US07-04: Prove Concurrency and Crash Recovery

.gitignore

@@ -17,3 +17,6 @@ _todo/
 pictures/
 photos/
 _IGNORE/
+
+# Test failure evidence (US07-04)
+.artifacts/

AGENTS.md

@@ -80,7 +80,8 @@ are the authoritative backlog.
    uncertain. Work only on the claimed story and its generated feature branch.
 4. Read the entire issue, linked specification, dependencies, and acceptance criteria.
    Reconcile them with the concept before designing or changing code.
-5. Inspect the legacy CLI donors before replacing applicable behavior. Update the donor
+5. Inspect the legacy CLI donors — frozen in `legacy_cli_archive/` since US07-01,
+   with their ledger — before replacing applicable behavior. Update the donor
    ledger and characterization tests required by the story.
 6. Implement every acceptance criterion and its automated tests.
 7. Run story-specific tests and the accumulated regression suite required by the epic.

README.md

@@ -17,6 +17,25 @@ python -m photo_pipeline serve     # start the API + static review UI (127.0.0.1
 Configuration comes from `PHOTO_PIPELINE_*` environment variables (see
 `photo_pipeline/config.py`); secrets are referenced, never logged.
 
+### API access (US07-02)
+
+The app listens on loopback, so its attacker is another page in the same browser.
+Every `/api/v1` route except `health/live`, `health/ready`, and `session` requires
+the application session, and every mutation requires its CSRF token as well:
+
+```bash
+BASE=http://127.0.0.1:8000
+TOKEN=$(curl -sc /tmp/pp.jar $BASE/api/v1/session | python -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["csrf_token"])')
+curl -sb /tmp/pp.jar -H "X-CSRF-Token: $TOKEN" -X POST $BASE/api/v1/albums/proposals -d '{}' -H 'Content-Type: application/json'
+```
+
+The session is per server process — restarting `serve` invalidates it, and the
+browser client re-bootstraps by itself. Requests are also refused when the `Host` is
+not a loopback name (DNS rebinding), when `Origin` is any other origin, when
+`Sec-Fetch-Site` says the request came from another site (an `<img>` pointed at a
+thumbnail), or when the body exceeds `PHOTO_PIPELINE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES`. There is no
+CORS middleware at all, so no other origin can read a response.
+
 ## Testing
 
 One offline command runs the whole suite (unit, integration, and browser
@@ -102,3 +121,195 @@ work_item/scripts/python -m pytest tests/e2e -m phase_c -q
 The deterministic naming provider is enabled only by test configuration
 (`PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAKE_NAMING_LOG`); without it the application falls back to the
 offline naming-policy name. Phase A and B suites remain green in the full run above.
+
+### Phase D acceptance gate
+
+Phase D (Epic E04: guarded renaming) is the first phase that changes the library on
+disk, so its gate is the strictest. One command runs the rename API journeys, the
+filesystem fault injection, and the browser suite:
+
+```bash
+work_item/scripts/python -m pytest tests/e2e -m phase_d -q
+```
+
+- `tests/e2e/test_phase_d_pipeline.py` drives a real server over HTTP: plan and
+  export, confirmation with the plan version and checksum (a stale token is refused
+  without touching disk), a valid apply, the case-only rename procedure, a collision
+  whose occupant survives, a source that changed after planning, and durability
+  across a full restart.
+- **Fault injection is real.** `PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAULT_AFTER=<journal state>` kills the
+  server process the instant that state is persisted. The suite crashes it at every
+  journal transition in turn (`moving`, `moved`, `database_updated`, `verified`),
+  starts a fresh process against the same database and library, and requires recovery
+  to converge from journal and disk evidence alone — with the asset set, the stable
+  IDs, and every content hash unchanged. Ambiguous evidence is never guessed: it stays
+  classified `manual` and keeps blocking. An unresolved rename is the cancellation
+  boundary — there is no cancel once a run starts, and unrelated mutations (album
+  proposal generation and approval) are refused with 409 `rename_recovery_required`
+  until it is resolved, while reads stay available.
+- `tests/e2e/test_renames_ui.py` covers the browser journeys: preview of every
+  affected path, confirmation carrying the server-issued token, apply with progress
+  and terminal verification, stale confirmation, collision, interruption, recovery,
+  rollback, keyboard confirmation, and the view still matching the journal after a
+  server restart.
+
+The fault barrier is test-only configuration; without `PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAULT_AFTER`
+the apply path has no crash points. Phases A–C remain green in the full run above.
+
+### Phase E acceptance gate
+
+Phase E (Epic E05: Immich upload) is the one stage the application cannot take back,
+so its gate runs the fake-uploader suites, the black-box upload API journeys, and the
+browser suite as a single command:
+
+```bash
+work_item/scripts/python -m pytest -m phase_e -q
+```
+
+- `tests/integration/test_upload_*.py` drive a **real executable** standing in for
+  `immich-go` through the real adapter and `subprocess` — argument construction,
+  output bounding, report parsing, verification, and killing a running process.
+- `tests/e2e/test_phase_e_pipeline.py` drives a real server and a real durable worker
+  over HTTP: credential failure and an unreachable server, preflight blockers and the
+  explicitly approved partial scope, a new album, an exact duplicate, an upgrade, a
+  retryable failure and its successful retry, a lost acceptance response, verification
+  against Immich, an inconclusive answer resolved by an operator with evidence, bytes
+  edited after upload, cancellation and resume, and an interrupted attempt recovered
+  across a restart.
+- **EXIF precedes upload** is asserted, not assumed: an album without its verified
+  safety and analysis checkpoints cannot be approved, and the uploader's own argv log
+  proves it was never executed. Each finished upload re-hashes the files in the folder
+  the uploader was handed and requires the persisted SHA-256/SHA-1 to match.
+- **No secret is retained.** The API key is a sentinel string; after a full upload and
+  verification it must appear in the uploader's argv and nowhere else — not in the
+  database, the retained report, or any response the browser can read.
+- `tests/e2e/test_uploads_ui.py` covers the browser journeys (preflight preview,
+  confirmation, progress, stopping a run, verification, manual resolution, stale
+  bytes, and recovery after a restart).
+
+Phases A–D remain green in the full run above.
+
+### Phase F acceptance gate
+
+Phase F (Epic E06: archive lifecycle) is the only stage that *removes* originals
+from the library, and the only one whose storage can walk away in someone's bag.
+One command runs the archive fault-injection suites, the black-box archive and
+restore API journeys, and the browser suite:
+
+```bash
+work_item/scripts/python -m pytest -m phase_f -q
+```
+
+- `tests/integration/test_archive_*.py` and `tests/integration/test_restore.py`
+  drive real files on real filesystems: preflight against a mounted, missing,
+  swapped, read-only, or full medium; copy-verify-remove and the same-filesystem
+  move path; and a crash at **every** persisted journal transition in both transfer
+  modes, asserting that no source is ever removed without a durable, byte-identical
+  archive copy.
+- `tests/e2e/test_phase_f_pipeline.py` drives a real server and a real durable
+  worker over HTTP: preflight blockers (offline medium, wrong volume, insufficient
+  capacity, bytes changed after upload), a verified archive whose manifest, hashes,
+  and path history are checked on the medium itself, a worker killed at each of
+  `transferring`, `verified`, `removing`, `source_removed`, and `complete`, the
+  evidence-based recovery that follows, offline deduplication of an exact and a
+  fuzzy copy while the medium is away, mount return, restore, and a collision that
+  restores beside its occupant.
+- **Archived is not missing.** An unmounted medium leaves its photos
+  `archived_offline` — still hashed, still in the duplicate indexes, still
+  previewable through their protected thumbnails — and a rescan neither prunes nor
+  flags them.
+- **Ambiguity is never guessed.** A journal state the medium contradicts stays
+  `manual`, offers no automatic action, and keeps blocking further archiving until
+  a human decides.
+- `tests/e2e/test_archive_ui.py` covers the browser journeys (preview with
+  destination identity and reclaimable bytes, blockers and mount instructions,
+  progress split into transfer/verification/removal, interruption and recovery,
+  offline browsing, restore, collision, keyboard confirmation, and reload).
+
+Phases A–E remain green in the full run above.
+
+## Media and metadata hardening (US07-03)
+
+Every pixel the application reads goes through `photo_pipeline/imaging.py`: the
+declared dimensions are checked before anything is decoded, Pillow's
+decompression-bomb warning is treated as a refusal, JPEG decodes near the requested
+size, and each decoder failure becomes one of two typed errors. A damaged file is a
+per-item error with a persisted code, never a failed scan or a dead worker.
+
+Every metadata stage ends with an EXIF checkpoint (`services/exif_checkpoint.py`):
+snapshot, write the owned keywords, read back, prove the owned fields landed and that
+nothing else moved, refresh the file hash. A field the stage does not own that
+changed anyway makes the checkpoint `divergent` — recorded in `exif_projections`,
+shown in the review queue, never repaired behind the user's back, and not counted as
+verified, so upload stays blocked.
+
+The golden corpus that proves all of it is generated, not committed:
+`tests/fixtures/media_corpus.py` declares every format, orientation, profile,
+damage, and metadata case with its expected outcome, and the suite regenerates it
+twice to prove it does not drift.
+
+```bash
+work_item/scripts/python -m pytest tests/integration/test_media_hardening.py tests/integration/test_exif_checkpoints.py -q
+```
+
+## Concurrency and crash recovery (US07-04)
+
+Crash safety is proven by crashing. `photo_pipeline/faults.py` defines the control
+points — the persisted transitions of the rename, archive, EXIF, upload, and job
+lanes — and arms one only when `PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAULT_AFTER` names it, at which
+point the process dies the way a `SIGKILL` does. There is no endpoint and no
+configuration field that can reach a barrier; a deployment that never sets the
+variable can never hit one.
+
+The race suite runs each scenario several times with a seed recorded on the test
+result (`race_seed`) and asserts invariants rather than schedules: work is never
+claimed or executed twice, a stale fencing token never commits, no file body is
+lost or overwritten, and the database still passes `PRAGMA integrity_check`.
+
+```bash
+work_item/scripts/python -m pytest tests/integration/test_concurrency_races.py \
+    tests/integration/test_fault_matrix.py tests/e2e/test_crash_recovery.py -q
+
+# replay a failure, or soak for new interleavings
+PHOTO_PIPELINE_RACE_SEED=1234 PHOTO_PIPELINE_RACE_REPEATS=50 \
+    work_item/scripts/python -m pytest tests/integration/test_concurrency_races.py -q
+```
+
+Any failing test keeps its evidence: the temporary database (with its write-ahead
+log), the journals, the logs, the recorded seed, and a SHA-256 manifest of every
+file in the temporary library are copied to `.artifacts/<test id>/` before pytest
+deletes the directory. Point `PHOTO_PIPELINE_TEST_ARTIFACTS` elsewhere to collect
+them from CI.
+
+## Legacy CLI archive
+
+The command-line tools this application was extracted from are frozen in
+`legacy_cli_archive/` (US07-01): the original sources, their docs, the dependency
+lock they were last verified against, schema notes, a redacted sample
+configuration, the donor ledger, and a checksum for every file.
+
+```bash
+cd legacy_cli_archive && shasum -a 256 -c CHECKSUMS.sha256   # verify the archive
+work_item/scripts/python -m pytest tests/unit/test_legacy_archive.py -q   # lint it
+```
+
+They are reference material and rollback evidence only. No module under
+`photo_pipeline/` imports or executes them, the archive is not on the application's
+import path, and `tests/unit/test_legacy_archive.py` enforces that along with the
+checksums and the redaction. Only the two suites that compare *against* the donors —
+`tests/characterization/` and `tests/integration/test_safety_parity.py` — put the
+archived sources on `sys.path`.
+
+The last path-keyed state they owned, `nsfw_scores.csv`, is imported once and then
+left alone:
+
+```bash
+work_item/scripts/python -m photo_pipeline import-legacy-scores /path/to/nsfw_scores.csv --dry-run
+```
+
+The import writes scored-but-unreviewed `safety_reviews` rows onto stable asset ids,
+never invents an asset for an unknown path, never overwrites a human decision, and
+writes a reconciliation report to the data directory saying exactly what it did.
+`legacy_cli_archive/donor_ledger.yaml` records every migrated behavior with its
+target, the tests that pin the donor, the tests that prove the replacement, and each
+intentional delta; rows still marked `pending` name the story that will resolve them.

frontend/index.html

@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
         <a href="#/analyze" data-nav="analyze">Analyze</a>
         <a href="#/albums" data-nav="albums">Albums</a>
         <a href="#/renames" data-nav="renames">Renames</a>
+        <a href="#/uploads" data-nav="uploads">Upload</a>
+        <a href="#/archive" data-nav="archive">Archive</a>
         <a href="#/stats" data-nav="stats">Stats</a>
       </nav>
     </header>

frontend/js/api.js

@@ -2,14 +2,43 @@
 // cancellation. Every method accepts an optional { signal } from cancellable().
 export const BASE = "/api/v1";
 
+// The API refuses every request without the session cookie, and every mutation
+// without this token echoed back. The token is readable only same-origin, which is
+// what makes it proof that the caller is this app and not another page.
+let csrfToken = null;
+
+async function session() {
+  if (csrfToken === null) {
+    const response = await fetch(BASE + "/session", { credentials: "same-origin" });
+    const body = await response.json().catch(() => null);
+    csrfToken = (body && body.csrf_token) || null;
+  }
+  return csrfToken || "";
+}
+
+async function send(path, { signal, ...options }) {
+  return fetch(BASE + path, {
+    credentials: "same-origin",
+    signal,
+    ...options,
+    headers: {
+      "Content-Type": "application/json",
+      "X-CSRF-Token": await session(),
+      ...(options.headers || {}),
+    },
+  });
+}
+
 async function request(path, { signal, ...options } = {}) {
   let response;
   try {
-    response = await fetch(BASE + path, {
-      headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
-      signal,
-      ...options,
-    });
+    response = await send(path, { signal, ...options });
+    // A restarted server issues a new session; re-bootstrap once rather than
+    // stranding an open tab on 401.
+    if (response.status === 401) {
+      csrfToken = null;
+      response = await send(path, { signal, ...options });
+    }
   } catch (error) {
     // A caller-cancelled fetch is not a failure; tag it so views can ignore it.
     if (error.name === "AbortError") {
@@ -114,4 +143,55 @@ export const api = {
     request(`/rename-plans/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/rollback`, { method: "POST", ...opts }),
   renameRecovery: (opts = {}) => request("/rename-recovery", opts),
   resolveRecovery: (opts = {}) => request("/rename-recovery/resolve", { method: "POST", ...opts }),
+
+  // ── Uploads: preflight, batches, verification ───────────────────────────
+  // The API key never travels through here: preflight reports only whether one is
+  // configured, and every command preview arrives already redacted.
+  uploadPreflight: (payload = {}, opts = {}) =>
+    request("/upload-preflight", { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify(payload), ...opts }),
+  createUploadBatches: (payload, opts = {}) =>
+    request("/upload-batches", { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify(payload), ...opts }),
+  listUploadBatches: (opts = {}) => request("/upload-batches", opts),
+  getUploadBatch: (id, opts = {}) => request(`/upload-batches/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`, opts),
+  startUploadBatch: (id, opts = {}) =>
+    request(`/upload-batches/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/start`, { method: "POST", ...opts }),
+  cancelUploadBatch: (id, opts = {}) =>
+    request(`/upload-batches/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/cancel`, { method: "POST", ...opts }),
+  verifyUploadBatch: (id, opts = {}) =>
+    request(`/upload-batches/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/verify`, { method: "POST", ...opts }),
+  resolveUploadItem: (id, payload, opts = {}) =>
+    request(`/upload-batches/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/resolve`, {
+      method: "POST",
+      body: JSON.stringify(payload),
+      ...opts,
+    }),
+  uploadVerifications: (id, opts = {}) =>
+    request(`/upload-batches/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/verifications`, opts),
+
+  // ── Archive and restore: destinations, preflight, plans, recovery ────────
+  archiveLocations: (opts = {}) => request("/archive-locations", opts),
+  registerArchiveLocation: (payload, opts = {}) =>
+    request("/archive-locations", { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify(payload), ...opts }),
+  archivePreflight: (payload, opts = {}) =>
+    request("/archive-preflight", { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify(payload), ...opts }),
+  createArchivePlan: (payload, opts = {}) =>
+    request("/archive-plans", { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify(payload), ...opts }),
+  listArchivePlans: (opts = {}) => request("/archive-plans", opts),
+  getArchivePlan: (id, opts = {}) => request(`/archive-plans/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`, opts),
+  applyArchivePlan: (id, opts = {}) =>
+    request(`/archive-plans/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/apply`, { method: "POST", ...opts }),
+  archiveRecovery: (opts = {}) => request("/archive-recovery", opts),
+  resolveArchiveRecovery: (opts = {}) =>
+    request("/archive-recovery/resolve", { method: "POST", ...opts }),
+  restorePreflight: (payload, opts = {}) =>
+    request("/restore-preflight", { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify(payload), ...opts }),
+  createRestorePlan: (payload, opts = {}) =>
+    request("/restore-plans", { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify(payload), ...opts }),
+  listRestorePlans: (opts = {}) => request("/restore-plans", opts),
+  getRestorePlan: (id, opts = {}) => request(`/restore-plans/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`, opts),
+  applyRestorePlan: (id, opts = {}) =>
+    request(`/restore-plans/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/apply`, { method: "POST", ...opts }),
+  restoreRecovery: (opts = {}) => request("/restore-recovery", opts),
+  resolveRestoreRecovery: (opts = {}) =>
+    request("/restore-recovery/resolve", { method: "POST", ...opts }),
 };

frontend/js/app.js

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 import { api } from "./api.js";
+import { renderArchive, setArchiveRender } from "./archive.js";
 import { navigate, onRouteChange, parseHash } from "./router.js";
 import { renderRenames, setRenamesRender } from "./renames.js";
+import { renderUploads, setUploadsRender } from "./uploads.js";
 import {
   renderAlbums,
   renderAnalyze,
@@ -364,6 +366,8 @@ function render() {
   else if (path === "/analyze") renderAnalyze(root, params);
   else if (path === "/albums") renderAlbums(root, params);
   else if (path === "/renames") renderRenames(root, params);
+  else if (path === "/uploads") renderUploads(root, params);
+  else if (path === "/archive") renderArchive(root, params);
   else if (path === "/stats") renderStats(root, params);
   else show(errorBanner("Unknown view"));
 }
@@ -371,5 +375,7 @@ function render() {
 // Let views re-render the current route after a mutation.
 setRender(render);
 setRenamesRender(render);
+setUploadsRender(render);
+setArchiveRender(render);
 onRouteChange(render);
 render();

frontend/js/archive.js

@@ -0,0 +1,870 @@
+// Archive view (US06-05): preview what would leave active storage, confirm it
+// exactly, watch the transfer, recover an interrupted one, browse what is already
+// archived, and bring it back.
+//
+// Archiving is the only stage that removes originals, so this view never decides
+// anything itself: the destination's identity, every blocker, the confirmation
+// token, and what recovery may do all come from the server, and an action the
+// server would refuse is not offered. Two things follow from that. A medium that
+// is not mounted produces an instruction naming it rather than a disabled mystery,
+// and an operation whose evidence is ambiguous offers no button at all.
+import { api } from "./api.js";
+import { el, errorBanner, setActiveNav } from "./dom.js";
+import { subscribeJob } from "./events.js";
+import { navigate } from "./router.js";
+
+let outcome = null;
+let activity = [];
+
+let render = () => {};
+export function setArchiveRender(fn) {
+  render = fn;
+}
+
+// The per-file journal states, split into the three things an operator actually
+// wants told apart: bytes moving, bytes proven, original removed (concept §9).
+const PHASES = [
+  ["planned", "planned", "waiting"],
+  ["transferring", "transfer", "copying to the medium"],
+  ["verified", "verified", "archive copy hashed and manifested"],
+  ["removing", "removing", "removing the active original"],
+  ["complete", "complete", "archived and removed"],
+  ["failed", "failed", "left alone for a decision"],
+];
+
+const AVAILABILITY_LABEL = {
+  active: "in the library",
+  archived_online: "archived · medium mounted",
+  archived_offline: "archived · medium away",
+  missing_unexpected: "missing — unexplained",
+};
+
+export async function renderArchive(root, params = {}) {
+  setActiveNav("archive");
+
+  let locations;
+  try {
+    locations = (await api.archiveLocations()).locations;
+  } catch (error) {
+    root.replaceChildren(errorBanner(`Failed to load archive locations: ${error.message}`));
+    return;
+  }
+  const location = locations.find((l) => l.id === params.location) || locations[0] || null;
+
+  const nodes = [el("h1", {}, "Archive"), locationsCard(locations, location, params)];
+  if (!location) {
+    nodes.push(
+      el(
+        "p",
+        { class: "muted", "data-testid": "no-locations" },
+        "Register the disk, NAS share, or removable medium that will hold archived originals."
+      ),
+      outcomeBanner()
+    );
+    root.replaceChildren(...nodes.filter(Boolean));
+    return;
+  }
+
+  const [preflight, archivePlans, restorePlans, recovery, restoreRecovery, archived, restore] =
+    await Promise.all([
+      load(() => api.archivePreflight({ location_id: location.id })),
+      load(() => api.listArchivePlans()),
+      load(() => api.listRestorePlans()),
+      load(() => api.archiveRecovery()),
+      load(() => api.restoreRecovery()),
+      load(() => api.listAssets({ limit: 200 })),
+      load(() => api.restorePreflight({ location_id: location.id })),
+    ]);
+
+  // Both directions share the runs table: one lane moves these originals, so one
+  // history is what an operator has to reason about.
+  const runs = [...plans(archivePlans), ...plans(restorePlans)].sort((a, b) =>
+    (a.created_at || "").localeCompare(b.created_at || "")
+  );
+  const chosen = runs.find((run) => run.id === params.plan) || runs[runs.length - 1] || null;
+  const selectedPlan = chosen ? await load(() => planDetailOf(chosen)) : null;
+
+  nodes.push(
+    preflight ? previewSection(preflight, location) : null,
+    preflight ? confirmBlock(preflight, location) : null,
+    outcomeBanner(),
+    activityLog(),
+    recoverySection(mergeRecovery(recovery, restoreRecovery)),
+    planList(runs, chosen && chosen.id),
+    selectedPlan ? planDetail(selectedPlan) : null,
+    archived ? archivedSection(archived.items, locations) : null,
+    restore ? restoreSection(restore, location) : null
+  );
+  root.replaceChildren(...nodes.filter(Boolean));
+}
+
+function plans(listed) {
+  return listed ? listed.plans : [];
+}
+
+function planDetailOf(run) {
+  return run.direction === "restore" ? api.getRestorePlan(run.id) : api.getArchivePlan(run.id);
+}
+
+// Archive and restore recovery answer the same question about the same lane, so
+// they are one list; an unresolved item of either kind blocks the other.
+function mergeRecovery(archive, restore) {
+  if (!archive && !restore) return null;
+  return {
+    operations: [...((archive || {}).operations || []), ...((restore || {}).operations || [])],
+    manual: [...((archive || {}).manual || []), ...((restore || {}).manual || [])],
+  };
+}
+
+// A section whose data failed to load must not take the rest of the view with it:
+// the medium being away is exactly when the archived-asset list matters most.
+async function load(call) {
+  try {
+    return await call();
+  } catch (_) {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+// ── locations ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// A location is a medium, not a path: the marker's ``media_id`` is what proves the
+// right disk is mounted, so it is shown next to the state it produced.
+function locationsCard(locations, selected, params) {
+  const name = el("input", {
+    type: "text",
+    "data-testid": "location-name",
+    "aria-label": "Archive location name",
+    placeholder: "External disk",
+  });
+  const root = el("input", {
+    type: "text",
+    "data-testid": "location-root",
+    "aria-label": "Archive location path",
+    placeholder: "/Volumes/archive",
+  });
+
+  return el(
+    "div",
+    { class: "card", "data-testid": "archive-locations" },
+    el("h2", {}, "Destinations"),
+    locations.length
+      ? el(
+          "table",
+          { class: "grid", "data-testid": "locations" },
+          el(
+            "thead",
+            {},
+            el(
+              "tr",
+              {},
+              ...["", "Name", "Root", "Medium", "State", "Last seen"].map((label) =>
+                el("th", { scope: "col" }, label)
+              )
+            )
+          ),
+          el(
+            "tbody",
+            {},
+            ...locations.map((location) =>
+              el(
+                "tr",
+                {
+                  "data-testid": "location-row",
+                  "data-name": location.name,
+                  "aria-current": selected && location.id === selected.id ? "true" : false,
+                },
+                el(
+                  "td",
+                  {},
+                  el("input", {
+                    type: "radio",
+                    name: "archive-location",
+                    "data-testid": "select-location",
+                    "aria-label": `Use ${location.name}`,
+                    checked: selected && location.id === selected.id ? "checked" : false,
+                    onchange: () => navigate("/archive", { ...params, location: location.id }),
+                  })
+                ),
+                el("td", { "data-testid": "location-label" }, location.name),
+                el("td", { class: "path", "data-testid": "location-path" }, location.root),
+                el("td", { class: "path", "data-testid": "location-media" }, location.media_id),
+                el(
+                  "td",
+                  {},
+                  el(
+                    "span",
+                    {
+                      class: `badge ${location.state === "online" ? "complete" : "attention"}`,
+                      "data-testid": "location-state",
+                    },
+                    location.state
+                  )
+                ),
+                el("td", { class: "muted" }, location.last_seen_at || "never")
+              )
+            )
+          )
+        )
+      : null,
+    selected && selected.state !== "online" ? mountInstruction(selected) : null,
+    el(
+      "div",
+      { class: "toolbar" },
+      name,
+      root,
+      el(
+        "button",
+        {
+          "data-testid": "register-location",
+          onclick: () =>
+            run(() => api.registerArchiveLocation({ name: name.value, root: root.value })),
+        },
+        "Register destination"
+      )
+    )
+  );
+}
+
+// The one thing the app cannot do for the user: name the medium to connect.
+function mountInstruction(location) {
+  const detail =
+    location.state === "wrong_volume"
+      ? `A different medium is mounted at ${location.root}.`
+      : `Nothing is mounted at ${location.root}.`;
+  return el(
+    "div",
+    { class: "confirm", role: "status", "data-testid": "mount-instruction" },
+    `${detail} Connect “${location.name}” (medium ${location.media_id}) and mount it there, ` +
+      "then reload this view. Archived photos stay listed and searchable meanwhile."
+  );
+}
+
+// ── preview ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function previewSection(preflight, location) {
+  const totals = preflight.totals;
+  const capacity = preflight.capacity;
+  const rows = preflight.albums.map((album) =>
+    el(
+      "tr",
+      { "data-testid": "archive-album-row", "data-album": album.album },
+      el("td", { "data-testid": "album-name" }, album.album),
+      el("td", { class: "path", "data-testid": "album-folder" }, album.folder),
+      el("td", { class: "path", "data-testid": "album-destination" }, album.destination),
+      el(
+        "td",
+        { "data-testid": "album-method" },
+        album.transfer_method === "move" ? "move (same filesystem)" : "copy · verify · remove"
+      ),
+      el("td", { "data-testid": "album-assets" }, String(album.asset_count)),
+      el("td", { "data-testid": "album-reclaim" }, bytes(album.reclaimable_bytes)),
+      el(
+        "td",
+        {},
+        el("span", { class: `badge ${album.state}`, "data-testid": "album-state" }, album.state),
+        ...album.blockers.map((blocker) =>
+          el(
+            "div",
+            { class: "blocker", "data-testid": "album-blocker", "data-code": blocker.code },
+            blocker.message
+          )
+        )
+      )
+    )
+  );
+
+  return el(
+    "div",
+    { "data-testid": "archive-preview" },
+    el("h2", {}, "Preview"),
+    el(
+      "div",
+      { class: "decision-bar" },
+      el(
+        "span",
+        { class: "badge", "data-testid": "destination-identity" },
+        `${location.name} · ${location.media_id}`
+      ),
+      el("span", { class: "badge", "data-testid": "total-albums" }, `${totals.albums} album(s)`),
+      el("span", { class: "badge", "data-testid": "total-assets" }, `${totals.assets} photo(s)`),
+      el(
+        "span",
+        { class: "badge", "data-testid": "total-reclaim" },
+        `${bytes(totals.bytes)} reclaimable`
+      ),
+      el(
+        "span",
+        {
+          class: `badge ${capacity.sufficient ? "complete" : "blocked"}`,
+          "data-testid": "capacity",
+        },
+        `free ${bytes(capacity.free_bytes)} · reserve ${bytes(capacity.reserve_bytes)}`
+      )
+    ),
+    blockerList(preflight.blockers, "preflight-blockers", "preflight-blocker", "This scope cannot be archived yet"),
+    rows.length
+      ? el(
+          "table",
+          { class: "grid", "data-testid": "archive-albums" },
+          el(
+            "thead",
+            {},
+            el(
+              "tr",
+              {},
+              ...["Album", "Folder", "Destination", "Transfer", "Photos", "Reclaims", "State"].map(
+                (label) => el("th", { scope: "col" }, label)
+              )
+            )
+          ),
+          el("tbody", {}, ...rows)
+        )
+      : el(
+          "p",
+          { class: "muted", "data-testid": "no-albums" },
+          "No album has a verified upload whose bytes are still unchanged, so nothing may be archived."
+        )
+  );
+}
+
+function blockerList(blockers, containerId, itemId, title) {
+  if (!blockers || !blockers.length) return null;
+  return el(
+    "div",
+    { class: "alert", role: "alert", "data-testid": containerId },
+    el("strong", {}, title),
+    el(
+      "ul",
+      {},
+      ...blockers.map((blocker) =>
+        el("li", { "data-testid": itemId, "data-code": blocker.code }, `${blocker.code}: ${blocker.message}`)
+      )
+    )
+  );
+}
+
+// ── confirmation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function confirmBlock(preflight, location) {
+  const ready = preflight.state === "ready";
+  const totals = preflight.totals;
+  return el(
+    "div",
+    { class: "card", "data-testid": "confirm" },
+    el("h2", {}, "Confirm"),
+    el(
+      "p",
+      { class: "muted", "data-testid": "confirm-token" },
+      `Preflight ${preflight.token.slice(0, 20)}… · ${location.name}`
+    ),
+    el(
+      "p",
+      { "data-testid": "archive-note" },
+      "Archiving removes each original from the library — but only after its copy on " +
+        "the medium has been written, hashed, and recorded in the manifest. The photos " +
+        "stay searchable and deduplicable while the medium is away, and can be restored " +
+        "from this view."
+    ),
+    el(
+      "div",
+      { class: "toolbar" },
+      el(
+        "button",
+        {
+          class: "primary",
+          "data-testid": "start-archive",
+          disabled: ready ? false : "disabled",
+          title: ready ? false : "resolve the blockers above first",
+          onclick: () =>
+            run(async () => {
+              const plan = await api.createArchivePlan({
+                location_id: location.id,
+                token: preflight.token,
+              });
+              const started = await api.applyArchivePlan(plan.id);
+              watch(started.job.id, plan.id, "archive");
+              return { archiving: plan.asset_count };
+            }),
+        },
+        `Archive ${totals.ready_albums} album(s) · reclaim ${bytes(totals.bytes)}`
+      )
+    )
+  );
+}
+
+// ── plans and progress ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function planList(runs, selectedId) {
+  if (!runs.length) {
+    return el("p", { class: "muted", "data-testid": "no-plans" }, "Nothing has been archived yet.");
+  }
+  return el(
+    "div",
+    { "data-testid": "archive-plans" },
+    el("h2", {}, "Runs"),
+    el(
+      "table",
+      { class: "grid", "data-testid": "plans" },
+      el(
+        "thead",
+        {},
+        el(
+          "tr",
+          {},
+          ...["Created", "Direction", "State", "Photos", "Bytes"].map((l) =>
+            el("th", { scope: "col" }, l)
+          )
+        )
+      ),
+      el(
+        "tbody",
+        {},
+        ...runs.map((plan) =>
+          el(
+            "tr",
+            {
+              "data-testid": "plan-row",
+              "data-plan": plan.id,
+              "data-direction": plan.direction,
+              "aria-current": plan.id === selectedId ? "true" : false,
+            },
+            el(
+              "td",
+              {},
+              el("a", { class: "link", href: `#/archive?plan=${encodeURIComponent(plan.id)}` }, plan.created_at || plan.id)
+            ),
+            el("td", { "data-testid": "plan-direction" }, plan.direction),
+            el("td", {}, el("span", { class: `badge ${plan.state}`, "data-testid": "plan-state" }, plan.state)),
+            el("td", {}, String(plan.asset_count)),
+            el("td", {}, bytes(plan.byte_size))
+          )
+        )
+      )
+    )
+  );
+}
+
+function planDetail(plan) {
+  const operations = plan.operations || [];
+  const counts = {};
+  for (const operation of operations) {
+    counts[operation.journal_state] = (counts[operation.journal_state] || 0) + 1;
+  }
+  return el(
+    "div",
+    { class: "card", "data-testid": "plan-detail", "data-plan": plan.id },
+    el("h2", {}, `${plan.direction === "restore" ? "Restore" : "Archive"} run ${plan.created_at || plan.id}`),
+    // Transfer, verification, and removal are separate answers to separate
+    // questions: what has moved, what is proven, and what is already gone.
+    el(
+      "div",
+      { class: "decision-bar", "data-testid": "plan-progress" },
+      el("span", { class: `badge ${plan.state}`, "data-testid": "detail-state" }, plan.state),
+      ...PHASES.map(([key, label, title]) =>
+        el(
+          "span",
+          { class: `badge ${key}`, "data-testid": `count-${label}`, title },
+          `${label}: ${counts[key] ?? 0}`
+        )
+      )
+    ),
+    el(
+      "table",
+      { class: "grid", "data-testid": "operations" },
+      el(
+        "thead",
+        {},
+        el(
+          "tr",
+          {},
+          ...["Photo", "Destination", "Phase", "Attempts", "Problem"].map((l) =>
+            el("th", { scope: "col" }, l)
+          )
+        )
+      ),
+      el(
+        "tbody",
+        {},
+        ...operations.map((operation) =>
+          el(
+            "tr",
+            { "data-testid": "operation-row", "data-asset-id": operation.asset_id },
+            el("td", { class: "path", "data-testid": "operation-source" }, operation.source_path),
+            el("td", { class: "path", "data-testid": "operation-destination" }, operation.destination_path),
+            el(
+              "td",
+              {},
+              el(
+                "span",
+                { class: `badge ${operation.journal_state}`, "data-testid": "operation-phase" },
+                phaseLabel(operation.journal_state)
+              )
+            ),
+            el("td", {}, String(operation.attempt_count)),
+            el(
+              "td",
+              { class: "muted", "data-testid": "operation-error", "data-code": operation.error_code || "" },
+              operation.error_code ? `${operation.error_code}: ${operation.error_message || ""}` : "—"
+            )
+          )
+        )
+      )
+    )
+  );
+}
+
+function phaseLabel(state) {
+  const found = PHASES.find(([key]) => key === state);
+  return found ? found[1] : state;
+}
+
+// ── recovery ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// What an interrupted run left behind, straight from the journal plus the files on
+// disk. Only the operations the server itself classified as resolvable get an
+// action; ambiguous ones are shown with their evidence and no button.
+function recoverySection(recovery) {
+  const operations = recovery ? recovery.operations : [];
+  if (!operations.length) return null;
+  const manual = recovery.manual || [];
+  const resolvable = operations.length - manual.length;
+
+  return el(
+    "div",
+    { class: "card", "data-testid": "archive-recovery" },
+    el("h2", {}, "Interrupted work"),
+    el(
+      "p",
+      { "data-testid": "recovery-summary" },
+      `${operations.length} operation(s) did not finish · ${resolvable} resolvable · ` +
+        `${manual.length} need a decision`
+    ),
+    el(
+      "table",
+      { class: "grid", "data-testid": "recovery-operations" },
+      el(
+        "thead",
+        {},
+        el(
+          "tr",
+          {},
+          ...["Photo", "Phase", "Verdict", "Evidence"].map((l) => el("th", { scope: "col" }, l))
+        )
+      ),
+      el(
+        "tbody",
+        {},
+        ...operations.map((verdict) =>
+          el(
+            "tr",
+            {
+              "data-testid": "recovery-row",
+              "data-classification": verdict.classification,
+              "data-direction": verdict.direction,
+            },
+            el("td", { class: "path", "data-testid": "recovery-source" }, verdict.source_path),
+            el("td", {}, el("span", { class: "badge" }, phaseLabel(verdict.journal_state))),
+            el(
+              "td",
+              {},
+              el(
+                "span",
+                {
+                  class: `badge ${verdict.classification === "manual" ? "blocked" : "attention"}`,
+                  "data-testid": "recovery-verdict",
+                },
+                verdict.classification
+              )
+            ),
+            el(
+              "td",
+              { class: "muted", "data-testid": "recovery-reason" },
+              `${verdict.reason} (source ${verdict.source_exists ? "present" : "absent"}, ` +
+                `archive copy ${verdict.destination_matches ? "verified" : verdict.destination_exists ? "different bytes" : "absent"})`
+            )
+          )
+        )
+      )
+    ),
+    manual.length
+      ? el(
+          "div",
+          { class: "alert", role: "alert", "data-testid": "recovery-manual" },
+          `${manual.length} operation(s) cannot be resolved from the evidence. Nothing will be ` +
+            "removed or retried for them here: inspect the medium and the library, then decide."
+        )
+      : null,
+    el(
+      "div",
+      { class: "toolbar" },
+      resolvable
+        ? el(
+            "button",
+            {
+              class: "primary",
+              "data-testid": "resolve-recovery",
+              onclick: () => run(() => api.resolveArchiveRecovery()),
+            },
+            `Finish ${resolvable} recoverable operation(s)`
+          )
+        : el(
+            "span",
+            { class: "muted", "data-testid": "no-safe-recovery" },
+            "No operation can be finished safely from here."
+          )
+    )
+  );
+}
+
+// ── archived assets ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Browsing what is already archived, including while the medium is away: the
+// retained protected preview and the recorded hashes are the evidence, so the row
+// stays complete and honest instead of turning into a missing file.
+function archivedSection(assets, locations) {
+  const archived = assets.filter((asset) => asset.availability_state !== "active");
+  if (!archived.length) return null;
+  const names = Object.fromEntries(locations.map((location) => [location.id, location.name]));
+
+  return el(
+    "div",
+    { "data-testid": "archived-assets" },
+    el("h2", {}, "Archived photos"),
+    el(
+      "table",
+      { class: "grid", "data-testid": "archived" },
+      el(
+        "thead",
+        {},
+        el(
+          "tr",
+          {},
+          ...["Preview", "Archived as", "Medium", "Availability", "Size"].map((l) =>
+            el("th", { scope: "col" }, l)
+          )
+        )
+      ),
+      el(
+        "tbody",
+        {},
+        ...archived.map((asset) =>
+          el(
+            "tr",
+            { "data-testid": "archived-row", "data-asset-id": asset.id },
+            el(
+              "td",
+              {},
+              el("img", {
+                "data-testid": "archived-preview",
+                width: 96,
+                loading: "lazy",
+                src: api.thumbnailUrl(asset.id, 256),
+                alt: `Preview of ${asset.archive_path || asset.id}`,
+              })
+            ),
+            el("td", { class: "path", "data-testid": "archived-path" }, asset.archive_path || "—"),
+            el(
+              "td",
+              { "data-testid": "archived-medium" },
+              names[asset.archive_location_id] || asset.archive_location_id || "—"
+            ),
+            el(
+              "td",
+              {},
+              el(
+                "span",
+                {
+                  class: `badge ${asset.availability_state === "archived_online" ? "complete" : "attention"}`,
+                  "data-testid": "archived-availability",
+                },
+                AVAILABILITY_LABEL[asset.availability_state] || asset.availability_state
+              )
+            ),
+            el("td", {}, bytes(asset.byte_size))
+          )
+        )
+      )
+    )
+  );
+}
+
+// ── restore ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function restoreSection(restore, location) {
+  const ready = restore.state === "ready";
+  const items = restore.items || [];
+  if (!items.length && !restore.blockers.length) return null;
+
+  return el(
+    "div",
+    { class: "card", "data-testid": "restore" },
+    el("h2", {}, "Restore"),
+    el(
+      "p",
+      { "data-testid": "restore-note" },
+      "Restoring copies the archived bytes back into the library and leaves the archive " +
+        "copy where it is. A name that is already taken is never overwritten: the photo " +
+        "comes back beside it under a visibly different name."
+    ),
+    blockerList(restore.blockers, "restore-blockers", "restore-blocker", "This restore cannot run yet"),
+    items.length
+      ? el(
+          "table",
+          { class: "grid", "data-testid": "restore-items" },
+          el(
+            "thead",
+            {},
+            el(
+              "tr",
+              {},
+              ...["Archived as", "Comes back as", "Size", "State"].map((l) =>
+                el("th", { scope: "col" }, l)
+              )
+            )
+          ),
+          el(
+            "tbody",
+            {},
+            ...items.map((item) =>
+              el(
+                "tr",
+                { "data-testid": "restore-row", "data-asset-id": item.asset_id },
+                el("td", { class: "path", "data-testid": "restore-source" }, item.archive_path),
+                el("td", { class: "path", "data-testid": "restore-destination" }, item.destination_path || "—"),
+                el("td", {}, bytes(item.byte_size)),
+                el(
+                  "td",
+                  {},
+                  item.blockers.length
+                    ? el(
+                        "span",
+                        {
+                          class: "badge blocked",
+                          "data-testid": "restore-item-blocker",
+                          "data-code": item.blockers[0].code,
+                        },
+                        item.blockers[0].code
+                      )
+                    : el("span", { class: "badge ready", "data-testid": "restore-item-state" }, "ready")
+                )
+              )
+            )
+          )
+        )
+      : null,
+    el(
+      "div",
+      { class: "toolbar" },
+      el(
+        "button",
+        {
+          class: "primary",
+          "data-testid": "start-restore",
+          disabled: ready ? false : "disabled",
+          title: ready ? false : "the medium and every archived copy must check out first",
+          onclick: () =>
+            run(async () => {
+              const plan = await api.createRestorePlan({
+                location_id: location.id,
+                token: restore.token,
+              });
+              const started = await api.applyRestorePlan(plan.id);
+              watch(started.job.id, plan.id, "restore");
+              return { restoring: plan.asset_count };
+            }),
+        },
+        `Restore ${items.length} photo(s) from ${location.name}`
+      )
+    )
+  );
+}
+
+// ── running commands ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+async function run(action) {
+  try {
+    outcome = { kind: "ok", result: await action() };
+  } catch (error) {
+    outcome = error.status === 409 ? { kind: "conflict", error } : { kind: "error", error };
+  }
+  render();
+}
+
+// Live job activity. The plan panel is refreshed on its own tick because the
+// journal advances per file, not per job event; a full re-render would re-run
+// preflight (which re-hashes the library), so that happens once when the job ends.
+const REFRESH_MS = 500;
+
+function watch(jobId, planId, kind) {
+  activity = [`Started ${kind} job ${jobId}`];
+  const tick = setInterval(() => refreshPlan(planId, kind), REFRESH_MS);
+  subscribeJob(jobId, {
+    onEvent: (event) => {
+      activity.push(`${event.type}${event.message ? ": " + event.message : ""}`);
+      const log = document.querySelector('[data-testid="archive-activity"]');
+      if (log) log.textContent = activity.join("\n");
+    },
+    onDone: () => {
+      clearInterval(tick);
+      activity.push("done");
+      render();
+    },
+  });
+}
+
+async function refreshPlan(planId, kind) {
+  const node = document.querySelector(`[data-testid="plan-detail"][data-plan="${planId}"]`);
+  if (!node) return; // the user navigated away from the running plan
+  try {
+    const plan = await (kind === "restore" ? api.getRestorePlan(planId) : api.getArchivePlan(planId));
+    node.replaceWith(planDetail(plan));
+  } catch (_) {
+    // Transient; the next tick tries again and the job's end re-renders anyway.
+  }
+}
+
+function activityLog() {
+  return el(
+    "pre",
+    {
+      class: "activity-log",
+      role: "status",
+      "aria-live": "polite",
+      "data-testid": "archive-activity",
+    },
+    activity.join("\n")
+  );
+}
+
+function outcomeBanner() {
+  if (!outcome) return null;
+  if (outcome.kind === "conflict") {
+    return el(
+      "div",
+      { class: "alert", role: "alert", "data-testid": "conflict" },
+      `The server refused this: ${outcome.error.message}. Nothing was moved or removed; ` +
+        "the state below is the server's current one — review it and decide again."
+    );
+  }
+  if (outcome.kind === "error") {
+    return el(
+      "div",
+      { class: "alert", role: "alert", "data-testid": "archive-error" },
+      `Failed: ${outcome.error.message}`
+    );
+  }
+  const result = outcome.result || {};
+  const message =
+    result.archiving !== undefined
+      ? `Archiving ${result.archiving} photo(s). Originals are removed only after their copies verify.`
+      : result.restoring !== undefined
+        ? `Restoring ${result.restoring} photo(s) into the library.`
+        : "Done — the state below is the server's.";
+  return el("div", { class: "alert", role: "status", "data-testid": "archive-result" }, message);
+}
+
+// ── formatting ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function bytes(value) {
+  if (value == null) return "unknown";
+  const units = ["B", "kB", "MB", "GB", "TB"];
+  let size = value;
+  let unit = 0;
+  while (size >= 1000 && unit < units.length - 1) {
+    size /= 1000;
+    unit += 1;
+  }
+  return `${unit === 0 ? size : size.toFixed(1)} ${units[unit]}`;
+}

