is keeping.
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## Before you start
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| you need | version | why |
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| Python | 3.12 or newer | the application |
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| `exiftool` | 13.x (the image pins `13.25+dfsg-1`) | every EXIF read and write |
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| `immich-go` | 0.32.0 (pinned in the image) | the upload stage only |
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| Docker + the compose plugin | any current | the container installation only |
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| a vision provider key | — | the analysis stage only |
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You also need a photo library you can afford to be wrong about. Take a backup of it
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before pointing anything at it for the first time, and consider running with
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[`PHOTO_PIPELINE_REQUIRE_DRY_RUN_APPROVAL`](#the-settings) on.
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## Host installation
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```bash
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python3.12 -m venv .venv
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.venv/bin/pip install -e ".[vision]" # drop [vision] for a review-only install
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```
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Configure it. Every setting is an environment variable; a `.env` file in the working
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directory is read at startup:
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```bash
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cp .env.example .env && $EDITOR .env
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```
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`.env.example` lists every variable with its default and no values at all. For a
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loopback installation you need exactly one:
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```bash
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PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS=/home/you/Pictures
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```
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Then migrate and start the two processes:
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```bash
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.venv/bin/python -m photo_pipeline migrate # create or upgrade the database
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.venv/bin/python -m photo_pipeline serve # API and browser app on 127.0.0.1:8000
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.venv/bin/python -m photo_pipeline worker # second terminal
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```
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**Both processes are required.** `serve` enqueues work and renders the application;
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nothing is scanned, scored, analysed, renamed, uploaded, or archived without a
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worker. Open <http://127.0.0.1:8000/app/> and confirm the workflow page loads.
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### The configuration file
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`.env`, or any path named by `PHOTO_PIPELINE_ENV_FILE`. It is parsed, never executed:
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`KEY=value` lines, `#` comments, optional quotes, no interpolation and no `export`. A
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configuration file that can run code is a configuration file that can be a
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vulnerability.
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**Anything already exported in the shell wins.** The file is your standing
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configuration; the environment is the override for one run.
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The archived CLI's names still work, so an existing `photo_analyzer.env` can be used
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as it is:
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| in the file | applied as |
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| `LLM_API_KEY` / `GEMINI_API_KEY` | `OPENAI_API_KEY` |
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| `LLM_BASE_URL` | `OPENAI_BASE_URL` |
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| `LIBRARY` | `PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS` |
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`.env` and `*.env` are gitignored and refused by the repository's safety checks. The
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file holds a real key; it must never be committed.
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## Container installation
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```bash
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cp .env.example .env && $EDITOR .env
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docker compose up -d --build
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```
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The composition is one `serve` container, one `worker` container, a one-shot
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`migrate` that both wait for, one bind-mounted library, and one named data volume.
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Three variables it cannot start without:
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| variable | is |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_HOST_PATH` | the library on this host |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS` | where that library is mounted **inside** the container |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET` | required, because publishing a port means the app is reachable from outside the container |
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Set `PHOTO_PIPELINE_UID` and `PHOTO_PIPELINE_GID` to the owner of the library: what
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the containers rename and rewrite keeps that ownership.
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### The data volume
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The `data` volume holds the database, its write-ahead log, the thumbnail cache, the
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operation journals, and the backups. **It must stay on a local filesystem.** SQLite
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in WAL mode needs real local locking, so NFS, SMB, and network volume drivers do not
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slow it down — they corrupt it. The library bind mount has no such restriction.
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### Ports and reaching it
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The API port is published to `127.0.0.1` unless `PHOTO_PIPELINE_PUBLISH_ADDRESS` says
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otherwise. Being reachable *was* the authentication in earlier versions: whoever could
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open the port owned the library. So the moment the application answers to anything but
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loopback — a hostname, a proxy, `0.0.0.0` — the access secret becomes mandatory and
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`serve` refuses to start without it rather than publishing your photographs.
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Behind a reverse proxy:
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```bash
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PHOTO_PIPELINE_ALLOWED_HOSTS=photos.example.com
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PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET=… # python -c 'import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(32))'
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PHOTO_PIPELINE_TRUSTED_PROXIES=10.0.0.2 # only the proxy's own address
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```
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`X-Forwarded-Proto` and `X-Forwarded-Host` are believed only from a trusted-proxy
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address, so a client cannot declare its own origin. The browser asks for the secret
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once per tab. Wrong secrets are rate-limited and logged with the caller's address
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only. The health endpoints stay open so an orchestrator can restart the container;
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nothing else is.