frontend/js/tests/unit.js

@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ function jsonResponse(status, body) {
 const tick = (ms = 0) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
 
 async function run() {
+  // The client fetches its CSRF token once, lazily (US07-02). Do that against the
+  // real server first, so the stubbed fetch below only ever sees the call under test.
+  await api.workflow().catch(() => {});
+
   // ── store ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
   {
     const store = createStore({ n: 0 });

frontend/js/uploads.js

@@ -0,0 +1,704 @@
+// Upload view (US05-05): preflight a scope, confirm exactly what will be sent,
+// watch the batch run, and resolve whatever the uploader left uncertain.
+//
+// Two rules shape this file. First, nothing here decides what is safe: blockers,
+// the preflight token, and the retry policy all come from the server, and an action
+// the server would refuse is not offered at all. Second, the API key never reaches
+// the browser — preflight reports only that one is configured, and every command
+// preview arrives redacted — so nothing in this view may reconstruct, store, or
+// route a secret.
+import { api } from "./api.js";
+import { el, errorBanner, setActiveNav } from "./dom.js";
+import { subscribeJob } from "./events.js";
+import { navigate } from "./router.js";
+
+// Result of the last command issued from this tab, and the activity of the last
+// upload job. Deliberately not persisted: after a reload the page must show what
+// the server says happened, not what this page remembers.
+let outcome = null;
+let activity = [];
+
+let render = () => {};
+export function setUploadsRender(fn) {
+  render = fn;
+}
+
+// Report outcomes (services/upload_reports.py) in the words the operator uses.
+const OUTCOME_LABEL = [
+  ["uploaded", "new"],
+  ["upgraded", "upgraded"],
+  ["duplicate", "duplicate"],
+  ["skipped", "skipped"],
+  ["failed", "failed"],
+  ["unknown", "uncertain"],
+];
+
+export async function renderUploads(root, params = {}) {
+  setActiveNav("uploads");
+  const albums = parseAlbums(params.albums);
+  const allowPartial = params.partial === "1";
+
+  let preflight, listed;
+  try {
+    [preflight, listed] = await Promise.all([
+      api.uploadPreflight({ albums, allow_partial: allowPartial }),
+      api.listUploadBatches(),
+    ]);
+  } catch (error) {
+    root.replaceChildren(errorBanner(`Failed to load uploads: ${error.message}`));
+    return;
+  }
+
+  const batches = listed.batches;
+  const selectedId = params.batch || (batches.length ? batches[batches.length - 1].id : null);
+  let batch = null;
+  let history = [];
+  if (selectedId) {
+    try {
+      const [detail, verifications] = await Promise.all([
+        api.getUploadBatch(selectedId),
+        api.uploadVerifications(selectedId),
+      ]);
+      batch = detail;
+      history = verifications.verifications;
+    } catch (error) {
+      root.replaceChildren(errorBanner(`Failed to load upload batch: ${error.message}`));
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+
+  root.replaceChildren(
+    ...[
+      el("h1", {}, "Upload"),
+      configurationCard(preflight),
+      preflightBlockers(preflight),
+      scopeSection(preflight, params, albums, allowPartial),
+      confirmBlock(preflight, params, allowPartial),
+      outcomeBanner(),
+      activityLog(),
+      batchList(batches, selectedId),
+      batch ? batchDetail(batch, history) : null,
+    ].filter(Boolean)
+  );
+}
+
+// Album names can contain commas, so each one is escaped before the URL joins them.
+function parseAlbums(value) {
+  if (!value) return null;
+  const names = value.split(",").filter(Boolean).map(decodeURIComponent);
+  return names.length ? names : null;
+}
+
+function albumsParam(names) {
+  return names.map(encodeURIComponent).join(",");
+}
+
+// ── configuration ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// What the upload is aimed at, in the only form the browser is ever given: the
+// server URL, whether a key exists, and the uploader's version.
+function configurationCard(preflight) {
+  const credentials = preflight.credentials;
+  const uploader = preflight.uploader;
+  return el(
+    "div",
+    { class: "card", "data-testid": "upload-config" },
+    el("h2", {}, "Configuration"),
+    el(
+      "dl",
+      {},
+      el("dt", {}, "Immich server"),
+      el("dd", { "data-testid": "config-server" }, credentials.server_url || "not configured"),
+      el("dt", {}, "API key"),
+      // Presence, never the value — and never a length or prefix either.
+      el(
+        "dd",
+        { "data-testid": "config-key" },
+        credentials.api_key_configured ? "configured (never shown)" : "missing"
+      ),
+      el("dt", {}, "Reachable"),
+      el(
+        "dd",
+        { "data-testid": "config-reachable" },
+        preflight.server.reachable ? "yes" : `no — ${preflight.server.detail || "unknown"}`
+      ),
+      el("dt", {}, "Uploader"),
+      el(
+        "dd",
+        { "data-testid": "config-uploader" },
+        uploader.installed ? uploader.version || "installed" : `${uploader.binary} is not installed`
+      )
+    )
+  );
+}
+
+function preflightBlockers(preflight) {
+  if (!preflight.blockers.length) return null;
+  return el(
+    "div",
+    { class: "alert", role: "alert", "data-testid": "preflight-blockers" },
+    el("strong", {}, "This scope cannot be uploaded yet"),
+    el(
+      "ul",
+      {},
+      ...preflight.blockers.map((blocker) =>
+        el(
+          "li",
+          { "data-testid": "preflight-blocker", "data-code": blocker.code },
+          `${blocker.code}: ${blocker.message}`
+        )
+      )
+    )
+  );
+}
+
+// ── scope ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function scopeSection(preflight, params, albums, allowPartial) {
+  const selected = new Set(albums || preflight.albums.map((album) => album.album));
+
+  function toggle(name, checked) {
+    const next = new Set(selected);
+    if (checked) next.add(name);
+    else next.delete(name);
+    // An empty selection means "everything" again, which is also what an absent
+    // parameter means — there is no way to preflight nothing.
+    navigate("/uploads", { ...params, albums: albumsParam([...next]), batch: params.batch });
+  }
+
+  const rows = preflight.albums.map((album) =>
+    el(
+      "tr",
+      { "data-testid": "album-row", "data-album": album.album },
+      el(
+        "td",
+        {},
+        el("input", {
+          type: "checkbox",
+          "data-testid": "album-selected",
+          "aria-label": `Include ${album.album}`,
+          checked: selected.has(album.album) ? "checked" : false,
+          onchange: (event) => toggle(album.album, event.target.checked),
+        })
+      ),
+      el("td", { "data-testid": "album-name" }, album.album),
+      // What Immich will call it, which is not always what the folder is called here.
+      el("td", { "data-testid": "album-immich-name" }, album.album_name),
+      el("td", { class: "path", "data-testid": "album-folder" }, album.folder),
+      el("td", { "data-testid": "album-eligible" }, String(album.eligible_count)),
+      el("td", { "data-testid": "album-blocked" }, String(album.blocked_count)),
+      el(
+        "td",
+        {},
+        el("span", { class: `badge ${album.state}`, "data-testid": "album-state" }, album.state),
+        ...album.blockers.map((blocker) =>
+          el(
+            "div",
+            { class: "blocker", "data-testid": "album-blocker", "data-code": blocker.code },
+            blocker.message
+          )
+        )
+      ),
+      // The exact invocation, as the server built it. Shown so the upload holds no
+      // surprises; the key is masked at the source, not here.
+      el("td", { class: "path", "data-testid": "album-command" }, album.command_preview.join(" "))
+    )
+  );
+
+  const totals = preflight.totals;
+  return el(
+    "div",
+    { "data-testid": "upload-scope" },
+    el("h2", {}, "Scope"),
+    el(
+      "div",
+      { class: "decision-bar" },
+      el("span", { class: "badge", "data-testid": "total-albums" }, `${totals.albums} album(s)`),
+      el("span", { class: "badge", "data-testid": "total-eligible" }, `${totals.eligible} ready`),
+      totals.blocked
+        ? el(
+            "span",
+            { class: "badge attention", "data-testid": "total-blocked" },
+            `${totals.blocked} blocked`
+          )
+        : null,
+      el(
+        "label",
+        {},
+        el("input", {
+          type: "checkbox",
+          "data-testid": "allow-partial",
+          checked: allowPartial ? "checked" : false,
+          onchange: (event) =>
+            navigate("/uploads", { ...params, partial: event.target.checked ? "1" : "" }),
+        }),
+        " Upload ready photos and leave the blocked ones behind"
+      )
+    ),
+    rows.length
+      ? el(
+          "table",
+          { class: "grid", "data-testid": "albums" },
+          el(
+            "thead",
+            {},
+            el(
+              "tr",
+              {},
+              ...["", "Album", "Immich album", "Folder", "Ready", "Blocked", "State", "Command"].map(
+                (label) => el("th", { scope: "col" }, label)
+              )
+            )
+          ),
+          el("tbody", {}, ...rows)
+        )
+      : el("p", { class: "muted", "data-testid": "no-albums" }, "No album is ready to upload.")
+  );
+}
+
+// ── confirmation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function confirmBlock(preflight, params, allowPartial) {
+  const ready = preflight.state === "ready";
+  const totals = preflight.totals;
+  const albums = preflight.albums.map((album) => album.album);
+  return el(
+    "div",
+    { class: "card", "data-testid": "confirm" },
+    el("h2", {}, "Confirm"),
+    // The token is shown, not merely sent: a confirmation the user cannot see is a
+    // confirmation they cannot check against the preview above.
+    el(
+      "p",
+      { class: "muted", "data-testid": "confirm-token" },
+      `Preflight ${preflight.token.slice(0, 20)}… · ${allowPartial ? "partial" : "complete"} scope`
+    ),
+    el(
+      "p",
+      { "data-testid": "upload-note" },
+      "Uploading is not reversible from here: Immich decides what to do with each " +
+        "file, and the app can only record what it reports. One album is sent at a " +
+        "time and a running album can be stopped."
+    ),
+    el(
+      "div",
+      { class: "toolbar" },
+      el(
+        "button",
+        {
+          class: "primary",
+          "data-testid": "start-upload",
+          disabled: ready ? false : "disabled",
+          title: ready ? false : "resolve the blockers above first",
+          onclick: () =>
+            run(async () => {
+              const created = await api.createUploadBatches({
+                albums,
+                token: preflight.token,
+                allow_partial: allowPartial,
+              });
+              // One lane: the first batch starts now, the rest wait with their own
+              // start buttons rather than queueing behind a lock that would reject
+              // them.
+              const first = created.batches.find((batch) => !batch.retry_blockers.length);
+              if (!first) return { batches: created.batches.length, started: null };
+              const started = await api.startUploadBatch(first.id);
+              watch(started.job.id, first.id);
+              return { batches: created.batches.length, started: first.album };
+            }),
+        },
+        `Upload ${totals.albums} album(s) · ${totals.eligible} photo(s)`
+      )
+    )
+  );
+}
+
+// ── batches ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function batchList(batches, selectedId) {
+  if (!batches.length) {
+    return el("p", { class: "muted", "data-testid": "no-batches" }, "No upload has been started yet.");
+  }
+  return el(
+    "div",
+    { "data-testid": "upload-batches" },
+    el("h2", {}, "Batches"),
+    el(
+      "table",
+      { class: "grid", "data-testid": "batches" },
+      el(
+        "thead",
+        {},
+        el(
+          "tr",
+          {},
+          ...["Album", "State", "Evidence", "Attempts", "Photos"].map((label) =>
+            el("th", { scope: "col" }, label)
+          )
+        )
+      ),
+      el(
+        "tbody",
+        {},
+        ...batches.map((batch) =>
+          el(
+            "tr",
+            {
+              "data-testid": "batch-row",
+              "data-album": batch.album,
+              "aria-current": batch.id === selectedId ? "true" : false,
+            },
+            el(
+              "td",
+              {},
+              el("a", { class: "link", href: `#/uploads?batch=${encodeURIComponent(batch.id)}` }, batch.album)
+            ),
+            el(
+              "td",
+              {},
+              el("span", { class: `badge ${batch.state}`, "data-testid": "batch-state" }, batch.state)
+            ),
+            el("td", { "data-testid": "batch-outcome-state" }, batch.outcome_state || "not parsed"),
+            el("td", {}, String(batch.attempt_count)),
+            el("td", {}, String(batch.asset_count))
+          )
+        )
+      )
+    )
+  );
+}
+
+function batchDetail(batch, history) {
+  // Derived from the items, not from the batch's parsed-report summary: verifying
+  // or resolving an item changes what is true without re-parsing a report, and the
+  // progress line must show the current answer rather than the uploader's old one.
+  const counts = {};
+  for (const item of batch.items) {
+    const key = item.outcome || "unknown";
+    counts[key] = (counts[key] || 0) + 1;
+  }
+  const blockers = batch.retry_blockers;
+  const uncertain = batch.outcome_state === "requires_verification" || counts.unknown > 0;
+
+  const nodes = [
+    el("h2", {}, `${batch.album} — attempt ${batch.attempt_count}`),
+    el(
+      "div",
+      { class: "decision-bar", "data-testid": "batch-progress" },
+      el("span", { class: `badge ${batch.state}`, "data-testid": "detail-state" }, batch.state),
+      ...OUTCOME_LABEL.map(([key, label]) =>
+        el(
+          "span",
+          { class: `badge ${key}`, "data-testid": `count-${label}` },
+          `${label}: ${counts[key] ?? 0}`
+        )
+      )
+    ),
+  ];
+
+  if (batch.stale_bytes) {
+    nodes.push(
+      el(
+        "div",
+        { class: "alert", role: "alert", "data-testid": "stale-bytes" },
+        "Files in this batch changed after they were uploaded. Immich still holds the " +
+          "bytes that were sent; re-approve the album through a fresh preflight rather " +
+          "than uploading the new bytes over it."
+      )
+    );
+  }
+  if (batch.error_code) {
+    nodes.push(
+      el(
+        "div",
+        { class: "alert", role: "alert", "data-testid": "batch-error" },
+        `${batch.error_code}: ${batch.error_message || ""}`
+      )
+    );
+  }
+  if (uncertain) {
+    nodes.push(
+      el(
+        "div",
+        { class: "alert", role: "alert", "data-testid": "uncertain" },
+        el("strong", {}, "This upload's outcome is not fully known"),
+        el(
+          "p",
+          {},
+          "The uploader's report does not account for every file. Retrying could create " +
+            "a second copy of something Immich already accepted, so verify it first: the " +
+            "check asks Immich whether it holds the exact bytes that were sent."
+        )
+      )
+    );
+  }
+
+  nodes.push(
+    el(
+      "div",
+      { class: "toolbar" },
+      // A start button exists only when the server would accept one. An uncertain
+      // outcome and changed bytes therefore offer verification, never a retry.
+      blockers.length
+        ? el(
+            "div",
+            { class: "blocker", "data-testid": "retry-blocked" },
+            blockers.map((blocker) => `${blocker.code}: ${blocker.message}`).join("; ")
+          )
+        : el(
+            "button",
+            {
+              class: "primary",
+              "data-testid": "start-batch",
+              onclick: () =>
+                run(async () => {
+                  const started = await api.startUploadBatch(batch.id);
+                  watch(started.job.id, batch.id);
+                  return { started: batch.album };
+                }),
+            },
+            batch.attempt_count ? "Run this album again" : "Upload this album"
+          ),
+      ["planned", "running"].includes(batch.state)
+        ? el(
+            "button",
+            {
+              "data-testid": "cancel-batch",
+              onclick: () => run(() => api.cancelUploadBatch(batch.id)),
+            },
+            batch.state === "running" ? "Stop after the current file" : "Cancel this album"
+          )
+        : null,
+      // Offered for anything that has run, not only for uncertain outcomes:
+      // re-checking is read-only and idempotent, and it is how a file edited after
+      // its upload is discovered.
+      batch.attempt_count
+        ? el(
+            "button",
+            {
+              "data-testid": "verify-batch",
+              onclick: () => run(() => api.verifyUploadBatch(batch.id)),
+            },
+            "Verify against Immich"
+          )
+        : null
+    ),
+    itemsTable(batch)
+  );
+  if (history.length) nodes.push(historyList(history));
+  return el(
+    "div",
+    { class: "card", "data-testid": "batch-detail", "data-batch": batch.id },
+    ...nodes
+  );
+}
+
+function itemsTable(batch) {
+  if (!batch.items.length) {
+    return el("p", { class: "muted", "data-testid": "no-items" }, "This batch has no photos.");
+  }
+  return el(
+    "table",
+    { class: "grid", "data-testid": "items" },
+    el(
+      "thead",
+      {},
+      el(
+        "tr",
+        {},
+        ...["Photo", "Outcome", "Evidence", "Verification", "Bytes now", "Resolve"].map((label) =>
+          el("th", { scope: "col" }, label)
+        )
+      )
+    ),
+    el(
+      "tbody",
+      {},
+      ...batch.items.map((item) =>
+        el(
+          "tr",
+          { "data-testid": "item-row", "data-asset-id": item.asset_id },
+          el("td", { class: "path", "data-testid": "item-path" }, item.path),
+          el(
+            "td",
+            {},
+            el(
+              "span",
+              { class: `badge ${item.outcome || ""}`, "data-testid": "item-outcome" },
+              item.outcome === "uploaded" ? "new" : item.outcome || "pending"
+            )
+          ),
+          el("td", { class: "muted", "data-testid": "item-evidence" }, item.evidence || "—"),
+          el("td", { "data-testid": "item-verification" }, item.verification || "—"),
+          el(
+            "td",
+            {},
+            item.changed_after_upload
+              ? el("span", { class: "badge attention", "data-testid": "item-changed" }, "changed")
+              : el("span", { class: "muted" }, "unchanged")
+          ),
+          el("td", {}, resolveForm(batch, item))
+        )
+      )
+    )
+  );
+}
+
+// Manual resolution is evidence, not permission: the note and the author are
+// required by the server, so the form collects both and offers no default.
+function resolveForm(batch, item) {
+  const unresolved = !item.outcome || item.outcome === "unknown" || item.verification === "inconclusive";
+  if (!unresolved) return el("span", { class: "muted" }, "—");
+
+  const outcomeSelect = el(
+    "select",
+    { "data-testid": "resolve-outcome", "aria-label": `Outcome for ${item.path}` },
+    ...OUTCOME_LABEL.map(([key, label]) => el("option", { value: key }, label))
+  );
+  const evidence = el("input", {
+    type: "text",
+    "data-testid": "resolve-evidence",
+    "aria-label": `What you checked for ${item.path}`,
+    placeholder: "What did you check?",
+  });
+  const actor = el("input", {
+    type: "text",
+    "data-testid": "resolve-actor",
+    "aria-label": `Who checked ${item.path}`,
+    placeholder: "Who are you?",
+  });
+  return el(
+    "div",
+    { class: "toolbar" },
+    outcomeSelect,
+    evidence,
+    actor,
+    el(
+      "button",
+      {
+        "data-testid": "resolve-item",
+        onclick: () =>
+          run(() =>
+            api.resolveUploadItem(batch.id, {
+              asset_id: item.asset_id,
+              outcome: outcomeSelect.value,
+              evidence: evidence.value,
+              actor: actor.value,
+            })
+          ),
+      },
+      "Record"
+    )
+  );
+}
+
+function historyList(history) {
+  return el(
+    "div",
+    { "data-testid": "verification-history" },
+    el("h3", {}, "Verification history"),
+    el(
+      "ul",
+      {},
+      ...history.map((entry) =>
+        el(
+          "li",
+          { "data-testid": "history-entry", "data-source": entry.source },
+          `${entry.created_at || ""} · ${entry.action} · ${entry.source} · ${entry.result} → ` +
+            `${entry.outcome || "unresolved"} — ${entry.evidence}` +
+            (entry.actor ? ` (${entry.actor})` : "")
+        )
+      )
+    )
+  );
+}
+
+// ── running commands ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+async function run(action) {
+  try {
+    outcome = { kind: "ok", result: await action() };
+  } catch (error) {
+    outcome = error.status === 409 ? { kind: "conflict", error } : { kind: "error", error };
+  }
+  render();
+}
+
+// Live job activity. Events are appended to the log node and the running batch's
+// panel is refreshed on its own tick — the uploader reports per file, not per job
+// event, so waiting for the next event would leave the panel behind. Only that
+// panel is rebuilt: a full re-render would re-run preflight, which re-hashes the
+// library, so that happens once when the job ends.
+const REFRESH_MS = 1000;
+
+function watch(jobId, batchId) {
+  activity = [`Started upload job ${jobId}`];
+  const tick = setInterval(() => refreshBatch(batchId), REFRESH_MS);
+  subscribeJob(jobId, {
+    onEvent: (event) => {
+      activity.push(`${event.type}${event.message ? ": " + event.message : ""}`);
+      const log = document.querySelector('[data-testid="upload-activity"]');
+      if (log) log.textContent = activity.join("\n");
+    },
+    onDone: () => {
+      clearInterval(tick);
+      activity.push("done");
+      render();
+    },
+  });
+}
+
+async function refreshBatch(batchId) {
+  const node = document.querySelector(`[data-testid="batch-detail"][data-batch="${batchId}"]`);
+  if (!node) return; // the user navigated away from the running batch
+  try {
+    const [batch, verifications] = await Promise.all([
+      api.getUploadBatch(batchId),
+      api.uploadVerifications(batchId),
+    ]);
+    node.replaceWith(batchDetail(batch, verifications.verifications));
+  } catch (_) {
+    // Transient: the next tick tries again, and the job's end re-renders anyway.
+  }
+}
+
+function activityLog() {
+  return el(
+    "pre",
+    {
+      class: "activity-log",
+      role: "status",
+      "aria-live": "polite",
+      "data-testid": "upload-activity",
+    },
+    activity.join("\n")
+  );
+}
+
+function outcomeBanner() {
+  if (!outcome) return null;
+  if (outcome.kind === "conflict") {
+    return el(
+      "div",
+      { class: "alert", role: "alert", "data-testid": "conflict" },
+      `The server refused this: ${outcome.error.message}. Nothing was uploaded; the ` +
+        "state below is the server's current one — review it and decide again."
+    );
+  }
+  if (outcome.kind === "error") {
+    return el(
+      "div",
+      { class: "alert", role: "alert", "data-testid": "upload-error" },
+      `Failed: ${outcome.error.message}`
+    );
+  }
+  const result = outcome.result;
+  if (result && result.batches !== undefined) {
+    return el(
+      "div",
+      { class: "alert", role: "status", "data-testid": "upload-result" },
+      `Approved ${result.batches} album batch(es).` +
+        (result.started ? ` Uploading ${result.started} now.` : " Nothing could be started yet.")
+    );
+  }
+  return el(
+    "div",
+    { class: "alert", role: "status", "data-testid": "upload-result" },
+    "Done — the state below is the server's."
+  );
+}

legacy_cli_archive/CHECKSUMS.sha256

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+d098bbde13d2ebc872ca781e244cc1e48b97cc551fedaca3251d6a5278a15234  src/compare_models.py
+7d0f68cb95fbd6603e4c558620098b46929ebdb6fd91a598bbf84f26eea35e6c  src/nsfw_tag.py
+35329c53570e215cef15f59429c1a5251a0448b90522b0910ab9d68efe1bc307  src/nsfwtag/__init__.py
+7f52b55e4f3b77eda3657d7cd2272c7cca8422100e241671de495603c1126ee2  src/nsfwtag/__main__.py
+6f5a97114e0d87d272ce22d065dc31fa0dd72ff8590d11ad14cb1c1f486d339c  src/nsfwtag/bench.py
+29498fac1d73ba2b7420ffe1ffe49a87f684ec299e2c3b9c6e14e63e95643ba4  src/nsfwtag/exif.py
+934e82c402813ebf503e5a20eb03d5103f84df13117bc4dd1fd95deaa01ab263  src/nsfwtag/README.md
+68125e6184c7e4d2a5b0153f2155675753ab0b1329d1dbc4933d4769492ec4be  src/nsfwtag/review.html
+a597eab74803dd31452b5d70abf7d6d6320eb17a61596c891b009da15d624e98  src/nsfwtag/scoring.py
+674969a18e58ee511a2abf574a875db92f2f524769b1b614d0d3662ab879a709  src/nsfwtag/server.py
+24a7c8d029da6e97d46b110a9fe9dbb3900127f8ae3c142f634fdd91d6c45243  src/nsfwtag/webapp.py
+2c2ea558f1b9095c1150f078ea29c8e0f180cc045a9d1097b83f61bfb145295b  src/photo_analyzer.py
+5fb7ce2f977a17da1f501c45d7985328318ae14298a3f347eab46a6e3f02aab3  src/test_dedup.py
+1673dc76cc60aba56a5b065d9bc9f5dda00342cf2a79d000a3f74686fb7cffec  src/test_nsfw_skip.py
+55aa82f348e0e90be0163ba6aa278e5fc8e445996e5335774917e5ef59ad3563  src/webapp/__init__.py
+ba4342bd0175591a2121f063f14a78a602d5679bcfcf24aa14c8d4b8cd5da1a2  src/webapp/__main__.py
+a60f24035a989909467778f888d62854c1afc2702f47b8d3cca32bf3cf04d5cf  src/webapp/analyzer.html
+018bcc2f770d716444b456db58d6b4a41800138a98598b3c27ba503ab22d939e  src/webapp/page.py
+5f599b107b2b117ca118b6fbdec5e5786a9ab4eea424aa9af1bfea7bf87cebab  src/webapp/query.py
+875cce697caa02717c85a2707ba935c46dd9ace18428fd4abb13105b7a8e24d9  src/webapp/README.md
+af7d0d72d245b4bbb1e0e30f9708239697543212d4171defd1bfe26dd24a4f05  src/webapp/runner.py
+cddf0555b06fe7e4daa14309baaaf91130f8506922cb0ffb6507d76cbe39add4  src/webapp/server.py

legacy_cli_archive/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+# Legacy CLI archive (US07-01)
+
+Frozen, read-only sources of the command-line tools this application was extracted
+from. They are **reference material and rollback evidence** — provenance for
+behavior that now lives in `photo_pipeline/`, and the only way to answer "what did
+the original actually do?" once the replacement has drifted.
+
+> **Nothing here is production code.** No module under `photo_pipeline/` imports or
+> executes anything in this directory, and this directory is not on the application's
+> import path. `tests/unit/test_legacy_archive.py` enforces both, along with the
+> checksums and the redaction below.
+
+## What is here
+
+| Path | Role |
+|---|---|
+| `src/photo_analyzer.py` | the analysis CLI: discovery, hashing/dedup, vision analysis, EXIF writing, SQLite schema, album naming |
+| `src/nsfwtag/` | NSFW scoring, EXIF safety keywords, and the review server (`__init__` 1.1.0) |
+| `src/webapp/` | the stdlib review web app: FTS search, stats, subprocess runner, HTML shell (`__init__` 0.1.0) |
+| `src/nsfw_tag.py` | thin backwards-compatible entry point for `nsfwtag` |
+| `src/compare_models.py` | dev-only model comparison script |
+| `src/test_dedup.py`, `src/test_nsfw_skip.py` | the CLIs' own standalone self-checks (never pytest suites) |
+| `donor_ledger.yaml` | the donor ledger: every migrated behavior, its target, its tests, and every intentional delta |
+| `requirements-lock.txt` | the dependency versions the frozen sources were last verified against |
+| `photo_analyzer.env.sample` | the CLI's configuration surface, with every value replaced by a placeholder |
+| `CHECKSUMS.sha256` | SHA-256 of every archived source file |
+
+`photo_analyzer.py` carries no `__version__`; its identity is its checksum, recorded
+in `CHECKSUMS.sha256` and taken at commit `9b7ee6b` (the merge of US06-06, the last
+commit before archival).
+
+## Verifying the archive
+
+```bash
+cd legacy_cli_archive && shasum -a 256 -c CHECKSUMS.sha256
+```
+
+Any edit to an archived source must be accompanied by a regenerated checksum file
+and a note here explaining why a *frozen* archive changed — the normal answer being
+that it should not.
+
+## Schema notes
+
+`photo_analyzer.py` owned a path-keyed SQLite database (`SCHEMA`, near the top of the
+file):
+
+- `photos(id, path UNIQUE, status, phash, file_sha1, dup_of, description, tags,
+  people_count, setting, time_of_day, season, mood, location_hint, approx_year,
+  raw_response, error_message, analyzed_at, exif_written_at)`;
+- `photos_fts` — an FTS5 external-content index over `path, description, tags, mood,
+  location_hint`, kept in sync by insert/update/delete triggers;
+- late columns (`phash`, `file_sha1`, `dup_of`) were added by an in-code
+  `_migrate_schema()` rather than a migration tool, and their indexes are created
+  only after the `ALTER`.
+
+The replacement keeps the same analysis fields but re-keys everything to a stable
+`assets.id` (Alembic migrations `0001`…), because a path is not an identity: the
+donor's `path UNIQUE` is exactly what broke on every move and rename.
+
+`nsfwtag` kept its safety scores outside the database in `nsfw_scores.csv`
+(`path,nsfw_score`, four decimals, unreadable rows dropped). That file is no longer a
+source of truth; `photo_pipeline/services/legacy_import.py` imports it into
+`assets.safety_score` and reports exactly what matched, what did not, and why.
+
+## Redaction
+
+The archive contains no credentials. `photo_analyzer.env.sample` documents the
+configuration surface (`LLM_API_KEY`, `LLM_BASE_URL`, `LLM_MODEL`, and the tuning
+variables) with placeholder values only; the CLI itself never contained a key, it
+read one from `photo_analyzer.env` or the environment. No `.env`, database, log, CSV,
+or photo from the author's library is archived.
+
+## Why these tools were retired
+
+Each behavior's fate is recorded per row in `donor_ledger.yaml`: `reuse`, `extract`,
+`refactor`, or `replace`, with the target module, the characterization tests that
+pinned the donor's behavior, the parity tests the replacement passes, and — where the
+replacement deliberately does something else or nothing at all — a `delta` saying so.
+Rows still marked `pending` name the backlog story that will resolve them; they are
+the honest list of what has *not* been carried over yet.

legacy_cli_archive/donor_ledger.yaml

@@ -12,7 +12,15 @@
 #                            (if anything) carries over
 # Every row needs either `tests` (existing test IDs, module::function) or
 # `pending_story` (the backlog story that will characterize/deliver it).
-# status: characterized | pending
+# status: characterized — donor behavior pinned by characterization tests
+#         resolved      — replacement shipped; `parity` names the tests that prove
+#                         it, and `delta` states every intentional difference
+#         pending       — not migrated yet; `pending_story` says which story will
+# parity: test ids (path::function) in any suite, proving the replacement
+# delta:  what the replacement deliberately does differently, or not at all
+#
+# Archived by US07-01: the sources referenced below now live beside this file in
+# src/ and are frozen (see README.md). Nothing in photo_pipeline imports them.
 
 rows:
   # ── photo_analyzer.py ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -80,8 +88,12 @@ rows:
       Copying a primary's analysis into variant rows survives, but keyed by
       asset_id and recorded as stage state instead of raw row copies.
     target: photo_pipeline/services/duplicates.py
-    pending_story: US01-04
-    status: pending
+    parity:
+      - tests/integration/test_duplicate_engine.py::test_exact_copies_form_auto_decided_cluster
+      - tests/integration/test_duplicate_engine.py::test_perceptual_variant_is_review_only
+    delta: >
+      The donor propagated variant links implicitly while writing rows; the replacement makes the canonical link a reviewable, reversible cluster decision, so a propagated link can always be undone.
+    status: resolved
 
   - id: pa-hashing
     area: hashing
@@ -141,8 +153,12 @@ rows:
     classification: replace
     rationale: Console report; superseded by the duplicate-review API/UI (US01-06).
     target: photo_pipeline/api/routes + frontend duplicate review
-    pending_story: US01-06
-    status: pending
+    parity:
+      - tests/integration/test_review_api.py::test_clusters_list_and_detail
+      - tests/e2e/test_review_ui.py::test_fuzzy_decision_requires_confirmation
+    delta: >
+      The text listing became the paged cluster API and the comparison UI; no textual report is produced.
+    status: resolved
 
   - id: pa-reconcile
     area: database
@@ -202,7 +218,7 @@ rows:
       RGB-normalize (drops alpha, converts HEIC), LANCZOS resize to 2048px
       long-edge, JPEG q85 base64 — the provider-input contract. Truncated-image
       tolerance (ImageFile.LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES) carries with it.
-    target: photo_pipeline/integrations/vision.py
+    target: photo_pipeline/services/analysis.py
     tests:
       - test_pa_imaging::test_prepare_image_small_passthrough_jpeg
       - test_pa_imaging::test_prepare_image_resizes_to_max_long_edge
@@ -230,9 +246,12 @@ rows:
       response validation, 429/503 retry with exponential backoff. Prompt and
       model/config version must be persisted per analysis_runs. Characterized
       against a deterministic fake provider when the analysis service is ported.
-    target: photo_pipeline/integrations/vision.py
-    pending_story: US02-06
-    status: pending
+    target: photo_pipeline/services/analysis.py
+    parity:
+      - tests/integration/test_safety_analysis.py::test_provider_called_only_for_confirmed_sfw
+    delta: >
+      The prompt and response schema carry over; the provider is an injected adapter so the privacy gate is testable, and results are keyed to asset ids rather than paths.
+    status: resolved
 
   - id: pa-throttle
     area: logging
@@ -241,8 +260,8 @@ rows:
     rationale: >
       Rolling throttle window + persistent throttle_events.jsonl + RPD day
       counter become job metrics/events on the durable job model.
-    target: photo_pipeline/jobs/coordinator.py
-    pending_story: US02-02
+    target: photo_pipeline/services/jobs.py + photo_pipeline/services/analysis.py
+    pending_story: US07-04
     status: pending
 
   - id: pa-nsfw-filter
@@ -312,8 +331,12 @@ rows:
       checked between items, double-SIGINT force quit — becomes the durable
       JobRunner worker loop with the same drain-and-resume semantics.
     target: photo_pipeline/jobs/worker.py
-    pending_story: US02-02
-    status: pending
+    parity:
+      - tests/integration/test_worker.py::test_worker_processes_all_items
+      - tests/integration/test_worker.py::test_cooperative_cancellation_leaves_items_resumable
+    delta: >
+      The in-process folder loop with SIGINT handling became durable jobs claimed by a worker: cancellation is a persisted request, not a signal, and an interrupted run resumes from the database instead of restarting.
+    status: resolved
 
   - id: pa-ui-terminal
     area: ui
@@ -371,8 +394,12 @@ rows:
       the JSONL history logger become structured JSON logging with job_id/
       asset_id and job_events rows; per-photo history maps to job events.
     target: photo_pipeline structured logging + jobs/job_events
-    pending_story: US02-02
-    status: pending
+    parity:
+      - tests/integration/test_jobs.py::test_enqueue_persists_items_and_event
+      - tests/integration/test_jobs_sse.py::test_sse_streams_all_events_then_closes
+    delta: >
+      The JSONL history file and rich console handler are replaced by structured JSON logs plus durable job_events; the browser reads events over SSE rather than tailing a file.
+    status: resolved
 
   - id: pa-balance
     area: vision
@@ -382,8 +409,11 @@ rows:
       Provider balance/quota probes (report 'unsupported' on providers without
       the endpoint). Network-bound; characterized against the fake provider.
     target: photo_pipeline/services/analysis.py
-    pending_story: US02-06
-    status: pending
+    parity:
+      - tests/integration/test_safety_analysis.py::test_provider_called_only_for_confirmed_sfw
+    delta: >
+      Not carried over: balance/quota polling was provider-specific (Gemini/OpenAI billing endpoints) and key-scoped. Cost reporting, when a story asks for it, comes from the per-run usage recorded with each analysis result rather than from a vendor endpoint.
+    status: resolved
 
   - id: pa-cli
     area: configuration
@@ -393,9 +423,13 @@ rows:
       argparse surface is superseded by the API; flags map to job configs
       (documented in WEBAPP_CONCEPT.md §8 parity table). Transitional CLI calls
       the shared services until archival (E07).
-    target: photo_pipeline/api + transitional CLI
-    pending_story: US07-01
-    status: pending
+    target: photo_pipeline/__main__.py (serve | worker | migrate | import-legacy-scores) + /api/v1
+    parity:
+      - tests/integration/test_app_lifecycle.py::test_restart_preserves_data_and_reruns_migrations
+      - tests/unit/test_legacy_archive.py::test_production_code_never_imports_an_archived_module
+    delta: >
+      The argparse surface is not reproduced. Every flag that drove work became an API command or a job configuration; the CLI keeps only what an application needs to be operated (serve, worker, migrate) plus the one-off legacy CSV import.
+    status: resolved
 
   # ── nsfwtag/ ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
   - id: nt-discovery
@@ -422,9 +456,17 @@ rows:
       nsfw_scores.csv stops being the source of truth (concept: DB state).
       Format characterized (4-decimal scores, bad rows dropped) because the
       existing CSV must migrate into assets.safety_score.
-    target: photo_pipeline/repositories (safety), CSV import in US01-02 migration
+    target: photo_pipeline/services/legacy_import.py (one-off import into safety_reviews)
     tests: [test_nsfwtag::test_score_cache_roundtrip_and_tolerance]
-    status: characterized
+    parity:
+      - tests/integration/test_legacy_import.py::test_scores_are_imported_onto_asset_identity
+      - tests/integration/test_legacy_import.py::test_a_reviewed_asset_is_never_overwritten_by_the_csv
+    delta: >
+      The CSV is no longer read at runtime at all: it is imported once into
+      scored-but-unreviewed safety_reviews rows and left on disk untouched. A path
+      that matches nothing is reported, never turned into an asset, and a human
+      decision always outranks an imported score.
+    status: resolved
 
   - id: nt-score-model
     area: nsfw
@@ -438,6 +480,13 @@ rows:
       inference path needs the local model + deterministic fake.
     target: photo_pipeline/integrations/nsfw_model.py
     tests: [test_nsfwtag::test_score_images_cache_hit_skips_model]
+    delta: >
+      The donor set Pillow's process-global ImageFile.LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES so a
+      partially downloaded file still scored. Here the same process also hashes
+      files and renders previews, and those must keep refusing a truncated file
+      rather than silently working on half of one; scoring opens images through
+      the bounded photo_pipeline.imaging door instead and skips the ones it cannot
+      read, leaving them unscored and visibly undecided (US07-03).
     status: characterized
 
   - id: nt-exif-keyword
@@ -485,8 +534,11 @@ rows:
       Newline-list bulk tagging (nsfw_confirmed.txt flow) is superseded by DB
       review decisions; the existing list is a one-time migration input.
     target: photo_pipeline/services/safety.py (decision import in US01-02)
-    pending_story: US01-02
-    status: pending
+    parity:
+      - tests/integration/test_safety_parity.py::test_extracted_marks_and_partition_match_donor
+    delta: >
+      Bulk keyword application from a file list is replaced by decisions against asset ids; the EXIF write itself is the extracted, read-back-verified one.
+    status: resolved
 
   - id: nt-ui
     area: ui
@@ -498,8 +550,11 @@ rows:
       threshold/score review flow, lightbox and keyboard model are the frontend
       donor for the Safety view (preserved per concept §10; ported in US02-01).
     target: photo_pipeline/api + frontend Safety view
-    pending_story: US02-01
-    status: pending
+    parity:
+      - tests/e2e/test_workflow_views.py::test_safety_review_decide_persists_across_reload
+    delta: >
+      The stdlib review server is replaced by the API plus the Safety view; the donor's layout, thresholds, and keyboard flow carry over, its embedded HTML generation does not.
+    status: resolved
 
   - id: nt-bench
     area: nsfw
@@ -509,8 +564,11 @@ rows:
       Dev-only model benchmark; archived without webapp replacement (recorded
       basis of the AdamCodd model choice). No production caller.
     target: none (archive as reference)
-    pending_story: US07-01
-    status: pending
+    parity:
+      - tests/unit/test_legacy_archive.py::test_every_archived_source_matches_its_checksum
+    delta: >
+      No replacement: a dev-only benchmark whose result (the AdamCodd model choice) is already recorded. Kept in the archive as the basis of that choice.
+    status: resolved
 
   # ── webapp/ ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
   - id: wa-query-search
@@ -579,9 +637,13 @@ rows:
       Subprocess-driving-the-CLI job control is superseded by durable DB jobs
       with a worker process. Two ideas carry over: progress derived from DB
       counts (not job-private state) and single-mutating-job enforcement.
-    target: photo_pipeline/jobs/coordinator.py
-    pending_story: US02-02
-    status: pending
+    target: photo_pipeline/services/jobs.py + photo_pipeline/jobs/worker.py
+    parity:
+      - tests/integration/test_jobs.py::test_idempotency_key_returns_same_job
+      - tests/integration/test_worker.py::test_handler_failure_fails_the_job
+    delta: >
+      Subprocess supervision of a CLI is replaced by durable jobs in the same process family: there is no subprocess to supervise, and progress is persisted rather than scraped from stdout.
+    status: resolved
 
   - id: wa-server
     area: ui
@@ -593,5 +655,9 @@ rows:
       browser. analyzer.html + page.py design (dark OLED tokens, Library/
       Analyze/Stats views) is frontend donor material per concept §10.
     target: photo_pipeline/api/app.py + frontend
-    pending_story: US02-05
-    status: pending
+    parity:
+      - tests/e2e/test_frontend_shell.py::test_shell_loads_assets_without_console_or_network_errors
+      - tests/e2e/test_frontend_shell.py::test_deep_link_and_reload_restore_view_and_filters
+    delta: >
+      The stdlib HTTP routes become the versioned FastAPI API and the static frontend shell; Python no longer interpolates HTML.
+    status: resolved

legacy_cli_archive/photo_analyzer.env.sample

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# Sample configuration for the archived photo_analyzer.py CLI (US07-01).
+#
+# REDACTED: no value below is real. Each line names a variable the CLI read and
+# what belongs there; the placeholders are deliberately not key-shaped, so this
+# file can never be mistaken for — or scanned as — a credential.
+
+LLM_API_KEY=<paste your provider key here>
+LLM_BASE_URL=<provider base url, e.g. the OpenAI-compatible Gemini endpoint>
+LLM_MODEL=<model id, e.g. a Gemini Flash release>
+
+# Optional tuning the CLI read from the same file:
+PHASH_THRESHOLD=8
+MAX_WORKERS=4
+RETRY_ATTEMPTS=3
+RPD_LIMIT=0
+
+# The CLI ignored its own shipped placeholder (a literal "sk-REPLACE..." string)
+# until it was replaced, and a shell variable always won over this file.

legacy_cli_archive/requirements-lock.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Final dependency lock of the archived CLIs (US07-01).
+#
+# These are the versions present in the environment the archive was taken from —
+# what the frozen sources were last verified against by the characterization
+# suite. Restoring a donor for forensics means pinning these, not "latest".
+#
+# Python 3.14.6
+
+openai==3.0.0          # photo_analyzer: OpenAI-compatible vision client
+numpy==2.4.6           # photo_analyzer, nsfwtag: pixel work
+Pillow==12.3.0         # photo_analyzer, nsfwtag: decode/resize
+rich==15.0.0           # photo_analyzer: console output
+scipy==1.18.0          # photo_analyzer: perceptual-hash DCT
+PyYAML==6.0.3          # tooling that reads the donor ledger
+
+# NSFW inference (nsfwtag/scoring.py, nsfwtag/bench.py) was never installed in the
+# archiving environment; the model stack is recorded here from the sources so a
+# forensic run can reproduce it, not from a resolved lock:
+#   torch, transformers, timm  — AdamCodd/vit-base-nsfw-detector (see nsfwtag/README.md)
+# exiftool is an external binary, not a Python package.

migrations/versions/0008_upload_batches.py

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+"""Upload batches and their items (US05-02).
+
+Revision ID: 0008_upload_batches
+Revises: 0007_rename_plans
+Create Date: 2026-08-16
+
+One row per approved album folder handed to immich-go, plus the per-asset
+pre-upload hashes that later stories verify the result against.
+"""
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import op
+
+revision = "0008_upload_batches"
+down_revision = "0007_rename_plans"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    op.create_table(
+        "upload_batches",
+        sa.Column("id", sa.String(), primary_key=True),
+        sa.Column("album", sa.String(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("folder", sa.String(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("album_name", sa.String(), nullable=False),
+        # planned | running | cancelling | cancelled | succeeded | failed
+        # | unknown_requires_verification
+        sa.Column("state", sa.String(), nullable=False, server_default="planned"),
+        # Preflight token this batch was approved against; re-checked before every
+        # attempt, so changed bytes or decisions cannot be uploaded silently.
+        sa.Column("preflight_token", sa.String(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("allow_partial", sa.Boolean(), nullable=False, server_default="0"),
+        sa.Column("command", sa.String(), nullable=True),  # JSON array, redacted
+        sa.Column("uploader_version", sa.String(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("asset_count", sa.Integer(), nullable=False, server_default="0"),
+        sa.Column("attempt_count", sa.Integer(), nullable=False, server_default="0"),
+        # Bumped on every claim and used as the fencing token.
+        sa.Column("version", sa.Integer(), nullable=False, server_default="1"),
+        sa.Column("worker_id", sa.String(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("report_path", sa.String(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("report_bytes", sa.Integer(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("report_truncated", sa.Boolean(), nullable=False, server_default="0"),
+        sa.Column("exit_code", sa.Integer(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("error_code", sa.String(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("error_message", sa.String(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("started_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("finished_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column(
+            "created_at",
+            sa.DateTime(timezone=True),
+            nullable=False,
+            server_default=sa.text("CURRENT_TIMESTAMP"),
+        ),
+        sa.Column(
+            "updated_at",
+            sa.DateTime(timezone=True),
+            nullable=False,
+            server_default=sa.text("CURRENT_TIMESTAMP"),
+        ),
+    )
+    op.create_index("ix_upload_batches_album", "upload_batches", ["album"])
+    op.create_index("ix_upload_batches_state", "upload_batches", ["state"])
+
+    op.create_table(
+        "upload_items",
+        sa.Column(
+            "batch_id",
+            sa.String(),
+            sa.ForeignKey("upload_batches.id", ondelete="CASCADE"),
+            primary_key=True,
+        ),
+        sa.Column("asset_id", sa.String(), primary_key=True),
+        sa.Column("path", sa.String(), nullable=False),
+        # The bytes as they were when the batch was created; SHA-1 is what Immich
+        # uses to recognise a file it already holds.
+        sa.Column("sha256", sa.String(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("sha1", sa.String(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("state", sa.String(), nullable=False, server_default="pending"),
+        sa.Column(
+            "updated_at",
+            sa.DateTime(timezone=True),
+            nullable=False,
+            server_default=sa.text("CURRENT_TIMESTAMP"),
+        ),
+    )
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.drop_table("upload_items")
+    op.drop_table("upload_batches")

migrations/versions/0009_upload_report_outcomes.py

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+"""Parsed uploader outcomes (US05-03).
+
+Revision ID: 0009_upload_report_outcomes
+Revises: 0008_upload_batches
+Create Date: 2026-08-16
+
+Per-item outcomes parsed from the immich-go report plus the parser evidence that
+produced them, so "what did Immich do with this file?" survives a restart.
+"""
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import op
+
+revision = "0009_upload_report_outcomes"
+down_revision = "0008_upload_batches"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    # NULL parser = the uploader version has no pinned grammar; the batch is then
+    # requires_verification however the process exited.
+    op.add_column("upload_batches", sa.Column("parser", sa.String(), nullable=True))
+    op.add_column("upload_batches", sa.Column("parser_version", sa.Integer(), nullable=True))
+    op.add_column(
+        "upload_batches", sa.Column("parsed_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+    )
+    # verified | requires_verification
+    op.add_column("upload_batches", sa.Column("outcome_state", sa.String(), nullable=True))
+    op.add_column("upload_batches", sa.Column("outcome_counts", sa.String(), nullable=True))
+    op.add_column("upload_batches", sa.Column("report_counts", sa.String(), nullable=True))
+
+    # uploaded | upgraded | duplicate | skipped | failed | unknown
+    op.add_column("upload_items", sa.Column("outcome", sa.String(), nullable=True))
+    op.add_column("upload_items", sa.Column("evidence", sa.String(), nullable=True))
+    op.add_column(
+        "upload_items", sa.Column("outcome_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+    )
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    for column in ("outcome_at", "evidence", "outcome"):
+        op.drop_column("upload_items", column)
+    for column in (
+        "report_counts",
+        "outcome_counts",
+        "outcome_state",
+        "parsed_at",
+        "parser_version",
+        "parser",
+    ):
+        op.drop_column("upload_batches", column)

migrations/versions/0010_upload_verification.py

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+"""Upload verification and manual resolution (US05-04).
+
+Revision ID: 0010_upload_verification
+Revises: 0009_upload_report_outcomes
+Create Date: 2026-08-16
+
+Per-item server evidence plus the append-only history that produced it, so an
+uncertain upload can be resolved without ever guessing that it succeeded.
+"""
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import op
+
+revision = "0010_upload_verification"
+down_revision = "0009_upload_report_outcomes"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    op.add_column(
+        "upload_batches", sa.Column("verified_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+    )
+    # At least one uploaded file was edited afterwards: a visible warning that also
+    # blocks re-running the batch.
+    op.add_column(
+        "upload_batches",
+        sa.Column("stale_bytes", sa.Boolean(), nullable=False, server_default=sa.false()),
+    )
+
+    # present | absent | inconclusive | manual
+    op.add_column("upload_items", sa.Column("verification", sa.String(), nullable=True))
+    op.add_column(
+        "upload_items", sa.Column("verified_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+    )
+    op.add_column("upload_items", sa.Column("observed_sha256", sa.String(), nullable=True))
+    op.add_column(
+        "upload_items",
+        sa.Column("changed_after_upload", sa.Boolean(), nullable=False, server_default=sa.false()),
+    )
+
+    op.create_table(
+        "upload_verifications",
+        sa.Column("id", sa.String(), primary_key=True),
+        sa.Column(
+            "batch_id",
+            sa.String(),
+            sa.ForeignKey("upload_batches.id", ondelete="CASCADE"),
+            nullable=False,
+            index=True,
+        ),
+        sa.Column("asset_id", sa.String(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("action", sa.String(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("source", sa.String(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("result", sa.String(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("outcome", sa.String(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("evidence", sa.String(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("actor", sa.String(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column(
+            "created_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=sa.func.now()
+        ),
+    )
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.drop_table("upload_verifications")
+    for column in ("changed_after_upload", "observed_sha256", "verified_at", "verification"):
+        op.drop_column("upload_items", column)
+    for column in ("stale_bytes", "verified_at"):
+        op.drop_column("upload_batches", column)

migrations/versions/0011_archive_locations.py

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+"""Archive locations (US06-01).
+
+Revision ID: 0011_archive_locations
+Revises: 0010_upload_verification
+Create Date: 2026-08-16
+
+Configured archive destinations with their stable media identity, last probed
+capabilities, and state.
+"""
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import op
+
+revision = "0011_archive_locations"
+down_revision = "0010_upload_verification"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    op.create_table(
+        "archive_locations",
+        sa.Column("id", sa.String(), primary_key=True),
+        sa.Column("name", sa.String(), nullable=False, unique=True),
+        sa.Column("root", sa.String(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("media_id", sa.String(), nullable=False, unique=True),
+        sa.Column("capabilities", sa.String(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("state", sa.String(), nullable=False, server_default="offline"),
+        sa.Column("last_seen_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column(
+            "created_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=sa.func.now()
+        ),
+        sa.Column(
+            "updated_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=sa.func.now()
+        ),
+    )
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.drop_table("archive_locations")

migrations/versions/0012_archive_plans.py

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+"""Archive plans, per-item transfer journal, and archived asset location (US06-02).
+
+Revision ID: 0012_archive_plans
+Revises: 0011_archive_locations
+Create Date: 2026-08-16
+
+The journal is what makes removing an original recoverable: every item records its
+source, destination, expected hash, and the state it had reached before the process
+died. Assets gain the archive location and relative path so an offline original is
+still explained rather than looking missing.
+"""
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import op
+
+revision = "0012_archive_plans"
+down_revision = "0011_archive_locations"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    op.create_table(
+        "archive_plans",
+        sa.Column("id", sa.String(), primary_key=True),
+        sa.Column(
+            "location_id",
+            sa.String(),
+            sa.ForeignKey("archive_locations.id"),
+            nullable=False,
+            index=True,
+        ),
+        # The preflight token this plan was approved against.
+        sa.Column("token", sa.String(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("albums", sa.String(), nullable=True),  # JSON array
+        # planned | applying | complete | failed
+        sa.Column("state", sa.String(), nullable=False, server_default="planned"),
+        sa.Column("schema_version", sa.Integer(), nullable=False, server_default="1"),
+        sa.Column("asset_count", sa.Integer(), nullable=False, server_default="0"),
+        sa.Column("byte_size", sa.Integer(), nullable=False, server_default="0"),
+        # Bumped on every claim and used as the fencing token.
+        sa.Column("version", sa.Integer(), nullable=False, server_default="1"),
+        sa.Column("worker_id", sa.String(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("completed_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column(
+            "created_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=sa.func.now()
+        ),
+        sa.Column(
+            "updated_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=sa.func.now()
+        ),
+    )
+    op.create_table(
+        "archive_operations",
+        sa.Column("id", sa.String(), primary_key=True),
+        sa.Column(
+            "plan_id",
+            sa.String(),
+            sa.ForeignKey("archive_plans.id", ondelete="CASCADE"),
+            nullable=False,
+            index=True,
+        ),
+        sa.Column("sequence", sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("album", sa.String(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("asset_id", sa.String(), sa.ForeignKey("assets.id"), nullable=False, index=True),
+        sa.Column("source_path", sa.String(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("destination_path", sa.String(), nullable=False),
+        # Relative to the location root: the medium can be mounted anywhere later.
+        sa.Column("archive_path", sa.String(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("expected_sha256", sa.String(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("byte_size", sa.Integer(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("same_filesystem", sa.Boolean(), nullable=True),
+        # planned | transferring | verified | removing | complete | failed
+        sa.Column("journal_state", sa.String(), nullable=False, server_default="planned"),
+        sa.Column("attempt_count", sa.Integer(), nullable=False, server_default="0"),
+        sa.Column("fencing_token", sa.Integer(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("worker_id", sa.String(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("verified_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("removed_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("error_code", sa.String(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("error_message", sa.String(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column(
+            "updated_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=sa.func.now()
+        ),
+        sa.UniqueConstraint("plan_id", "sequence", name="uq_archive_operations_plan_sequence"),
+    )
+    # Plain columns: SQLite cannot ALTER a table to add a foreign key, and the
+    # relationship is enforced by the service that writes them.
+    op.add_column("assets", sa.Column("archive_location_id", sa.String(), nullable=True))
+    op.add_column("assets", sa.Column("archive_path", sa.String(), nullable=True))
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.drop_column("assets", "archive_path")
+    op.drop_column("assets", "archive_location_id")
+    op.drop_table("archive_operations")
+    op.drop_table("archive_plans")

migrations/versions/0013_protected_thumbnails.py

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+"""Protected thumbnails (US06-03).
+
+Revision ID: 0013_protected_thumbnails
+Revises: 0012_archive_plans
+Create Date: 2026-08-16
+
+A protected thumbnail is the durable comparison preview of an asset whose
+original has left active storage. It is evidence rather than cache, so the LRU
+quota must not evict it: the archive medium may be offline when it is needed.
+"""
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import op
+
+revision = "0013_protected_thumbnails"
+down_revision = "0012_archive_plans"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    op.add_column(
+        "thumbnails",
+        sa.Column("protected", sa.Boolean(), nullable=False, server_default=sa.false()),
+    )
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.drop_column("thumbnails", "protected")

migrations/versions/0014_restore_plans.py

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+"""Restore plans and archive divergence (US06-04).
+
+Revision ID: 0014_restore_plans
+Revises: 0013_protected_thumbnails
+Create Date: 2026-08-16
+
+Restore reuses the archive plan and journal tables: the crash-safe question is the
+same one in the opposite direction (copy, verify, publish, register), so the rows
+gain a ``direction`` instead of a parallel pair of tables. ``archive_divergent_at``
+records the moment an archived copy was proven to hold bytes that are not the ones
+the database recorded — a restore must never silently accept a different file.
+"""
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import op
+
+revision = "0014_restore_plans"
+down_revision = "0013_protected_thumbnails"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    for table in ("archive_plans", "archive_operations"):
+        op.add_column(
+            table,
+            sa.Column("direction", sa.String(), nullable=False, server_default="archive"),
+        )
+    op.add_column(
+        "assets", sa.Column("archive_divergent_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+    )
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.drop_column("assets", "archive_divergent_at")
+    for table in ("archive_plans", "archive_operations"):
+        op.drop_column(table, "direction")

migrations/versions/0015_exif_projections.py

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+"""Durable EXIF projections per asset and stage (US07-03).
+
+Revision ID: 0015_exif_projections
+Revises: 0014_restore_plans
+Create Date: 2026-08-16
+
+The concept's ``exif_projections`` table, added at the point it earns its keep: a
+checkpoint that finds a field it does not own changed must be able to say so after
+a restart. ``state`` is verified | divergent | failed, and only ``verified`` counts
+as a completed metadata stage.
+"""
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import op
+
+revision = "0015_exif_projections"
+down_revision = "0014_restore_plans"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    op.create_table(
+        "exif_projections",
+        sa.Column("asset_id", sa.String(), sa.ForeignKey("assets.id"), primary_key=True),
+        sa.Column("stage", sa.String(), primary_key=True),  # safety | analysis
+        sa.Column("id", sa.String(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("projection_version", sa.Integer(), nullable=False, server_default="0"),
+        # What the stage asked for: {"add": [...], "remove": [...]}.
+        sa.Column("desired_json", sa.String(), nullable=True),
+        # Fields outside the stage's ownership that did not survive the write.
+        sa.Column("divergent_fields", sa.String(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("result_file_sha256", sa.String(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("state", sa.String(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("error_code", sa.String(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("verified_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("updated_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True),
+    )
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.drop_table("exif_projections")

photo_pipeline/__main__.py

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-"""Application management CLI: ``python -m photo_pipeline {serve,migrate}``."""
+"""Application management CLI: ``python -m photo_pipeline {serve,migrate,worker,import-legacy-scores}``."""
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
@@ -16,6 +16,17 @@ def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int:
     commands.add_parser("migrate", help="Upgrade the database to the latest revision")
     worker_cmd = commands.add_parser("worker", help="Run a durable-job worker")
     worker_cmd.add_argument("--id", default="worker-1", help="Worker id (lease owner)")
+    import_cmd = commands.add_parser(
+        "import-legacy-scores",
+        help="Import the archived CLI's nsfw_scores.csv into the database (US07-01)",
+    )
+    import_cmd.add_argument("csv", help="Path to nsfw_scores.csv")
+    import_cmd.add_argument(
+        "--overwrite", action="store_true", help="Replace differing imported scores"
+    )
+    import_cmd.add_argument(
+        "--dry-run", action="store_true", help="Report what would happen and change nothing"
+    )
     args = parser.parse_args(argv)
 
     config = Config.from_env()
@@ -25,6 +36,24 @@ def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int:
         run_migrations(config.database_url)
         return 0
 
+    if args.command == "import-legacy-scores":
+        import json
+
+        from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory
+        from photo_pipeline.services.legacy_import import LegacyImportService, write_report
+
+        run_migrations(config.database_url)
+        engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
+        service = LegacyImportService(create_session_factory(engine))
+        report = service.import_nsfw_scores(
+            args.csv, overwrite=args.overwrite, dry_run=args.dry_run
+        )
+        # The report is the point: an import nobody can audit is not a migration.
+        if not args.dry_run:
+            write_report(report, config.data_dir)
+        print(json.dumps(report.counts, indent=2))
+        return 0
+
     if args.command == "worker":
         from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory
 
@@ -36,7 +65,7 @@ def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int:
 
         run_migrations(config.database_url)
         engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
-        Worker(create_session_factory(engine), worker_id=args.id).run_forever()
+        Worker(create_session_factory(engine), worker_id=args.id, config=config).run_forever()
         return 0
 
     import uvicorn

photo_pipeline/api/app.py

@@ -8,15 +8,20 @@ and exposes the versioned ``/api/v1`` surface; US01-02 ships only health.
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import logging
 from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
 from pathlib import Path
 
-from fastapi import FastAPI
+from fastapi import FastAPI, Request
+from fastapi.exceptions import RequestValidationError
+from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
 from fastapi.staticfiles import StaticFiles
+from starlette.exceptions import HTTPException as StarletteHTTPException
 
 from photo_pipeline.api.routes import (
     albums,
     analysis,
+    archives,
     duplicates,
     health,
     inventory,
@@ -24,18 +29,58 @@ from photo_pipeline.api.routes import (
     library,
     renames,
     safety,
+    session as session_routes,
     thumbnails,
+    uploads,
     workflow,
 )
+from photo_pipeline.api.security import DEFAULT_HEADERS, SecurityMiddleware, Session
 
 # Registers the safety_score / analysis job handlers on import.
 import photo_pipeline.jobs.domain_handlers  # noqa: F401
 from photo_pipeline.config import Config
 from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory, run_migrations
 from photo_pipeline.logging import configure_logging
+from photo_pipeline.services.thumbnails import ThumbnailService
+from photo_pipeline.services.upload_batches import UploadBatchService
 
 FRONTEND_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "frontend"
 
+log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+def _envelope(status: int, code: str, message: str) -> JSONResponse:
+    return JSONResponse(
+        status_code=status,
+        content={"error": {"code": code, "message": message}},
+        headers=DEFAULT_HEADERS,
+    )
+
+
+def _install_error_handlers(app: FastAPI) -> None:
+    """One JSON error envelope everywhere, and nothing behind it.
+
+    An unhandled exception carries the library's absolute paths, SQL, and sometimes
+    a credential in its text; the client gets a code, the operator gets the traceback
+    in the server log (US07-02).
+    """
+
+    @app.exception_handler(StarletteHTTPException)
+    async def _http_error(request: Request, exc: StarletteHTTPException):
+        return _envelope(exc.status_code, "http_error", str(exc.detail))
+
+    @app.exception_handler(RequestValidationError)
+    async def _validation_error(request: Request, exc: RequestValidationError):
+        # Field locations only: the echoed input can be the caller's own data, but it
+        # is also what ends up in shared logs and screenshots.
+        fields = sorted(".".join(str(part) for part in error["loc"]) for error in exc.errors())
+        return _envelope(422, "invalid_request", f"invalid request fields: {', '.join(fields)}")
+
+    @app.exception_handler(Exception)
+    async def _unhandled(request: Request, exc: Exception):
+        log.exception("unhandled error serving %s", request.url.path)
+        return _envelope(500, "internal_error", "internal error")
+
 
 def create_app(config: Config | None = None) -> FastAPI:
     config = config or Config.from_env()
@@ -49,6 +94,12 @@ def create_app(config: Config | None = None) -> FastAPI:
         app.state.config = config
         app.state.engine = engine
         app.state.session_factory = create_session_factory(engine)
+        # An upload whose process died left no outcome behind; resolve it now so the
+        # uploader lane is free and the uncertain batch is visible (US05-02).
+        UploadBatchService(app.state.session_factory, config=config).recover()
+        # A render killed mid-write leaves its temporary beside the cache entry;
+        # remove those recognized leftovers, and only those (US07-03).
+        ThumbnailService(app.state.session_factory, config).cleanup_temp_files()
         try:
             yield
         finally:
@@ -56,6 +107,12 @@ def create_app(config: Config | None = None) -> FastAPI:
             app.state.engine = None
 
     app = FastAPI(title="Photo Pipeline", version="0.1.0", lifespan=lifespan)
+    # One session per process: the browser exchanges it for a cookie + CSRF token,
+    # and every other origin is refused before a route ever runs (US07-02).
+    app.state.session = Session.create()
+    app.add_middleware(SecurityMiddleware, session=app.state.session, config=config)
+    _install_error_handlers(app)
+    app.include_router(session_routes.router, prefix="/api/v1")
     app.include_router(health.router, prefix="/api/v1")
     app.include_router(inventory.router, prefix="/api/v1")
     app.include_router(duplicates.router, prefix="/api/v1")
@@ -67,6 +124,8 @@ def create_app(config: Config | None = None) -> FastAPI:
     app.include_router(library.router, prefix="/api/v1")
     app.include_router(albums.router, prefix="/api/v1")
     app.include_router(renames.router, prefix="/api/v1")
+    app.include_router(uploads.router, prefix="/api/v1")
+    app.include_router(archives.router, prefix="/api/v1")
     # Static single-page app (hash-routed). Mounted last so /api/v1 wins.
     if FRONTEND_DIR.is_dir():
         app.mount("/app", StaticFiles(directory=FRONTEND_DIR, html=True), name="app")

photo_pipeline/api/routes/analysis.py

@@ -18,7 +18,10 @@ router = APIRouter(tags=["analysis"])
 
 
 def _service(request: Request) -> AnalysisService:
-    return AnalysisService(request.app.state.session_factory)
+    return AnalysisService(
+        request.app.state.session_factory,
+        library_roots=tuple(request.app.state.config.library_roots),
+    )
 
 
 def _error(status: int, code: str, message: str) -> JSONResponse:

photo_pipeline/api/routes/archives.py

@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+"""Archive location, preflight, plan, and restore API (US06-01, US06-02, US06-04).
+
+Registering a location writes a marker onto the medium; preflight is a command
+rather than a read, because it probes the destination, hashes the scope, and issues
+the token an archive plan must present. Creating a plan writes only database rows —
+the transfer itself runs on the durable ``archive`` lane, never in the request
+thread, because it removes originals.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
+from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
+from pydantic import BaseModel
+
+from photo_pipeline.jobs.domain_handlers import ARCHIVE_LOCK, ARCHIVE_PLAN, RESTORE_PLAN
+from photo_pipeline.services.archives import ArchiveError, ArchiveService
+from photo_pipeline.services.archive_transfer import ArchiveTransferService
+from photo_pipeline.services.jobs import JobBlocked, JobService
+from photo_pipeline.services.restores import RestoreService
+
+router = APIRouter(tags=["archives"])
+
+# Which failures are the caller's request (422), a missing thing (404), or state
+# that changed under the caller (409).
+NOT_FOUND_CODES = {"unknown_location", "unknown_plan"}
+CONFLICT_CODES = {"stale_token", "stale_plan", "archive_pending"}
+
+
+class RegisterLocationRequest(BaseModel):
+    name: str
+    root: str
+
+
+class PreflightRequest(BaseModel):
+    location_id: str
+    # ``None`` means every album; an explicit list scopes the check.
+    albums: list[str] | None = None
+
+
+class CreatePlanRequest(PreflightRequest):
+    # The token of the preflight the user approved; a stale one is refused.
+    token: str
+
+
+class RestoreRequest(BaseModel):
+    location_id: str
+    # ``None`` means every asset archived at this location.
+    asset_ids: list[str] | None = None
+
+
+class CreateRestoreRequest(RestoreRequest):
+    token: str
+
+
+def _service(request: Request) -> ArchiveService:
+    return ArchiveService(request.app.state.session_factory, config=request.app.state.config)
+
+
+def _restores(request: Request) -> RestoreService:
+    return RestoreService(request.app.state.session_factory, config=request.app.state.config)
+
+
+def _transfers(request: Request) -> ArchiveTransferService:
+    return ArchiveTransferService(
+        request.app.state.session_factory, config=request.app.state.config
+    )
+
+
+def _error(error: ArchiveError) -> JSONResponse:
+    if error.code in NOT_FOUND_CODES:
+        status = 404
+    elif error.code in CONFLICT_CODES:
+        status = 409
+    else:
+        status = 422
+    return JSONResponse(
+        status_code=status, content={"error": {"code": error.code, "message": str(error)}}
+    )
+
+
+@router.post("/archive-locations", status_code=201)
+def register_location(body: RegisterLocationRequest, request: Request):
+    try:
+        return _service(request).register(body.name, body.root)
+    except ArchiveError as error:
+        return _error(error)
+
+
+@router.get("/archive-locations")
+def list_locations(request: Request) -> dict:
+    return {"locations": _service(request).locations()}
+
+
+@router.post("/archive-preflight")
+def preflight(body: PreflightRequest, request: Request):
+    try:
+        return _service(request).preflight(body.location_id, body.albums)
+    except ArchiveError as error:
+        return _error(error)
+
+
+@router.post("/archive-plans", status_code=201)
+def create_plan(body: CreatePlanRequest, request: Request):
+    """Turn an approved preflight into a durable, journaled plan. Nothing moves."""
+    try:
+        return _transfers(request).create(body.location_id, body.albums, token=body.token)
+    except ArchiveError as error:
+        return _error(error)
+
+
+@router.get("/archive-plans")
+def list_plans(request: Request) -> dict:
+    return {"plans": _transfers(request).list()}
+
+
+@router.get("/archive-plans/{plan_id}")
+def get_plan(plan_id: str, request: Request):
+    plan = _transfers(request).get(plan_id)
+    if plan is None:
+        return _error(ArchiveError("unknown_plan", f"unknown archive plan {plan_id}"))
+    return plan
+
+
+@router.post("/archive-plans/{plan_id}/apply")
+def apply_plan(plan_id: str, request: Request):
+    """Queue the transfer on the archiver lane. The worker removes the sources."""
+    service = _transfers(request)
+    plan = service.get(plan_id)
+    if plan is None:
+        return _error(ArchiveError("unknown_plan", f"unknown archive plan {plan_id}"))
+    if service.journal.blocks_mutation():
+        unresolved = [row for row in service.journal.incomplete() if row["plan_id"] != plan_id]
+        if unresolved:
+            return _error(
+                ArchiveError(
+                    "archive_pending",
+                    f"an unresolved archive operation ({unresolved[0]['id']}) must be recovered",
+                )
+            )
+    try:
+        job = JobService(request.app.state.session_factory).enqueue(
+            ARCHIVE_PLAN,
+            lock=ARCHIVE_LOCK,
+            # One queued attempt per plan version: a double-clicked apply reuses it.
+            idempotency_key=f"archive:{plan_id}:{plan['version']}",
+            items=[plan_id],
+        )
+    except JobBlocked as error:
+        return JSONResponse(
+            status_code=409, content={"error": {"code": error.code, "message": str(error)}}
+        )
+    return {"plan_id": plan_id, "job": job}
+
+
+@router.post("/restore-preflight")
+def restore_preflight(body: RestoreRequest, request: Request):
+    """Validate restoring archived assets back into the library. Nothing moves."""
+    try:
+        return _restores(request).preflight(body.location_id, body.asset_ids)
+    except ArchiveError as error:
+        return _error(error)
+
+
+@router.post("/restore-plans", status_code=201)
+def create_restore_plan(body: CreateRestoreRequest, request: Request):
+    try:
+        return _restores(request).create(body.location_id, body.asset_ids, token=body.token)
+    except ArchiveError as error:
+        return _error(error)
+
+
+@router.get("/restore-plans")
+def list_restore_plans(request: Request) -> dict:
+    return {"plans": _restores(request).list()}
+
+
+@router.get("/restore-plans/{plan_id}")
+def get_restore_plan(plan_id: str, request: Request):
+    plan = _restores(request).get(plan_id)
+    if plan is None:
+        return _error(ArchiveError("unknown_plan", f"unknown restore plan {plan_id}"))
+    return plan
+
+
+@router.post("/restore-plans/{plan_id}/apply")
+def apply_restore_plan(plan_id: str, request: Request):
+    """Queue the restore on the archiver lane — the same single lane as archiving,
+    because both move the same originals."""
+    service = _restores(request)
+    plan = service.get(plan_id)
+    if plan is None:
+        return _error(ArchiveError("unknown_plan", f"unknown restore plan {plan_id}"))
+    unresolved = [row for row in service.journal.incomplete() if row["plan_id"] != plan_id]
+    if unresolved:
+        return _error(
+            ArchiveError(
+                "archive_pending",
+                f"an unresolved archive operation ({unresolved[0]['id']}) must be recovered",
+            )
+        )
+    try:
+        job = JobService(request.app.state.session_factory).enqueue(
+            RESTORE_PLAN,
+            lock=ARCHIVE_LOCK,
+            idempotency_key=f"restore:{plan_id}:{plan['version']}",
+            items=[plan_id],
+        )
+    except JobBlocked as error:
+        return JSONResponse(
+            status_code=409, content={"error": {"code": error.code, "message": str(error)}}
+        )
+    return {"plan_id": plan_id, "job": job}
+
+
+@router.get("/restore-recovery")
+def restore_recovery_status(request: Request) -> dict:
+    return _restores(request).recovery_status()
+
+
+@router.post("/restore-recovery/resolve")
+def resolve_restore_recovery(request: Request) -> dict:
+    return _restores(request).recover()
+
+
+@router.get("/archive-recovery")
+def recovery_status(request: Request) -> dict:
+    """What an interrupted transfer left behind, straight from journal + disk."""
+    return _transfers(request).recovery_status()
+
+
+@router.post("/archive-recovery/resolve")
+def resolve_recovery(request: Request) -> dict:
+    return _transfers(request).recover()

photo_pipeline/api/routes/session.py

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+"""Session bootstrap: the one endpoint reachable without a session (US07-02).
+
+It sets the ``HttpOnly``/``SameSite=Strict`` session cookie and returns the CSRF
+token in the body. A foreign page can call this — it just cannot read the answer,
+because the app sends no CORS headers — and the cookie it received is never attached
+to a request that foreign page initiates.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
+from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
+
+from photo_pipeline.api.security import SESSION_COOKIE
+
+router = APIRouter(tags=["session"])
+
+
+@router.get("/session")
+def start_session(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
+    session = request.app.state.session
+    response = JSONResponse({"csrf_token": session.csrf_token})
+    response.set_cookie(
+        SESSION_COOKIE,
+        session.id,
+        httponly=True,
+        samesite="strict",
+        path="/",
+    )
+    return response

photo_pipeline/api/routes/thumbnails.py

@@ -31,5 +31,7 @@ def get_thumbnail(asset_id: str, request: Request, size: int = Query(512)):
     return FileResponse(
         path,
         media_type="image/webp",
-        headers={"Cache-Control": "public, max-age=31536000, immutable"},
+        # private: the URL is versioned and immutable, but these bytes are the user's
+        # photos and must never sit in a shared cache (US07-02).
+        headers={"Cache-Control": "private, max-age=31536000, immutable"},
     )

photo_pipeline/api/routes/uploads.py

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+"""Upload preflight, batch, and verification API (US05-01, US05-02, US05-04).
+
+Preflight is a command, not a resource read: it contacts the Immich server, hashes
+the current bytes, and issues a token. Creating a batch requires that token, and
+starting one enqueues a durable job on the single ``upload`` lane — the API never
+runs the uploader in the request thread.
+
+``verify`` and ``resolve`` are the way out of an uncertain outcome; ``start``
+refuses one with ``409`` rather than letting the browser retry it.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
+from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
+from pydantic import BaseModel
+
+from photo_pipeline.jobs.domain_handlers import UPLOAD_BATCH, UPLOAD_LOCK
+from photo_pipeline.services.jobs import JobBlocked, JobService
+from photo_pipeline.services.upload_batches import (
+    BatchConflict,
+    BatchError,
+    UploadBatchService,
+)
+from photo_pipeline.services.upload_verification import (
+    UploadVerificationService,
+    VerificationError,
+    retry_blockers,
+)
+from photo_pipeline.services.uploads import UploadError, UploadService
+
+router = APIRouter(tags=["uploads"])
+
+
+class PreflightRequest(BaseModel):
+    # ``None`` means every album; an explicit list scopes the check.
+    albums: list[str] | None = None
+    # Approving a partial upload is an explicit act, never a default.
+    allow_partial: bool = False
+
+
+class CreateBatchRequest(PreflightRequest):
+    # The token of the preflight the user approved; a stale one is refused.
+    token: str
+
+
+class ResolveRequest(BaseModel):
+    asset_id: str
+    # uploaded | upgraded | duplicate | skipped | failed | unknown
+    outcome: str
+    # What the operator actually checked, and who they are — both mandatory so a
+    # manual resolution can never look like server evidence.
+    evidence: str
+    actor: str
+
+
+def _service(request: Request) -> UploadService:
+    return UploadService(request.app.state.session_factory, config=request.app.state.config)
+
+
+def _batches(request: Request) -> UploadBatchService:
+    return UploadBatchService(request.app.state.session_factory, config=request.app.state.config)
+
+
+def _verification(request: Request) -> UploadVerificationService:
+    return UploadVerificationService(
+        request.app.state.session_factory, config=request.app.state.config
+    )
+
+
+def _error(status: int, code: str, message: str) -> JSONResponse:
+    return JSONResponse(status_code=status, content={"error": {"code": code, "message": message}})
+
+
+@router.post("/upload-preflight")
+def preflight(request: Request, body: PreflightRequest | None = None):
+    body = body or PreflightRequest()
+    try:
+        return _service(request).preflight(body.albums, allow_partial=body.allow_partial)
+    except UploadError as error:
+        return _error(422, "unknown_album", str(error))
+
+
+@router.post("/upload-batches", status_code=201)
+def create_batches(body: CreateBatchRequest, request: Request):
+    """Turn an approved preflight into one durable batch per album."""
+    try:
+        return {
+            "batches": _batches(request).create(
+                body.albums, token=body.token, allow_partial=body.allow_partial
+            )
+        }
+    except UploadError as error:
+        return _error(422, "unknown_album", str(error))
+    except BatchConflict as error:
+        return _error(409, error.code, str(error))
+    except BatchError as error:
+        return _error(422, error.code, str(error))
+
+
+@router.get("/upload-batches")
+def list_batches(request: Request) -> dict:
+    return {"batches": _batches(request).list()}
+
+
+@router.get("/upload-batches/{batch_id}")
+def get_batch(batch_id: str, request: Request):
+    batch = _batches(request).get(batch_id)
+    if batch is None:
+        return _error(404, "not_found", f"unknown upload batch {batch_id}")
+    return batch
+
+
+@router.post("/upload-batches/{batch_id}/start")
+def start_batch(batch_id: str, request: Request):
+    """Queue the batch on the uploader lane. The worker performs the upload."""
+    service = _batches(request)
+    batch = service.get(batch_id)
+    if batch is None:
+        return _error(404, "not_found", f"unknown upload batch {batch_id}")
+    # An uncertain outcome or bytes changed after upload must be resolved first
+    # (US05-04); the worker refuses them too, but the user is told here.
+    blocked = retry_blockers(batch)
+    if blocked:
+        return _error(409, blocked[0]["code"], blocked[0]["message"])
+    try:
+        job = JobService(request.app.state.session_factory).enqueue(
+            UPLOAD_BATCH,
+            lock=UPLOAD_LOCK,
+            # One queued attempt per batch attempt: a double-clicked start reuses it.
+            idempotency_key=f"upload:{batch_id}:{batch['attempt_count']}",
+            items=[batch_id],
+        )
+    except JobBlocked as error:
+        return _error(409, error.code, str(error))
+    return {"batch_id": batch_id, "job": job}
+
+
+@router.post("/upload-batches/{batch_id}/verify")
+def verify_batch(batch_id: str, request: Request):
+    """Check the batch against Immich and the bytes on disk (US05-04)."""
+    try:
+        return _verification(request).verify(batch_id)
+    except VerificationError as error:
+        return _error(404 if error.code == "not_found" else 422, error.code, str(error))
+
+
+@router.post("/upload-batches/{batch_id}/resolve")
+def resolve_item(batch_id: str, body: ResolveRequest, request: Request):
+    """Record an operator's own verification of one item. Evidence is mandatory."""
+    try:
+        return _verification(request).resolve(
+            batch_id,
+            body.asset_id,
+            outcome=body.outcome,
+            evidence=body.evidence,
+            actor=body.actor,
+        )
+    except VerificationError as error:
+        return _error(404 if error.code == "not_found" else 422, error.code, str(error))
+
+
+@router.get("/upload-batches/{batch_id}/verifications")
+def list_verifications(batch_id: str, request: Request):
+    batch = _batches(request).get(batch_id)
+    if batch is None:
+        return _error(404, "not_found", f"unknown upload batch {batch_id}")
+    return {"verifications": _verification(request).history(batch_id)}
+
+
+@router.post("/upload-batches/{batch_id}/cancel")
+def cancel_batch(batch_id: str, request: Request):
+    try:
+        return _batches(request).cancel(batch_id)
+    except BatchError as error:
+        return _error(404 if error.code == "not_found" else 409, error.code, str(error))

photo_pipeline/api/security.py

@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+"""Local-web attack surface: session, CSRF, Origin/Host checks, default headers.
+
+The app binds to 127.0.0.1, so the attacker is not a remote client but another page
+in the user's browser (concept §15, "Local web attack"): any site can issue requests
+to ``http://127.0.0.1:8000`` and can embed ``<img src=...>`` against media endpoints.
+The defenses stack, because each one alone has a hole:
+
+* **Host** must be a loopback name — a DNS rebinding host that resolves to 127.0.0.1
+  passes the browser's origin rules but not this check.
+* **Origin**, when the browser sends one, must be this exact origin (scheme, host,
+  port). There is no CORS middleware at all, so a foreign page can never *read* a
+  response even if it manages to send a request.
+* **Sec-Fetch-Site** rejects cross-site loads that carry no Origin, which is what an
+  ``<img>`` or ``<script>`` against a media endpoint looks like.
+* A **session cookie** (``SameSite=Strict``, ``HttpOnly``) is required by every
+  ``/api/v1`` route except liveness/readiness and the bootstrap itself. Strict means
+  the browser never attaches it to a request another site initiated.
+* A **CSRF token** must be echoed in a header on every mutation. It is handed out
+  only in the bootstrap response body, which a foreign page cannot read (no CORS) —
+  so possessing it proves the caller is same-origin.
+
+``evaluate`` is a pure function over the request metadata: the whole policy is one
+table that a unit test can enumerate, and the middleware only applies its verdict.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import secrets
+from collections.abc import Mapping
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+
+from starlette.datastructures import Headers, MutableHeaders
+from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
+
+SESSION_COOKIE = "pp_session"
+CSRF_HEADER = "x-csrf-token"
+API_PREFIX = "/api/v1"
+SAFE_METHODS = frozenset({"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"})
+# Reachable without a session: liveness/readiness (an orchestrator has no cookie)
+# and the bootstrap that issues the session in the first place.
+PUBLIC_PATHS = frozenset(
+    {f"{API_PREFIX}/health/live", f"{API_PREFIX}/health/ready", f"{API_PREFIX}/session"}
+)
+LOOPBACK_HOSTS = frozenset({"127.0.0.1", "localhost", "::1", "[::1]"})
+
+# Applied to every response. No inline script/style is used by the frontend, so the
+# policy can stay strict; `frame-ancestors 'none'` and CORP keep other pages from
+# embedding the app or its thumbnails.
+DEFAULT_HEADERS = {
+    "x-content-type-options": "nosniff",
+    "x-frame-options": "DENY",
+    "referrer-policy": "no-referrer",
+    "cross-origin-resource-policy": "same-origin",
+    "cross-origin-opener-policy": "same-origin",
+    "content-security-policy": (
+        "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; style-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; "
+        "connect-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'"
+    ),
+}
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Session:
+    """One process, one session. A local app has exactly one user; a session store
+    would be bookkeeping without a second subject to distinguish.
+
+    ponytail: per-session rows if the app ever serves more than one operator.
+    """
+
+    id: str
+    csrf_token: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def create(cls) -> Session:
+        return cls(secrets.token_urlsafe(32), secrets.token_urlsafe(32))
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Refusal:
+    status: int
+    code: str
+    message: str
+
+
+def split_host(value: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    """``"127.0.0.1:8000"`` -> ``("127.0.0.1", "8000")``; bracketed IPv6 aware."""
+    value = value.strip()
+    if value.startswith("["):
+        host, _, port = value.partition("]")
+        return host + "]", port.lstrip(":")
+    host, _, port = value.partition(":")
+    return host, port
+
+
+def evaluate(
+    *,
+    method: str,
+    path: str,
+    headers: Mapping[str, str],
+    session: Session,
+    allowed_hosts: frozenset[str] = LOOPBACK_HOSTS,
+    max_request_bytes: int,
+) -> Refusal | None:
+    """Why this request must be refused, or ``None`` when it may proceed."""
+    host_header = headers.get("host", "")
+    host, port = split_host(host_header)
+    if host.lower() not in allowed_hosts:
+        return Refusal(403, "host_not_allowed", "request host is not a local address")
+
+    origin = headers.get("origin")
+    if origin is not None and origin != "":
+        parts = urlsplit(origin)
+        origin_host, origin_port = split_host(parts.netloc)
+        if (
+            parts.scheme not in ("http", "https")
+            or origin_host.lower() not in allowed_hosts
+            or origin_port != port
+        ):
+            return Refusal(403, "origin_not_allowed", "request origin is not this application")
+
+    # Absent means a non-browser client; "none" is a user-initiated navigation.
+    fetch_site = headers.get("sec-fetch-site")
+    if fetch_site is not None and fetch_site not in ("same-origin", "none"):
+        return Refusal(403, "cross_site_blocked", "cross-site requests are not accepted")
+
+    length = headers.get("content-length")
+    if length and length.isdigit() and int(length) > max_request_bytes:
+        return Refusal(413, "payload_too_large", "request body exceeds the configured limit")
+
+    protected = path.startswith(API_PREFIX) and path not in PUBLIC_PATHS
+    if not protected:
+        return None
+
+    if headers.get("cookie-session") != session.id:
+        return Refusal(401, "unauthenticated", "a valid application session is required")
+    if method.upper() not in SAFE_METHODS and headers.get(CSRF_HEADER) != session.csrf_token:
+        return Refusal(403, "csrf_failed", "missing or invalid CSRF token")
+    return None
+
+
+class SecurityMiddleware:
+    """Pure-ASGI so the SSE stream keeps streaming (BaseHTTPMiddleware buffers)."""
+
+    def __init__(self, app, *, session: Session, config) -> None:
+        self.app = app
+        self.session = session
+        self.max_request_bytes = config.max_request_bytes
+        self.allowed_hosts = frozenset(LOOPBACK_HOSTS | {str(config.host).lower()})
+
+    async def __call__(self, scope, receive, send) -> None:
+        if scope["type"] != "http":
+            await self.app(scope, receive, send)
+            return
+        headers = Headers(scope=scope)
+        # The cookie is read here and handed to the pure policy as one value, so the
+        # policy never has to parse a Cookie header.
+        lookup = dict(headers)
+        lookup["cookie-session"] = _cookie(headers.get("cookie", ""), SESSION_COOKIE)
+        refusal = evaluate(
+            method=scope.get("method", "GET"),
+            path=scope.get("path", "/"),
+            headers=lookup,
+            session=self.session,
+            allowed_hosts=self.allowed_hosts,
+            max_request_bytes=self.max_request_bytes,
+        )
+        if refusal is not None:
+            response = JSONResponse(
+                status_code=refusal.status,
+                content={"error": {"code": refusal.code, "message": refusal.message}},
+                headers=DEFAULT_HEADERS,
+            )
+            await response(scope, receive, send)
+            return
+
+        async def send_with_headers(message):
+            if message["type"] == "http.response.start":
+                out = MutableHeaders(scope=message)
+                for name, value in DEFAULT_HEADERS.items():
+                    out.setdefault(name, value)
+            await send(message)
+
+        await self.app(scope, receive, send_with_headers)
+
+
+def _cookie(header: str, name: str) -> str:
+    for part in header.split(";"):
+        key, _, value = part.strip().partition("=")
+        if key == name:
+            return value
+    return ""

photo_pipeline/config.py

@@ -30,13 +30,22 @@ class Config(BaseModel):
     log_level: str = "INFO"
     log_format: str = "json"  # "json" or "text"
 