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### Deployment
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The stack is managed from git by Portainer, which redeploys on a webhook after CI
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publishes an image built from `main`. Runtime secrets live in the Portainer stack's
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environment rather than in the repository, so rotation happens in one place and
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reading the repository discloses nothing.
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## The settings
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Every variable, its default, and whether it is a secret. `.env.example` is the same
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list in copyable form.
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### Library and data
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| variable | default | meaning |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS` | none | the library boundary, `os.pathsep`-separated. No path outside these roots is ever read or written |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR` | `data` | database, WAL, thumbnail cache, journals, backups. Never inside the library |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_DB_PATH` | `<data dir>/photo_pipeline.db` | the database file, if it must live elsewhere |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_ENV_FILE` | `.env` | where to read the configuration file from |
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### Serving and the trust boundary
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| variable | default | meaning |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_HOST` | `127.0.0.1` | bind address |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_PORT` | `8000` | port |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_ALLOWED_HOSTS` | none | comma-separated names the app answers to besides loopback. Naming one makes the access secret mandatory |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET` | none | **secret.** Traded for the session cookie at `GET /api/v1/session` |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | none | comma-separated peer addresses whose forwarded headers may be believed |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES` | `1048576` | largest request body accepted |
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### Logging
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| variable | default | meaning |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_LOG_LEVEL` | `INFO` | standard Python levels |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_LOG_FORMAT` | `json` | `json` or `text` |
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### Limits
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| variable | default | meaning |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_THUMBNAIL_CACHE_QUOTA_BYTES` | `500000000` | cache quota; over it is a diagnostics warning |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_THUMBNAIL_MAX_PIXELS` | `100000000` | refuse to decode anything larger. This is the decompression-bomb guard |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_ARCHIVE_FREE_SPACE_RESERVE_BYTES` | `1000000000` | free space an archive destination must keep beyond the transfer itself |
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### The safety gate
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| variable | default | meaning |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_REQUIRE_DRY_RUN_APPROVAL` | `false` | refuse every mutating request until a read-only dry run of this library has been produced and approved |
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### External services
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| variable | default | meaning |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_VISION_API_KEY` | none | **secret.** Without it the analysis stage cannot run |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_SERVER_URL` | none | the Immich server |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_API_KEY` | none | **secret.** |
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| `PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_GO_BINARY` | `immich-go` | the uploader, found on `PATH` |
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### Composition only
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Read by `docker-compose.yml`, not by the application:
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`PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMAGE`, `PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_HOST_PATH`,
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`PHOTO_PIPELINE_PUBLISH_ADDRESS`, `PHOTO_PIPELINE_UID`, `PHOTO_PIPELINE_GID`.
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A secret is never written to a log, never returned by the API, never stored in the
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database, and never recorded in a backup manifest — a manifest says `configured`, not
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the value. Do not put a real key in an example, a ticket, or a screenshot.
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## First run checklist
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Not "it started" — verified.
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1. **The database is at the current revision.**
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`python -m photo_pipeline migrate` exits 0.
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2. **The application answers.**
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`curl -s localhost:8000/api/v1/health/ready` returns 200.
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3. **The library was found.** Open the app, run a scan from the Inventory view, and
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check the count against what you expect. Anything under `_IGNORE/` must be missing
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from it — that is the exclusion working, not a bug.
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4. **The worker is claiming.** The scan job reaches `succeeded`. If it stays
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`queued`, no worker is running.
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5. **Diagnostics are clean.**
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`python -m photo_pipeline diagnostics` reports free space and an empty `warnings`.
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6. **Nothing was modified.** The scan is read-only; your files' timestamps are
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unchanged.
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Only then point it at the whole library.
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## Operations
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Every operation is the same CLI, on a host or in the composition:
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```bash
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python -m photo_pipeline diagnostics
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docker compose run --rm --no-deps api diagnostics
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```
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`--no-deps` keeps a one-off command from starting a second stack; `api` is only the
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service it borrows the image and mounts from.
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### Upgrading
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1. `python -m photo_pipeline backup --reason before-upgrade`
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2. Pull the new version (or `docker compose pull && docker compose up -d`).
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3. Migrations run by themselves at startup, and a **pending schema change is
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snapshotted first**. If the upgrade fails, the previous database and its
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`pre-migration` backup are both intact, and the error log names the backup
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directory.
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An up-to-date database is not backed up again on every start.