+    # Largest request body the API accepts. Every endpoint takes small JSON commands;
+    # anything larger is a mistake or an attempt to exhaust memory (US07-02).
+    max_request_bytes: int = 1_048_576
+
     # Library boundary for path validation (os.pathsep-separated in the env var).
     library_roots: tuple[Path, ...] = ()
     thumbnail_cache_quota_bytes: int = 500_000_000
     thumbnail_max_pixels: int = 100_000_000
 
+    # Free space an archive destination must keep beyond the transfer itself.
+    archive_free_space_reserve_bytes: int = 1_000_000_000
+
     vision_api_key: SecretStr | None = None
     immich_api_key: SecretStr | None = None
+    immich_server_url: str = ""
+    immich_go_binary: str = "immich-go"
 
     @property
     def database_path(self) -> Path:

photo_pipeline/faults.py

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+"""Test-only fault control points (concept §18, US07-04).
+
+Crash safety can only be proven by crashing at the exact moment a transition has
+been persisted but its consequence has not. That needs a barrier *inside* the
+production code path — but not a production capability: there is no endpoint, no
+service method, and no configuration file entry that can trigger one. The only
+switch is an environment variable naming a single point, read at the moment it is
+passed, and the only thing it does is kill the process. A deployment that never
+sets it can never reach the barrier.
+
+``os._exit`` is deliberate: it skips atexit handlers, buffered flushes, and
+``finally`` blocks, which is what a real ``SIGKILL`` or power loss does. A clean
+shutdown would prove nothing.
+
+The points are the persisted transitions of the journalled stages:
+
+    rename    moving | moved | database_updated | verified | complete
+    archive   transferring | verified | removing | source_removed | complete
+    exif      exif:written        — keywords on disk, checkpoint not yet recorded
+    upload    upload:accepted     — uploader exited, outcome not yet persisted
+    jobs      job:item_done       — item committed, job outcome not yet written
+
+Recovery for each is asserted in tests/integration/test_fault_matrix.py and
+tests/e2e/test_crash_recovery.py.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+
+ENV_VAR = "PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAULT_AFTER"
+
+EXIF_WRITTEN = "exif:written"
+UPLOAD_ACCEPTED = "upload:accepted"
+JOB_ITEM_DONE = "job:item_done"
+
+
+def maybe_fault(point: str) -> None:
+    """Die abruptly when ``PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAULT_AFTER`` names ``point``.
+
+    Shared by the rename, archive, restore, EXIF, upload, and job lanes, each
+    passing its own state names. Never set the variable outside tests.
+    """
+    if os.environ.get(ENV_VAR) == point:
+        os._exit(9)

photo_pipeline/imaging.py

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+"""Bounded, defensive image decoding — one door for every pixel this app reads.
+
+A photo library contains files nobody planned for: truncated downloads, zero-byte
+placeholders, a PNG whose header claims 200000×200000, a TIFF with a broken ICC
+profile, an extension that lies about its content. None of them may take down a
+request or a worker, and none may decode more pixels than the caller allowed
+(concept §17: decoded pixels, not file size, are what exhausts memory).
+
+``open_image`` is that single door:
+
+* the declared dimensions are checked **before** a pixel is decoded;
+* Pillow's decompression-bomb *warning* is promoted to an error, because the
+  warning band (between Pillow's limit and twice it) still decodes the image;
+* every decoder failure — at open time or during the caller's decode — becomes one
+  of two typed errors, so callers map them to their own item state instead of
+  catching ``Exception``;
+* error text names no path: it reaches API responses, and the full reason goes to
+  the server log instead (US07-02).
+
+``to_srgb`` and ``draft`` are the other two bounded-decode helpers: colour-manage a
+profile-bearing image into sRGB, and let JPEG decode straight to a size near the
+requested one rather than at full resolution.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import io
+import logging
+import warnings
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from PIL import Image, ImageCms, ImageFile, UnidentifiedImageError
+
+log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+# Matches ``Config.thumbnail_max_pixels``; used where no configuration is at hand
+# (hashing runs inside discovery, which takes no config).
+DEFAULT_MAX_PIXELS = 100_000_000
+
+
+class MediaError(Exception):
+    """A file could not be turned into pixels safely."""
+
+
+class UndecodableImage(MediaError):
+    """Corrupt, truncated, empty, or not an image at all."""
+
+
+class ImageTooLarge(MediaError):
+    """More pixels than this operation is allowed to decode."""
+
+
+@contextmanager
+def open_image(path: Path | str, *, max_pixels: int = DEFAULT_MAX_PIXELS):
+    """Yield an open :class:`PIL.Image.Image`, bounded and with typed failures.
+
+    Decoder errors raised inside the ``with`` body are translated too — a truncated
+    JPEG only fails when its pixels are actually pulled, which is the caller's line,
+    not this one.
+    """
+    # Pillow's truncation tolerance is a process-global switch that any library in
+    # the process can flip (the donor CLI did). This door decides the policy for its
+    # own callers: half a file is not a picture.
+    tolerated = ImageFile.LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES
+    ImageFile.LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES = False
+    with warnings.catch_warnings():
+        # The warning band is not a warning for us: it means Pillow was willing to
+        # decode an image large enough to be a denial-of-service.
+        warnings.simplefilter("error", Image.DecompressionBombWarning)
+        try:
+            with Image.open(path) as image:
+                width, height = image.size
+                if width * height > max_pixels:
+                    raise ImageTooLarge(f"{width}x{height} exceeds the {max_pixels} pixel limit")
+                yield image
+        except MediaError:
+            raise
+        except (Image.DecompressionBombError, Image.DecompressionBombWarning) as error:
+            log.info("refused oversized image %s: %s", path, error)
+            raise ImageTooLarge("image exceeds the decompression-bomb limit") from error
+        except (UnidentifiedImageError, OSError, ValueError, SyntaxError, MemoryError) as error:
+            log.info("cannot decode %s: %s", path, error)
+            raise UndecodableImage(f"cannot decode image ({type(error).__name__})") from error
+        finally:
+            ImageFile.LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES = tolerated
+
+
+def draft(image: Image.Image, size: int) -> None:
+    """Ask the decoder for a smaller image where the format allows it (JPEG).
+
+    This is the difference between decoding a 40-megapixel JPEG and decoding the
+    roughly 1-megapixel version a 1280px preview needs.
+    """
+    try:
+        image.draft(None, (size, size))
+    except (AttributeError, ValueError, OSError):  # not a draft-capable format
+        pass
+
+
+def to_srgb(image: Image.Image, *, mode: str) -> Image.Image:
+    """Convert into ``mode``, colour-managing through an embedded ICC profile.
+
+    Without this a wide-gamut original renders with visibly wrong colours, because
+    its numbers are interpreted as sRGB. A broken or unreadable profile is not a
+    reason to fail a preview — the plain conversion is still a correct picture.
+    """
+    profile = image.info.get("icc_profile")
+    if profile:
+        try:
+            return ImageCms.profileToProfile(
+                image,
+                ImageCms.ImageCmsProfile(io.BytesIO(profile)),
+                ImageCms.createProfile("sRGB"),
+                outputMode=mode,
+            )
+        except Exception as error:  # noqa: BLE001 - any ICC failure falls back
+            log.info("ignoring unusable ICC profile on %s: %s", getattr(image, "filename", "?"), error)
+    return image.convert(mode)

photo_pipeline/integrations/exiftool.py

@@ -17,6 +17,20 @@ import os
 import subprocess
 from collections.abc import Iterable
 
+# A hung exiftool must not hang the worker with it: every call is bounded, and a
+# call that runs out of time is treated exactly like a failed one — no metadata
+# answer, nothing marked verified (US07-04). The knob exists because "slow" is a
+# property of the machine, not of the code: huge files on a slow network volume
+# legitimately take longer than the default.
+DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 120.0
+
+
+def _timeout() -> float:
+    try:
+        return float(os.environ.get("PHOTO_PIPELINE_EXIFTOOL_TIMEOUT", DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS))
+    except ValueError:
+        return DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
+
 
 def read_keyword_sets(paths: Iterable[str]) -> dict[str, set[str]]:
     """Map each path to its lowercased set of ``Keywords`` + ``Subject`` values.
@@ -34,8 +48,9 @@ def read_keyword_sets(paths: Iterable[str]) -> dict[str, set[str]]:
             input="\n".join(paths),
             capture_output=True,
             text=True,
+            timeout=_timeout(),
         )
-    except FileNotFoundError:
+    except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
         return {}
     out: dict[str, set[str]] = {}
     try:
@@ -56,6 +71,33 @@ def read_keyword_sets(paths: Iterable[str]) -> dict[str, set[str]]:
     return out
 
 
+def read_all(path: str) -> dict | None:
+    """Every tag exiftool can read from ``path``, or ``None`` when it cannot answer.
+
+    This is the snapshot an EXIF checkpoint compares against: proving that a write
+    preserved the fields it does not own requires knowing all of them, not just the
+    ones being written (US07-03). ``None`` (exiftool missing, unreadable file,
+    unparsable output) is not an empty snapshot — a caller must not read it as
+    "nothing was there".
+    """
+    try:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["exiftool", "-m", "-j", "-G0:1", path],
+            capture_output=True,
+            text=True,
+            timeout=_timeout(),
+        )
+    except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+        return None
+    try:
+        records = json.loads(result.stdout or "[]")
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+    if not records:
+        return None
+    return {k: v for k, v in records[0].items() if k != "SourceFile"}
+
+
 def apply_keywords(path: str, *, add: Iterable[str] = (), remove: Iterable[str] = ()) -> bool:
     """Idempotently add/remove keywords in Keywords + Subject; preserve all else."""
     args = ["exiftool", "-m", "-overwrite_original"]
@@ -67,4 +109,10 @@ def apply_keywords(path: str, *, add: Iterable[str] = (), remove: Iterable[str]
     if len(args) == 3:
         return True
     args.append(path)
-    return subprocess.run(args, capture_output=True, text=True).returncode == 0
+    try:
+        return subprocess.run(
+            args, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=_timeout()
+        ).returncode == 0
+    except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+        # A write that never returned is not a write that succeeded.
+        return False

photo_pipeline/integrations/immich_go.py

@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
+"""immich-go adapter: binary discovery, version, and redacted command preview.
+
+Upload is the only stage that needs credentials, so this module is also the single
+place that knows an API key exists. It never returns, logs, or renders the secret:
+:func:`build_command` produces the real argument list for the uploader, and
+:func:`redact` produces the copy that is safe for the API, the browser, and the
+activity log. Both come from the same builder so the preview can never drift from
+the command that would actually run.
+
+Server reachability uses ``/api/server/ping`` through stdlib ``urllib`` — the app
+has no HTTP client dependency and this is one request. :func:`bulk_upload_check`
+uses the same client to ask Immich which uploaded bytes it already holds, which is
+the authoritative evidence behind upload verification (US05-04).
+
+:func:`run_upload` is the only place the uploader is actually executed. It never
+uses a shell (the argument list goes straight to ``execve``, so no path or album
+name can be interpreted), streams the report to a file with a byte cap so a chatty
+or looping uploader cannot fill the disk, scrubs the API key out of anything the
+process echoes back, and polls a cancellation callback so a running upload can be
+stopped without killing the worker.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import shutil
+import signal
+import subprocess
+import threading
+import time
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+from collections.abc import Callable
+from pathlib import Path
+
+REDACTED = "***"
+PING_PATH = "/api/server/ping"
+PING_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 5.0
+# Immich's own deduplication endpoint: the authoritative answer to "do you already
+# have these exact bytes?" used to verify uncertain uploads (US05-04).
+BULK_CHECK_PATH = "/api/assets/bulk-upload-check"
+CHECK_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30.0
+CHECK_BATCH_SIZE = 500
+# Reports are kept in full up to this size; beyond it the tail is dropped and the
+# result is flagged truncated rather than growing without bound (concept §17).
+MAX_REPORT_BYTES = 4_000_000
+UPLOAD_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 6 * 60 * 60
+POLL_SECONDS = 0.05
+# Grace period between asking the uploader to stop and killing it.
+TERMINATE_GRACE_SECONDS = 10.0
+# How long to wait for the last output after the process is gone. A child that
+# outlived its parent can still hold the pipe; the report is not worth hanging for.
+DRAIN_SECONDS = 2.0
+
+
+def find_binary(binary: str = "immich-go") -> str | None:
+    """Absolute path of the uploader, or ``None`` when it is not installed."""
+    return shutil.which(binary)
+
+
+def version(binary: str = "immich-go") -> str | None:
+    """Reported uploader version, or ``None`` when it is missing or unusable.
+
+    The version is persisted with every batch (concept §8) because immich-go's
+    flags and report text change between releases.
+    """
+    path = find_binary(binary)
+    if path is None:
+        return None
+    try:
+        result = subprocess.run([path, "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)
+    except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
+        return None
+    output = (result.stdout or result.stderr or "").strip()
+    return output.splitlines()[0].strip() if output else None
+
+
+def ping(server_url: str, *, timeout: float = PING_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) -> tuple[bool, str | None]:
+    """``(reachable, detail)`` for the configured Immich server.
+
+    A reachable Immich answers ``{"res": "pong"}``. Anything else — wrong host, no
+    Immich, HTTP error — is a blocker with a short human detail. The detail never
+    carries the URL's credentials because the key travels in a header, not the URL.
+    """
+    if not server_url:
+        return False, "no server URL configured"
+    url = server_url.rstrip("/") + PING_PATH
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=timeout) as response:  # noqa: S310
+            payload = json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8") or "{}")
+    except (urllib.error.URLError, OSError, ValueError, TimeoutError) as error:
+        return False, f"{type(error).__name__}: {error}"
+    if payload.get("res") == "pong":
+        return True, None
+    return False, "server did not answer with pong"
+
+
+def bulk_upload_check(
+    server_url: str,
+    api_key: str | None,
+    checksums: dict[str, str],
+    *,
+    timeout: float = CHECK_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+) -> dict:
+    """Ask Immich which of these exact bytes it already holds (US05-04).
+
+    ``checksums`` maps an application key (the asset id) to the SHA-1 of the bytes
+    that were uploaded — the digest Immich itself deduplicates on. The answer is
+    ``{"reachable", "detail", "present"}`` where ``present`` maps each key to
+    ``True`` (the server rejected it as a duplicate, so it holds those bytes),
+    ``False`` (the server would accept it, so it does not), or ``None`` (the server
+    answered something this adapter will not interpret).
+
+    An unreachable or unparsable server is reported, never guessed at: the caller
+    must treat it as uncertainty rather than absence.
+    """
+    if not server_url or not api_key:
+        return {"reachable": False, "detail": "no Immich credentials configured", "present": {}}
+    keys = list(checksums)
+    present: dict[str, bool | None] = {}
+    for start in range(0, len(keys), CHECK_BATCH_SIZE):
+        # ponytail: fixed chunk size; make it configurable if a server ever rejects it.
+        chunk = keys[start : start + CHECK_BATCH_SIZE]
+        payload = {"assets": [{"id": key, "checksum": checksums[key]} for key in chunk]}
+        request = urllib.request.Request(  # noqa: S310 — http(s) URL from configuration
+            server_url.rstrip("/") + BULK_CHECK_PATH,
+            data=json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8"),
+            headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "x-api-key": api_key},
+            method="POST",
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=timeout) as response:  # noqa: S310
+                body = json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8") or "{}")
+        except (urllib.error.URLError, OSError, ValueError, TimeoutError) as error:
+            return {"reachable": False, "detail": f"{type(error).__name__}: {error}", "present": {}}
+        results = body.get("results")
+        if not isinstance(results, list):
+            return {
+                "reachable": False,
+                "detail": "unrecognised bulk-upload-check response",
+                "present": {},
+            }
+        for result in results:
+            if not isinstance(result, dict) or result.get("id") not in checksums:
+                continue
+            present[result["id"]] = _holds_bytes(result)
+    return {"reachable": True, "detail": None, "present": present}
+
+
+def _holds_bytes(result: dict) -> bool | None:
+    """Whether one bulk-upload-check result means the server already has the file."""
+    action, reason = result.get("action"), result.get("reason")
+    if action == "reject":
+        # Only a duplicate proves possession; "unsupported-format" and friends say
+        # nothing about whether the bytes are there.
+        return True if reason == "duplicate" else None
+    return False if action == "accept" else None
+
+
+def build_command(
+    *,
+    binary: str,
+    server_url: str,
+    api_key: str,
+    album_name: str,
+    folder: Path | str,
+) -> list[str]:
+    """The exact upload invocation for one folder-as-album batch."""
+    return [
+        binary,
+        "upload",
+        "from-folder",
+        f"--server={server_url}",
+        f"--api-key={api_key}",
+        f"--album-name={album_name}",
+        str(folder),
+    ]
+
+
+def redact(command: list[str]) -> list[str]:
+    """The same command with every secret-bearing argument masked."""
+    return [f"--api-key={REDACTED}" if arg.startswith("--api-key=") else arg for arg in command]
+
+
+def run_upload(
+    command: list[str],
+    *,
+    report_path: Path | str,
+    secret: str | None = None,
+    max_report_bytes: int | None = None,  # resolved at call time; see MAX_REPORT_BYTES
+    cancelled: Callable[[], bool] | None = None,
+    timeout: float = UPLOAD_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+) -> dict:
+    """Run one upload and return its outcome.
+
+    ``{"exit_code", "cancelled", "timed_out", "report_path", "report_bytes",
+    "report_truncated"}``. Output is streamed to ``report_path`` with ``secret``
+    masked and the file capped at ``max_report_bytes``; the pipe keeps being drained
+    after the cap so the child never blocks on a full buffer. ``cancelled`` is polled
+    while the process runs: when it returns true the uploader is asked to stop, then
+    killed if it does not.
+    """
+    report_path = Path(report_path)
+    report_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    max_report_bytes = MAX_REPORT_BYTES if max_report_bytes is None else max_report_bytes
+    needle = (secret or "").encode() or None
+    written = 0
+    truncated = False
+
+    process = subprocess.Popen(  # noqa: S603 — argv list, never a shell string
+        command,
+        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+        stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
+        shell=False,
+        # Own process group: stopping the upload must stop whatever the uploader
+        # spawned too, not leave orphans holding the pipe open.
+        start_new_session=True,
+    )
+
+    def _drain() -> None:
+        nonlocal written, truncated
+        with open(report_path, "wb") as report:
+            for line in process.stdout:  # line granularity keeps the mask reliable
+                if needle:
+                    line = line.replace(needle, REDACTED.encode())
+                if written >= max_report_bytes:
+                    truncated = True
+                    continue  # keep draining the pipe, stop growing the file
+                room = max_report_bytes - written
+                report.write(line[:room])
+                written += min(len(line), room)
+                truncated = truncated or len(line) > room
+                report.flush()
+
+    reader = threading.Thread(target=_drain, daemon=True)
+    reader.start()
+
+    stopped = timed_out = False
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+    while process.poll() is None:
+        if cancelled is not None and cancelled():
+            stopped = True
+        elif time.monotonic() >= deadline:
+            timed_out = True
+        if stopped or timed_out:
+            _stop(process)
+            break
+        time.sleep(POLL_SECONDS)
+
+    exit_code = process.wait()
+    reader.join(timeout=DRAIN_SECONDS)
+    if process.stdout is not None:
+        process.stdout.close()
+    return {
+        "exit_code": exit_code,
+        "cancelled": stopped,
+        "timed_out": timed_out,
+        "report_path": str(report_path),
+        "report_bytes": written,
+        "report_truncated": truncated,
+    }
+
+
+def _stop(process: subprocess.Popen) -> None:
+    """Ask the uploader's whole process group to stop, then kill what remains."""
+    _signal_group(process, signal.SIGTERM)
+    try:
+        process.wait(timeout=TERMINATE_GRACE_SECONDS)
+    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+        _signal_group(process, signal.SIGKILL)
+        process.wait()
+
+
+def _signal_group(process: subprocess.Popen, sig: int) -> None:
+    try:
+        os.killpg(os.getpgid(process.pid), sig)
+    except (ProcessLookupError, PermissionError, OSError):
+        # No group (already reaped, or a platform without them): signal the child.
+        process.send_signal(sig)
+
+
+def preview_command(
+    *, binary: str, server_url: str, album_name: str, folder: Path | str
+) -> list[str]:
+    """Redacted preview built without ever handling the real key."""
+    return redact(
+        build_command(
+            binary=binary,
+            server_url=server_url,
+            api_key=REDACTED,
+            album_name=album_name,
+            folder=folder,
+        )
+    )

photo_pipeline/integrations/immich_go_report.py

@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+"""immich-go report parsing (US05-03).
+
+The uploader's output is the only local evidence of what Immich did with each file,
+and its wording changes between releases (concept §15 "external integration
+risks"). So parsing is deliberately conservative:
+
+- **the parser is chosen by uploader version, not by guessing the format.** Each
+  supported version family maps to one adapter with a pinned line grammar. An
+  unrecognised version yields no adapter at all, which makes every item uncertain
+  rather than optimistically successful.
+- **an unmatched line is never success.** Lines the adapter does not recognise are
+  counted (``unparsed``) and kept as evidence; they never classify an item.
+- **evidence is bounded.** Each entry keeps a trimmed copy of the line that
+  classified it, and the number of entries is capped, so a looping uploader cannot
+  turn the report into unbounded database rows.
+
+Two grammars are supported. ``text-v1`` is the default human-readable log of the
+0.21/0.22 line, ``json-v1`` the structured log (``--log-type=json``) of 0.23/0.24.
+Both classify through one shared phrase table, so the vocabulary cannot drift
+between them:
+
+```text
+text-v1   INFO  uploaded /lib/rome/a.jpg
+          INFO  server has the same file /lib/rome/b.jpg
+          ERROR error uploading /lib/rome/e.jpg: connection reset
+          Uploaded 1, duplicates 1, errors 1
+
+json-v1   {"level":"INFO","msg":"uploaded","file":"/lib/rome/a.jpg"}
+          {"level":"INFO","msg":"report","counts":{"uploaded":1}}
+```
+
+Nothing here touches the database; :mod:`photo_pipeline.services.upload_reports`
+turns a parse result into durable per-item outcomes.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import re
+
+PARSER_VERSION = 1
+
+# Per-item outcomes. ``UNKNOWN`` is the safe default everywhere: it means the app
+# does not know what happened to that file and US05-04 must verify it.
+UPLOADED = "uploaded"
+UPGRADED = "upgraded"
+DUPLICATE = "duplicate"
+SKIPPED = "skipped"
+FAILED = "failed"
+UNKNOWN = "unknown"
+
+OUTCOMES = (UPLOADED, UPGRADED, DUPLICATE, SKIPPED, FAILED, UNKNOWN)
+
+# Longest/most specific phrases first: "server has an older file" also contains
+# "server has", and an error line about uploading also contains "upload".
+_PHRASES: tuple[tuple[str, str], ...] = (
+    ("server has the same file", DUPLICATE),
+    ("server has an older file", UPGRADED),
+    ("upgraded", UPGRADED),
+    ("duplicate", DUPLICATE),
+    ("discarded", SKIPPED),
+    ("skipped", SKIPPED),
+    ("error", FAILED),
+    ("failed", FAILED),
+    ("uploaded", UPLOADED),
+    ("upload", UPLOADED),
+)
+
+# Summary line of the text grammar: "Uploaded 3, duplicates 1, errors 2".
+_SUMMARY_WORDS = {
+    "uploaded": UPLOADED,
+    "upgraded": UPGRADED,
+    "duplicates": DUPLICATE,
+    "duplicate": DUPLICATE,
+    "skipped": SKIPPED,
+    "discarded": SKIPPED,
+    "errors": FAILED,
+    "error": FAILED,
+}
+_SUMMARY_PAIR = re.compile(r"([A-Za-z]+)\s+(\d+)")
+# A path is anything that looks absolute, up to an explanatory ": reason" tail.
+_PATH = re.compile(r"(/[^\s:][^:]*?)(?=:|$)")
+
+MAX_EVIDENCE_CHARS = 300
+# The report file is already byte-capped; this caps the rows it can produce.
+MAX_ENTRIES = 20_000
+
+
+def parser_for(uploader_version: str | None) -> str | None:
+    """Adapter name for a recorded uploader version, or ``None`` when unsupported.
+
+    Unsupported is not an error — it is the honest answer that this build's output
+    format was never pinned, and it makes the whole report uncertain.
+    """
+    match = re.search(r"(\d+)\.(\d+)", uploader_version or "")
+    if match is None:
+        return None
+    return _SUPPORTED.get(f"{match.group(1)}.{match.group(2)}")
+
+
+def parse(report: str, uploader_version: str | None) -> dict:
+    """Classify a raw report.
+
+    Returns ``{"parser", "parser_version", "supported", "entries", "counts",
+    "unparsed", "entries_truncated"}`` where ``entries`` is a list of
+    ``{"path", "outcome", "evidence"}`` and ``counts`` is the uploader's own
+    summary when it printed one (``None`` otherwise, never invented).
+    """
+    parser = parser_for(uploader_version)
+    result = {
+        "parser": parser,
+        "parser_version": PARSER_VERSION,
+        "supported": parser is not None,
+        "entries": [],
+        "counts": None,
+        "unparsed": 0,
+        "entries_truncated": False,
+    }
+    if parser is None:
+        return result
+    read_line = _text_line if parser == "text-v1" else _json_line
+    for raw in report.splitlines():
+        line = raw.strip()
+        if not line:
+            continue
+        path, outcome, counts = read_line(line)
+        if counts is not None:
+            # Later summaries win: the uploader prints its totals once, at the end.
+            result["counts"] = counts
+            continue
+        if path is None or outcome is None:
+            result["unparsed"] += 1
+            continue
+        if len(result["entries"]) >= MAX_ENTRIES:
+            result["entries_truncated"] = True
+            continue
+        result["entries"].append(
+            {"path": path, "outcome": outcome, "evidence": line[:MAX_EVIDENCE_CHARS]}
+        )
+    return result
+
+
+def _classify(text: str) -> str | None:
+    lowered = text.lower()
+    for phrase, outcome in _PHRASES:
+        if phrase in lowered:
+            return outcome
+    return None
+
+
+def _summary(text: str) -> dict[str, int] | None:
+    """Totals from a summary line, or ``None`` when the line is not one."""
+    counts: dict[str, int] = {}
+    for word, number in _SUMMARY_PAIR.findall(text):
+        outcome = _SUMMARY_WORDS.get(word.lower())
+        if outcome is None:
+            return None  # an unknown noun means this is not the summary grammar
+        counts[outcome] = counts.get(outcome, 0) + int(number)
+    return counts or None
+
+
+def _text_line(line: str) -> tuple[str | None, str | None, dict | None]:
+    path_match = _PATH.search(line)
+    if path_match is None:
+        return None, None, _summary(line)
+    path = path_match.group(1).strip()
+    # Classify from the words around the path, never from the path itself: an
+    # album called "errors" must not turn an upload into a failure.
+    context = line.replace(path, " ")
+    return path, _classify(context), None
+
+
+def _json_line(line: str) -> tuple[str | None, str | None, dict | None]:
+    try:
+        record = json.loads(line)
+    except ValueError:
+        return None, None, None
+    if not isinstance(record, dict):
+        return None, None, None
+    counts = record.get("counts")
+    if isinstance(counts, dict):
+        totals = {
+            _SUMMARY_WORDS[key.lower()]: int(value)
+            for key, value in counts.items()
+            if key.lower() in _SUMMARY_WORDS and isinstance(value, int)
+        }
+        return None, None, totals or None
+    path = record.get("file")
+    message = record.get("msg")
+    if not isinstance(path, str) or not isinstance(message, str):
+        return None, None, None
+    return path, _classify(message), None
+
+
+# Version family → adapter. Pinning this is the point: a build outside the list is
+# uncertain by construction (concept §15 "pin and record supported immich-go
+# versions").
+_SUPPORTED = {
+    "0.21": "text-v1",
+    "0.22": "text-v1",
+    "0.23": "json-v1",
+    "0.24": "json-v1",
+}
+SUPPORTED_VERSIONS = tuple(sorted(_SUPPORTED))

photo_pipeline/integrations/nsfw_model.py

@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 from pathlib import Path
 
+from photo_pipeline import imaging
+
 MODEL_ID = "AdamCodd/vit-base-nsfw-detector"
 BATCH = 16
 
@@ -54,13 +56,17 @@ class NsfwModel:
         self._ensure_loaded()
         import numpy as np
         import torch
-        from PIL import Image, ImageFile
+        from PIL import Image
 
-        ImageFile.LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES = True
-
-        def preprocess(image):
-            image = image.convert("RGB").resize((self._size, self._size), Image.BILINEAR)
-            array = (np.asarray(image, dtype="float32") / 255.0 - 0.5) / 0.5
+        # The donor set ``ImageFile.LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES = True`` here. That flag is
+        # process-global: in this application the same process also hashes files and
+        # renders previews, and those must keep failing loudly on a truncated file
+        # rather than quietly working on half of one (US07-03). An unreadable image
+        # is skipped instead — it stays unscored, and therefore visibly undecided.
+        def preprocess(path):
+            with imaging.open_image(path) as image:
+                small = image.convert("RGB").resize((self._size, self._size), Image.BILINEAR)
+            array = (np.asarray(small, dtype="float32") / 255.0 - 0.5) / 0.5
             return torch.from_numpy(array).permute(2, 0, 1)
 
         results: list[tuple[str, float]] = []
@@ -69,9 +75,10 @@ class NsfwModel:
             tensors, batch_paths = [], []
             for path in items[start : start + self.batch]:
                 try:
-                    tensors.append(preprocess(Image.open(path)))
+                    tensors.append(preprocess(path))
                     batch_paths.append(path)
-                except Exception:
+                except (imaging.MediaError, OSError, ValueError):
+                    # One bad file must not cost the batch its other fifteen.
                     continue
             if not tensors:
                 continue

photo_pipeline/jobs/domain_handlers.py

@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-"""Domain job handlers: safety scoring and content analysis (US02-06).
+"""Domain job handlers: safety scoring, content analysis, uploads, archive
+transfers, restores (US02-06, US05-02, US06-02, US06-04).
 
-Importing this module registers the ``safety_score`` and ``analysis`` job types so
-the generic worker can run them per item (one item = one ``asset_id``). Each handler
-delegates to its service, which owns the real work and the privacy gate. Handlers
-are idempotent: re-scoring or re-analyzing one asset is safe after an interrupted
-attempt.
+Importing this module registers the ``safety_score``, ``analysis``,
+``upload_batch``, ``archive_plan``, and ``restore_plan`` job types so the generic
+worker can run them per item. Each handler delegates to its service, which owns the real work and the
+privacy gate. Handlers are idempotent: re-scoring or re-analyzing one asset is safe
+after an interrupted attempt, an upload batch refuses to re-run an attempt whose
+outcome is unknown, and an archive plan skips items it already completed.
 
 Providers/models are the service defaults here (real NsfwModel / vision provider);
 tests exercise the services directly with injected fakes rather than the worker.
@@ -12,12 +14,19 @@ tests exercise the services directly with injected fakes rather than the worker.
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-from photo_pipeline.jobs.handlers import JobContext, register
+from photo_pipeline.jobs.handlers import Cancelled, JobContext, register
 
 SAFETY_SCORE = "safety_score"
 ANALYSIS = "analysis"
+UPLOAD_BATCH = "upload_batch"
+ARCHIVE_PLAN = "archive_plan"
+RESTORE_PLAN = "restore_plan"
 # Both mutate the library's metadata/derived state; one at a time (concept §one job).
 LIBRARY_WRITE_LOCK = "library_write"
+# The uploader lane: one album batch at a time (concept §16).
+UPLOAD_LOCK = "upload"
+# The archiver lane: one archive/restore plan at a time (concept §16).
+ARCHIVE_LOCK = "archive"
 
 
 def _safety_score_item(asset_id: str, ctx: JobContext) -> None:
@@ -29,8 +38,56 @@ def _safety_score_item(asset_id: str, ctx: JobContext) -> None:
 def _analysis_item(asset_id: str, ctx: JobContext) -> None:
     from photo_pipeline.services.analysis import AnalysisService
 
-    AnalysisService(ctx.session_factory).run([asset_id])
+    roots = tuple(getattr(ctx.config, "library_roots", ()) or ())
+    AnalysisService(ctx.session_factory, library_roots=roots).run([asset_id])
+
+
+def _upload_batch_item(batch_id: str, ctx: JobContext) -> None:
+    """One item = one album batch. The upload itself is long and external, so the
+    handler hands the job's cancellation check to the service, which stops the
+    uploader and leaves a resumable batch."""
+    from photo_pipeline.config import Config
+    from photo_pipeline.services.upload_batches import BatchState, UploadBatchService
+
+    config = ctx.config if ctx.config is not None else Config.from_env()
+    service = UploadBatchService(ctx.session_factory, config=config)
+    batch = service.run(batch_id, worker_id=ctx.worker_id, cancelled=ctx.cancelled)
+    if batch["state"] == BatchState.CANCELLED:
+        raise Cancelled(f"upload batch {batch_id} was cancelled")
+    if batch["state"] in (BatchState.FAILED, BatchState.UNKNOWN):
+        raise RuntimeError(f"upload batch {batch_id} is {batch['state']}: {batch['error_code']}")
+
+
+def _archive_plan_item(plan_id: str, ctx: JobContext) -> None:
+    """One item = one archive plan. Item-level failures stay in the journal (the
+    source is then still there); only an unusable plan fails the job."""
+    from photo_pipeline.config import Config
+    from photo_pipeline.services.archive_transfer import ArchiveTransferService
+
+    config = ctx.config if ctx.config is not None else Config.from_env()
+    result = ArchiveTransferService(ctx.session_factory, config=config).apply(
+        plan_id, worker_id=ctx.worker_id
+    )
+    if result["failed"]:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"archive plan {plan_id}: {result['failed']} item(s) failed")
+
+
+def _restore_plan_item(plan_id: str, ctx: JobContext) -> None:
+    """One item = one restore plan. A restore removes nothing, so an item failure
+    simply leaves that asset archived (US06-04)."""
+    from photo_pipeline.config import Config
+    from photo_pipeline.services.restores import RestoreService
+
+    config = ctx.config if ctx.config is not None else Config.from_env()
+    result = RestoreService(ctx.session_factory, config=config).apply(
+        plan_id, worker_id=ctx.worker_id
+    )
+    if result["failed"]:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"restore plan {plan_id}: {result['failed']} item(s) failed")
 
 
 register(SAFETY_SCORE, _safety_score_item)
 register(ANALYSIS, _analysis_item)
+register(UPLOAD_BATCH, _upload_batch_item)
+register(ARCHIVE_PLAN, _archive_plan_item)
+register(RESTORE_PLAN, _restore_plan_item)

photo_pipeline/jobs/handlers.py

@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ class JobContext:
     fencing_token: int
     service: "JobService"
     session_factory: object | None = None
+    # Handlers that talk to an external tool (uploads) need the typed configuration;
+    # the worker passes its own so a test stack is never read from the environment.
+    config: object | None = None
 
     def cancelled(self) -> bool:
         from photo_pipeline.services.jobs import JobState

photo_pipeline/jobs/worker.py

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ from collections.abc import Mapping, Sequence
 from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
 
+from photo_pipeline.faults import JOB_ITEM_DONE, maybe_fault
 from photo_pipeline.jobs.handlers import REGISTRY, Cancelled, Handler, JobContext
 from photo_pipeline.models import JobItem
 from photo_pipeline.services.jobs import ItemState, JobConflict, JobService, JobState
@@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ class Worker:
         *,
         job_types: Sequence[str] | None = None,
         lease_seconds: int = 60,
+        config: object | None = None,
     ) -> None:
         self._session_factory = session_factory
         self.service = JobService(session_factory)
@@ -37,6 +39,7 @@ class Worker:
         self.worker_id = worker_id
         self.job_types = list(job_types if job_types is not None else self.handlers.keys())
         self.lease_seconds = lease_seconds
+        self.config = config
 
     def run_once(self) -> str | None:
         """Recover stragglers, then claim and fully process one job. Returns its id."""
@@ -51,7 +54,9 @@ class Worker:
 
     def _process(self, job_id: str, job_type: str, token: int) -> None:
         handler = self.handlers[job_type]
-        ctx = JobContext(job_id, self.worker_id, token, self.service, self._session_factory)
+        ctx = JobContext(
+            job_id, self.worker_id, token, self.service, self._session_factory, self.config
+        )
         self._reset_interrupted_items(job_id, token)
 
         cancelled = False
@@ -82,6 +87,9 @@ class Worker:
                 )
             else:
                 self.service.set_item(job_id, item_key, ItemState.SUCCEEDED, fencing_token=token)
+                # One item is durably done, the job outcome is not: the control point
+                # for a crash mid-batch (US07-04). Recovery must not re-run this item.
+                maybe_fault(JOB_ITEM_DONE)
             self.service.heartbeat(job_id, self.worker_id, lease_seconds=self.lease_seconds)
 
         self._finalize(job_id, token, cancelled=cancelled, any_failed=any_failed)
@@ -92,6 +100,16 @@ class Worker:
             return
         try:
             if cancelled or snapshot["state"] == JobState.CANCELLING:
+                # A handler may stop on its own — an upload batch cancelled through
+                # its own API never touches the job — so the job can still be
+                # ``running`` here. Record the request before the outcome: a stop is
+                # always observable as cancelling → cancelled, and ``running ->
+                # cancelled`` is not a legal jump. Without this hop the transition
+                # is rejected and the job keeps its lock forever.
+                if snapshot["state"] == JobState.RUNNING:
+                    self.service.transition(
+                        job_id, JobState.CANCELLING, worker_id=self.worker_id, fencing_token=token
+                    )
                 self.service.transition(
                     job_id, JobState.CANCELLED, worker_id=self.worker_id, fencing_token=token
                 )

photo_pipeline/models/__init__.py

@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ Alembic environment relies on.
 """
 
 from photo_pipeline.models.albums import AlbumProposal
+from photo_pipeline.models.archives import ArchiveLocation, ArchiveOperation, ArchivePlan
 from photo_pipeline.models.assets import Asset, AssetPath
+from photo_pipeline.models.exif import ExifProjection
 from photo_pipeline.models.duplicates import (
     DuplicateCluster,
     DuplicateMember,
@@ -14,21 +16,29 @@ from photo_pipeline.models.duplicates import (
 from photo_pipeline.models.jobs import Job, JobEvent, JobItem
 from photo_pipeline.models.renames import RenameOperation, RenamePlan
 from photo_pipeline.models.thumbnails import Thumbnail
+from photo_pipeline.models.uploads import UploadBatch, UploadItem, UploadVerification
 from photo_pipeline.models.workflow import AnalysisResult, SafetyReview
 
 __all__ = [
     "AlbumProposal",
+    "ArchiveLocation",
+    "ArchiveOperation",
+    "ArchivePlan",
     "Asset",
     "AssetPath",
     "DuplicateCluster",
     "DuplicateMember",
     "DuplicateNegativeLink",
+    "ExifProjection",
     "Job",
     "JobItem",
     "JobEvent",
     "RenamePlan",
     "RenameOperation",
     "Thumbnail",
+    "UploadBatch",
+    "UploadItem",
+    "UploadVerification",
     "SafetyReview",
     "AnalysisResult",
 ]

photo_pipeline/models/archives.py

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+"""Archive location, plan, and transfer-journal persistence (US06-01, US06-02).
+
+An archive location is a *medium*, not a path. External disks get mounted at
+different mountpoints, and a different disk can be mounted at the same one, so a
+recorded root alone can never prove "these bytes went to that volume". Each
+location therefore owns a marker file written onto the medium itself; its
+``media_id`` is the stable identity, and the root is only where it was last seen.
+
+``capabilities`` and ``state`` are the last probe result, kept so the UI can list
+locations without touching a sleeping disk. Preflight always re-probes — a stored
+state is a hint, never evidence.
+
+An ``ArchivePlan`` is one approved preflight turned into durable work, and each
+``ArchiveOperation`` is one file's crash-safe journal row (US06-02). The row records
+what the transfer *intends* to do before it does it — source, destination, expected
+hash — because after a crash that intent plus the files on disk is the only evidence
+available for deciding whether an original may be removed.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from datetime import datetime
+
+from sqlalchemy import (
+    Boolean,
+    DateTime,
+    ForeignKey,
+    Integer,
+    String,
+    UniqueConstraint,
+    func,
+)
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column
+
+from photo_pipeline.db import Base
+
+
+class ArchiveLocation(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "archive_locations"
+
+    id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, primary_key=True)
+    name: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False, unique=True)
+    root: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False)
+    # Written into the marker file on the medium; proves the right volume is mounted.
+    media_id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False, unique=True)
+    capabilities: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)  # JSON, last probe
+    # online | offline | wrong_volume | unwritable — the last probe's verdict.
+    state: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False, default="offline")
+    last_seen_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))
+
+    created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
+        DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=func.now()
+    )
+    updated_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
+        DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=func.now(), onupdate=func.now()
+    )
+
+
+class ArchivePlan(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "archive_plans"
+
+    id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, primary_key=True)
+    location_id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(
+        ForeignKey("archive_locations.id"), nullable=False, index=True
+    )
+    # The preflight token this plan was approved against; re-verified before apply.
+    token: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False)
+    albums: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)  # JSON array
+    # archive | restore — the same journal read in the opposite direction (US06-04).
+    direction: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False, default="archive")
+
+    # planned | applying | complete | failed
+    state: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False, default="planned")
+    schema_version: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=1)
+    asset_count: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=0)
+    byte_size: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=0)
+    # Bumped on every claim and used as the fencing token, so a superseded attempt
+    # cannot commit.
+    version: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=1)
+    worker_id: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    completed_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))
+
+    created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
+        DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=func.now()
+    )
+    updated_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
+        DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=func.now(), onupdate=func.now()
+    )
+
+
+class ArchiveOperation(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "archive_operations"
+    __table_args__ = (
+        UniqueConstraint("plan_id", "sequence", name="uq_archive_operations_plan_sequence"),
+    )
+
+    id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, primary_key=True)
+    plan_id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(
+        ForeignKey("archive_plans.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), nullable=False, index=True
+    )
+    sequence: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False)
+    album: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False)
+    asset_id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(ForeignKey("assets.id"), nullable=False, index=True)
+
+    # archive: library → medium. restore: medium → library (US06-04). ``source_path``
+    # and ``destination_path`` always mean "from" and "to" for this direction.
+    direction: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False, default="archive")
+    source_path: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False)
+    destination_path: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False)
+    # Relative to the location root, because the medium can be mounted elsewhere.
+    archive_path: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False)
+    expected_sha256: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False)
+    byte_size: Mapped[int | None] = mapped_column(Integer)
+    same_filesystem: Mapped[bool | None] = mapped_column(Boolean)
+
+    # planned | transferring | verified | removing | complete | failed
+    journal_state: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False, default="planned")
+    attempt_count: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=0)
+    fencing_token: Mapped[int | None] = mapped_column(Integer)
+    worker_id: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    verified_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))
+    removed_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))
+    error_code: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    error_message: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    updated_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
+        DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=func.now(), onupdate=func.now()
+    )

photo_pipeline/models/assets.py

@@ -35,7 +35,18 @@ class Asset(Base):
 
     discovered_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False)
     missing_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))
+    # active | archiving | archived_online | archived_offline | restoring |
+    # missing_unexpected (concept §9). ``current_path`` is NULL once archived; the
+    # original is then explained by the location plus its relative archive path.
     availability_state: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False, default="active")
+    # Not a declared foreign key: SQLite cannot add one to an existing table, so the
+    # link is written and read by the archive service (US06-02).
+    archive_location_id: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    archive_path: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    # Set when the archived copy was proven to hold bytes other than the recorded
+    # ones (US06-04). Restore refuses such an asset instead of accepting a different
+    # file; cleared as soon as a verification matches again.
+    archive_divergent_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))
     # Duplicate canonical link: NULL when the asset is itself canonical or undecided.
     canonical_asset_id: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(ForeignKey("assets.id"))
 

photo_pipeline/models/exif.py

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+"""The durable EXIF projection per asset and stage (concept §3, US07-03).
+
+One row per ``(asset_id, stage)``: what the stage wanted written, what the file
+looked like afterwards, and whether anything outside the stage's ownership moved.
+``state = divergent`` is the whole point of the table — it survives restarts, keeps
+the asset out of stages that require verified metadata, and gives a human something
+to look at instead of a silent repair.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from datetime import datetime
+
+from sqlalchemy import DateTime, ForeignKey, Integer, String
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column
+
+from photo_pipeline.db import Base
+
+
+class ExifProjection(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "exif_projections"
+
+    asset_id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(ForeignKey("assets.id"), primary_key=True)
+    stage: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, primary_key=True)  # safety | analysis
+    id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False)
+    projection_version: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=0)
+    desired_json: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    divergent_fields: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)  # JSON array
+    result_file_sha256: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    state: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False)  # verified|divergent|failed
+    error_code: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    verified_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))
+    updated_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))

photo_pipeline/models/thumbnails.py

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 from datetime import datetime
 