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### Backing up
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```bash
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python -m photo_pipeline backup --reason weekly --keep 7
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python -m photo_pipeline verify-backup data/backups/<name>
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```
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Backups go through SQLite's online backup API, never a file copy: with WAL enabled
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the `.db` file alone is missing every committed page still in the write-ahead log.
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Each backup is a directory holding the snapshot and a `manifest.json` — schema
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revision, SHA-256, row counts, the archive media the library depends on, and which
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settings were configured.
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`verify-backup` runs `PRAGMA integrity_check` **and** `PRAGMA foreign_key_check`,
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compares the snapshot's SHA-256 against the manifest, and re-counts every table it
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recorded. Bit rot, a truncated copy, and a "repaired" snapshot all fail it.
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`--keep N` prunes the oldest and never the newest. The same is available at
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`GET /api/v1/diagnostics`, `GET|POST /api/v1/backups`,
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`GET /api/v1/backups/{name}/verify`, and `POST /api/v1/backups/prune`.
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### Restoring
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Restore is deliberately **not** an API call. It replaces the state of an
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installation, so it belongs to a stopped one and a person at a terminal.
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1. Stop `serve` and `worker`.
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2. `python -m photo_pipeline verify-backup data/backups/<name>` — never restore an
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unverified snapshot, and `restore` will refuse one anyway.
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3. `python -m photo_pipeline restore data/backups/<name> --into /path/to/fresh-data`.
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A target that already holds a database is refused; recovering in place means
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moving the old data directory aside first.
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4. Point `PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR` at the restored directory and run `migrate`.
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5. Run an inventory scan, so paths are reconciled against the real library.
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6. Mount every archive location the manifest names before archiving again. The
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database records where archived originals are; it does not contain them.
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Practise this against a copy before you need it.
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### Watching it
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`diagnostics` reports the database, write-ahead log, thumbnail cache, uploader
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reports, backups, and logs separately, with free space and warnings for low disk
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(`disk_low`, `disk_critical`), a cache over its quota, a write-ahead log outgrowing
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its database, and a legacy CLI writing the library.
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Logs go to stdout in JSON by default — `docker compose logs -f worker`, or your
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service manager's journal on a host. Uploader output is kept per attempt under the
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data directory with the API key scrubbed line by line.
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## When it refuses to start
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Every refusal below is deliberate. The application would rather stop and explain than
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guess about somebody's photographs.
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| exit code | meaning | what to do |
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| `1` | the operation failed and said why — an unverifiable backup, an occupied restore target, an unknown benchmark profile | read the message; nothing was changed |
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| `2` | **the library lock is held.** Another `serve` or `worker` owns this data directory | stop the other process. The message names the holder; a lock whose process is gone is taken over automatically |
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| `3` | **a legacy CLI looks active.** The frozen command-line tools are writing this library | stop them. `--allow-legacy` overrides and you own the outcome |
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| `4` | **configuration refused.** The application is reachable beyond loopback and no access secret is set | set `PHOTO_PIPELINE_ACCESS_SECRET`, or bind to loopback only |
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| `5` | **a library root is not mounted** (containers only) | fix the bind mount. Refusing is what stops the container writing into its own throwaway layer instead of your library |
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Other things that look like faults and are not:
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- **`403 host_not_allowed`** — the `Host` header is not a name in
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`PHOTO_PIPELINE_ALLOWED_HOSTS`. Add the real hostname; do not add `*`.
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- **`409 lock_held`** — a mutating job is already running. One at a time is what
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makes a crash recoverable.
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- **`409 rename_recovery_required`** — an interrupted rename is unresolved. Resolve
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it in the Renames view; unrelated mutations stay blocked until then, on purpose.
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- **A job stuck in `queued`** — no worker is running.
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- **An empty scan** — check `PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS`, and in a container check
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that the path is the *container-side* mount, not the host path.
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## What an installer must not work around
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- **One writer.** Do not run two workers, and do not run the frozen CLI beside the
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application. Each is safe alone and destructive together — the lock is not
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bureaucracy.
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- **`_IGNORE/` is never read.** Do not "fix" the exclusion.
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- **EXIF is verified before upload.** Do not skip the checkpoint to make a stage
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finish; an unverified projection is exactly the case where the wrong bytes reach
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Immich.
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- **The data directory is not the library.** Keep them apart, and keep the data
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directory on a local filesystem.
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- **Secrets stay in the environment.** Not in the database, not in a log, not in a
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commit.
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