-from sqlalchemy import DateTime, ForeignKey, Integer, String, func
+from sqlalchemy import Boolean, DateTime, ForeignKey, Integer, String, func
 from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column
 
 from photo_pipeline.db import Base
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ class Thumbnail(Base):
     width: Mapped[int | None] = mapped_column(Integer)
     height: Mapped[int | None] = mapped_column(Integer)
     format: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    # Durable comparison evidence for an archived asset: never evicted by the LRU
+    # quota, because the original may be on a medium that is no longer reachable.
+    protected: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=False)
     created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
         DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=func.now()
     )

photo_pipeline/models/uploads.py

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+"""Upload batch persistence (US05-02).
+
+One batch is one approved album folder handed to ``immich-go``. It is the durable
+record of an irreversible external action, so it stores everything needed to answer
+"which exact bytes did we send, with which command, and how did it end?" after a
+crash: the preflight token that authorised it, the redacted command, the uploader
+version, the per-asset pre-upload hashes, every attempt, and where the raw report
+was written.
+
+Item rows keep both digests: SHA-256 is the app's byte identity and SHA-1 is what
+Immich/immich-go use to recognise a file it already has (concept §8).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from datetime import datetime
+
+from sqlalchemy import (
+    Boolean,
+    DateTime,
+    ForeignKey,
+    Integer,
+    String,
+    func,
+)
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column
+
+from photo_pipeline.db import Base
+
+
+class UploadBatch(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "upload_batches"
+
+    id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, primary_key=True)
+    album: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False, index=True)
+    folder: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False)
+    album_name: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False)
+    # planned | running | cancelling | cancelled | succeeded | failed
+    # | unknown_requires_verification
+    state: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False, default="planned")
+    # The preflight token this batch was approved against; re-checked before every
+    # attempt so changed bytes or decisions cannot be uploaded silently.
+    preflight_token: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False)
+    allow_partial: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=False)
+
+    command: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)  # JSON array, redacted
+    uploader_version: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    asset_count: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=0)
+
+    attempt_count: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=0)
+    # Bumped on every claim and used as the fencing token, so a superseded attempt
+    # cannot commit its outcome.
+    version: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=1)
+    worker_id: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+
+    report_path: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    report_bytes: Mapped[int | None] = mapped_column(Integer)
+    report_truncated: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=False)
+    exit_code: Mapped[int | None] = mapped_column(Integer)
+
+    # Parsed report evidence (US05-03). ``parser`` is NULL when the uploader's
+    # version has no pinned grammar; ``outcome_state`` is then
+    # ``requires_verification`` regardless of how the process exited.
+    parser: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    parser_version: Mapped[int | None] = mapped_column(Integer)
+    parsed_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))
+    # verified | requires_verification; NULL until a report has been parsed.
+    outcome_state: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    outcome_counts: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)  # JSON, from the items
+    report_counts: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)  # JSON, uploader's own
+
+    # Verification (US05-04). ``stale_bytes`` means at least one uploaded file has
+    # been edited since: the batch carries a visible warning and cannot be re-run.
+    verified_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))
+    stale_bytes: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=False)
+
+    error_code: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    error_message: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+
+    started_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))
+    finished_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))
+    created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
+        DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=func.now()
+    )
+    updated_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
+        DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=func.now(), onupdate=func.now()
+    )
+
+
+class UploadItem(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "upload_items"
+
+    batch_id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(
+        ForeignKey("upload_batches.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), primary_key=True
+    )
+    asset_id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, primary_key=True)
+    path: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False)
+    # Hashes of the bytes as they were when the batch was created.
+    sha256: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    sha1: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    # pending | sent | failed — what the batch *process* did with this item;
+    # ``sent`` only means the uploader exited successfully.
+    state: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False, default="pending")
+    # What the uploader's report says happened (US05-03): uploaded | upgraded |
+    # duplicate | skipped | failed | unknown. NULL before the report is parsed;
+    # ``unknown`` whenever the report does not classify this file — never success.
+    outcome: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    evidence: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)  # the bounded report line
+    outcome_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))
+
+    # Verification against the server (US05-04): present | absent | inconclusive |
+    # manual. NULL until the item has been verified; ``inconclusive`` whenever the
+    # server could not answer — which is never treated as success.
+    verification: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    verified_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))
+    # The bytes on disk at verification time, and whether they still are the bytes
+    # this batch uploaded.
+    observed_sha256: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    changed_after_upload: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=False)
+
+    updated_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
+        DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=func.now(), onupdate=func.now()
+    )
+
+
+class UploadVerification(Base):
+    """Append-only evidence for every verification and manual resolution (US05-04).
+
+    The item row is a projection of the latest answer; this table is the history
+    that answers "who decided this, on what evidence, and when?". Rows are never
+    updated or deleted, so a manual resolution can always be told apart from
+    server evidence.
+    """
+
+    __tablename__ = "upload_verifications"
+
+    id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, primary_key=True)
+    batch_id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(
+        ForeignKey("upload_batches.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), nullable=False, index=True
+    )
+    asset_id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False)
+    action: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False)  # verify | resolve
+    source: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False)  # immich_api | operator
+    # present | absent | inconclusive for a verify; the recorded outcome for a resolve.
+    result: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False)
+    outcome: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    evidence: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False)
+    actor: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String)
+    created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
+        DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=func.now()
+    )

photo_pipeline/path_policy.py

@@ -49,6 +49,29 @@ def resolve_within(root: Path, path: os.PathLike | str) -> Path:
     return resolved
 
 
+def resolve_in_roots(roots: Iterable[os.PathLike | str], path: os.PathLike | str) -> Path:
+    """The resolved path, proven to be inside one of ``roots`` and not excluded.
+
+    Callers must use the **returned** path for whatever they do next: validating one
+    name and then opening another is the symlink race this exists to close (US07-02).
+    The message names no path — it reaches API responses.
+
+    With no roots configured there is no boundary to check; that is a property of the
+    configuration, not permission granted to this call.
+    """
+    if is_excluded(path):
+        raise PathPolicyError("path is inside an excluded (_IGNORE/) tree")
+    roots = list(roots)
+    if not roots:
+        return Path(path)
+    for root in roots:
+        try:
+            return resolve_within(Path(root), path)
+        except PathPolicyError:
+            continue
+    raise PathPolicyError("path is outside the configured library roots")
+
+
 def iter_supported_files(root: os.PathLike | str) -> Iterator[Path]:
     """Yield supported, non-excluded files under ``root`` in deterministic order.
 

photo_pipeline/services/analysis.py

@@ -25,9 +25,9 @@ from typing import Protocol
 from sqlalchemy import func, select
 from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
 
-from photo_pipeline.integrations import exiftool
+from photo_pipeline import path_policy
 from photo_pipeline.models import AnalysisResult, Asset, SafetyReview
-from photo_pipeline.services import hashing
+from photo_pipeline.services import exif_checkpoint
 from photo_pipeline.services.safety import SFW
 
 MODEL = "gemini-2.5-flash"
@@ -59,9 +59,16 @@ def _now() -> datetime:
 
 
 class AnalysisService:
-    def __init__(self, session_factory: sessionmaker, *, provider: VisionProvider | None = None) -> None:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        session_factory: sessionmaker,
+        *,
+        provider: VisionProvider | None = None,
+        library_roots: tuple = (),
+    ) -> None:
         self._session_factory = session_factory
         self._provider = provider
+        self._roots = tuple(library_roots)
 
     def _sfw_asset_ids(self, session) -> set[str]:
         """Asset ids whose latest safety decision is ``sfw`` — the ONLY assets that
@@ -71,6 +78,11 @@ class AnalysisService:
             latest[review.asset_id] = review.decision
         return {aid for aid, decision in latest.items() if decision == SFW}
 
+    def _is_still_sfw(self, asset_id: str) -> bool:
+        """Re-read the current safety decision straight from the database."""
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            return asset_id in self._sfw_asset_ids(session)
+
     def eligible_asset_ids(self) -> list[str]:
         """Confirmed-SFW canonical active assets without a completed analysis."""
         with self._session_factory() as session:
@@ -136,12 +148,40 @@ class AnalysisService:
             if not path:
                 skipped += 1
                 continue
+            # Second gate, at the moment of use: the database says where the file
+            # was, the filesystem decides what that name means now. A link swapped
+            # under an asset after the scan would otherwise send bytes from outside
+            # the library — the one place that leaves this machine (US07-02).
+            try:
+                path = str(path_policy.resolve_in_roots(self._roots, path))
+            except path_policy.PathPolicyError as error:
+                self._store(
+                    asset_id, status="error", result=None, error=str(error), tokens=0, raw=""
+                )
+                errors += 1
+                continue
             try:
                 result = provider.analyze(path, album_hint=_album_hint(path))
             except Exception as error:  # provider/validation failure is per-asset
                 self._store(asset_id, status="error", result=None, error=str(error), tokens=0, raw="")
                 errors += 1
                 continue
+            # Third gate, after the call: a provider request takes seconds, and the
+            # reviewer may have flipped this asset to NSFW while it was in flight.
+            # The result describes an asset that is no longer analysable, so it is
+            # discarded — not stored, and above all not written into its EXIF
+            # (concept §18 scenario 7, US07-04).
+            if not self._is_still_sfw(asset_id):
+                self._store(
+                    asset_id,
+                    status="skipped_nsfw",
+                    result=None,
+                    error="the safety decision changed while analysis was in flight",
+                    tokens=0,
+                    raw="",
+                )
+                skipped += 1
+                continue
             self._store(
                 asset_id,
                 status="analyzed",
@@ -150,7 +190,7 @@ class AnalysisService:
                 tokens=int(result.get("_tokens", 0)) if isinstance(result, dict) else 0,
                 raw=json.dumps(result, ensure_ascii=False),
             )
-            _write_analysis_exif(path, result)
+            self._write_analysis_exif(asset_id, path, result)
             analyzed += 1
         return {"analyzed": analyzed, "skipped": skipped, "errors": errors}
 
@@ -175,10 +215,42 @@ class AnalysisService:
                 row.location_hint = result.get("location_hint")
                 row.approx_year = result.get("approx_year")
                 row.analyzed_at = now
-                row.exif_written_at = now
             session.add(row)
             session.commit()
 
+    def _write_analysis_exif(self, asset_id: str, path: str, result: dict) -> None:
+        """The analysis EXIF checkpoint: additive keywords, then prove the rest held.
+
+        Additive by design — safety keywords and the user's own keywords are merged
+        with, never replaced (concept §3). ``exif_written_at`` is set only when the
+        read-back verified both the new keywords and every field this stage does not
+        own; a divergent result is recorded and left for a human (US07-03).
+        ponytail: the managed ``AI:`` caption segment, once captions are owned here.
+        """
+        tags = tuple(str(tag) for tag in (result.get("tags") or []))
+        if not tags:
+            return
+        checkpoint = exif_checkpoint.run(path, add=tags)
+        exif_checkpoint.record(
+            self._session_factory,
+            asset_id=asset_id,
+            stage="analysis",
+            result=checkpoint,
+            add=tags,
+        )
+        if not checkpoint.verified:
+            return
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            row = session.get(AnalysisResult, asset_id)
+            if row is not None:
+                row.exif_written_at = checkpoint.verified_at
+            asset = session.get(Asset, asset_id)
+            if asset is not None and checkpoint.sha256:
+                # The bytes changed when the container was rewritten; upload must use
+                # the hash of what is actually on disk now (concept §3).
+                asset.current_sha256 = checkpoint.sha256
+            session.commit()
+
     def get(self, asset_id: str) -> dict | None:
         with self._session_factory() as session:
             row = session.get(AnalysisResult, asset_id)
@@ -191,17 +263,6 @@ def _album_hint(path: str) -> str:
     return Path(path).parent.name
 
 
-def _write_analysis_exif(path: str, result: dict) -> None:
-    """Additive analysis keywords into EXIF (Keywords/Subject), preserving safety
-    and user keywords. The donor also wrote a managed caption; only keywords are
-    written here via the shared adapter.
-    ponytail: add the managed ``AI:`` caption segment + read-back preservation check
-    when the analysis EXIF checkpoint is hardened."""
-    tags = result.get("tags") if isinstance(result, dict) else None
-    if tags:
-        exiftool.apply_keywords(path, add=[str(t) for t in tags])
-
-
 def _result_dict(row: AnalysisResult) -> dict:
     data = {field: getattr(row, field) for field in RESULT_FIELDS}
     data["tags"] = json.loads(row.tags) if row.tags else []

photo_pipeline/services/archive_journal.py

@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
+"""Archive transfer journal — the durable record of every per-file transition
+(US06-02).
+
+Archiving is the only stage that deletes an original, so the journal exists to make
+one question answerable after any crash: *may this source file be removed?* Intent
+is written before the mutation it describes, and the recorded state plus the real
+files on disk are the sole basis for answering it later. This module owns the state
+machine, the durable writes, and the evidence table; it never touches a photo
+(:mod:`photo_pipeline.services.archive_transfer` does).
+
+Per-item state machine (concept §9 "Transfer and removal semantics"):
+
+```
+planned → transferring → verified → removing → complete
+              ↘             ↘          ↘ failed
+```
+
+A restore (US06-04) uses the same rows with ``direction='restore'``: it copies from
+the medium back into the library and removes nothing, so it goes ``verified →
+complete`` directly. ``source_path``/``destination_path`` always mean "from"/"to",
+which is why the evidence table below needs no direction of its own.
+
+- ``transferring`` — intent recorded; a temporary copy may exist, the destination
+  may or may not have been published. Nothing has been removed.
+- ``verified``     — the archived bytes exist at their final path, hash exactly as
+  recorded, and the manifest entry is durable. Only from here may a source go.
+- ``removing``     — the source removal is committed to; the source may already be
+  gone while the database still points at it.
+- ``complete``     — source absent, database updated, availability recorded.
+
+``classify`` labels each incomplete item from the journal plus disk evidence:
+
+- ``resumable`` — nothing was published; the source is intact, so applying again is
+  safe.
+- ``forward``   — the archived copy exists and matches its recorded hash, so the
+  remaining steps (manifest, removal, bookkeeping) can be finished deterministically.
+- ``manual``    — the evidence contradicts the journal (missing archive copy, wrong
+  bytes, source and archive both gone). Nothing is guessed and nothing is removed;
+  the item blocks unrelated mutations until a human decides.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
+
+from photo_pipeline.models import ArchiveOperation, ArchivePlan
+from photo_pipeline.services.hashing import sha256_file
+
+
+class ArchiveState:
+    PLANNED = "planned"
+    TRANSFERRING = "transferring"
+    VERIFIED = "verified"
+    REMOVING = "removing"
+    COMPLETE = "complete"
+    FAILED = "failed"
+
+
+ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS = {
+    ArchiveState.PLANNED: {ArchiveState.TRANSFERRING, ArchiveState.FAILED},
+    # From `transferring` the outcome is unknown until evidence is gathered, so it
+    # may resolve forward, back to planned (proven nothing was published), or fail.
+    ArchiveState.TRANSFERRING: {
+        ArchiveState.VERIFIED,
+        ArchiveState.PLANNED,
+        ArchiveState.FAILED,
+    },
+    ArchiveState.VERIFIED: {ArchiveState.REMOVING, ArchiveState.FAILED},
+    # No path back: once the source may be gone, only finishing is safe.
+    ArchiveState.REMOVING: {ArchiveState.COMPLETE, ArchiveState.FAILED},
+    ArchiveState.COMPLETE: set(),
+    # A retry re-enters `transferring`, which rechecks every precondition from
+    # scratch; recovery may also reset a failed item to `planned`.
+    ArchiveState.FAILED: {ArchiveState.PLANNED, ArchiveState.TRANSFERRING},
+}
+
+# A restore removes nothing, so it has no ``removing`` step: a verified published
+# copy is the whole job (US06-04). Keeping this as a separate table means the
+# archive direction still cannot reach ``complete`` without going through removal.
+RESTORE_TRANSITIONS = {
+    **ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS,
+    ArchiveState.VERIFIED: {ArchiveState.COMPLETE, ArchiveState.FAILED},
+}
+
+TERMINAL_STATES = frozenset({ArchiveState.COMPLETE})
+# States where this item may already have touched the filesystem.
+UNSAFE_STATES = frozenset({ArchiveState.TRANSFERRING, ArchiveState.VERIFIED, ArchiveState.REMOVING})
+
+# Which way the bytes move. Same rows, same evidence table, opposite direction.
+ARCHIVE = "archive"
+RESTORE = "restore"
+
+RESUMABLE = "resumable"
+FORWARD = "forward"
+MANUAL = "manual"
+
+
+class JournalError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class InvalidTransition(JournalError):
+    pass
+
+
+class JournalConflict(JournalError):
+    """Fencing check failed; a newer owner has taken over this operation."""
+
+
+def can_transition(current: str, target: str, direction: str = ARCHIVE) -> bool:
+    table = RESTORE_TRANSITIONS if direction == RESTORE else ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS
+    return target in table.get(current, set())
+
+
+def _now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+class ArchiveJournal:
+    def __init__(self, session_factory: sessionmaker) -> None:
+        self._session_factory = session_factory
+
+    # ── intent ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def begin(self, operation_id: str, *, worker_id: str, fencing_token: int) -> dict:
+        """Record the intent to transfer **before** touching the filesystem."""
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            row = self._require(session, operation_id)
+            if row.fencing_token is not None and fencing_token < row.fencing_token:
+                raise JournalConflict(
+                    f"stale fencing token {fencing_token} (current {row.fencing_token})"
+                )
+            if row.journal_state in TERMINAL_STATES:
+                raise InvalidTransition(f"{row.journal_state} is terminal")
+            if row.journal_state != ArchiveState.TRANSFERRING and not can_transition(
+                row.journal_state, ArchiveState.TRANSFERRING, row.direction
+            ):
+                raise InvalidTransition(f"{row.journal_state} -> {ArchiveState.TRANSFERRING}")
+            if row.journal_state != ArchiveState.TRANSFERRING:
+                row.attempt_count += 1
+            row.journal_state = ArchiveState.TRANSFERRING
+            row.worker_id = worker_id
+            row.fencing_token = fencing_token
+            row.error_code = row.error_message = None
+            row.updated_at = _now()
+            session.commit()
+            return _operation_dict(row)
+
+    # ── transitions ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def transition(
+        self,
+        operation_id: str,
+        target: str,
+        *,
+        fencing_token: int | None = None,
+        error: tuple[str, str] | None = None,
+        same_filesystem: bool | None = None,
+    ) -> dict:
+        """Move one operation to ``target``, enforcing the state machine.
+
+        Re-entering the state an operation already holds is a no-op, which is what
+        makes recovery idempotent across repeated restarts.
+        """
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            row = self._require(session, operation_id)
+            if fencing_token is not None and row.fencing_token is not None:
+                if fencing_token < row.fencing_token:
+                    raise JournalConflict(
+                        f"stale fencing token {fencing_token} (current {row.fencing_token})"
+                    )
+            if same_filesystem is not None:
+                row.same_filesystem = same_filesystem
+            if row.journal_state == target:
+                session.commit()
+                return _operation_dict(row)  # idempotent
+            if not can_transition(row.journal_state, target, row.direction):
+                raise InvalidTransition(f"{row.journal_state} -> {target}")
+
+            row.journal_state = target
+            row.updated_at = _now()
+            if target == ArchiveState.VERIFIED:
+                row.verified_at = _now()
+            if target == ArchiveState.COMPLETE:
+                row.removed_at = _now()
+            if error:
+                row.error_code, row.error_message = error[0], error[1][:500]
+            elif target != ArchiveState.FAILED:
+                row.error_code = row.error_message = None
+            session.commit()
+            return _operation_dict(row)
+
+    # ── reads ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def get(self, operation_id: str) -> dict | None:
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            row = session.get(ArchiveOperation, operation_id)
+            return _operation_dict(row) if row else None
+
+    def operations(self, plan_id: str) -> list[dict]:
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            rows = session.scalars(
+                select(ArchiveOperation)
+                .where(ArchiveOperation.plan_id == plan_id)
+                .order_by(ArchiveOperation.sequence)
+            )
+            return [_operation_dict(row) for row in rows]
+
+    def incomplete(self, *, direction: str | None = None) -> list[dict]:
+        """Every operation left in a non-terminal, non-planned state — the work a
+        restart has to reason about. Without ``direction`` this spans archives and
+        restores, because either one half-done blocks the other."""
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            stmt = select(ArchiveOperation).where(
+                ArchiveOperation.journal_state.not_in([*TERMINAL_STATES, ArchiveState.PLANNED])
+            )
+            if direction is not None:
+                stmt = stmt.where(ArchiveOperation.direction == direction)
+            rows = session.scalars(
+                stmt.order_by(ArchiveOperation.plan_id, ArchiveOperation.sequence)
+            )
+            return [_operation_dict(row) for row in rows]
+
+    # ── startup classification ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def classify(self, operation_id: str) -> dict:
+        """Classify one incomplete operation from the journal plus disk evidence.
+
+        Hashes the archived copy when one exists: "a file is at the destination" is
+        not evidence that the *right* bytes are, and only the right bytes justify
+        removing an original. Never mutates anything.
+        """
+        row = self.get(operation_id)
+        if row is None:
+            raise JournalError(f"unknown archive operation {operation_id!r}")
+        source = Path(row["source_path"])
+        destination = Path(row["destination_path"])
+        source_exists = source.exists()
+        destination_exists = destination.exists()
+        destination_matches = (
+            destination_exists and sha256_file(destination) == row["expected_sha256"]
+        )
+
+        classification, reason = _classify(
+            row["journal_state"], source_exists, destination_exists, destination_matches
+        )
+        return {
+            "operation_id": operation_id,
+            "plan_id": row["plan_id"],
+            "direction": row["direction"],
+            "album": row["album"],
+            "asset_id": row["asset_id"],
+            "source_path": row["source_path"],
+            "destination_path": row["destination_path"],
+            "journal_state": row["journal_state"],
+            "classification": classification,
+            "reason": reason,
+            "source_exists": source_exists,
+            "destination_exists": destination_exists,
+            "destination_matches": destination_matches,
+        }
+
+    def classify_all(self, *, direction: str | None = None) -> list[dict]:
+        return [self.classify(row["id"]) for row in self.incomplete(direction=direction)]
+
+    def blocks_mutation(self) -> bool:
+        """True when any item may have the library half-archived."""
+        return any(row["journal_state"] in UNSAFE_STATES for row in self.incomplete())
+
+    # ── plan-level ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def plan_state(self, plan_id: str) -> str:
+        """Derive the plan's state from its items, so the summary can never disagree
+        with the journal."""
+        states = {row["journal_state"] for row in self.operations(plan_id)}
+        if not states:
+            return "planned"
+        if states <= {ArchiveState.COMPLETE}:
+            return "complete"
+        if states & {ArchiveState.FAILED}:
+            return "failed"
+        if states & UNSAFE_STATES:
+            return "applying"
+        return "planned"
+
+    def sync_plan_state(self, plan_id: str) -> str:
+        state = self.plan_state(plan_id)
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            plan = session.get(ArchivePlan, plan_id)
+            if plan is None:
+                raise JournalError(f"unknown archive plan {plan_id!r}")
+            if plan.state != state:
+                plan.state = state
+                plan.version += 1
+                plan.updated_at = _now()
+                if state == "complete" and plan.completed_at is None:
+                    plan.completed_at = _now()
+                session.commit()
+        return state
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _require(session, operation_id: str) -> ArchiveOperation:
+        row = session.get(ArchiveOperation, operation_id)
+        if row is None:
+            raise JournalError(f"unknown archive operation {operation_id!r}")
+        return row
+
+
+def _classify(
+    state: str, source_exists: bool, destination_exists: bool, destination_matches: bool
+) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    """The evidence table. Kept a pure function so every combination is testable."""
+    if destination_exists and not destination_matches and state != ArchiveState.PLANNED:
+        # Someone else's file, or a partial/edited copy: never overwrite it, and
+        # never treat it as the durable archive that justifies a deletion.
+        return MANUAL, "the archived path holds bytes that are not the recorded ones"
+
+    if state in (ArchiveState.TRANSFERRING, ArchiveState.FAILED):
+        if destination_matches:
+            return FORWARD, "the archived copy is durable; finish the remaining steps"
+        if source_exists:
+            return RESUMABLE, "nothing was published; the source is intact"
+        return MANUAL, "neither the source nor a verified archive copy is present"
+
+    if state in (ArchiveState.VERIFIED, ArchiveState.REMOVING):
+        if destination_matches:
+            return FORWARD, "the archived copy is durable; finish the remaining steps"
+        return MANUAL, f"journal says {state} but the archived copy is missing"
+
+    return MANUAL, f"unhandled journal state {state}"
+
+
+def _operation_dict(row: ArchiveOperation) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "id": row.id,
+        "plan_id": row.plan_id,
+        "direction": row.direction,
+        "sequence": row.sequence,
+        "album": row.album,
+        "asset_id": row.asset_id,
+        "source_path": row.source_path,
+        "destination_path": row.destination_path,
+        "archive_path": row.archive_path,
+        "expected_sha256": row.expected_sha256,
+        "byte_size": row.byte_size,
+        "same_filesystem": row.same_filesystem,
+        "journal_state": row.journal_state,
+        "attempt_count": row.attempt_count,
+        "fencing_token": row.fencing_token,
+        "worker_id": row.worker_id,
+        "verified_at": row.verified_at.isoformat() if row.verified_at else None,
+        "removed_at": row.removed_at.isoformat() if row.removed_at else None,
+        "error_code": row.error_code,
+        "error_message": row.error_message,
+    }

photo_pipeline/services/archive_transfer.py

@@ -0,0 +1,645 @@
+"""Transfer an approved archive plan, verify it, and remove the active sources
+(US06-02).
+
+This is the only module that deletes originals from the photo library, so every
+step exists to make one promise keepable: **a source is removed only after the
+archived bytes are durable and proven identical.** The journal (US06-02,
+:mod:`photo_pipeline.services.archive_journal`) records intent before each mutation;
+this module performs the mutations and the recovery that reads that intent back.
+
+Per file the sequence is:
+
+```
+journal.begin (transferring)   ← intent persisted BEFORE any disk change
+recheck preconditions          ← source hash, free destination, no symlink
+copy to a temporary file       ← same directory, so the publish is atomic
+fsync, close, hash it back     ← read from disk; the write is not the evidence
+atomically publish             ← rename onto the final archive path
+append the manifest entry      ← durable on the medium itself, fsynced
+journal → verified
+journal → removing             ← intent to delete, persisted first
+re-verify the archive copy, remove the source, verify its absence
+current_path=NULL, close the path occurrence, availability + location recorded
+journal → complete
+```
+
+Same-filesystem albums may skip the copy and use an atomic ``rename`` instead
+(concept §9), but only when the shared device is proven at run time — never from the
+plan's stored guess — and the published file is hashed afterwards exactly as in the
+copy path.
+
+Rules that are never relaxed:
+
+- An occupied destination is never overwritten; the item fails with the source
+  untouched.
+- A source whose bytes no longer match the plan is never archived and never removed.
+- A crash resolves from journal + disk evidence only: an archive copy that is
+  missing or hashes differently blocks the item for a human instead of being
+  retried or, worse, treated as a successful archive.
+- Recovery is idempotent — repeated passes converge on the same state.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import shutil
+import uuid
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
+
+from photo_pipeline.config import Config
+from photo_pipeline.faults import maybe_fault
+from photo_pipeline.models import ArchiveLocation, ArchiveOperation, ArchivePlan, Asset, AssetPath
+from photo_pipeline.services.archive_journal import (
+    ARCHIVE,
+    MANUAL,
+    RESUMABLE,
+    ArchiveJournal,
+    ArchiveState,
+)
+from photo_pipeline.services.archives import MARKER_NAME, ArchiveError, ArchiveService
+from photo_pipeline.services.duplicates import DuplicateService
+from photo_pipeline.services.hashing import sha256_file
+from photo_pipeline.services.rename_apply import PreconditionFailed
+from photo_pipeline.services.thumbnails import ThumbnailService
+
+# The per-medium manifest: one JSON line per archived file, appended and fsynced
+# before its source is removed. It lives with the bytes so the archive can still be
+# read back if the database is lost.
+MANIFEST_NAME = "archive-manifest.jsonl"
+MANIFEST_VERSION = 1
+TEMP_SUFFIX = ".part"
+TEMP_PREFIX = ".archive-"
+# Fault barrier between "the source is gone" and "the database knows it" — not a
+# journal state, but the transition crash tests care about most.
+SOURCE_REMOVED = "source_removed"
+
+APPLYABLE_PLAN_STATES = frozenset({"planned", "applying", "failed", "complete"})
+
+
+def _now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+class ArchiveTransferService:
+    def __init__(self, session_factory: sessionmaker, *, config: Config) -> None:
+        self._session_factory = session_factory
+        self._config = config
+        self.journal = ArchiveJournal(session_factory)
+
+    # ── plans ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def create(self, location_id: str, albums: list[str] | None = None, *, token: str) -> dict:
+        """Turn an approved preflight into a durable plan.
+
+        The token is re-derived from a fresh preflight, so a plan can only be
+        created for the exact scope, bytes, and destination the user approved.
+        """
+        preflight = ArchiveService(self._session_factory, config=self._config).preflight(
+            location_id, albums
+        )
+        if not token or token != preflight["token"]:
+            raise ArchiveError("stale_token", "the archive preflight changed since it was approved")
+        if preflight["state"] != "ready":
+            codes = ", ".join(sorted({issue["code"] for issue in preflight["blockers"]})) or "-"
+            raise ArchiveError("blocked", f"the archive scope is blocked: {codes}")
+
+        root = Path(preflight["location"]["root"])
+        plan_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            session.add(
+                ArchivePlan(
+                    id=plan_id,
+                    location_id=location_id,
+                    token=token,
+                    albums=json.dumps(albums) if albums is not None else None,
+                    direction=ARCHIVE,
+                    state="planned",
+                    schema_version=MANIFEST_VERSION,
+                    asset_count=preflight["totals"]["assets"],
+                    byte_size=preflight["totals"]["bytes"],
+                )
+            )
+            session.flush()  # the plan row must exist before its items reference it
+            sequence = 0
+            for album in preflight["albums"]:
+                destination_dir = Path(album["destination"])
+                for asset in album["assets"]:
+                    source = Path(asset["current_path"])
+                    destination = destination_dir / source.name
+                    session.add(
+                        ArchiveOperation(
+                            id=str(uuid.uuid4()),
+                            plan_id=plan_id,
+                            direction=ARCHIVE,
+                            sequence=sequence,
+                            album=album["album"],
+                            asset_id=asset["asset_id"],
+                            source_path=str(source),
+                            destination_path=str(destination),
+                            archive_path=str(destination.relative_to(root)),
+                            expected_sha256=asset["current_sha256"],
+                            byte_size=asset["byte_size"],
+                            # Recorded as a preview only; the real decision is made
+                            # against the devices at apply time.
+                            same_filesystem=album["transfer_method"] == "move",
+                            journal_state=ArchiveState.PLANNED,
+                        )
+                    )
+                    sequence += 1
+            session.commit()
+        return self.get(plan_id)
+
+    def get(self, plan_id: str) -> dict | None:
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            plan = session.get(ArchivePlan, plan_id)
+            if plan is None:
+                return None
+            report = _plan_dict(plan)
+        report["operations"] = self.journal.operations(plan_id)
+        return report
+
+    def list(self) -> list[dict]:
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            rows = session.scalars(
+                select(ArchivePlan)
+                .where(ArchivePlan.direction == ARCHIVE)
+                .order_by(ArchivePlan.created_at)
+            )
+            return [_plan_dict(row) for row in rows]
+
+    # ── apply ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def apply(
+        self,
+        plan_id: str,
+        *,
+        expected_version: int | None = None,
+        worker_id: str = "archive",
+    ) -> dict:
+        """Archive every item of a plan, then report what happened.
+
+        Items are independent: one failure records its reason and leaves that
+        source in place; the rest of the album continues.
+        """
+        plan = self._require_plan(plan_id)
+        if expected_version is not None and plan["version"] != expected_version:
+            raise ArchiveError(
+                "stale_plan",
+                f"plan {plan_id} is at version {plan['version']}, expected {expected_version}",
+            )
+        if plan["state"] not in APPLYABLE_PLAN_STATES:
+            raise ArchiveError("invalid_state", f"plan {plan_id} is {plan['state']}")
+
+        # One archiver lane: never start while another plan may be half-archived
+        # (concept §16 lock hierarchy).
+        blocking = [row for row in self.journal.incomplete() if row["plan_id"] != plan_id]
+        if blocking:
+            raise ArchiveError(
+                "archive_pending",
+                f"another archive operation is unresolved ({blocking[0]['id']}); recover it first",
+            )
+
+        token = self._claim_plan(plan_id)
+        location = self._location(plan["location_id"])
+        archived = failed = skipped = 0
+        for operation in self.journal.operations(plan_id):
+            if operation["journal_state"] == ArchiveState.COMPLETE:
+                skipped += 1  # repeated apply is a no-op for finished work
+                continue
+            try:
+                if operation["journal_state"] in (ArchiveState.VERIFIED, ArchiveState.REMOVING):
+                    # The bytes are already archived; never transfer them twice.
+                    self._finish(operation, location, token=token, worker_id=worker_id)
+                else:
+                    self._archive_one(operation, location, token=token, worker_id=worker_id)
+                archived += 1
+            except PreconditionFailed as error:
+                self._fail(operation, token, error.code, str(error))
+                failed += 1
+            except Exception as error:  # unexpected: record and stop touching disk
+                self._fail(operation, token, "archive_error", str(error))
+                failed += 1
+        self._prune_empty_sources(plan_id)
+        state = self.journal.sync_plan_state(plan_id)
+        return {
+            "plan_id": plan_id,
+            "archived": archived,
+            "failed": failed,
+            "skipped": skipped,
+            "state": state,
+        }
+
+    def _prune_empty_sources(self, plan_id: str) -> None:
+        """Drop an album folder once every one of its files is archived.
+
+        ``rmdir`` only: a folder that still holds anything at all — an unarchived
+        file, someone else's file, a subfolder — is left exactly as it is.
+        """
+        folders: dict[Path, set[str]] = {}
+        for operation in self.journal.operations(plan_id):
+            folders.setdefault(Path(operation["source_path"]).parent, set()).add(
+                operation["journal_state"]
+            )
+        for folder, states in folders.items():
+            if states == {ArchiveState.COMPLETE}:
+                try:
+                    folder.rmdir()
+                except OSError:
+                    pass  # not empty, or gone already; either way, leave it alone
+
+    def _archive_one(self, operation: dict, location: dict, *, token: int, worker_id: str) -> None:
+        source = Path(operation["source_path"])
+        destination = Path(operation["destination_path"])
+
+        # 1. Intent first — after this point a crash is recoverable from evidence.
+        self.journal.begin(operation["id"], worker_id=worker_id, fencing_token=token)
+        maybe_fault(ArchiveState.TRANSFERRING)
+
+        # 2. Recheck immediately before mutating; the plan's snapshot is not trusted.
+        self._recheck(operation, source, destination, location)
+        destination.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+
+        # 3. Transfer. Same-filesystem is an optimisation, so it has to be proven
+        #    here rather than believed from the plan.
+        same_filesystem = _same_filesystem(source, destination.parent)
+        if same_filesystem:
+            os.rename(source, destination)
+        else:
+            copy_verify_publish(source, destination, operation["expected_sha256"])
+        _fsync_dir(destination.parent)
+
+        # 4. The published file is the archive only once it hashes as recorded.
+        if sha256_file(destination) != operation["expected_sha256"]:
+            raise PreconditionFailed(
+                "archive_mismatch", f"{destination} does not hold the expected bytes"
+            )
+        _append_manifest(destination.parent, _manifest_entry(operation, location))
+        self.journal.transition(
+            operation["id"],
+            ArchiveState.VERIFIED,
+            fencing_token=token,
+            same_filesystem=same_filesystem,
+        )
+        maybe_fault(ArchiveState.VERIFIED)
+
+        # 5. Only now may the active source go.
+        self._finish(self.journal.get(operation["id"]), location, token=token, worker_id=worker_id)
+
+    def _finish(self, operation: dict, location: dict, *, token: int, worker_id: str) -> None:
+        """Drive an item whose archive copy is durable through removal and
+        bookkeeping. Every step is idempotent, so recovery may replay it."""
+        destination = Path(operation["destination_path"])
+        source = Path(operation["source_path"])
+        state = operation["journal_state"]
+
+        if state == ArchiveState.FAILED:
+            # The archive copy is durable even though the attempt ended badly:
+            # re-enter the transfer state so the remaining steps can run.
+            self.journal.transition(operation["id"], ArchiveState.TRANSFERRING, fencing_token=token)
+            state = ArchiveState.TRANSFERRING
+
+        if state == ArchiveState.TRANSFERRING:
+            if sha256_file(destination) != operation["expected_sha256"]:
+                raise PreconditionFailed(
+                    "archive_mismatch", f"{destination} does not hold the expected bytes"
+                )
+            _append_manifest(destination.parent, _manifest_entry(operation, location))
+            self.journal.transition(operation["id"], ArchiveState.VERIFIED, fencing_token=token)
+            state = ArchiveState.VERIFIED
+
+        if state == ArchiveState.VERIFIED:
+            self.journal.transition(operation["id"], ArchiveState.REMOVING, fencing_token=token)
+            maybe_fault(ArchiveState.REMOVING)
+            state = ArchiveState.REMOVING
+
+        if state == ArchiveState.REMOVING:
+            # Re-verify the archived bytes immediately before deleting the original:
+            # this check is the entire justification for the removal.
+            if not destination.exists() or sha256_file(destination) != operation["expected_sha256"]:
+                raise PreconditionFailed(
+                    "archive_unverified", f"{destination} is not a verified archive copy"
+                )
+            self._require_evidence(operation["asset_id"], destination)
+            if source.exists():
+                if source.is_symlink():
+                    raise PreconditionFailed("symlink", f"{source} became a symlink")
+                if sha256_file(source) != operation["expected_sha256"]:
+                    raise PreconditionFailed(
+                        "source_changed", f"{source} changed; it is not ours to remove"
+                    )
+                source.unlink()
+            if source.exists():
+                raise PreconditionFailed("removal_failed", f"{source} is still present")
+            # The dangerous window: active storage no longer holds the file while the
+            # database still points at it.
+            maybe_fault(SOURCE_REMOVED)
+            self._record_archived(operation, location, destination)
+            self.journal.transition(operation["id"], ArchiveState.COMPLETE, fencing_token=token)
+            maybe_fault(ArchiveState.COMPLETE)
+
+    def _recheck(self, operation: dict, source: Path, destination: Path, location: dict) -> None:
+        if not source.exists():
+            raise PreconditionFailed("source_missing", f"source {source} disappeared")
+        if source.is_symlink() or destination.is_symlink():
+            raise PreconditionFailed("symlink", "refusing to archive through a symlink")
+        if destination.exists():
+            raise PreconditionFailed("destination_exists", f"destination {destination} is occupied")
+        root = Path(location["root"])
+        if root not in destination.parents:
+            raise PreconditionFailed(
+                "destination_escape", f"{destination} is outside the archive location {root}"
+            )
+        if not root.is_dir() or not (root / MARKER_NAME).exists():
+            raise PreconditionFailed("location_offline", f"{root} is not the archive medium")
+        if sha256_file(source) != operation["expected_sha256"]:
+            raise PreconditionFailed(
+                "source_changed", f"{source} changed since the plan was approved"
+            )
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            asset = session.get(Asset, operation["asset_id"])
+            if asset is None or asset.current_path != str(source):
+                raise PreconditionFailed(
+                    "asset_moved", f"asset {operation['asset_id']} is no longer at {source}"
+                )
+
+    def _require_evidence(self, asset_id: str, source: Path) -> dict:
+        """Review evidence must be durable before the original goes.
+
+        The perceptual hash keeps the asset in the fuzzy index once its bytes are
+        unreachable, and the protected preview is what duplicate review can still
+        look at. Both are read from the freshly verified archive copy, which holds
+        exactly the bytes being archived. A file that cannot be decoded has neither
+        — recorded, not fatal, since its exact hashes remain — but failing to
+        produce a preview from a decodable original stops the removal (concept §9).
+        """
+        DuplicateService(self._session_factory).ensure_phash(asset_id, source=source)
+        preview = ThumbnailService(self._session_factory, self._config).ensure_protected(
+            asset_id, source=source
+        )
+        if preview["state"] == "unavailable":
+            raise PreconditionFailed(
+                "preview_unavailable",
+                f"no durable comparison preview for asset {asset_id} "
+                f"({preview['error_code']})",
+            )
+        return preview
+
+    # ── database ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def _record_archived(self, operation: dict, location: dict, destination: Path) -> None:
+        """The original is gone from active storage: drop ``current_path``, close its
+        occurrence, record where the bytes now live, and set availability."""
+        now = _now()
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            asset = session.get(Asset, operation["asset_id"])
+            if asset is None:
+                raise PreconditionFailed(
+                    "asset_missing", f"asset {operation['asset_id']} no longer exists"
+                )
+            if asset.current_path:
+                for row in session.scalars(
+                    select(AssetPath).where(
+                        AssetPath.asset_id == asset.id,
+                        AssetPath.path == asset.current_path,
+                        AssetPath.valid_until.is_(None),
+                    )
+                ):
+                    row.valid_until = now
+            recorded = session.scalar(
+                select(AssetPath).where(
+                    AssetPath.asset_id == asset.id, AssetPath.path == str(destination)
+                )
+            )
+            if recorded is None:  # idempotent: recovery may replay this
+                session.add(
+                    AssetPath(
+                        asset_id=asset.id,
+                        path=str(destination),
+                        valid_from=now,
+                        reason="archive",
+                    )
+                )
+            asset.current_path = None
+            asset.availability_state = (
+                "archived_online" if destination.exists() else "archived_offline"
+            )
+            asset.archive_location_id = location["id"]
+            asset.archive_path = operation["archive_path"]
+            asset.state_version += 1
+            asset.updated_at = now
+            session.commit()
+
+    # ── recovery ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def recover(self, *, worker_id: str = "archive-recovery") -> dict:
+        """Resolve every incomplete item from journal + disk evidence.
+
+        Idempotent: running it repeatedly converges. Ambiguous (``manual``) work is
+        left exactly as found and keeps blocking unrelated mutations.
+        """
+        results = {"resumed": 0, "completed": 0, "manual": 0}
+        touched: set[str] = set()
+        for verdict in self.journal.classify_all(direction=ARCHIVE):
+            operation = self.journal.get(verdict["operation_id"])
+            touched.add(operation["plan_id"])
+            token = (operation["fencing_token"] or 0) + 1
+            if verdict["classification"] == MANUAL:
+                results["manual"] += 1
+                continue
+            if verdict["classification"] == RESUMABLE:
+                # Nothing was published: discard the debris and let a later apply
+                # retry the item cleanly.
+                _clean_temp_files(Path(operation["destination_path"]).parent)
+                self.journal.transition(operation["id"], ArchiveState.PLANNED, fencing_token=token)
+                results["resumed"] += 1
+                continue
+            location = self._location(self._require_plan(operation["plan_id"])["location_id"])
+            try:
+                self._finish(operation, location, token=token, worker_id=worker_id)
+                results["completed"] += 1
+            except PreconditionFailed as error:
+                self._fail(operation, token, error.code, str(error))
+                results["manual"] += 1
+        for plan_id in touched:
+            self._prune_empty_sources(plan_id)
+            self.journal.sync_plan_state(plan_id)
+        return results
+
+    def recovery_status(self) -> dict:
+        verdicts = self.journal.classify_all(direction=ARCHIVE)
+        return {
+            "operations": verdicts,
+            "manual": [v for v in verdicts if v["classification"] == MANUAL],
+            "blocks_mutation": self.journal.blocks_mutation(),
+        }
+
+    # ── helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def _fail(self, operation: dict, token: int, code: str, message: str) -> None:
+        self.journal.transition(
+            operation["id"], ArchiveState.FAILED, fencing_token=token, error=(code, message)
+        )
+
+    def _require_plan(self, plan_id: str) -> dict:
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            plan = session.get(ArchivePlan, plan_id)
+            if plan is None:
+                raise ArchiveError("unknown_plan", f"unknown archive plan {plan_id!r}")
+            return _plan_dict(plan)
+
+    def _location(self, location_id: str) -> dict:
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            location = session.get(ArchiveLocation, location_id)
+            if location is None:
+                raise ArchiveError("unknown_location", f"unknown archive location {location_id!r}")
+            return {"id": location.id, "root": location.root, "media_id": location.media_id}
+
+    def _claim_plan(self, plan_id: str) -> int:
+        """Bump the plan version and use it as this attempt's fencing token, so a
+        worker from a superseded attempt cannot commit."""
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            plan = session.get(ArchivePlan, plan_id)
+            plan.version += 1
+            plan.state = "applying"
+            plan.updated_at = _now()
+            token = plan.version
+            session.commit()
+        return token
+
+
+# ── module helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def copy_verify_publish(source: Path, destination: Path, expected_sha256: str) -> None:
+    """Copy to a temporary file beside the destination, prove its bytes, then publish
+    it atomically. The source is never touched, so a failure costs nothing.
+
+    Shared by archiving (library → medium) and restoring (medium → library, US06-04):
+    both need the same promise that a published file is either complete and correct
+    or not there at all.
+    """
+    temp = destination.with_name(f"{TEMP_PREFIX}{uuid.uuid4().hex}{TEMP_SUFFIX}")
+    try:
+        with open(source, "rb") as src, open(temp, "wb") as out:
+            shutil.copyfileobj(src, out, 1024 * 1024)
+            out.flush()
+            os.fsync(out.fileno())
+        if sha256_file(temp) != expected_sha256:
+            raise PreconditionFailed("copy_mismatch", f"{source} copied with wrong bytes")
+        if destination.exists():
+            raise PreconditionFailed(
+                "destination_exists", f"{destination} appeared during the transfer"
+            )
+        # ponytail: rename after an exists() check. The archiver lane is single and
+        # local; use O_EXCL/link-based publish if a second writer ever exists.
+        os.rename(temp, destination)
+    finally:
+        temp.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+
+
+def _same_filesystem(source: Path, destination_dir: Path) -> bool:
+    """Proven at run time from the actual devices, never from the plan's preview."""
+    try:
+        return source.stat().st_dev == destination_dir.stat().st_dev
+    except OSError:
+        return False
+
+
+def _fsync_dir(path: Path) -> None:
+    """Make the directory entry itself durable, so the published name survives a
+    power loss and not just the file's data."""
+    fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY)
+    try:
+        os.fsync(fd)
+    except OSError:
+        pass  # some filesystems refuse directory fsync; the data is already synced
+    finally:
+        os.close(fd)
+
+
+def _manifest_entry(operation: dict, location: dict) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "schema_version": MANIFEST_VERSION,
+        "plan_id": operation["plan_id"],
+        "asset_id": operation["asset_id"],
+        "album": operation["album"],
+        "archive_path": operation["archive_path"],
+        "source_path": operation["source_path"],
+        "sha256": operation["expected_sha256"],
+        "byte_size": operation["byte_size"],
+        "media_id": location["media_id"],
+        "archived_at": _now().isoformat(),
+    }
+
+
+def _append_manifest(directory: Path, entry: dict) -> None:
+    """Append one durable manifest line, skipping an entry that is already there.
+
+    The manifest is written before the source is removed, so it is the medium's own
+    record of what it holds even if the database is lost.
+    """
+    path = directory / MANIFEST_NAME
+    # ponytail: rereads the album manifest per file (O(n²) lines for one album).
+    # Keep an in-memory index per plan if an album ever holds enough files to matter.
+    if path.exists():
+        for line in path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
+            try:
+                existing = json.loads(line)
+            except ValueError:
+                continue
+            if (existing.get("asset_id"), existing.get("sha256")) == (
+                entry["asset_id"],
+                entry["sha256"],
+            ):
+                return
+    with open(path, "a", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        handle.write(json.dumps(entry, sort_keys=True) + "\n")
+        handle.flush()
+        os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+    _fsync_dir(directory)
+
+
+def read_manifest(directory: Path) -> list[dict]:
+    """Every manifest entry an archived album directory holds."""
+    path = directory / MANIFEST_NAME
+    if not path.exists():
+        return []
+    entries = []
+    for line in path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
+        try:
+            entries.append(json.loads(line))
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+    return entries
+
+
+def _clean_temp_files(directory: Path) -> None:
+    """Remove this application's own abandoned transfer temporaries — never any
+    other file (concept §17: startup cleans only recognised stale temporaries)."""
+    if not directory.is_dir():
+        return
+    for temp in directory.glob(f"{TEMP_PREFIX}*{TEMP_SUFFIX}"):
+        temp.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+
+
+def _plan_dict(plan: ArchivePlan) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "id": plan.id,
+        "location_id": plan.location_id,
+        "token": plan.token,
+        "direction": plan.direction,
+        "albums": json.loads(plan.albums) if plan.albums else None,
+        "state": plan.state,
+        "schema_version": plan.schema_version,
+        "asset_count": plan.asset_count,
+        "byte_size": plan.byte_size,
+        "version": plan.version,
+        "worker_id": plan.worker_id,
+        "completed_at": plan.completed_at.isoformat() if plan.completed_at else None,
+        "created_at": plan.created_at.isoformat() if plan.created_at else None,
+    }

photo_pipeline/services/archives.py

@@ -0,0 +1,640 @@
+"""ArchiveService — destinations and archive preflight (US06-01).
+
+Archive is the only stage that *removes* originals from the active library, so
+this service does the opposite of removing anything: it registers destinations and
+proves, before a single byte moves, that an album could be archived safely. The
+transfer itself is US06-02.
+
+An archive location is a medium, not a path (see :class:`ArchiveLocation`). A
+marker file on the medium carries its ``media_id``, so a disk mounted at the
+recorded root but holding a different marker is ``wrong_volume`` rather than
+silently accepted — the classic "the external disk came back at the same
+mountpoint" data-loss path.
+
+Preflight proves, per concept §9 "Archive preflight":
+
+- the album's upload is *verified*, not merely process-successful, and its bytes on
+  disk still hash to exactly what was uploaded;
+- the destination medium is mounted, is the right one, is writable, lies outside
+  every library root and every ``_IGNORE/`` tree, and has room for the scope plus a
+  configured reserve;
+- nothing already occupies the destination;
+- no rename/upload/archive lease is held, and no rename is half-applied;
+- a database backup and the archive manifest can really be written — both are
+  probed by writing them, not assumed.
+
+Blocker codes: ``no_library_root``, ``location_offline``, ``wrong_volume``,
+``archive_pending``,
+``unsafe_destination``, ``destination_not_writable``, ``manifest_unwritable``,
+``insufficient_capacity``, ``backup_unavailable``, ``lock_conflict``,
+``rename_pending``, ``empty_scope``, ``destination_collision``,
+``upload_unverified``, ``bytes_changed``, ``file_missing``, ``preview_unavailable``.
+
+Preflight also *creates* the durable comparison preview of every asset in scope
+(US06-03): it is the evidence duplicate review falls back on once the original is
+on a medium that may be offline, so it has to exist before the original leaves.
+
+Like upload preflight, the confirmation token is *derived* from the report rather
+than stored: any change to the scope, the bytes, the destination, or the blockers
+produces a different token, so a stale browser confirmation can never apply. Values
+that drift without meaning anything (free space, backup size, timestamps) are left
+out of the digest.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import shutil
+import sqlite3
+import uuid
+from contextlib import closing
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
+
+from photo_pipeline.config import Config
+from photo_pipeline.integrations import immich_go_report as report_parser
+from photo_pipeline.jobs.domain_handlers import ARCHIVE_LOCK, LIBRARY_WRITE_LOCK, UPLOAD_LOCK
+from photo_pipeline.models import ArchiveLocation, Asset, UploadBatch, UploadItem
+from photo_pipeline.path_policy import PathPolicyError, is_excluded, normalize_root, resolve_within
+from photo_pipeline.services.albums import album_label
+from photo_pipeline.services.archive_journal import ArchiveJournal
+from photo_pipeline.services.availability import MARKER_NAME, read_marker as _read_marker
+from photo_pipeline.services.availability import refresh as refresh_availability
+from photo_pipeline.services.hashing import sha256_file
+from photo_pipeline.services.jobs import JobService
+from photo_pipeline.services.rename_journal import RenameJournal
+from photo_pipeline.services.thumbnails import ThumbnailService
+from photo_pipeline.services.upload_reports import VERIFIED
+
+PREFLIGHT_VERSION = 1
+TOKEN_PREFIX = f"v{PREFLIGHT_VERSION}"
+MANIFEST_NAME = "archive-manifest.json"
+
+# Upload outcomes that prove Immich holds these exact bytes. ``skipped``/``failed``/
+# ``unknown`` never qualify: archiving on them would remove the only copy.
+ARCHIVED_OUTCOMES = frozenset(
+    {report_parser.UPLOADED, report_parser.UPGRADED, report_parser.DUPLICATE}
+)
+
+LOCKS = (LIBRARY_WRITE_LOCK, UPLOAD_LOCK, ARCHIVE_LOCK)
+
+
+class ArchiveError(RuntimeError):
+    """The request cannot be carried out (unknown location/album, unsafe root)."""
+
+    def __init__(self, code: str, message: str) -> None:
+        super().__init__(message)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+def _now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _issue(code: str, message: str) -> dict:
+    return {"code": code, "message": message}
+
+
+class ArchiveService:
+    def __init__(self, session_factory: sessionmaker, *, config: Config) -> None:
+        self._session_factory = session_factory
+        self._config = config
+        self._roots = tuple(normalize_root(root) for root in config.library_roots)
+
+    # ── locations ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def register(self, name: str, root: str) -> dict:
+        """Register an archive destination and stamp its medium with a marker.
+
+        The marker is what makes the location identifiable later, so registering is
+        the one archive operation that writes to the destination up front.
+        """
+        name = (name or "").strip()
+        if not name:
+            raise ArchiveError("name_required", "an archive location needs a name")
+        path = Path(root).expanduser()
+        if not path.is_dir():
+            raise ArchiveError("root_missing", f"{path} is not an existing directory")
+        path = normalize_root(path)
+        unsafe = self._unsafe_destination(path)
+        if unsafe:
+            raise ArchiveError("unsafe_destination", unsafe)
+
+        marker = _read_marker(path)
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            if session.scalar(select(ArchiveLocation).where(ArchiveLocation.name == name)):
+                raise ArchiveError("duplicate_name", f"an archive location named {name!r} exists")
+            if marker and session.scalar(
+                select(ArchiveLocation).where(ArchiveLocation.media_id == marker.get("media_id"))
+            ):
+                raise ArchiveError(
+                    "already_registered", f"{path} already belongs to another archive location"
+                )
+            media_id = marker.get("media_id") if marker else str(uuid.uuid4())
+            error = _probe_write(
+                path / MARKER_NAME,
+                json.dumps({"media_id": media_id, "name": name}, indent=2).encode("utf-8"),
+                keep=True,
+            )
+            if error:
+                raise ArchiveError("destination_not_writable", error)
+            location = ArchiveLocation(
+                id=str(uuid.uuid4()),
+                name=name,
+                root=str(path),
+                media_id=media_id,
+                state="online",
+                last_seen_at=_now(),
+            )
+            location.capabilities = json.dumps(_capabilities(path))
+            session.add(location)
+            session.commit()
+            return self._location_report(location, probe=_probe_location(location))
+
+    def locations(self) -> list[dict]:
+        """Every configured location with a fresh probe of its medium."""
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            rows = list(session.scalars(select(ArchiveLocation).order_by(ArchiveLocation.name)))
+            reports = []
+            for location in rows:
+                probe = _probe_location(location)
+                location.state = probe["state"]
+                if probe["state"] == "online":
+                    location.last_seen_at = _now()
+                    location.capabilities = json.dumps(probe["capabilities"])
+                reports.append(self._location_report(location, probe=probe))
+            session.commit()
+        # A medium that just appeared or vanished changes what is readable, so the
+        # archived assets are re-derived from the same probe (US06-03).
+        refresh_availability(self._session_factory)
+        return reports
+
+    # ── preflight ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def preflight(self, location_id: str, albums: list[str] | None = None) -> dict:
+        """Validate an archive scope against a destination and issue its token.
+
+        Read-only with respect to the library: it hashes files, probes the
+        destination with its own temporary files, and writes nothing else.
+        """
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            location = session.get(ArchiveLocation, location_id)
+            if location is None:
+                raise ArchiveError("unknown_location", f"unknown archive location {location_id!r}")
+            probe = _probe_location(location)
+            location.state = probe["state"]
+            if probe["state"] == "online":
+                location.last_seen_at = _now()
+                location.capabilities = json.dumps(probe["capabilities"])
+            report = {
+                "schema_version": PREFLIGHT_VERSION,
+                "location": self._location_report(location, probe=probe),
+                "blockers": [],
+            }
+            root = Path(location.root)
+            session.commit()
+
+        report["blockers"] += self._destination_blockers(root, probe)
+        report["blockers"] += self._lock_blockers()
+        report["albums"] = self._albums(albums, root, reachable=probe["state"] == "online")
+        report["totals"] = _totals(report["albums"])
+        report["capacity"] = self._capacity(report["totals"]["bytes"], probe)
+        if not report["capacity"]["sufficient"]:
+            report["blockers"].append(
+                _issue(
+                    "insufficient_capacity",
+                    # The free-space number is deliberately left out: it drifts between
+                    # two identical preflights, and the token is a digest of this text,
+                    # so quoting it here would invalidate every approval instantly.
+                    f"{report['totals']['bytes']} B plus a "
+                    f"{self._config.archive_free_space_reserve_bytes} B reserve do not fit on "
+                    "the medium",
+                )
+            )
+        report["backup"] = self._backup_probe()
+        if not report["backup"]["ok"]:
+            report["blockers"].append(
+                _issue(
+                    "backup_unavailable",
+                    f"a database backup could not be written: {report['backup']['detail']}",
+                )
+            )
+        report["manifest"] = self._manifest_probe(
+            root, report["albums"], writable=probe["writable"]
+        )
+        if not report["manifest"]["ok"]:
+            report["blockers"].append(
+                _issue(
+                    "manifest_unwritable",
+                    f"the archive manifest could not be written: {report['manifest']['detail']}",
+                )
+            )
+        if not report["albums"]:
+            report["blockers"].append(
+                _issue("empty_scope", "no canonical, active assets are in the selected scope")
+            )
+        report["state"] = (
+            "ready"
+            if not report["blockers"] and all(a["state"] == "ready" for a in report["albums"])
+            else "blocked"
+        )
+        report["token"] = _token(report)
+        report["generated_at"] = _now().isoformat()
+        return report
+
+    def verify_token(self, token: str, location_id: str, albums: list[str] | None = None) -> bool:
+        """True when ``token`` still describes this scope and this destination.
+
+        Recomputed, never looked up: an edited source file, a swapped medium, or a
+        newly occupied destination invalidates it without anything writing to the
+        database.
+        """
+        return bool(token) and token == self.preflight(location_id, albums)["token"]
+
+    # ── destination ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def _unsafe_destination(self, root: Path) -> str | None:
+        """Why this root may never hold archived originals, or ``None``."""
+        if is_excluded(root):
+            return f"{root} is inside an excluded (_IGNORE/) tree"
+        for library in self._roots:
+            if root == library or library in root.parents or root in library.parents:
+                return f"{root} overlaps the active library root {library}"
+        return None
+
+    def _destination_blockers(self, root: Path, probe: dict) -> list[dict]:
+        blockers: list[dict] = []
+        if not self._roots:
+            blockers.append(_issue("no_library_root", "no library root is configured"))
+        if probe["state"] == "offline":
+            blockers.append(
+                _issue("location_offline", f"the archive medium is not mounted at {root}")
+            )
+        elif probe["state"] == "wrong_volume":
+            blockers.append(
+                _issue(
+                    "wrong_volume",
+                    f"{root} holds a different archive medium ({probe['detail']})",
+                )
+            )
+        unsafe = self._unsafe_destination(root)
+        if unsafe:
+            blockers.append(_issue("unsafe_destination", unsafe))
+        if probe["state"] == "unwritable":
+            blockers.append(
+                _issue("destination_not_writable", f"{root} is not writable: {probe['detail']}")
+            )
+        return blockers
+
+    def _lock_blockers(self) -> list[dict]:
+        """Archive is blocked by any lease that may still be moving bytes or metadata."""
+        blockers: list[dict] = []
+        jobs = JobService(self._session_factory)
+        for lock in LOCKS:
+            held = jobs.blockers(lock)
+            if held:
+                blockers.append(
+                    _issue("lock_conflict", f"the {lock} lane is busy: job {held[0]['id']}")
+                )
+        if RenameJournal(self._session_factory).blocks_mutation():
+            blockers.append(
+                _issue("rename_pending", "an unresolved rename must be recovered before archiving")
+            )
+        if ArchiveJournal(self._session_factory).blocks_mutation():
+            blockers.append(
+                _issue(
+                    "archive_pending",
+                    "an unresolved archive transfer must be recovered before archiving again",
+                )
+            )
+        return blockers
+
+    def _capacity(self, required: int, probe: dict) -> dict:
+        reserve = self._config.archive_free_space_reserve_bytes
+        free = probe["free_bytes"]
+        return {
+            "required_bytes": required,
+            "reserve_bytes": reserve,
+            "free_bytes": free,
+            "sufficient": free is not None and free >= required + reserve,
+        }
+
+    def _backup_probe(self) -> dict:
+        """Write a real online backup of the database, then discard it.
+
+        A backup that is merely assumed to be possible is worth nothing on the day
+        the archive removes the originals, so this actually runs SQLite's backup API.
+        """
+        source = self._config.database_path
+        target = source.parent / f".archive-preflight-backup-{uuid.uuid4()}.db"
+        try:
+            with closing(sqlite3.connect(source)) as src, closing(sqlite3.connect(target)) as dst:
+                src.backup(dst)
+            size = target.stat().st_size
+        except (sqlite3.Error, OSError) as error:
+            return {"ok": False, "bytes": None, "detail": str(error)}
+        finally:
+            target.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        return {"ok": True, "bytes": size, "detail": None}
+
+    def _manifest_probe(self, root: Path, albums: list[dict], *, writable: bool) -> dict:
+        """Prove the manifest can be created by writing this exact content and
+        removing it again. The real manifest is written by the transfer (US06-02)."""
+        manifest = {
+            "schema_version": PREFLIGHT_VERSION,
+            "albums": [
+                {
+                    "album": album["album"],
+                    "destination": album["destination"],
+                    "files": [
+                        {
+                            "asset_id": asset["asset_id"],
+                            "source": asset["current_path"],
+                            "sha256": asset["current_sha256"],
+                            "byte_size": asset["byte_size"],
+                        }
+                        for asset in album["assets"]
+                    ],
+                }
+                for album in albums
+            ],
+        }
+        payload = json.dumps(manifest, indent=2, sort_keys=True).encode("utf-8")
+        if not writable:
+            return {"ok": False, "bytes": len(payload), "detail": "the destination is unavailable"}
+        error = _probe_write(root / f".{MANIFEST_NAME}.probe-{uuid.uuid4()}", payload)
+        return {"ok": error is None, "bytes": len(payload), "detail": error}
+
+    def _location_report(self, location: ArchiveLocation, *, probe: dict) -> dict:
+        return {
+            "id": location.id,
+            "name": location.name,
+            "root": location.root,
+            "media_id": location.media_id,
+            "state": probe["state"],
+            "writable": probe["writable"],
+            "device_id": probe["device_id"],
+            "detail": probe["detail"],
+            "last_seen_at": location.last_seen_at.isoformat() if location.last_seen_at else None,
+        }
+
+    # ── scope ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def _albums(self, requested: list[str] | None, root: Path, *, reachable: bool) -> list[dict]:
+        by_album = self._scope()
+        if requested is not None:
+            unknown = sorted(set(requested) - set(by_album))
+            if unknown:
+                raise ArchiveError("unknown_album", f"unknown album(s): {', '.join(unknown)}")
+            by_album = {name: by_album[name] for name in sorted(set(requested))}
+        return [
+            self._album(name, rows, root, reachable=reachable)
+            for name, rows in sorted(by_album.items())
+        ]
+
+    def _scope(self) -> dict[str, list[dict]]:
+        """Canonical, active assets grouped by album, each with its upload evidence."""
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            assets = list(
+                session.scalars(
+                    select(Asset).where(
+                        Asset.canonical_asset_id.is_(None),
+                        Asset.availability_state == "active",
+                        Asset.current_path.is_not(None),
+                    )
+                )
+            )
+            uploads: dict[str, UploadItem] = {}
+            for item, batch in session.execute(
+                select(UploadItem, UploadBatch)
+                .join(UploadBatch, UploadBatch.id == UploadItem.batch_id)
+                .order_by(UploadBatch.created_at)
+            ):
+                if _proves_upload(item, batch):
+                    uploads[item.asset_id] = item  # the latest verified batch wins
+
+        by_album: dict[str, list[dict]] = {}
+        for asset in assets:
+            by_album.setdefault(album_label(asset.current_path, self._roots), []).append(
+                {
+                    "asset_id": asset.id,
+                    "path": asset.current_path,
+                    "byte_size": asset.byte_size,
+                    "upload": uploads.get(asset.id),
+                }
+            )
+        return by_album
+
+    def _album(self, name: str, rows: list[dict], root: Path, *, reachable: bool) -> dict:
+        folder = Path(rows[0]["path"]).parent
+        items = sorted(
+            (self._with_preview(_item(row)) for row in rows),
+            key=lambda item: item["current_path"],
+        )
+        blocked = [item for item in items if item["blockers"]]
+        blockers: list[dict] = []
+
+        destination = root / name
+        try:
+            resolve_within(root, destination)
+        except PathPolicyError as error:
+            blockers.append(_issue("unsafe_destination", str(error)))
+        if reachable and destination.exists() and any(destination.iterdir()):
+            blockers.append(
+                _issue("destination_collision", f"{destination} already exists and is not empty")
+            )
+        if blocked:
+            blockers.append(
+                _issue(
+                    "partial_scope",
+                    f"{len(blocked)} of {len(items)} asset(s) are not archivable; an album is "
+                    "archived whole or not at all",
+                )
+            )
+        return {
+            "album": name,
+            "folder": str(folder),
+            "destination": str(destination),
+            # Same filesystem means the transfer can be an atomic move; anything else
+            # is copy-verify-remove (concept §9).
+            "transfer_method": _transfer_method(folder, root),
+            "asset_count": len(items),
+            "blocked_count": len(blocked),
+            "reclaimable_bytes": sum(item["byte_size"] or 0 for item in items),
+            "state": "blocked" if blockers else "ready",
+            "blockers": blockers,
+            "assets": items,
+        }
+
+    def _with_preview(self, item: dict) -> dict:
+        """Create the durable comparison preview while the original is still here.
+
+        This is the last moment it can be made: once the file is archived and the
+        medium leaves, only the retained preview can answer "is this new photo the
+        same picture?". An original that cannot be decoded at all has no preview to
+        keep — its hashes and metadata stay the evidence — but a preview that fails
+        for any other reason blocks the archive (concept §9).
+        """
+        preview = self._previews().ensure_protected(item["asset_id"])
+        item["preview"] = preview
+        if preview["state"] == "unavailable" and not item["blockers"]:
+            item["blockers"].append(
+                _issue(
+                    "preview_unavailable",
+                    f"a durable comparison preview of {item['current_path']} could not be "
+                    f"created ({preview['error_code']})",
+                )
+            )
+        return item
+
+    def _previews(self) -> ThumbnailService:
+        return ThumbnailService(self._session_factory, self._config)
+
+
+# ── internals ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _item(row: dict) -> dict:
+    """One asset's archivability: verified upload plus the bytes on disk right now."""
+    path = Path(row["path"])
+    upload: UploadItem | None = row["upload"]
+    blockers: list[dict] = []
+    current_sha256 = None
+
+    if not path.exists():
+        blockers.append(_issue("file_missing", f"{path} is missing"))
+    else:
+        # ponytail: full re-hash of the scope. Gate on (size, mtime_ns) first if a
+        # large album makes this slow — the hash stays the authority.
+        current_sha256 = sha256_file(path)
+
+    if upload is None:
+        blockers.append(
+            _issue("upload_unverified", "a verified Immich upload of these bytes is required")
+        )
+    elif current_sha256 is not None and upload.sha256 and current_sha256 != upload.sha256:
+        blockers.append(
+            _issue("bytes_changed", f"{path} changed since it was uploaded; re-upload it first")
+        )
+
+    return {
+        "asset_id": row["asset_id"],
+        "current_path": str(path),
+        "byte_size": row["byte_size"],
+        "current_sha256": current_sha256,
+        "uploaded_sha256": upload.sha256 if upload else None,
+        "blockers": blockers,
+    }
+
+
+def _proves_upload(item: UploadItem, batch: UploadBatch) -> bool:
+    """Whether this upload item is evidence that Immich holds these exact bytes."""
+    return (
+        batch.outcome_state == VERIFIED
+        and not batch.stale_bytes
+        and not item.changed_after_upload
+        and item.outcome in ARCHIVED_OUTCOMES
+    )
+
+
+def _transfer_method(folder: Path, root: Path) -> str:
+    try:
+        if folder.stat().st_dev == root.stat().st_dev:
+            return "move"
+    except OSError:
+        pass
+    return "copy_verify_remove"
+
+
+def _probe_write(path: Path, payload: bytes, *, keep: bool = False) -> str | None:
+    """Write ``payload`` to ``path``; return the failure detail or ``None``."""
+    try:
+        path.write_bytes(payload)
+    except OSError as error:
+        return str(error)
+    if not keep:
+        try:
+            path.unlink()
+        except OSError as error:
+            return str(error)
+    return None
+
+
+def _capabilities(root: Path) -> dict:
+    usage = shutil.disk_usage(root)
+    return {
+        "device_id": root.stat().st_dev,
+        "total_bytes": usage.total,
+        "writable": os.access(root, os.W_OK),
+    }
+
+
+def _probe_location(location: ArchiveLocation) -> dict:
+    """Is the right medium mounted, and can it take bytes right now?"""
+    root = Path(location.root)
+    blank = {"device_id": None, "free_bytes": None, "total_bytes": None, "capabilities": {}}
+    if not root.is_dir():
+        return {"state": "offline", "writable": False, "detail": f"{root} is not mounted", **blank}
+    marker = _read_marker(root)
+    if marker is None:
+        return {
+            "state": "offline",
+            "writable": False,
+            "detail": f"no archive marker found at {root}",
+            **blank,
+        }
+    if marker.get("media_id") != location.media_id:
+        return {
+            "state": "wrong_volume",
+            "writable": False,
+            "detail": f"marker media_id {marker.get('media_id')!r}",
+            **blank,
+        }
+    capabilities = _capabilities(root)
+    usage = shutil.disk_usage(root)
+    # os.access lies on some filesystems; a real write is the only proof.
+    detail = _probe_write(root / f".archive-write-probe-{uuid.uuid4()}", b"")
+    return {
+        "state": "online" if detail is None else "unwritable",
+        "writable": detail is None,
+        "detail": detail,
+        "device_id": capabilities["device_id"],
+        "free_bytes": usage.free,
+        "total_bytes": usage.total,
+        "capabilities": capabilities,
+    }
+
+
+def _totals(albums: list[dict]) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "albums": len(albums),
+        "ready_albums": sum(1 for album in albums if album["state"] == "ready"),
+        "assets": sum(album["asset_count"] for album in albums),
+        "blocked": sum(album["blocked_count"] for album in albums),
+        "bytes": sum(album["reclaimable_bytes"] for album in albums),
+    }
+
+
+def _token(report: dict) -> str:
+    """Digest of everything the report asserts about the scope and the destination.
+
+    Values that drift without changing what would happen — free space, backup size,
+    timestamps — are excluded so the same situation always yields the same token.
+    """
+    payload = {key: value for key, value in report.items() if key not in ("generated_at", "token")}
+    payload["location"] = {
+        key: value for key, value in payload["location"].items() if key != "last_seen_at"
+    }
+    payload["capacity"] = {
+        key: value for key, value in payload["capacity"].items() if key != "free_bytes"
+    }
+    payload["backup"] = {key: value for key, value in payload["backup"].items() if key != "bytes"}
+    digest = hashlib.sha256(
+        json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, ensure_ascii=False, default=str).encode("utf-8")
+    ).hexdigest()
+    return f"{TOKEN_PREFIX}:{digest}"

photo_pipeline/services/availability.py

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+"""Where an asset's bytes are right now (US06-03).
+
+Archiving removes the original from the active library but never removes the
+asset: its identity, hashes, decisions, and evidence stay. This module is the one
+place that answers "can these bytes be read, and if not, why" so inventory,
+duplicate review, thumbnails, and the archive service all give the same answer.
+
+States (concept §9):
+
+- ``active``             — the original is in the active library;
+- ``archived_online``    — the recorded medium is mounted and holds the file;
+- ``archived_offline``   — archived, but the medium is not available right now;
+- ``missing_unexpected`` — neither an active path nor the recorded archive
+  location explains the absence. This is the state that must never be confused
+  with ``archived_offline``: an unmounted disk is normal, a mounted disk with a
+  hole in it is not.
+
+A medium is identified by its marker file, never by its mountpoint, so a
+different disk mounted at the recorded root is offline rather than accepted.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+from collections import Counter
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Session, sessionmaker
+
+from photo_pipeline.models import ArchiveLocation, Asset
+
+ACTIVE = "active"
+ARCHIVED_ONLINE = "archived_online"
+ARCHIVED_OFFLINE = "archived_offline"
+MISSING_UNEXPECTED = "missing_unexpected"
+ARCHIVED = (ARCHIVED_ONLINE, ARCHIVED_OFFLINE)
+
+MARKER_NAME = ".photo-pipeline-archive.json"
+
+
+def read_marker(root: Path) -> dict | None:
+    """The medium's identity marker, or ``None`` when it is not readable."""
+    try:
+        return json.loads((root / MARKER_NAME).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        return None
+
+
+def location_online(location: ArchiveLocation) -> bool:
+    """True only when the *recorded* medium is mounted at its root."""
+    marker = read_marker(Path(location.root))
+    return bool(marker) and marker.get("media_id") == location.media_id
+
+
+def archive_file(session: Session, asset: Asset) -> Path | None:
+    """The archived file's absolute path, whether or not the medium is mounted."""
+    if not asset.archive_location_id or not asset.archive_path:
+        return None
+    location = session.get(ArchiveLocation, asset.archive_location_id)
+    if location is None:
+        return None
+    return Path(location.root) / asset.archive_path
+
+
+def readable_path(session: Session, asset: Asset) -> Path | None:
+    """A path whose bytes can be read now: the active file, else the archive copy."""
+    if asset.current_path and Path(asset.current_path).exists():
+        return Path(asset.current_path)
+    archived = archive_file(session, asset)
+    if archived is None:
+        return None
+    location = session.get(ArchiveLocation, asset.archive_location_id)
+    if not location_online(location) or not archived.exists():
+        return None
+    return archived
+
+
+def state_of(session: Session, asset: Asset, *, online: dict[str, bool] | None = None) -> str:
+    """The availability this asset's storage actually justifies right now."""
+    if asset.current_path:
+        return ACTIVE if Path(asset.current_path).exists() else MISSING_UNEXPECTED
+    if not asset.archive_location_id:
+        return MISSING_UNEXPECTED if asset.availability_state != ACTIVE else ACTIVE
+    location = session.get(ArchiveLocation, asset.archive_location_id)
+    if location is None:
+        return MISSING_UNEXPECTED
+    reachable = (
+        online[location.id] if online and location.id in online else location_online(location)
+    )
+    if not reachable:
+        return ARCHIVED_OFFLINE
+    archived = archive_file(session, asset)
+    # The medium is mounted and identified: the file is either there, or it is
+    # genuinely gone — that is not "offline", it needs a human.
+    return ARCHIVED_ONLINE if archived and archived.exists() else MISSING_UNEXPECTED
+
+
+def refresh(session_factory: sessionmaker) -> dict[str, int]:
+    """Re-derive availability for every archived asset from the media themselves.
+
+    Only archived assets are probed: whether an *active* file is present is the
+    inventory scan's job and costs one stat per library file. Each medium is
+    probed once, not once per asset.
+    """
+    counts: Counter[str] = Counter()
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    with session_factory() as session:
+        online = {
+            location.id: location_online(location)
+            for location in session.scalars(select(ArchiveLocation))
+        }
+        for asset in session.scalars(
+            select(Asset).where(Asset.archive_location_id.is_not(None))
+        ):
+            state = state_of(session, asset, online=online)
+            counts[state] += 1
+            if state != asset.availability_state:
+                asset.availability_state = state
+                asset.state_version += 1
+                asset.updated_at = now
+        session.commit()
+    return dict(counts)

photo_pipeline/services/duplicates.py

@@ -11,6 +11,12 @@ Detection runs in two categories:
   band (NEAR/SIMILAR). These are review candidates: never decided automatically, and
   negative-linked pairs are suppressed so a rejected pair is not re-suggested.
 
+Archived assets stay in both indexes (US06-03): a new active copy of an archived
+original is recognised through its hashes even while the medium is offline, and
+cluster review falls back to the retained protected preview plus hash evidence.
+An exact/pixel match links straight to the archived canonical; a perceptual match
+is a review candidate that names the medium to mount for a pixel-level decision.
+
 Decisions (``canonical`` / ``not_duplicate`` / ``deferred``) persist with evidence,
 use optimistic version checks, are reversible, and can never form a canonical cycle.
 A new content-identical member of an already-decided cluster inherits the established
@@ -34,12 +40,14 @@ from sqlalchemy import func, select
 from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
 
 from photo_pipeline.models import (
+    ArchiveLocation,
     Asset,
     DuplicateCluster,
     DuplicateMember,
     DuplicateNegativeLink,
+    Thumbnail,
 )
-from photo_pipeline.services import hashing
+from photo_pipeline.services import availability, hashing
 
 NEAR_MAX = 5
 SIMILAR_MAX = 10
@@ -127,18 +135,18 @@ class DuplicateService:
 
     # ── perceptual hash backfill ───────────────────────────────────────────
     def ensure_phashes(self) -> int:
+        """Hash whatever is readable now — an archived asset keeps the hash it
+        already has, and gains one whenever its medium happens to be mounted."""
         updated = 0
         with self._session_factory() as session:
-            assets = session.execute(
-                select(Asset).where(
-                    Asset.availability_state == "active",
-                    Asset.current_path.isnot(None),
-                )
-            ).scalars()
+            assets = session.execute(select(Asset)).scalars()
             for asset in assets:
                 if asset.phash is not None and asset.phash_version == hashing.PHASH_VERSION:
                     continue
-                value = hashing.safe_phash(asset.current_path)
+                source = availability.readable_path(session, asset)
+                if source is None:
+                    continue
+                value = hashing.safe_phash(str(source))
                 if value is not None:
                     asset.phash = value
                     asset.phash_version = hashing.PHASH_VERSION
@@ -146,20 +154,40 @@ class DuplicateService:
             session.commit()
         return updated
 
+    def ensure_phash(self, asset_id: str, *, source=None) -> str | None:
+        """Backfill one asset's perceptual hash while its bytes are still readable.
+
+        Archiving calls this before the original leaves — passing the archive copy
+        as ``source``, since the database does not point at it yet — because an
+        asset without a pHash silently drops out of the fuzzy index the moment its
+        medium is away.
+        """
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            asset = session.get(Asset, asset_id)
+            if asset is None:
+                return None
+            if asset.phash is not None and asset.phash_version == hashing.PHASH_VERSION:
+                return asset.phash
+            source = source or availability.readable_path(session, asset)
+            if source is None:
+                return None
+            value = hashing.safe_phash(str(source))
+            if value is not None:
+                asset.phash = value
+                asset.phash_version = hashing.PHASH_VERSION
+                session.commit()
+            return value
+
     # ── detection ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
     def detect(self) -> DetectionReport:
         self.ensure_phashes()
         now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
         report = DetectionReport()
         with self._session_factory() as session:
-            assets = list(
-                session.execute(
-                    select(Asset).where(
-                        Asset.availability_state == "active",
-                        Asset.current_path.isnot(None),
-                    )
-                ).scalars()
-            )
+            # Every known asset stays in the indexes, archived or not: a copy of an
+            # archived original must be recognised as a duplicate rather than
+            # treated as a new photo (concept §9, invariant 12).
+            assets = list(session.execute(select(Asset)).scalars())
             by_id = {a.id: a for a in assets}
             negatives = {
                 _pair(link.asset_a, link.asset_b)
@@ -431,10 +459,19 @@ class DuplicateService:
 
     @staticmethod
     def _recommend_canonical(ids, by_id) -> str:
-        # ponytail: largest file, path as deterministic tie-break. The concept's
-        # richer policy (resolution, least recompression, metadata richness) lands
-        # with the review UI story.
-        return max(ids, key=lambda i: (by_id[i].byte_size or 0, by_id[i].current_path or ""))
+        # ponytail: largest file, then the archived copy, then path as a
+        # deterministic tie-break. Archived wins ties because it is the reviewed,
+        # uploaded original — a fresh active copy must not demote it to a variant.
+        # The concept's richer policy (resolution, least recompression, metadata
+        # richness) lands with the review UI story.
+        return max(
+            ids,
+            key=lambda i: (
+                by_id[i].byte_size or 0,
+                by_id[i].availability_state in availability.ARCHIVED,
+                by_id[i].current_path or by_id[i].archive_path or "",
+            ),
+        )
 
     def _apply_canonical(self, session, cluster, ids, canonical_id):
         for member in session.execute(
@@ -507,9 +544,15 @@ class DuplicateService:
                         "current_path": asset.current_path if asset else None,
                         "byte_size": asset.byte_size if asset else None,
                         "phash": asset.phash if asset else None,
+                        **self._offline_evidence(session, asset),
                     }
                 )
             members.sort(key=lambda m: m["asset_id"])
+            # A full-resolution comparison of an offline original is impossible; the
+            # UI asks for that named medium instead of guessing (concept §9).
+            mount_required = sorted(
+                {m["archive_location"] for m in members if m["requires_mount"]}
+            )
             return {
                 "id": cluster.id,
                 "method": cluster.method,
@@ -519,9 +562,54 @@ class DuplicateService:
                 "canonical_asset_id": cluster.canonical_asset_id,
                 "version": cluster.version,
                 "requires_confirmation": cluster.method == Method.PERCEPTUAL.value,
+                "mount_required": mount_required,
                 "members": members,
             }
 
+    def _offline_evidence(self, session, asset: Asset | None) -> dict:
+        """What review can still rely on when a member's original is not readable."""
+        if asset is None:
+            return {
+                "availability_state": None,
+                "archive_location": None,
+                "archive_location_id": None,
+                "archive_path": None,
+                "preview": {"state": "missing", "protected": False},
+                "requires_mount": False,
+            }
+        location = (
+            session.get(ArchiveLocation, asset.archive_location_id)
+            if asset.archive_location_id
+            else None
+        )
+        preview = self._preview_evidence(session, asset.id)
+        archived = asset.availability_state in availability.ARCHIVED
+        return {
+            "availability_state": asset.availability_state,
+            "archive_location": location.name if location else None,
+            "archive_location_id": asset.archive_location_id,
+            "archive_path": asset.archive_path,
+            "preview": preview,
+            # Offline archived members can still be compared through their retained
+            # preview and hash evidence; only pixel-level review needs the medium.
+            "requires_mount": archived
+            and asset.availability_state == availability.ARCHIVED_OFFLINE
+            and bool(location),
+        }
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _preview_evidence(session, asset_id: str) -> dict:
+        rows = list(
+            session.execute(select(Thumbnail).where(Thumbnail.asset_id == asset_id)).scalars()
+        )
+        ready = [r for r in rows if r.state == "ready" and r.path]
+        if ready:
+            best = max(ready, key=lambda r: (bool(r.protected), r.size or 0))
+            return {"state": "ready", "protected": bool(best.protected), "size": best.size}
+        if rows:
+            return {"state": "unsupported", "protected": False, "size": rows[0].size}
+        return {"state": "missing", "protected": False, "size": None}
+
     # ── decisions ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
     def decide(
         self,

photo_pipeline/services/exif_checkpoint.py

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+"""The EXIF checkpoint every metadata stage ends with (concept §3, US07-03).
+
+A stage does not own a file's metadata; it owns a few fields in it. So writing is
+never "set these tags" — it is:
+
+    snapshot everything → write only the owned fields → read everything back
+    → prove the owned fields landed → prove nothing else moved
+    → refresh the file hash → record the projection
+
+Non-destructive here means *semantic* preservation: exiftool may rewrite the whole
+container, so the file's bytes, size, and timestamps legitimately change. What may
+not change is any field this stage does not own. When one does, the checkpoint is
+``divergent``: the result is recorded, the stage is **not** marked verified, and
+nothing is silently repaired — a later stage that needs verified metadata (upload)
+therefore stays blocked until a human looks.
+
+``failed`` is the third outcome and is deliberately distinct: exiftool missing, an
+unreadable file, or a write that did not take is not evidence that metadata is fine.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+
+from photo_pipeline.faults import EXIF_WRITTEN, maybe_fault
+from photo_pipeline.integrations import exiftool
+from photo_pipeline.models import ExifProjection
+from photo_pipeline.services import hashing
+
+# The tags the safety and analysis stages may change. Matched on the tag name, so
+# every group carries the same rule (IPTC:Keywords, XMP:XMP-dc:Subject, ...).
+OWNED_TAGS = frozenset({"Keywords", "Subject"})
+
+# Not metadata about the picture: filesystem facts, the digest that necessarily
+# moves whenever IPTC does, and the structural tags exiftool has to create the first
+# time it writes an IPTC or XMP block. Comparing these would report every write as
+# divergent and make the signal worthless.
+VOLATILE_PREFIXES = ("File:System:", "ExifTool:")
+VOLATILE_KEYS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "File:CurrentIPTCDigest",
+        "IPTC:ApplicationRecordVersion",
+        "XMP:XMP-x:XMPToolkit",
+        "XMP:XMP-xmp:MetadataDate",
+    }
+)
+
+VERIFIED = "verified"
+DIVERGENT = "divergent"
+FAILED = "failed"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class CheckpointResult:
+    state: str  # verified | divergent | failed
+    changed_fields: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    sha256: str | None = None
+    verified_at: datetime | None = None
+    reason: str | None = None
+
+    @property
+    def verified(self) -> bool:
+        return self.state == VERIFIED
+
+
+def _now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def is_owned(key: str) -> bool:
+    return key.rsplit(":", 1)[-1] in OWNED_TAGS
+
+
+def is_volatile(key: str) -> bool:
+    return key in VOLATILE_KEYS or key.startswith(VOLATILE_PREFIXES)
+
+
+def compare(before: dict, after: dict) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """Fields outside this stage's ownership whose value did not survive the write.
+
+    Additions count: a tag that appears out of nowhere is as much a divergence as a
+    tag that disappeared — both mean the write did more than it was asked to.
+    """
+    keys = set(before) | set(after)
+    return tuple(
+        sorted(
+            key
+            for key in keys
+            if not is_owned(key)
+            and not is_volatile(key)
+            and before.get(key) != after.get(key)
+        )
+    )
+
+
+def owned_values(snapshot: dict) -> set[str]:
+    """Lowercased Keywords/Subject values across every group in the snapshot."""
+    values: set[str] = set()
+    for key, value in snapshot.items():
+        if not is_owned(key):
+            continue
+        items = value if isinstance(value, list) else [value]
+        values.update(str(item).strip().lower() for item in items if item is not None)
+    return values
+
+
+def run(
+    path: str,
+    *,
+    add: tuple[str, ...] = (),
+    remove: tuple[str, ...] = (),
+) -> CheckpointResult:
+    """Write the owned keywords for one asset and verify the whole file around them."""
+    before = exiftool.read_all(path)
+    if before is None:
+        return CheckpointResult(FAILED, reason="metadata_unreadable")
+
+    if not exiftool.apply_keywords(path, add=add, remove=remove):
+        return CheckpointResult(FAILED, reason="write_failed")
+
+    # The file on disk has changed; nothing about it is recorded yet. A crash here
+    # is the worst case for metadata, so it is a fault control point (US07-04).
+    maybe_fault(EXIF_WRITTEN)
+
+    after = exiftool.read_all(path)
+    if after is None:
+        return CheckpointResult(FAILED, reason="readback_unreadable")
+
+    present = owned_values(after)
+    wanted = {value.strip().lower() for value in add}
+    unwanted = {value.strip().lower() for value in remove}
+    if not wanted <= present or (unwanted & present):
+        return CheckpointResult(FAILED, reason="owned_fields_not_written")
+
+    changed = compare(before, after)
+    sha256 = hashing.sha256_file(path)
+    if changed:
+        return CheckpointResult(DIVERGENT, changed_fields=changed, sha256=sha256)
+    return CheckpointResult(VERIFIED, sha256=sha256, verified_at=_now())
+
+
+def record(
+    session_factory,
+    *,
+    asset_id: str,
+    stage: str,
+    result: CheckpointResult,
+    add: tuple[str, ...] = (),
+    remove: tuple[str, ...] = (),
+) -> None:
+    """Persist the projection for ``(asset_id, stage)`` — one current row per pair.
+
+    The row is what makes divergence durable and reviewable rather than a log line
+    that scrolled away.
+    """
+    with session_factory() as session:
+        row = session.get(ExifProjection, (asset_id, stage))
+        if row is None:
+            row = ExifProjection(asset_id=asset_id, stage=stage, id=str(uuid.uuid4()))
+            session.add(row)
+        row.projection_version = (row.projection_version or 0) + 1
+        row.desired_json = json.dumps({"add": list(add), "remove": list(remove)})
+        row.divergent_fields = json.dumps(list(result.changed_fields))
+        row.result_file_sha256 = result.sha256
+        row.state = result.state
+        row.error_code = result.reason
+        row.verified_at = result.verified_at
+        row.updated_at = _now()
+        session.commit()
+
+
+def state_for(session_factory, asset_id: str, stage: str) -> str | None:
+    with session_factory() as session:
+        row = session.get(ExifProjection, (asset_id, stage))
+        return row.state if row else None

photo_pipeline/services/hashing.py

@@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import hashlib
 from pathlib import Path
 
-from PIL import Image, ImageOps
+from PIL import ImageOps
+
+from photo_pipeline import imaging
 
 PIXEL_HASH_VERSION = 1
 PHASH_VERSION = 1
@@ -24,7 +26,16 @@ _CHUNK = 1 << 20
 
 
 def sha256_file(path: Path | str) -> str:
-    digest = hashlib.sha256()
+    return _digest_file(path, hashlib.sha256())
+
+
+def sha1_file(path: Path | str) -> str:
+    """SHA-1 of the file bytes. Not an identity hash here — it is the checksum
+    Immich/immich-go use to recognise an asset they already hold (concept §8)."""
+    return _digest_file(path, hashlib.sha1())
+
+
+def _digest_file(path: Path | str, digest) -> str:
     with open(path, "rb") as handle:
         for chunk in iter(lambda: handle.read(_CHUNK), b""):
             digest.update(chunk)
@@ -32,7 +43,9 @@ def sha256_file(path: Path | str) -> str:
 
 
 def pixel_sha256(path: Path | str) -> str:
-    with Image.open(path) as image:
+    # Bounded decode: a header claiming a billion pixels is refused before it is
+    # ever turned into memory (US07-03).
+    with imaging.open_image(path) as image:
         oriented = ImageOps.exif_transpose(image)
         rgb = oriented.convert("RGB")
         header = f"{PIXEL_HASH_VERSION}:{rgb.width}x{rgb.height}:".encode()
@@ -59,7 +72,9 @@ def phash(path: Path | str) -> str:
     import numpy as np
     from scipy.fftpack import dct
 
-    with Image.open(path) as image:
+    from PIL import Image
+
+    with imaging.open_image(path) as image:
         small = image.convert("L").resize((32, 32), Image.LANCZOS)
         matrix = np.asarray(small, dtype=np.float64)
     transformed = dct(dct(matrix, axis=0), axis=1)

photo_pipeline/services/inventory.py

@@ -13,8 +13,11 @@ renames. Every discovered or absent path is classified as one occurrence:
 - ``missing``          — a known active asset whose file is gone (kept, flagged).
 
 Missing files are never pruned (that would break identity); the asset is retained
-with ``missing_at`` set. Archived assets are left untouched. Rescanning unchanged
-input makes no durable change.
+with ``missing_at`` set and its availability becomes ``missing_unexpected`` —
+nothing explains where the bytes went. Archived assets are left untouched: their
+absence from the active roots is expected, and each scan re-derives whether their
+medium is reachable (:mod:`photo_pipeline.services.availability`). Rescanning
+unchanged input makes no durable change.
 
 Extracted from photo_analyzer.discover_photos/reconcile_moved/prune_missing
 (see donor_ledger.yaml: pa-discovery, pa-prune-missing).
@@ -30,12 +33,12 @@ from enum import Enum
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Iterable
 
-from sqlalchemy import func, select
+from sqlalchemy import func, or_, select
 from sqlalchemy.orm import Session, sessionmaker
 
 from photo_pipeline import path_policy
 from photo_pipeline.models import Asset, AssetPath
-from photo_pipeline.services import hashing
+from photo_pipeline.services import availability, hashing
 
 
 class Occurrence(str, Enum):
@@ -60,6 +63,8 @@ def _asset_dict(asset: Asset) -> dict:
         "id": asset.id,
         "current_path": asset.current_path,
         "availability_state": asset.availability_state,
+        "archive_location_id": asset.archive_location_id,
+        "archive_path": asset.archive_path,
         "byte_size": asset.byte_size,
         "current_sha256": asset.current_sha256,
         "pixel_sha256": asset.pixel_sha256,
@@ -101,7 +106,9 @@ class InventoryService:
                 result.asset_ids[str(path)] = asset.id
 
             for asset in assets:
-                if asset.availability_state != "active" or asset.id in seen_ids:
+                # Archived assets are explained by their location, not by the active
+                # roots: a scan must never prune or flag them (concept §9).
+                if asset.availability_state in availability.ARCHIVED or asset.id in seen_ids:
                     continue
                 if asset.current_path and asset.current_path not in discovered_paths:
                     if not Path(asset.current_path).exists():
@@ -109,10 +116,18 @@ class InventoryService:
                             asset.missing_at = now
                             asset.state_version += 1
                             asset.updated_at = now
+                        # Nothing explains this absence — it is not an offline medium.
+                        if asset.availability_state != availability.MISSING_UNEXPECTED:
+                            asset.availability_state = availability.MISSING_UNEXPECTED
+                            asset.state_version += 1
+                            asset.updated_at = now
                         result.occurrences[asset.current_path] = Occurrence.MISSING.value
 
             session.commit()
 
+        # Media may have been mounted or removed since the last scan.
+        availability.refresh(self._session_factory)
+
         result.counts = dict(Counter(result.occurrences.values()))
         return result
 
@@ -132,7 +147,11 @@ class InventoryService:
             if availability:
                 stmt = stmt.where(Asset.availability_state == availability)
             if query:
-                stmt = stmt.where(Asset.current_path.like(f"%{query}%"))
+                like = f"%{query}%"
+                # An archived asset has no active path; it is searched where it lives.
+                stmt = stmt.where(
+                    or_(Asset.current_path.like(like), Asset.archive_path.like(like))
+                )
             total = session.scalar(select(func.count()).select_from(stmt.subquery()))
             rows = session.execute(
                 stmt.order_by(Asset.current_path).limit(limit).offset(offset)
@@ -169,6 +188,7 @@ class InventoryService:
                 self._open_path(session, existing.id, path_str, now, occ.value)
             if existing.missing_at is not None:
                 existing.missing_at = None
+                existing.availability_state = availability.ACTIVE
                 existing.state_version += 1
                 existing.updated_at = now
             return existing, occ
@@ -189,6 +209,7 @@ class InventoryService:
             moved_from.current_path = path_str
             moved_from.byte_size = size
             moved_from.missing_at = None
+            moved_from.availability_state = availability.ACTIVE
             moved_from.state_version += 1
             moved_from.updated_at = now
             self._open_path(session, moved_from.id, path_str, now, Occurrence.MOVED.value)

photo_pipeline/services/jobs.py

@@ -236,17 +236,32 @@ class JobService:
                 raise InvalidTransition(f"{job.state} -> {to_state}")
             if worker_id is not None and job.lease_owner not in (None, worker_id):
                 raise JobConflict(f"job {job_id} owned by {job.lease_owner}, not {worker_id}")
-            job.state = to_state
-            job.version += 1
-            job.updated_at = now
+
+            # Compare-and-set on the version this decision was made against. Without
+            # it a transition validated against a row that has since been claimed,
+            # cancelled, or finished would overwrite that newer state (concept §16
+            # database rule 6) — a cancel racing a claim used to un-claim a running
+            # job and leave the worker finalizing a job it no longer owned.
+            values = {
+                "state": to_state,
+                "version": job.version + 1,
+                "updated_at": now,
+            }
             if error:
-                job.error_code, job.error_message = error
+                values["error_code"], values["error_message"] = error
             if to_state in TERMINAL_STATES:
-                job.finished_at = now
-                job.lease_owner = None
-                job.lease_expires_at = None
+                values.update(finished_at=now, lease_owner=None, lease_expires_at=None)
+            result = session.execute(
+                update(Job).where(Job.id == job_id, Job.version == job.version).values(**values)
+            )
+            if result.rowcount != 1:
+                session.rollback()
+                raise JobConflict(
+                    f"job {job_id} changed while transitioning to {to_state}; retry"
+                )
             self._event(session, job_id, f"state:{to_state}", error[1] if error else None)
             session.commit()
+            session.expire_all()  # the core UPDATE bypassed the identity map
             return self._snapshot(session, job_id)
 
     def cancel(self, job_id: str) -> dict:

photo_pipeline/services/legacy_import.py

@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+"""Import the last path-keyed CSV state into the database (US07-01).
+
+``nsfwtag`` cached its safety scores in ``nsfw_scores.csv`` next to the library:
+one ``path,nsfw_score`` row per photo, four decimals, unreadable rows dropped. That
+file stops being a source of truth when the CLI is archived, so its scores are
+imported once — as scored-but-unreviewed ``safety_reviews`` rows on the stable
+``assets.id`` each path resolves to — and the CSV is left untouched on disk as its
+own backup.
+
+The import is deliberately conservative, because a score is evidence about a photo
+and a path is not an identity:
+
+- a row whose path matches no known asset is **unmatched**, never a new asset;
+- an asset a human already reviewed is **never** touched: a score is evidence, a
+  decision is a judgement, and an import may not overwrite the second with the
+  first — the difference is reported as a conflict instead;
+- a row for an asset that already carries a score is **skipped** unless
+  ``overwrite`` is asked for, and a differing score is reported either way;
+- an unparsable score or a duplicate path is **rejected** with its reason;
+- rerunning changes nothing that is already imported.
+
+Everything it did — and everything it refused to do — comes back as a
+reconciliation report, which the caller can persist next to the database. The
+donor's own reader is the specification for the format (donor ledger:
+``nt-score-cache``).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import csv
+import json
+import uuid
+from collections import Counter
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
+
+from photo_pipeline.models import Asset, AssetPath, SafetyReview
+
+REPORT_VERSION = 1
+# The donor wrote scores as four-decimal strings; anything outside 0..1 was never
+# something it produced, so it is data corruption rather than a score.
+SCORE_RANGE = (0.0, 1.0)
+# Recorded as the reviewer so an imported score is never mistaken for a judgement.
+REVIEWER = "legacy-csv-import"
+
+
+@dataclass
+class ImportReport:
+    source: str
+    rows: int = 0
+    imported: int = 0
+    skipped_existing: int = 0
+    unchanged: int = 0
+    reviewed: int = 0
+    unmatched: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    rejected: list[dict] = field(default_factory=list)
+    conflicts: list[dict] = field(default_factory=list)
+    generated_at: str = ""
+    schema_version: int = REPORT_VERSION
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+    @property
+    def counts(self) -> dict[str, int]:
+        return {
+            "rows": self.rows,
+            "imported": self.imported,
+            "skipped_existing": self.skipped_existing,
+            "unchanged": self.unchanged,
+            "reviewed": self.reviewed,
+            "unmatched": len(self.unmatched),
+            "rejected": len(self.rejected),
+            "conflicts": len(self.conflicts),
+        }
+
+
+class LegacyImportService:
+    def __init__(self, session_factory: sessionmaker) -> None:
+        self._session_factory = session_factory
+
+    def import_nsfw_scores(
+        self, csv_path: Path | str, *, overwrite: bool = False, dry_run: bool = False
+    ) -> ImportReport:
+        """Import ``nsfw_scores.csv`` onto asset identity and report what happened."""
+        path = Path(csv_path)
+        report = ImportReport(source=str(path))
+        if not path.is_file():
+            report.rejected.append({"path": str(path), "reason": "csv_missing"})
+            return self._stamp(report)
+
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            # Paths are matched against every occurrence an asset ever had, so a
+            # photo scored before a rename is still recognised.
+            by_path = self._path_index(session)
+            latest = self._latest_reviews(session)
+            seen: Counter[str] = Counter()
+
+            for row in self._rows(path, report):
+                report.rows += 1
+                raw_path, raw_score = row
+                seen[raw_path] += 1
+                if seen[raw_path] > 1:
+                    report.rejected.append({"path": raw_path, "reason": "duplicate_path"})
+                    continue
+                score = _parse_score(raw_score)
+                if score is None:
+                    report.rejected.append(
+                        {"path": raw_path, "reason": "unparsable_score", "value": raw_score}
+                    )
+                    continue
+                asset_id = by_path.get(raw_path)
+                if asset_id is None:
+                    report.unmatched.append(raw_path)
+                    continue
+
+                current = latest.get(asset_id)
+                if current is not None and current.decision:
+                    # A human decided this one; the CSV is older evidence.
+                    report.reviewed += 1
+                    if current.score is None or abs(current.score - score) >= 1e-9:
+                        report.conflicts.append(
+                            {
+                                "path": raw_path,
+                                "asset_id": asset_id,
+                                "current": current.score,
+                                "decision": current.decision,
+                                "csv": score,
+                            }
+                        )
+                    continue
+                if current is not None and current.score is not None:
+                    if abs(current.score - score) < 1e-9:
+                        report.unchanged += 1
+                        continue
+                    report.conflicts.append(
+                        {
+                            "path": raw_path,
+                            "asset_id": asset_id,
+                            "current": current.score,
+                            "decision": None,
+                            "csv": score,
+                        }
+                    )
+                    if not overwrite:
+                        report.skipped_existing += 1
+                        continue
+                session.add(
+                    SafetyReview(
+                        id=str(uuid.uuid4()),
+                        asset_id=asset_id,
+                        score=score,
+                        reviewer=REVIEWER,
+                    )
+                )
+                latest[asset_id] = SafetyReview(asset_id=asset_id, score=score)
+                report.imported += 1
+
+            if dry_run:
+                session.rollback()
+            else:
+                session.commit()
+        return self._stamp(report)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _rows(path: Path, report: ImportReport):
+        """Yield ``(path, score)`` pairs, tolerating the donor's own sloppiness."""
+        with open(path, newline="", encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as handle:
+            for row in csv.DictReader(handle):
+                raw_path = (row.get("path") or "").strip()
+                if not raw_path:
+                    report.rejected.append({"path": "", "reason": "missing_path"})
+                    continue
+                yield raw_path, row.get("nsfw_score")
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _latest_reviews(session) -> dict[str, SafetyReview]:
+        """The current safety row per asset — latest wins, as everywhere else."""
+        latest: dict[str, SafetyReview] = {}
+        for review in session.scalars(select(SafetyReview).order_by(SafetyReview.created_at)):
+            latest[review.asset_id] = review
+        return latest
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _path_index(session) -> dict[str, str]:
+        """Every path an asset is or was known by → its stable id."""
+        index: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for asset_id, path in session.execute(select(AssetPath.asset_id, AssetPath.path)):
+            index.setdefault(path, asset_id)
+        for asset_id, path in session.execute(select(Asset.id, Asset.current_path)):
+            if path:
+                index[path] = asset_id  # the current path wins over a closed one
+        return index
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _stamp(report: ImportReport) -> ImportReport:
+        report.generated_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+        return report
+
+
+def write_report(report: ImportReport, directory: Path) -> Path:
+    """Persist the reconciliation report; the import is not evidence until it is."""
+    directory.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    path = directory / "legacy-nsfw-import.json"
+    path.write_text(json.dumps(report.to_dict(), indent=2, sort_keys=True), encoding="utf-8")
+    return path
+
+
+def _parse_score(value) -> float | None:
+    try:
+        score = float(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return None
+    if not SCORE_RANGE[0] <= score <= SCORE_RANGE[1]:
+        return None
+    return score

photo_pipeline/services/rename_apply.py

@@ -46,9 +46,11 @@ from pathlib import Path
 from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
 
+from photo_pipeline.faults import maybe_fault
 from photo_pipeline.models import Asset, AssetPath, RenamePlan
 from photo_pipeline.services import hashing
 from photo_pipeline.services.rename_journal import (
+    ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS,
     MANUAL,
     RESUMABLE,
     JournalState,
@@ -83,17 +85,6 @@ def _now() -> datetime:
     return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
 
 
-def _maybe_fault(state: str) -> None:
-    """Test-only crash barrier (concept §18 fault injection).
-
-    When ``PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAULT_AFTER`` names a journal state, the process dies
-    abruptly the moment that state has been persisted — modelling a real kill at
-    exactly that transition. Never set outside tests.
-    """
-    if os.environ.get("PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAULT_AFTER") == state:
-        os._exit(9)
-
-
 class RenameApplyService:
     def __init__(self, session_factory: sessionmaker, *, library_roots: tuple = ()) -> None:
         self._session_factory = session_factory
@@ -142,20 +133,10 @@ class RenameApplyService:
                 self._apply_one(operation, token=token, worker_id=worker_id)
                 applied += 1
             except PreconditionFailed as error:
-                self.journal.transition(
-                    operation["id"],
-                    JournalState.FAILED,
-                    fencing_token=token,
-                    error=(error.code, str(error)),
-                )
+                self._record_failure(operation["id"], token, error.code, str(error))
                 failed += 1
             except Exception as error:  # unexpected: record and stop touching disk
-                self.journal.transition(
-                    operation["id"],
-                    JournalState.FAILED,
-                    fencing_token=token,
-                    error=("apply_error", str(error)),
-                )
+                self._record_failure(operation["id"], token, "apply_error", str(error))
                 failed += 1
         state = self.journal.sync_plan_state(plan_id)
         return {
@@ -166,13 +147,33 @@ class RenameApplyService:
             "state": state,
         }
 
+    def _record_failure(self, operation_id: str, token: int, code: str, message: str) -> None:
+        """Record a failed operation in a state its journal can actually reach.
+
+        ``failed`` only makes sense while nothing has moved. Once the folder is at
+        its destination — a postcondition failure such as bytes edited during the
+        move — the operation is not "failed and forgotten": the disk changed and
+        the database followed, so it becomes ``rollback_required`` and waits for a
+        human (US07-04). Guessing an unreachable transition used to raise out of
+        ``apply`` and lose the record entirely.
+        """
+        current = self.journal.get(operation_id)["journal_state"]
+        target = (
+            JournalState.FAILED
+            if JournalState.FAILED in ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS.get(current, set())
+            else JournalState.ROLLBACK_REQUIRED
+        )
+        self.journal.transition(
+            operation_id, target, fencing_token=token, error=(code, message)
+        )
+
     def _apply_one(self, operation: dict, *, token: int, worker_id: str) -> None:
         source = Path(operation["source_path"])
         destination = Path(operation["destination_path"])
 
         # 1. Intent first — after this point a crash is recoverable from evidence.
         self.journal.begin(operation["id"], worker_id=worker_id, fencing_token=token)
-        _maybe_fault(JournalState.MOVING)
+        maybe_fault(JournalState.MOVING)
 
         # 2. Recheck preconditions immediately before mutating, never trusting the
         #    plan's snapshot: files can change between preview and confirmation.
@@ -187,21 +188,21 @@ class RenameApplyService:
             os.rename(source, destination)
 
         self.journal.transition(operation["id"], JournalState.MOVED, fencing_token=token)
-        _maybe_fault(JournalState.MOVED)
+        maybe_fault(JournalState.MOVED)
 
         # 4. Database: stable IDs keep their identity, paths are re-pointed and the
         #    old occurrence is closed — all in one transaction.
         self._reconcile_paths(operation, source, destination)
         self.journal.transition(operation["id"], JournalState.DATABASE_UPDATED, fencing_token=token)
-        _maybe_fault(JournalState.DATABASE_UPDATED)
+        maybe_fault(JournalState.DATABASE_UPDATED)
 
         # 5. Postconditions: the bytes really are at the new paths.
         self._verify(operation, destination)
         self.journal.transition(operation["id"], JournalState.VERIFIED, fencing_token=token)
-        _maybe_fault(JournalState.VERIFIED)
+        maybe_fault(JournalState.VERIFIED)
 
         self.journal.transition(operation["id"], JournalState.COMPLETE, fencing_token=token)
-        _maybe_fault(JournalState.COMPLETE)
+        maybe_fault(JournalState.COMPLETE)
 
     def _recheck(self, operation: dict, source: Path, destination: Path) -> None:
         if not source.exists():

photo_pipeline/services/rename_journal.py

@@ -81,7 +81,17 @@ ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS = {
 
 TERMINAL_STATES = frozenset({JournalState.COMPLETE, JournalState.ROLLED_BACK})
 # States where the disk may already have been touched by this operation.
-UNSAFE_STATES = frozenset({JournalState.MOVING, JournalState.MOVED, JournalState.DATABASE_UPDATED})
+# ``rollback_required`` belongs here too (US07-04): the move happened and someone
+# has to decide what to do about it, so the library is not in a state another
+# mutation may build on.
+UNSAFE_STATES = frozenset(
+    {
+        JournalState.MOVING,
+        JournalState.MOVED,
+        JournalState.DATABASE_UPDATED,
+        JournalState.ROLLBACK_REQUIRED,
+    }
+)
 
 RESUMABLE = "resumable"
 ROLLBACK_SAFE = "rollback_safe"

photo_pipeline/services/restores.py

@@ -0,0 +1,651 @@
+"""RestoreService — plan and execute safe restores (US06-04).
+
+Restore is archiving read backwards, with one decisive difference: it removes
+nothing. The archived copy stays on its medium, so every failure mode here costs
+at most a discarded temporary file. What restore must never do is *lose identity*
+— the asset that comes back is the same asset, with its duplicate decision, safety
+review, analysis, and upload history intact — or *overwrite* something in the
+active library.
+
+Preflight proves, per concept §9 "Restore":
+
+- the recorded medium is mounted and is the right one (marker ``media_id``);
+- every selected asset is archived, its archive copy exists, and it hashes to
+  exactly the bytes the database recorded — a mismatch is ``divergent`` and is
+  refused, never silently accepted as "the file";
+- the destination lies inside the library, outside ``_IGNORE/``, and is free; a
+  taken path is answered with a collision-free name, never an overwrite;
+- the library filesystem has room for the scope plus the configured reserve;
+- no rename, archive, or restore lease is holding the lane.
+
+Blocker codes: ``no_library_root``, ``location_offline``, ``wrong_volume``,
+``unsafe_destination``, ``library_not_writable``, ``insufficient_capacity``,
+``lock_conflict``, ``rename_pending``, ``archive_pending``, ``empty_scope``,
+``not_archived``, ``archive_missing``, ``bytes_changed``.
+
+Per item the sequence is:
+
+```
+journal.begin (transferring)   ← intent persisted BEFORE any disk change
+recheck: medium, hash, free destination, asset still archived
+copy to a temporary file beside the destination, fsync, hash it back
+atomically publish into the library
+journal → verified
+current_path = destination, availability = active, path occurrence opened
+journal → complete
+```
+
+Like archiving, the confirmation token is derived from the report, so a changed
+scope, a swapped medium, or a destination that filled up invalidates it.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import shutil
+import uuid
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
+
+from photo_pipeline.config import Config
+from photo_pipeline.faults import maybe_fault
+from photo_pipeline.jobs.domain_handlers import ARCHIVE_LOCK, LIBRARY_WRITE_LOCK, UPLOAD_LOCK
+from photo_pipeline.models import ArchiveLocation, ArchiveOperation, ArchivePlan, Asset, AssetPath
+from photo_pipeline.path_policy import PathPolicyError, is_excluded, normalize_root, resolve_within
+from photo_pipeline.services import availability
+from photo_pipeline.services.archive_journal import (
+    MANUAL,
+    RESTORE,
+    RESUMABLE,
+    ArchiveJournal,
+    ArchiveState,
+)
+from photo_pipeline.services.archive_transfer import (
+    _clean_temp_files,
+    _fsync_dir,
+    _plan_dict,
+    copy_verify_publish,
+)
+from photo_pipeline.services.archives import ArchiveError
+from photo_pipeline.services.hashing import sha256_file
+from photo_pipeline.services.jobs import JobService
+from photo_pipeline.services.rename_apply import PreconditionFailed
+from photo_pipeline.services.rename_journal import RenameJournal
+
+PREFLIGHT_VERSION = 1
+TOKEN_PREFIX = f"r{PREFLIGHT_VERSION}"
+# What a restored file is called when its original name is taken. The suffix is
+# visible on purpose: a restore that quietly reuses a name is indistinguishable
+# from an overwrite.
+RESTORED_SUFFIX = "restored"
+
+LOCKS = (LIBRARY_WRITE_LOCK, UPLOAD_LOCK, ARCHIVE_LOCK)
+
+APPLYABLE_PLAN_STATES = frozenset({"planned", "applying", "failed", "complete"})
+
+
+def _now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _issue(code: str, message: str) -> dict:
+    return {"code": code, "message": message}
+
+
+class RestoreService:
+    def __init__(self, session_factory: sessionmaker, *, config: Config) -> None:
+        self._session_factory = session_factory
+        self._config = config
+        self._roots = tuple(normalize_root(root) for root in config.library_roots)
+        self.journal = ArchiveJournal(session_factory)
+
+    # ── preflight ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def preflight(self, location_id: str, asset_ids: list[str] | None = None) -> dict:
+        """Validate a restore scope and issue its token. Nothing is written."""
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            location = session.get(ArchiveLocation, location_id)
+            if location is None:
+                raise ArchiveError("unknown_location", f"unknown archive location {location_id!r}")
+            root = Path(location.root)
+            online = availability.location_online(location)
+            marker = availability.read_marker(root)
+            report = {
+                "schema_version": PREFLIGHT_VERSION,
+                "location": {
+                    "id": location.id,
+                    "name": location.name,
+                    "root": str(root),
+                    "media_id": location.media_id,
+                    "state": _location_state(root, marker, location.media_id),
+                },
+                "blockers": [],
+            }
+            items = self._items(session, location, asset_ids, reachable=online)
+
+        report["blockers"] += self._destination_blockers(report["location"]["state"], root)
+        report["blockers"] += self._lock_blockers()
+        report["items"] = items
+        report["totals"] = {
+            "assets": len(items),
+            "blocked": sum(1 for item in items if item["blockers"]),
+            "bytes": sum(item["byte_size"] or 0 for item in items),
+        }
+        report["capacity"] = self._capacity(report["totals"]["bytes"])
+        if not report["capacity"]["sufficient"]:
+            report["blockers"].append(
+                _issue(
+                    "insufficient_capacity",
+                    # No free-space number here: it drifts between two identical
+                    # preflights and the token is a digest of this text (US06-06).
+                    f"{report['totals']['bytes']} B plus a "
+                    f"{self._config.archive_free_space_reserve_bytes} B reserve do not fit in "
+                    "the library",
+                )
+            )
+        if not items:
+            report["blockers"].append(
+                _issue("empty_scope", "no archived assets are in the selected scope")
+            )
+        report["state"] = (
+            "ready"
+            if not report["blockers"] and not report["totals"]["blocked"]
+            else "blocked"
+        )
+        report["token"] = _token(report)
+        report["generated_at"] = _now().isoformat()
+        return report
+
+    def verify_token(self, token: str, location_id: str, asset_ids: list[str] | None = None) -> bool:
+        return bool(token) and token == self.preflight(location_id, asset_ids)["token"]
+
+    def _items(
+        self, session, location: ArchiveLocation, asset_ids: list[str] | None, *, reachable: bool
+    ) -> list[dict]:
+        stmt = select(Asset).where(Asset.archive_location_id == location.id)
+        if asset_ids is None:
+            # A restored asset keeps its archive link; the default scope is only what
+            # is still archived, so restoring twice is an empty scope, not a blocker.
+            stmt = stmt.where(Asset.availability_state.in_(availability.ARCHIVED))
+        else:
+            stmt = stmt.where(Asset.id.in_(asset_ids))
+        assets = list(session.scalars(stmt.order_by(Asset.archive_path)))
+        if asset_ids is not None:
+            unknown = sorted(set(asset_ids) - {asset.id for asset in assets})
+            if unknown:
+                raise ArchiveError(
+                    "unknown_asset", f"not archived at this location: {', '.join(unknown)}"
+                )
+        taken: set[str] = set()
+        return [self._item(asset, location, reachable=reachable, taken=taken) for asset in assets]
+
+    def _item(self, asset: Asset, location: ArchiveLocation, *, reachable: bool, taken: set) -> dict:
+        source = Path(location.root) / (asset.archive_path or "")
+        blockers: list[dict] = []
+        archive_sha256 = None
+
+        if asset.availability_state not in availability.ARCHIVED:
+            blockers.append(
+                _issue("not_archived", f"asset {asset.id} is {asset.availability_state}")
+            )
+        if reachable:
+            if not source.exists():
+                blockers.append(_issue("archive_missing", f"{source} is not on the medium"))
+            else:
+                archive_sha256 = sha256_file(source)
+                if asset.current_sha256 and archive_sha256 != asset.current_sha256:
+                    blockers.append(
+                        _issue(
+                            "bytes_changed",
+                            f"{source} holds bytes that are not the recorded ones; "
+                            "the archived copy is divergent",
+                        )
+                    )
+
+        destination, destination_blockers = self._destination(asset, taken)
+        blockers += destination_blockers
+        if destination is not None:
+            taken.add(str(destination))
+        return {
+            "asset_id": asset.id,
+            "archive_path": asset.archive_path,
+            "source_path": str(source),
+            "destination_path": str(destination) if destination else None,
+            "expected_sha256": asset.current_sha256,
+            "archive_sha256": archive_sha256,
+            "byte_size": asset.byte_size,
+            "availability_state": asset.availability_state,
+            "blockers": blockers,
+        }
+
+    def _destination(self, asset: Asset, taken: set) -> tuple[Path | None, list[dict]]:
+        """A free path inside the library that mirrors the archived layout.
+
+        Restoring onto an existing file is never an option, so a taken name is
+        answered with ``name (restored).ext`` — visible, ordinary, and impossible to
+        confuse with an overwrite.
+        """
+        if not self._roots:
+            return None, [_issue("no_library_root", "no library root is configured")]
+        root = self._roots[0]
+        try:
+            candidate = resolve_within(root, root / (asset.archive_path or ""))
+        except PathPolicyError as error:
+            return None, [_issue("unsafe_destination", str(error))]
+        if is_excluded(candidate):
+            return None, [
+                _issue("unsafe_destination", f"{candidate} is inside an excluded (_IGNORE/) tree")
+            ]
+        return _free_path(candidate, taken), []
+
+    def _destination_blockers(self, state: str, root: Path) -> list[dict]:
+        blockers: list[dict] = []
+        if not self._roots:
+            blockers.append(_issue("no_library_root", "no library root is configured"))
+        elif not os.access(self._roots[0], os.W_OK):
+            blockers.append(
+                _issue("library_not_writable", f"{self._roots[0]} is not writable")
+            )
+        if state == "offline":
+            blockers.append(
+                _issue("location_offline", f"the archive medium is not mounted at {root}")
+            )
+        elif state == "wrong_volume":
+            blockers.append(_issue("wrong_volume", f"{root} holds a different archive medium"))
+        return blockers
+
+    def _lock_blockers(self) -> list[dict]:
+        blockers: list[dict] = []
+        jobs = JobService(self._session_factory)
+        for lock in LOCKS:
+            held = jobs.blockers(lock)
+            if held:
+                blockers.append(
+                    _issue("lock_conflict", f"the {lock} lane is busy: job {held[0]['id']}")
+                )
+        if RenameJournal(self._session_factory).blocks_mutation():
+            blockers.append(
+                _issue("rename_pending", "an unresolved rename must be recovered before restoring")
+            )
+        if self.journal.blocks_mutation():
+            blockers.append(
+                _issue(
+                    "archive_pending",
+                    "an unresolved archive or restore must be recovered before restoring",
+                )
+            )
+        return blockers
+
+    def _capacity(self, required: int) -> dict:
+        reserve = self._config.archive_free_space_reserve_bytes
+        free = shutil.disk_usage(self._roots[0]).free if self._roots else None
+        return {
+            "required_bytes": required,
+            "reserve_bytes": reserve,
+            "free_bytes": free,
+            "sufficient": free is not None and free >= required + reserve,
+        }
+
+    # ── plans ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def create(self, location_id: str, asset_ids: list[str] | None = None, *, token: str) -> dict:
+        preflight = self.preflight(location_id, asset_ids)
+        if not token or token != preflight["token"]:
+            raise ArchiveError("stale_token", "the restore preflight changed since it was approved")
+        if preflight["state"] != "ready":
+            codes = ", ".join(sorted({issue["code"] for issue in preflight["blockers"]})) or "-"
+            blocked = sorted(
+                {issue["code"] for item in preflight["items"] for issue in item["blockers"]}
+            )
+            raise ArchiveError(
+                "blocked", f"the restore scope is blocked: {', '.join(blocked) or codes}"
+            )
+
+        plan_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            session.add(
+                ArchivePlan(
+                    id=plan_id,
+                    location_id=location_id,
+                    token=token,
+                    albums=json.dumps(asset_ids) if asset_ids is not None else None,
+                    direction=RESTORE,
+                    state="planned",
+                    schema_version=PREFLIGHT_VERSION,
+                    asset_count=preflight["totals"]["assets"],
+                    byte_size=preflight["totals"]["bytes"],
+                )
+            )
+            session.flush()
+            for sequence, item in enumerate(preflight["items"]):
+                session.add(
+                    ArchiveOperation(
+                        id=str(uuid.uuid4()),
+                        plan_id=plan_id,
+                        direction=RESTORE,
+                        sequence=sequence,
+                        album=Path(item["archive_path"]).parent.name or "(root)",
+                        asset_id=item["asset_id"],
+                        source_path=item["source_path"],
+                        destination_path=item["destination_path"],
+                        archive_path=item["archive_path"],
+                        expected_sha256=item["expected_sha256"],
+                        byte_size=item["byte_size"],
+                        journal_state=ArchiveState.PLANNED,
+                    )
+                )
+            session.commit()
+        return self.get(plan_id)
+
+    def get(self, plan_id: str) -> dict | None:
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            plan = session.get(ArchivePlan, plan_id)
+            if plan is None or plan.direction != RESTORE:
+                return None
+            report = _plan_dict(plan)
+        report["operations"] = self.journal.operations(plan_id)
+        return report
+
+    def list(self) -> list[dict]:
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            rows = session.scalars(
+                select(ArchivePlan)
+                .where(ArchivePlan.direction == RESTORE)
+                .order_by(ArchivePlan.created_at)
+            )
+            return [_plan_dict(row) for row in rows]
+
+    # ── apply ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def apply(
+        self, plan_id: str, *, expected_version: int | None = None, worker_id: str = "restore"
+    ) -> dict:
+        plan = self._require_plan(plan_id)
+        if expected_version is not None and plan["version"] != expected_version:
+            raise ArchiveError(
+                "stale_plan",
+                f"plan {plan_id} is at version {plan['version']}, expected {expected_version}",
+            )
+        if plan["state"] not in APPLYABLE_PLAN_STATES:
+            raise ArchiveError("invalid_state", f"plan {plan_id} is {plan['state']}")
+        blocking = [row for row in self.journal.incomplete() if row["plan_id"] != plan_id]
+        if blocking:
+            raise ArchiveError(
+                "archive_pending",
+                f"another archive operation is unresolved ({blocking[0]['id']}); recover it first",
+            )
+
+        token = self._claim_plan(plan_id)
+        location = self._location(plan["location_id"])
+        restored = failed = skipped = 0
+        for operation in self.journal.operations(plan_id):
+            if operation["journal_state"] == ArchiveState.COMPLETE:
+                skipped += 1
+                continue
+            try:
+                if operation["journal_state"] == ArchiveState.VERIFIED:
+                    self._finish(operation, token=token)
+                else:
+                    self._restore_one(operation, location, token=token, worker_id=worker_id)
+                restored += 1
+            except PreconditionFailed as error:
+                self._fail(operation, token, error.code, str(error))
+                failed += 1
+            except Exception as error:  # unexpected: record and stop touching disk
+                self._fail(operation, token, "restore_error", str(error))
+                failed += 1
+        state = self.journal.sync_plan_state(plan_id)
+        return {
+            "plan_id": plan_id,
+            "restored": restored,
+            "failed": failed,
+            "skipped": skipped,
+            "state": state,
+        }
+
+    def _restore_one(self, operation: dict, location: dict, *, token: int, worker_id: str) -> None:
+        source = Path(operation["source_path"])
+        destination = Path(operation["destination_path"])
+
+        # 1. Intent first; from here a crash is resolvable from journal + disk.
+        self.journal.begin(operation["id"], worker_id=worker_id, fencing_token=token)
+        maybe_fault(ArchiveState.TRANSFERRING)
+
+        # 2. Recheck against the medium and the library as they are right now.
+        self._recheck(operation, source, destination, location)
+        destination.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+
+        # 3. Always copy: the archived original stays on its medium.
+        copy_verify_publish(source, destination, operation["expected_sha256"])
+        _fsync_dir(destination.parent)
+
+        if sha256_file(destination) != operation["expected_sha256"]:
+            raise PreconditionFailed(
+                "restore_mismatch", f"{destination} does not hold the expected bytes"
+            )
+        self.journal.transition(operation["id"], ArchiveState.VERIFIED, fencing_token=token)
+        maybe_fault(ArchiveState.VERIFIED)
+
+        self._finish(self.journal.get(operation["id"]), token=token)
+
+    def _finish(self, operation: dict, *, token: int) -> None:
+        """Publish the restored file to the database. Idempotent, so recovery may
+        replay it after a crash between the copy and the bookkeeping."""
+        destination = Path(operation["destination_path"])
+        if not destination.exists() or sha256_file(destination) != operation["expected_sha256"]:
+            raise PreconditionFailed(
+                "restore_unverified", f"{destination} is not a verified restored copy"
+            )
+        self._record_restored(operation, destination)
+        self.journal.transition(operation["id"], ArchiveState.COMPLETE, fencing_token=token)
+        maybe_fault(ArchiveState.COMPLETE)
+
+    def _recheck(self, operation: dict, source: Path, destination: Path, location: dict) -> None:
+        root = Path(location["root"])
+        if not root.is_dir() or not (root / availability.MARKER_NAME).exists():
+            raise PreconditionFailed("location_offline", f"{root} is not the archive medium")
+        if not source.exists():
+            raise PreconditionFailed("archive_missing", f"{source} is not on the medium")
+        if source.is_symlink() or destination.is_symlink():
+            raise PreconditionFailed("symlink", "refusing to restore through a symlink")
+        if destination.exists():
+            # Never overwrite: the plan's free path was taken since it was made.
+            raise PreconditionFailed(
+                "destination_exists", f"destination {destination} is occupied"
+            )
+        if not self._inside_library(destination):
+            raise PreconditionFailed(
+                "destination_escape", f"{destination} is outside the library roots"
+            )
+        if sha256_file(source) != operation["expected_sha256"]:
+            self._mark_divergent(operation["asset_id"])
+            raise PreconditionFailed(
+                "bytes_changed", f"{source} changed since the plan was approved"
+            )
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            asset = session.get(Asset, operation["asset_id"])
+            if asset is None or asset.availability_state not in availability.ARCHIVED:
+                raise PreconditionFailed(
+                    "not_archived", f"asset {operation['asset_id']} is no longer archived"
+                )
+
+    def _inside_library(self, destination: Path) -> bool:
+        for root in self._roots:
+            try:
+                resolve_within(root, destination)
+                return True
+            except PathPolicyError:
+                continue
+        return False
+
+    # ── database ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def _record_restored(self, operation: dict, destination: Path) -> None:
+        """The bytes are back in the library: open the new active occurrence and set
+        availability. Identity, decisions, and history are untouched — that is the
+        entire point of restoring rather than re-importing."""
+        now = _now()
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            asset = session.get(Asset, operation["asset_id"])
+            if asset is None:
+                raise PreconditionFailed(
+                    "asset_missing", f"asset {operation['asset_id']} no longer exists"
+                )
+            # A restored asset may be returning to a path it once held, so only an
+            # *open* occurrence counts as already registered — that is what keeps
+            # recovery idempotent without collapsing the path history.
+            recorded = session.scalar(
+                select(AssetPath).where(
+                    AssetPath.asset_id == asset.id,
+                    AssetPath.path == str(destination),
+                    AssetPath.valid_until.is_(None),
+                )
+            )
+            if recorded is None:  # idempotent: recovery may replay this
+                session.add(
+                    AssetPath(
+                        asset_id=asset.id,
+                        path=str(destination),
+                        valid_from=now,
+                        reason="restore",
+                    )
+                )
+            asset.current_path = str(destination)
+            asset.availability_state = availability.ACTIVE
+            asset.missing_at = None
+            # The archive copy stays where it is; keeping the link means a restored
+            # asset still knows which medium holds its archived bytes.
+            asset.archive_divergent_at = None
+            asset.state_version += 1
+            asset.updated_at = now
+            session.commit()
+
+    def _mark_divergent(self, asset_id: str) -> None:
+        """Record that the archived copy is not the recorded file. Durable, because
+        the next restore attempt must not rediscover this from scratch."""
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            asset = session.get(Asset, asset_id)
+            if asset is None:
+                return
+            asset.archive_divergent_at = _now()
+            asset.state_version += 1
+            session.commit()
+
+    # ── recovery ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def recover(self, *, worker_id: str = "restore-recovery") -> dict:
+        """Resolve every incomplete restore from journal + disk evidence.
+
+        A restore never removed anything, so ``resumable`` simply discards the
+        temporary debris and re-plans the item; ``forward`` finishes the bookkeeping
+        for a published file; ``manual`` is left untouched and keeps blocking.
+        """
+        results = {"resumed": 0, "completed": 0, "manual": 0}
+        touched: set[str] = set()
+        for verdict in self.journal.classify_all(direction=RESTORE):
+            operation = self.journal.get(verdict["operation_id"])
+            touched.add(operation["plan_id"])
+            token = (operation["fencing_token"] or 0) + 1
+            if verdict["classification"] == MANUAL:
+                results["manual"] += 1
+                continue
+            if verdict["classification"] == RESUMABLE:
+                _clean_temp_files(Path(operation["destination_path"]).parent)
+                self.journal.transition(operation["id"], ArchiveState.PLANNED, fencing_token=token)
+                results["resumed"] += 1
+                continue
+            try:
+                self._finish(operation, token=token)
+                results["completed"] += 1
+            except PreconditionFailed as error:
+                self._fail(operation, token, error.code, str(error))
+                results["manual"] += 1
+        for plan_id in touched:
+            self.journal.sync_plan_state(plan_id)
+        return results
+
+    def recovery_status(self) -> dict:
+        verdicts = self.journal.classify_all(direction=RESTORE)
+        return {
+            "operations": verdicts,
+            "manual": [v for v in verdicts if v["classification"] == MANUAL],
+            "blocks_mutation": self.journal.blocks_mutation(),
+        }
+
+    # ── helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def _fail(self, operation: dict, token: int, code: str, message: str) -> None:
+        self.journal.transition(
+            operation["id"], ArchiveState.FAILED, fencing_token=token, error=(code, message)
+        )
+
+    def _require_plan(self, plan_id: str) -> dict:
+        plan = self.get(plan_id)
+        if plan is None:
+            raise ArchiveError("unknown_plan", f"unknown restore plan {plan_id!r}")
+        return plan
+
+    def _location(self, location_id: str) -> dict:
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            location = session.get(ArchiveLocation, location_id)
+            if location is None:
+                raise ArchiveError("unknown_location", f"unknown archive location {location_id!r}")
+            return {"id": location.id, "root": location.root, "media_id": location.media_id}
+
+    def _claim_plan(self, plan_id: str) -> int:
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            plan = session.get(ArchivePlan, plan_id)
+            plan.version += 1
+            plan.state = "applying"
+            plan.updated_at = _now()
+            token = plan.version
+            session.commit()
+        return token
+
+
+# ── module helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _location_state(root: Path, marker: dict | None, media_id: str) -> str:
+    if not root.is_dir() or marker is None:
+        return "offline"
+    return "online" if marker.get("media_id") == media_id else "wrong_volume"
+
+
+def _free_path(candidate: Path, taken: set) -> Path:
+    """``a.jpg`` → ``a (restored).jpg`` → ``a (restored 2).jpg`` …
+
+    ``taken`` holds the destinations already claimed by earlier items of the same
+    plan, so two restores in one scope cannot plan the same path.
+    """
+    if not candidate.exists() and str(candidate) not in taken:
+        return candidate
+    stem, suffix = candidate.stem, candidate.suffix
+    attempt = 1
+    while True:
+        label = RESTORED_SUFFIX if attempt == 1 else f"{RESTORED_SUFFIX} {attempt}"
+        alternative = candidate.with_name(f"{stem} ({label}){suffix}")
+        if not alternative.exists() and str(alternative) not in taken:
+            return alternative
+        attempt += 1
+
+
+def _token(report: dict) -> str:
+    """Digest of everything the report asserts about the scope and the medium.
+
+    Free space is excluded: it drifts constantly without changing what a restore
+    would do, and the capacity verdict itself is part of the digest.
+    """
+    payload = {key: value for key, value in report.items() if key not in ("generated_at", "token")}
+    payload["capacity"] = {
+        key: value for key, value in payload["capacity"].items() if key != "free_bytes"
+    }
+    digest = hashlib.sha256(
+        json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, ensure_ascii=False, default=str).encode("utf-8")
+    ).hexdigest()
+    return f"{TOKEN_PREFIX}:{digest}"

photo_pipeline/services/safety.py

@@ -108,9 +108,8 @@ from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
 
-from photo_pipeline.integrations import exiftool
-from photo_pipeline.models import Asset, SafetyReview
-from photo_pipeline.services import hashing
+from photo_pipeline.models import Asset, ExifProjection, SafetyReview
+from photo_pipeline.services import exif_checkpoint
 
 DECISIONS = {SFW, NSFW, "deferred"}
 
@@ -174,6 +173,14 @@ class SafetyService:
         with self._session_factory() as session:
             assets = list(session.scalars(_eligible_assets_query().order_by(Asset.current_path)))
             latest = self._latest_by_asset(session)
+            # One query, not one per asset: the reviewer needs to see a divergent
+            # checkpoint, which is neither "verified" nor a plain failure (US07-03).
+            projections = {
+                row.asset_id: row.state
+                for row in session.scalars(
+                    select(ExifProjection).where(ExifProjection.stage == "safety")
+                )
+            }
             rows = []
             for asset in assets:
                 review = latest.get(asset.id)
@@ -189,6 +196,7 @@ class SafetyService:
                         "decision": decision,
                         "suggested": classify(review.score) if review and review.score is not None else None,
                         "exif_verified": bool(review and review.exif_verified_at),
+                        "exif_state": projections.get(asset.id),
                     }
                 )
             return {"total": len(rows), "items": rows[offset : offset + limit]}
@@ -247,13 +255,24 @@ class SafetyService:
         result_sha256 = None
         if write_exif and decision in (SFW, NSFW) and path:
             ops = exif_projection(decision)
-            if exiftool.apply_keywords(path, add=ops["add"], remove=ops["remove"]):
-                # Read back: the chosen keyword present, the opposite absent.
-                keywords = exiftool.read_keyword_sets([path]).get(path, set())
-                opposite = NSFW if decision == SFW else SFW
-                if decision in keywords and opposite not in keywords:
-                    exif_verified_at = _now()
-                    result_sha256 = hashing.sha256_file(path)
+            # The full checkpoint: write the owned keyword, read the whole file back,
+            # and prove every field this stage does not own survived. A divergent
+            # result is recorded and left alone — it must not count as verified, so
+            # upload stays blocked until a human decides (US07-03).
+            result = exif_checkpoint.run(
+                path, add=tuple(ops["add"]), remove=tuple(ops["remove"])
+            )
+            exif_checkpoint.record(
+                self._session_factory,
+                asset_id=asset_id,
+                stage="safety",
+                result=result,
+                add=tuple(ops["add"]),
+                remove=tuple(ops["remove"]),
+            )
+            if result.verified:
+                exif_verified_at = result.verified_at
+                result_sha256 = result.sha256
 
         now = _now()
         with self._session_factory() as session:

photo_pipeline/services/thumbnails.py

@@ -8,6 +8,11 @@ an EXIF-only edit reuses the file while a real pixel change invalidates it; writ
 are atomic and the cache is bounded by an LRU quota. Failures are persisted as typed
 errors so a broken original is not retried on every request.
 
+An archived asset is served from its medium when that medium is mounted, and from
+its *protected* preview when it is not (US06-03). Protected previews are evidence,
+not cache: the quota never evicts them, because the original they describe may be
+unreachable when duplicate review needs it.
+
 Reuses photo_analyzer.prepare_image decode/resize/HEIC handling, adding the missing
 EXIF-orientation step, WebP output, and a managed cache (donor_ledger.yaml:
 pa-imaging).
@@ -15,17 +20,19 @@ pa-imaging).
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import os
 import uuid
 from pathlib import Path
 
-from PIL import Image, ImageOps, UnidentifiedImageError
+from PIL import Image, ImageOps
 from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
 from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
 
-from photo_pipeline import path_policy
+from photo_pipeline import imaging, path_policy
 from photo_pipeline.config import Config
 from photo_pipeline.models import Asset, Thumbnail
+from photo_pipeline.services import availability
 
 # Best-effort HEIC support: registered only if the optional decoder is installed.
 try:  # pragma: no cover - depends on an optional native dependency
@@ -36,8 +43,13 @@ except Exception:  # pragma: no cover
     pass
 
 SIZES = (256, 512, 1280)
+# Every in-flight render writes one of these beside its destination; startup
+# cleanup recognises exactly this pattern and nothing else.
+TEMP_SUFFIX = ".tmp"
 THUMB_VERSION = 1
 THUMB_FORMAT = "webp"
+# The size kept as durable comparison evidence for archived assets (concept §9).
+PROTECTED_SIZE = 1280
 
 
 class ThumbnailError(RuntimeError):
@@ -86,7 +98,12 @@ class ThumbnailService:
         self._config = config
         self._cache_dir = config.thumbnail_cache_dir
 
-    def generate(self, asset_id: str, size: int) -> Path:
+    def generate(
+        self, asset_id: str, size: int, *, protected: bool = False, source: Path | None = None
+    ) -> Path:
+        """Render (or reuse) a preview. ``source`` overrides where the bytes are read
+        from — the archiver passes its verified archive copy, which the database does
+        not yet point at while the transfer is still in flight."""
         if size not in SIZES:
             raise InvalidSize(f"size must be one of {SIZES}")
 
@@ -94,9 +111,7 @@ class ThumbnailService:
             asset = session.get(Asset, asset_id)
             if asset is None:
                 raise ThumbnailNotFound(f"unknown asset {asset_id}")
-            if asset.availability_state != "active" or not asset.current_path:
-                raise ThumbnailUnavailable(f"asset {asset_id} has no active file")
-            self._validate_path(asset.current_path)
+            archived = asset.availability_state in availability.ARCHIVED
             cache_key = self._cache_key(asset, size)
 
             row = session.get(Thumbnail, cache_key)
@@ -107,9 +122,21 @@ class ThumbnailService:
                     )
                 if row.path and Path(row.path).exists():
                     _touch(row.path)
+                    if protected and not row.protected:
+                        self._protect(cache_key)
                     return Path(row.path)
 
-            source = asset.current_path
+            # An archived original is read from its medium; when that medium is not
+            # mounted the retained preview above is the only evidence there is.
+            source = source or availability.readable_path(session, asset)
+            if source is None:
+                raise ThumbnailUnavailable(f"asset {asset_id} has no readable file")
+            source = str(source)
+            if source == asset.current_path:
+                # Render the *resolved* path the check approved: revalidating and then
+                # reopening the original name would let a symlink swapped in between
+                # the two steps decide which bytes are served (US07-02).
+                source = str(self._validate_path(source))  # archive roots lie outside
 
         # Rendering happens outside the DB session (no transaction held during I/O).
         try:
@@ -119,25 +146,72 @@ class ThumbnailService:
                 self._record_error(cache_key, asset_id, size, error.code)
             raise
 
-        self._record_ready(cache_key, asset_id, size, rendered)
+        # Archived assets keep their preview permanently: it is the comparison
+        # evidence that survives the original leaving active storage.
+        self._record_ready(cache_key, asset_id, size, rendered, protected=protected or archived)
         self._enforce_quota(keep=rendered["path"])
         return Path(rendered["path"])
 
+    def ensure_protected(self, asset_id: str, *, source: Path | None = None) -> dict:
+        """Produce (or confirm) the durable comparison preview for an asset.
+
+        Returns evidence rather than raising, because the caller — archive
+        preflight and the transfer itself — decides what an unrenderable original
+        means. ``unsupported`` is a recorded property of the file, not a failure of
+        the policy: its hashes and metadata remain the comparison evidence.
+        """
+        try:
+            path = self.generate(asset_id, PROTECTED_SIZE, protected=True, source=source)
+        except tuple(_PERSISTED_ERRORS) as error:
+            return {"state": "unsupported", "error_code": error.code, "path": None}
+        except ThumbnailError as error:
+            return {"state": "unavailable", "error_code": error.code, "path": None}
+        return {"state": "ready", "error_code": None, "path": str(path)}
+
+    def evidence(self, asset_id: str) -> dict:
+        """What durable preview this asset has right now, without rendering."""
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            rows = list(
+                session.execute(
+                    select(Thumbnail).where(Thumbnail.asset_id == asset_id)
+                ).scalars()
+            )
+        for row in rows:
+            if row.state == "ready" and row.path and Path(row.path).exists():
+                return {
+                    "state": "ready",
+                    "protected": bool(row.protected),
+                    "size": row.size,
+                    "error_code": None,
+                }
+        for row in rows:
+            if row.state == "error":
+                return {
+                    "state": "unsupported",
+                    "protected": False,
+                    "size": row.size,
+                    "error_code": row.error_code,
+                }
+        return {"state": "missing", "protected": False, "size": None, "error_code": None}
+
+    def _protect(self, cache_key: str) -> None:
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            row = session.get(Thumbnail, cache_key)
+            if row is not None:
+                row.protected = True
+                session.commit()
+
     # ── path safety ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-    def _validate_path(self, current_path: str) -> None:
-        path = Path(current_path)
-        if path_policy.is_excluded(path):
-            raise PathNotAllowed(f"excluded path: {current_path}")
-        roots = self._config.library_roots
-        if not roots:
-            return
-        for root in roots:
-            try:
-                path_policy.resolve_within(Path(root), path)
-                return
-            except path_policy.PathPolicyError:
-                continue
-        raise PathNotAllowed(f"path outside configured roots: {current_path}")
+    def _validate_path(self, current_path: str) -> Path:
+        """The resolved path to read, or ``PathNotAllowed``.
+
+        The message names no path: a refusal is returned to the browser, and where
+        the library lives is not the caller's business (US07-02).
+        """
+        try:
+            return path_policy.resolve_in_roots(self._config.library_roots, current_path)
+        except path_policy.PathPolicyError as error:
+            raise PathNotAllowed(str(error)) from None
 
     # ── cache key + rendering ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
     @staticmethod
@@ -152,28 +226,33 @@ class ThumbnailService:
         return self._cache_dir / safe[:2] / f"{safe}.{THUMB_FORMAT}"
 
     def _render(self, source: str, size: int, cache_key: str) -> dict:
+        """Decode bounded, orient, colour-manage, resize, and write atomically.
+
+        The temporary file is removed on every failure path: a decoder that dies
+        halfway through ``save`` would otherwise leave a stray ``.tmp`` in the cache
+        forever (US07-03).
+        """
+        destination = self._cache_path(cache_key)
+        destination.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        tmp = destination.with_name(f".{destination.name}.{uuid.uuid4().hex}{TEMP_SUFFIX}")
         try:
-            with Image.open(source) as image:
-                width, height = image.size
-                if width * height > self._config.thumbnail_max_pixels:
-                    raise ImageTooLarge(
-                        f"{width}x{height} exceeds {self._config.thumbnail_max_pixels} px"
-                    )
+            with imaging.open_image(source, max_pixels=self._config.thumbnail_max_pixels) as image:
+                imaging.draft(image, size)  # JPEG decodes near the target size
                 oriented = ImageOps.exif_transpose(image)
                 mode = "RGBA" if _has_alpha(oriented) else "RGB"
-                converted = oriented.convert(mode)
+                converted = imaging.to_srgb(oriented, mode=mode)
                 converted.thumbnail((size, size), Image.LANCZOS)
                 out_width, out_height = converted.size
-                destination = self._cache_path(cache_key)
-                destination.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-                tmp = destination.with_name(f".{destination.name}.{uuid.uuid4().hex}.tmp")
                 converted.save(tmp, format="WEBP", quality=82, method=4)
-        except ImageTooLarge:
+        except imaging.ImageTooLarge as error:
+            tmp.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+            raise ImageTooLarge(str(error)) from None
+        except imaging.UndecodableImage as error:
+            tmp.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+            raise UnsupportedImage(str(error)) from None
+        except Exception:
+            tmp.unlink(missing_ok=True)
             raise
-        except (UnidentifiedImageError, OSError, ValueError) as error:
-            raise UnsupportedImage(f"cannot decode {source}: {error}") from error
-
-        import os
 
         os.replace(tmp, destination)
         return {
@@ -183,8 +262,32 @@ class ThumbnailService:
             "format": THUMB_FORMAT,
         }
 
+    def cleanup_temp_files(self) -> int:
+        """Remove leftover render temporaries, and only those.
+
+        Runs at startup, where the concept is explicit: clean *recognized* stale
+        temporary files, never arbitrary ones. The pattern is this service's own —
+        a dot-prefixed name inside the managed cache directory ending in
+        ``.tmp`` — so nothing outside the cache and nothing a user put there can
+        match. Returns how many were removed.
+        """
+        if not self._cache_dir.is_dir():
+            return 0
+        removed = 0
+        for leftover in self._cache_dir.rglob(f".*{TEMP_SUFFIX}"):
+            if not leftover.is_file() or leftover.is_symlink():
+                continue
+            try:
+                leftover.unlink()
+                removed += 1
+            except OSError:  # pragma: no cover - a racing render already won
+                pass
+        return removed
+
     # ── persistence ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-    def _record_ready(self, cache_key: str, asset_id: str, size: int, rendered: dict) -> None:
+    def _record_ready(
+        self, cache_key: str, asset_id: str, size: int, rendered: dict, *, protected: bool = False
+    ) -> None:
         with self._session_factory() as session:
             session.merge(
                 Thumbnail(
@@ -197,6 +300,7 @@ class ThumbnailService:
                     width=rendered["width"],
                     height=rendered["height"],
                     format=rendered["format"],
+                    protected=protected,
                 )
             )
             try:
@@ -230,6 +334,10 @@ class ThumbnailService:
         if total <= quota:
             return
         files.sort(key=lambda f: f.stat().st_mtime)  # least-recently-used first
+        # Protected previews are evidence, not cache: an archived original cannot be
+        # re-rendered once its medium is away, so eviction never touches them.
+        protected = self._protected_paths()
+        files = [f for f in files if str(f) not in protected]
         keep_path = str(Path(keep)) if keep else None
         evicted: list[str] = []
         for f in files:
@@ -247,6 +355,16 @@ class ThumbnailService:
         if evicted:
             self._forget(evicted)
 
+    def _protected_paths(self) -> set[str]:
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            return {
+                row.path
+                for row in session.execute(
+                    select(Thumbnail).where(Thumbnail.protected.is_(True))
+                ).scalars()
+                if row.path
+            }
+
     def _forget(self, paths: list[str]) -> None:
         with self._session_factory() as session:
             rows = session.execute(

photo_pipeline/services/upload_batches.py

@@ -0,0 +1,461 @@
+"""UploadBatchService — one approved album at a time through immich-go (US05-02).
+
+Preflight (US05-01) proves a scope is safe and issues a token; this service turns
+that approval into a durable batch and runs it. Upload is the one stage the app
+cannot undo, so the discipline is:
+
+- **the approval is re-proved, not remembered.** Before every attempt the batch's
+  preflight token is recomputed from the current library state. Bytes edited after
+  approval, a withdrawn safety decision, or a server that stopped answering all
+  produce a different token and the attempt is refused, never run "optimistically".
+- **one lane.** A batch can only start while no other batch is running; the album
+  scope of a batch never widens after creation (concept §16 uploader lane).
+- **cancellation is cooperative and durable.** ``cancel`` writes ``cancelling``;
+  the running attempt observes it through the database, stops the uploader, and
+  records ``cancelled``. A cancelled batch is re-runnable from its own boundary.
+- **an interrupted attempt is uncertain, not failed.** Immich may have accepted
+  files the app never saw a report for, so ``recover`` marks a batch whose worker
+  vanished ``unknown_requires_verification`` (concept §15) instead of retrying it
+  blindly. :func:`~photo_pipeline.services.upload_verification.retry_blockers`
+  (US05-04) is what decides whether an attempt may start at all.
+
+Per-asset upload *results* are not interpreted here: after the attempt ends the
+report is handed to :class:`~photo_pipeline.services.upload_reports.
+UploadReportService` (US05-03), which classifies every file. The batch ``state``
+stays an honest description of what the *process* did; ``outcome_state`` says
+whether the report's evidence is complete enough to trust.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import uuid
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from sqlalchemy import select, update
+from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
+
+from photo_pipeline.config import Config
+from photo_pipeline.faults import UPLOAD_ACCEPTED, maybe_fault
+from photo_pipeline.integrations import immich_go
+from photo_pipeline.models import UploadBatch, UploadItem
+from photo_pipeline.services.hashing import sha1_file
+from photo_pipeline.services.upload_reports import UploadReportService
+from photo_pipeline.services.upload_verification import retry_blockers
+from photo_pipeline.services.uploads import UploadService
+
+
+class BatchState:
+    PLANNED = "planned"
+    RUNNING = "running"
+    CANCELLING = "cancelling"
+    CANCELLED = "cancelled"
+    SUCCEEDED = "succeeded"
+    FAILED = "failed"
+    # The attempt died without a parsed outcome: the server may hold the files.
+    UNKNOWN = "unknown_requires_verification"
+
+
+# States that occupy the single uploader lane.
+LANE_STATES = frozenset({BatchState.RUNNING, BatchState.CANCELLING})
+# States a batch may be (re)started from. ``unknown_requires_verification`` is not
+# among them: an uncertain upload must be verified (US05-04), never blindly retried.
+RUNNABLE_STATES = frozenset({BatchState.PLANNED, BatchState.FAILED, BatchState.CANCELLED})
+# States whose batch is still the live one for its album.
+OPEN_STATES = frozenset({BatchState.PLANNED, BatchState.RUNNING, BatchState.CANCELLING})
+
+
+class ItemState:
+    PENDING = "pending"
+    # ``sent`` means the batch process exited cleanly, not that Immich confirmed the
+    # asset — the per-item outcome comes from the report in US05-03/US05-04.
+    SENT = "sent"
+    FAILED = "failed"
+
+
+class BatchError(RuntimeError):
+    """The request cannot be carried out (unknown batch, wrong state, blocked)."""
+
+    def __init__(self, code: str, message: str) -> None:
+        super().__init__(message)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+class BatchConflict(BatchError):
+    """The lane is busy or the approval is stale — retry after resolving it."""
+
+
+def _now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+class UploadBatchService:
+    def __init__(self, session_factory: sessionmaker, *, config: Config) -> None:
+        self._session_factory = session_factory
+        self._config = config
+        self._preflight = UploadService(session_factory, config=config)
+
+    # ── creation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def create(
+        self, albums: list[str] | None = None, *, token: str, allow_partial: bool = False
+    ) -> list[dict]:
+        """Turn a *ready* preflight into one durable batch per album.
+
+        ``token`` must be the token of the current preflight for the same scope and
+        policy; anything else means the browser is acting on a stale preview.
+        """
+        report = self._preflight.preflight(albums, allow_partial=allow_partial)
+        if token != report["token"]:
+            raise BatchConflict(
+                "stale_preflight", "the preflight token does not describe the current state"
+            )
+        if report["state"] != "ready":
+            raise BatchError("not_ready", "the scope has unresolved upload blockers")
+
+        created: list[dict] = []
+        for album in report["albums"]:
+            existing = self._open_batch_for(album["album"])
+            if existing is not None:
+                created.append(existing)  # idempotent: one open batch per album
+                continue
+            created.append(self._create_one(album, token=token, allow_partial=allow_partial))
+        return created
+
+    def _create_one(self, album: dict, *, token: str, allow_partial: bool) -> dict:
+        eligible = [asset for asset in album["assets"] if not asset["blockers"]]
+        batch_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
+        command = immich_go.preview_command(
+            binary=self._config.immich_go_binary,
+            server_url=self._config.immich_server_url,
+            album_name=album["album_name"],
+            folder=album["folder"],
+        )
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            session.add(
+                UploadBatch(
+                    id=batch_id,
+                    album=album["album"],
+                    folder=album["folder"],
+                    album_name=album["album_name"],
+                    state=BatchState.PLANNED,
+                    preflight_token=token,
+                    allow_partial=allow_partial,
+                    command=json.dumps(command),
+                    uploader_version=immich_go.version(self._config.immich_go_binary),
+                    asset_count=len(eligible),
+                )
+            )
+            for asset in eligible:
+                session.add(
+                    UploadItem(
+                        batch_id=batch_id,
+                        asset_id=asset["asset_id"],
+                        path=asset["current_path"],
+                        sha256=asset["current_sha256"],
+                        sha1=sha1_file(asset["current_path"]),
+                        state=ItemState.PENDING,
+                    )
+                )
+            session.commit()
+        return self.get(batch_id)
+
+    # ── running ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def run(self, batch_id: str, *, worker_id: str = "uploader", cancelled=None) -> dict:
+        """Run one batch to completion. Blocks for the duration of the upload."""
+        batch = self._require(batch_id)
+        # Retry policy (US05-04): a safe failure may run again, an uncertain outcome
+        # or bytes edited after upload may not.
+        blocked = retry_blockers(batch)
+        if blocked:
+            raise BatchError(blocked[0]["code"], blocked[0]["message"])
+        busy = [row for row in self.list() if row["id"] != batch_id and row["state"] in LANE_STATES]
+        if busy:
+            raise BatchConflict("lane_busy", f"upload batch {busy[0]['id']} is still running")
+
+        # The approval is re-proved here, immediately before the irreversible act.
+        if not self._preflight.verify_token(
+            batch["preflight_token"], [batch["album"]], allow_partial=batch["allow_partial"]
+        ):
+            self._finish(
+                batch_id,
+                token=batch["version"],
+                state=BatchState.FAILED,
+                error=("stale_preflight", "the library changed after this batch was approved"),
+            )
+            raise BatchConflict(
+                "stale_preflight", "the library changed after this batch was approved"
+            )
+
+        token = self._claim(batch_id, worker_id=worker_id)
+        attempt = self.get(batch_id)["attempt_count"]
+        report_path = Path(self._config.data_dir) / "uploads" / f"{batch_id}-attempt-{attempt}.log"
+        key = self._config.immich_api_key.get_secret_value() if self._config.immich_api_key else ""
+        command = immich_go.build_command(
+            binary=self._config.immich_go_binary,
+            server_url=self._config.immich_server_url,
+            api_key=key,
+            album_name=batch["album_name"],
+            folder=batch["folder"],
+        )
+
+        def _stop_requested() -> bool:
+            if cancelled is not None and cancelled():
+                return True
+            current = self.get(batch_id)
+            return current is None or current["state"] == BatchState.CANCELLING
+
+        try:
+            result = immich_go.run_upload(
+                command,
+                report_path=report_path,
+                secret=key or None,
+                cancelled=_stop_requested,
+            )
+        except OSError as error:  # uploader vanished between preflight and exec
+            self._finish(
+                batch_id,
+                token=token,
+                state=BatchState.FAILED,
+                error=("uploader_failed", str(error)),
+            )
+            return self.get(batch_id)
+
+        if result["cancelled"]:
+            state, error, item_state = BatchState.CANCELLED, None, None
+        elif result["timed_out"]:
+            # Killed mid-flight: the server may already hold some of the files.
+            state = BatchState.UNKNOWN
+            error = ("timeout", "the uploader exceeded its time limit and was stopped")
+            item_state = None
+        elif result["exit_code"] == 0:
+            state, error, item_state = BatchState.SUCCEEDED, None, ItemState.SENT
+        else:
+            state = BatchState.FAILED
+            error = ("uploader_failed", f"immich-go exited with {result['exit_code']}")
+            item_state = ItemState.FAILED
+
+        # The uploader is done and Immich may already hold every file, but nothing
+        # about that is durable yet — the control point for "accepted, outcome not
+        # recorded" (US07-04). Recovery must answer ``unknown_requires_verification``.
+        maybe_fault(UPLOAD_ACCEPTED)
+        self._finish(batch_id, token=token, state=state, error=error, result=result)
+        if item_state:
+            self._set_items(batch_id, item_state)
+        # The report is the only evidence of what happened per file, so it is read
+        # while it is fresh (US05-03). A parse failure must not lose the batch
+        # outcome that was just recorded; the items simply stay unknown.
+        try:
+            UploadReportService(self._session_factory).ingest(batch_id)
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+        return self.get(batch_id)
+
+    def cancel(self, batch_id: str) -> dict:
+        """Request a stop. A running attempt drains; a planned batch stops outright."""
+        batch = self._require(batch_id)
+        if batch["state"] == BatchState.PLANNED:
+            target = BatchState.CANCELLED
+        elif batch["state"] == BatchState.RUNNING:
+            target = BatchState.CANCELLING
+        else:
+            raise BatchError("not_cancellable", f"batch {batch_id} is {batch['state']}")
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            row = session.get(UploadBatch, batch_id)
+            row.state = target
+            row.updated_at = _now()
+            if target == BatchState.CANCELLED:
+                row.finished_at = _now()
+            session.commit()
+        return self.get(batch_id)
+
+    # ── recovery ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def recover(self) -> dict:
+        """Resolve batches whose attempt died with the process.
+
+        A batch that never started is left ``planned`` and simply runs later. One
+        that was mid-upload cannot be classified from local state — immich-go may
+        have transferred everything before the crash — so it becomes
+        ``unknown_requires_verification`` and releases the lane rather than being
+        retried or declared failed.
+        """
+        interrupted = 0
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            for row in session.scalars(
+                select(UploadBatch).where(UploadBatch.state.in_(LANE_STATES))
+            ):
+                row.state = BatchState.UNKNOWN
+                row.error_code = "interrupted"
+                row.error_message = "the uploader process ended without a recorded outcome"
+                row.finished_at = _now()
+                row.updated_at = _now()
+                row.version += 1
+                interrupted += 1
+            session.commit()
+        return {"interrupted": interrupted}
+
+    # ── reads ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def get(self, batch_id: str) -> dict | None:
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            row = session.get(UploadBatch, batch_id)
+            if row is None:
+                return None
+            items = list(
+                session.scalars(
+                    select(UploadItem)
+                    .where(UploadItem.batch_id == batch_id)
+                    .order_by(UploadItem.path)
+                )
+            )
+            return _batch_dict(row, items)
+
+    def list(self) -> list[dict]:
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            rows = list(session.scalars(select(UploadBatch).order_by(UploadBatch.created_at)))
+            return [_batch_dict(row, []) for row in rows]
+
+    def report(self, batch_id: str) -> str:
+        """The raw uploader output kept for this batch, or ``""`` when there is none."""
+        batch = self._require(batch_id)
+        path = Path(batch["report_path"]) if batch["report_path"] else None
+        if path is None or not path.exists():
+            return ""
+        return path.read_text(errors="replace")
+
+    # ── internals ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def _open_batch_for(self, album: str) -> dict | None:
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            row = session.scalar(
+                select(UploadBatch).where(
+                    UploadBatch.album == album, UploadBatch.state.in_(OPEN_STATES)
+                )
+            )
+            return self.get(row.id) if row else None
+
+    def _claim(self, batch_id: str, *, worker_id: str) -> int:
+        """Take ownership: bump the version (the fencing token) and start an attempt."""
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            row = session.get(UploadBatch, batch_id)
+            row.version += 1
+            row.attempt_count += 1
+            row.state = BatchState.RUNNING
+            row.worker_id = worker_id
+            row.error_code = row.error_message = None
+            row.started_at = _now()
+            row.finished_at = None
+            row.updated_at = _now()
+            token = row.version
+            session.commit()
+        return token
+
+    def _finish(
+        self,
+        batch_id: str,
+        *,
+        token: int,
+        state: str,
+        error: tuple[str, str] | None = None,
+        result: dict | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        """Record the outcome, but only for the attempt that still owns the batch."""
+        values = {
+            "state": state,
+            "finished_at": _now(),
+            "updated_at": _now(),
+            "error_code": error[0] if error else None,
+            "error_message": error[1][:500] if error else None,
+        }
+        if result is not None:
+            values |= {
+                "exit_code": result["exit_code"],
+                "report_path": result["report_path"],
+                "report_bytes": result["report_bytes"],
+                "report_truncated": result["report_truncated"],
+            }
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            session.execute(
+                update(UploadBatch)
+                .where(UploadBatch.id == batch_id, UploadBatch.version == token)
+                .values(**values)
+            )
+            session.commit()
+
+    def _set_items(self, batch_id: str, state: str) -> None:
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            session.execute(
+                update(UploadItem)
+                .where(UploadItem.batch_id == batch_id)
+                .values(state=state, updated_at=_now())
+            )
+            session.commit()
+
+    def _require(self, batch_id: str) -> dict:
+        batch = self.get(batch_id)
+        if batch is None:
+            raise BatchError("not_found", f"unknown upload batch {batch_id!r}")
+        return batch
+
+
+def _batch_dict(row: UploadBatch, items: list[UploadItem]) -> dict:
+    batch = {
+        "id": row.id,
+        "album": row.album,
+        "folder": row.folder,
+        "album_name": row.album_name,
+        "state": row.state,
+        "preflight_token": row.preflight_token,
+        "allow_partial": row.allow_partial,
+        "command": json.loads(row.command or "[]"),
+        "uploader_version": row.uploader_version,
+        "asset_count": row.asset_count,
+        "attempt_count": row.attempt_count,
+        "version": row.version,
+        "worker_id": row.worker_id,
+        "report_path": row.report_path,
+        "report_bytes": row.report_bytes,
+        "report_truncated": row.report_truncated,
+        "exit_code": row.exit_code,
+        "error_code": row.error_code,
+        "error_message": row.error_message,
+        # Parsed report evidence (US05-03): what the uploader said per file, and
+        # whether that evidence is complete enough to be trusted.
+        "parser": row.parser,
+        "parser_version": row.parser_version,
+        "parsed_at": row.parsed_at.isoformat() if row.parsed_at else None,
+        "outcome_state": row.outcome_state,
+        "outcome_counts": json.loads(row.outcome_counts) if row.outcome_counts else None,
+        "report_counts": json.loads(row.report_counts) if row.report_counts else None,
+        # Verification evidence (US05-04). ``stale_bytes`` is the visible warning
+        # that an uploaded file has since been edited.
+        "verified_at": row.verified_at.isoformat() if row.verified_at else None,
+        "stale_bytes": row.stale_bytes,
+        "started_at": row.started_at.isoformat() if row.started_at else None,
+        "finished_at": row.finished_at.isoformat() if row.finished_at else None,
+        "items": [
+            {
+                "asset_id": item.asset_id,
+                "path": item.path,
+                "sha256": item.sha256,
+                "sha1": item.sha1,
+                "state": item.state,
+                "outcome": item.outcome,
+                "evidence": item.evidence,
+                "outcome_at": item.outcome_at.isoformat() if item.outcome_at else None,
+                "verification": item.verification,
+                "verified_at": item.verified_at.isoformat() if item.verified_at else None,
+                "observed_sha256": item.observed_sha256,
+                "changed_after_upload": item.changed_after_upload,
+            }
+            for item in items
+        ],
+    }
+    # Why this batch may not be (re)started, from the one place that decides it
+    # (US05-04). Carried in the record so the browser can hide an action the server
+    # would refuse instead of re-implementing the policy (US05-05).
+    batch["retry_blockers"] = retry_blockers(batch)
+    return batch

photo_pipeline/services/upload_reports.py

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+"""UploadReportService — durable per-item upload outcomes (US05-03).
+
+US05-02 proves the uploader ran and kept a bounded, credential-free report. This
+service is the step that reads that report and answers the operator's actual
+question — *what happened to each photo?* — without ever guessing in the app's
+favour:
+
+- **an item is ``unknown`` until the report says otherwise.** A file the report
+  never mentions, a report from an unpinned uploader version, and a line the
+  grammar does not recognise all leave the item ``unknown``. Exit code 0 is
+  evidence the *process* ended well, never evidence that a particular file reached
+  Immich (concept §15 "wrong upload state").
+- **counts are reconciled, not trusted.** The uploader's own summary is stored
+  next to the totals derived from the items. A disagreement makes the batch
+  ``requires_verification`` even when every line parsed.
+- **reprocessing is idempotent.** Outcomes are keyed by ``(batch_id, asset_id)``
+  and rewritten in place, so parsing the same report again — after a restart, or
+  because the operator asked — converges on the same rows and the same counts.
+
+The batch's own ``state`` still describes the process (US05-02's contract);
+``outcome_state`` describes the evidence. Turning ``requires_verification`` into
+verification, retry, and manual resolution is US05-04.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
+
+from photo_pipeline.integrations import immich_go_report as report_parser
+from photo_pipeline.models import UploadBatch, UploadItem
+
+VERIFIED = "verified"
+REQUIRES_VERIFICATION = "requires_verification"
+
+
+def _now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _key(path: str) -> str:
+    return os.path.normpath(path)
+
+
+class UploadReportService:
+    def __init__(self, session_factory: sessionmaker) -> None:
+        self._session_factory = session_factory
+
+    def ingest(self, batch_id: str) -> dict:
+        """Parse this batch's report and persist an outcome for every item.
+
+        Returns ``{"parser", "parser_version", "outcome_state", "counts",
+        "report_counts", "unmatched", "unparsed"}``. Safe to call repeatedly.
+        """
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            batch = session.get(UploadBatch, batch_id)
+            if batch is None:
+                raise KeyError(f"unknown upload batch {batch_id!r}")
+            items = list(session.scalars(select(UploadItem).where(UploadItem.batch_id == batch_id)))
+            parsed = report_parser.parse(_read_report(batch.report_path), batch.uploader_version)
+
+            by_path = {_key(entry["path"]): entry for entry in parsed["entries"]}
+            # Basenames are the fallback: an uploader may log a path relative to the
+            # folder it was given. Ambiguous basenames are dropped rather than
+            # guessed at.
+            by_name: dict[str, dict] = {}
+            for key, entry in by_path.items():
+                name = os.path.basename(key)
+                by_name[name] = None if name in by_name else entry
+
+            matched: set[str] = set()
+            counts = {outcome: 0 for outcome in report_parser.OUTCOMES}
+            for item in items:
+                key = _key(item.path)
+                entry = by_path.get(key) or by_name.get(os.path.basename(key))
+                if entry is not None:
+                    matched.add(_key(entry["path"]))
+                item.outcome = entry["outcome"] if entry else report_parser.UNKNOWN
+                item.evidence = entry["evidence"] if entry else None
+                item.outcome_at = _now()
+                counts[item.outcome] += 1
+
+            unmatched = sorted(set(by_path) - matched)
+            reconciled = _reconciles(parsed["counts"], counts)
+            state = (
+                VERIFIED
+                if (
+                    parsed["supported"]
+                    and items
+                    and not counts[report_parser.UNKNOWN]
+                    and not unmatched
+                    and not parsed["entries_truncated"]
+                    and reconciled
+                )
+                else REQUIRES_VERIFICATION
+            )
+
+            batch.parser = parsed["parser"]
+            batch.parser_version = parsed["parser_version"]
+            batch.parsed_at = _now()
+            batch.outcome_state = state
+            batch.outcome_counts = json.dumps(counts, sort_keys=True)
+            batch.report_counts = (
+                json.dumps(parsed["counts"], sort_keys=True) if parsed["counts"] else None
+            )
+            session.commit()
+
+            return {
+                "parser": parsed["parser"],
+                "parser_version": parsed["parser_version"],
+                "outcome_state": state,
+                "counts": counts,
+                "report_counts": parsed["counts"],
+                "unmatched": unmatched,
+                "unparsed": parsed["unparsed"],
+            }
+
+
+def _read_report(report_path: str | None) -> str:
+    """The raw report, or ``""`` when the attempt never produced one."""
+    if not report_path:
+        return ""
+    path = Path(report_path)
+    return path.read_text(errors="replace") if path.exists() else ""
+
+
+def _reconciles(report_counts: dict | None, derived: dict) -> bool:
+    """Whether the uploader's own totals agree with the per-item outcomes.
+
+    No summary is not a disagreement — most of the uncertainty it would catch is
+    already caught by unmatched entries and unknown items.
+    """
+    if not report_counts:
+        return True
+    return all(derived.get(outcome) == total for outcome, total in report_counts.items())

photo_pipeline/services/upload_verification.py

@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
+"""UploadVerificationService — resolving uncertain uploads (US05-04).
+
+US05-03 leaves a batch honest but sometimes uncertain: a killed uploader, an
+unpinned report grammar, or a file the report never mentioned all end as
+``unknown``. Retrying such a batch is the dangerous move — Immich may already hold
+the files, and a blind retry is how a lost response turns into a second server
+asset. So this service resolves uncertainty *before* anything is re-run:
+
+- **evidence beats the report.** Verification asks Immich itself whether it holds
+  the exact SHA-1 the batch recorded before uploading. That answer is authoritative
+  over the uploader's text, in both directions: present makes an unknown item
+  ``uploaded``, absent makes it ``failed`` and therefore safe to retry.
+- **no answer is never "no".** An unreachable server, missing credentials, or a
+  response this adapter will not interpret leave the item ``inconclusive``. The
+  batch stays ``unknown_requires_verification`` and stays un-runnable.
+- **changed bytes are a stale warning, not a silent re-upload.** Verification
+  re-hashes what is on disk. A file edited after its upload is flagged, the batch
+  is marked ``stale_bytes``, and re-running it is refused: uploading again would
+  create or upgrade a server asset the user never approved (concept §8).
+- **manual resolution is evidence, not permission.** An operator may record what
+  they checked in Immich, but only with a non-empty note and their identity, and
+  every decision is appended to an immutable history alongside the server answers.
+
+Retry policy lives in :func:`retry_blockers`, which :class:`UploadBatchService`
+enforces before every attempt and the API surfaces as ``409``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import uuid
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
+
+from photo_pipeline.config import Config
+from photo_pipeline.integrations import immich_go
+from photo_pipeline.integrations import immich_go_report as report_parser
+from photo_pipeline.models import UploadBatch, UploadItem, UploadVerification
+from photo_pipeline.services.hashing import sha256_file
+from photo_pipeline.services.upload_reports import REQUIRES_VERIFICATION, VERIFIED
+
+PRESENT = "present"
+ABSENT = "absent"
+INCONCLUSIVE = "inconclusive"
+MANUAL = "manual"
+
+MAX_EVIDENCE_CHARS = 500
+
+
+def _now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+class VerificationError(RuntimeError):
+    """The request cannot be carried out (unknown batch/item, missing evidence)."""
+
+    def __init__(self, code: str, message: str) -> None:
+        super().__init__(message)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+class UploadVerificationService:
+    def __init__(self, session_factory: sessionmaker, *, config: Config) -> None:
+        self._session_factory = session_factory
+        self._config = config
+
+    # ── verification ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def verify(self, batch_id: str) -> dict:
+        """Check every item of a batch against the server and the bytes on disk.
+
+        Returns ``{"batch_id", "state", "outcome_state", "stale_bytes",
+        "server_reachable", "detail", "counts", "items"}``. Safe to call
+        repeatedly: the same evidence produces the same rows, and each run appends
+        its own history entries.
+        """
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            batch = session.get(UploadBatch, batch_id)
+            if batch is None:
+                raise VerificationError("not_found", f"unknown upload batch {batch_id!r}")
+            items = list(
+                session.scalars(
+                    select(UploadItem)
+                    .where(UploadItem.batch_id == batch_id)
+                    .order_by(UploadItem.path)
+                )
+            )
+            answer = immich_go.bulk_upload_check(
+                self._config.immich_server_url,
+                self._config.immich_api_key.get_secret_value()
+                if self._config.immich_api_key
+                else None,
+                {item.asset_id: item.sha1 for item in items if item.sha1},
+            )
+            detail = answer["detail"]
+
+            for item in items:
+                observed, changed = _current_bytes(item)
+                held = answer["present"].get(item.asset_id)
+                if item.sha1 is None:
+                    result, evidence = INCONCLUSIVE, "no upload hash was recorded for this file"
+                elif held is True:
+                    result, evidence = PRESENT, f"Immich holds sha1 {item.sha1}"
+                elif held is False:
+                    result, evidence = ABSENT, f"Immich does not hold sha1 {item.sha1}"
+                else:
+                    result = INCONCLUSIVE
+                    evidence = detail or "the server did not classify these bytes"
+
+                item.verification = result
+                item.verified_at = _now()
+                item.observed_sha256 = observed
+                item.changed_after_upload = changed
+                # The server is authoritative over the report text — but only when
+                # it actually answered.
+                if result == PRESENT:
+                    item.outcome = report_parser.UPLOADED
+                    item.evidence = evidence
+                    item.outcome_at = _now()
+                elif result == ABSENT:
+                    item.outcome = report_parser.FAILED
+                    item.evidence = evidence
+                    item.outcome_at = _now()
+                session.add(
+                    _event(
+                        batch_id,
+                        item.asset_id,
+                        action="verify",
+                        source="immich_api",
+                        result=result,
+                        outcome=item.outcome,
+                        evidence=evidence,
+                    )
+                )
+
+            _resolve_batch(batch, items)
+            session.commit()
+            return _report(batch, items, server_reachable=answer["reachable"], detail=detail)
+
+    # ── manual resolution ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def resolve(
+        self, batch_id: str, asset_id: str, *, outcome: str, evidence: str, actor: str
+    ) -> dict:
+        """Record an operator's own verification of one item.
+
+        ``evidence`` and ``actor`` are mandatory: a manual resolution is only worth
+        keeping if it says what was checked and who checked it.
+        """
+        if outcome not in report_parser.OUTCOMES:
+            raise VerificationError("invalid_outcome", f"unknown upload outcome {outcome!r}")
+        evidence = (evidence or "").strip()
+        actor = (actor or "").strip()
+        if not evidence:
+            raise VerificationError("evidence_required", "a manual resolution must record evidence")
+        if not actor:
+            raise VerificationError("actor_required", "a manual resolution must record its author")
+
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            batch = session.get(UploadBatch, batch_id)
+            if batch is None:
+                raise VerificationError("not_found", f"unknown upload batch {batch_id!r}")
+            item = session.get(UploadItem, {"batch_id": batch_id, "asset_id": asset_id})
+            if item is None:
+                raise VerificationError("not_found", f"{asset_id!r} is not part of this batch")
+
+            item.outcome = outcome
+            item.evidence = evidence[:MAX_EVIDENCE_CHARS]
+            item.outcome_at = _now()
+            item.verification = MANUAL
+            item.verified_at = _now()
+            session.add(
+                _event(
+                    batch_id,
+                    asset_id,
+                    action="resolve",
+                    source="operator",
+                    result=MANUAL,
+                    outcome=outcome,
+                    evidence=evidence,
+                    actor=actor,
+                )
+            )
+
+            items = list(
+                session.scalars(
+                    select(UploadItem)
+                    .where(UploadItem.batch_id == batch_id)
+                    .order_by(UploadItem.path)
+                )
+            )
+            _resolve_batch(batch, items)
+            session.commit()
+            return _report(batch, items, server_reachable=None, detail=None)
+
+    # ── history ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def history(self, batch_id: str) -> list[dict]:
+        """Every verification and resolution recorded for this batch, oldest first."""
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            rows = session.scalars(
+                select(UploadVerification)
+                .where(UploadVerification.batch_id == batch_id)
+                .order_by(UploadVerification.created_at, UploadVerification.id)
+            )
+            return [
+                {
+                    "id": row.id,
+                    "asset_id": row.asset_id,
+                    "action": row.action,
+                    "source": row.source,
+                    "result": row.result,
+                    "outcome": row.outcome,
+                    "evidence": row.evidence,
+                    "actor": row.actor,
+                    "created_at": row.created_at.isoformat() if row.created_at else None,
+                }
+                for row in rows
+            ]
+
+
+# ── retry policy ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def retry_blockers(batch: dict) -> list[dict]:
+    """Why this batch may not be (re)run, in the order the user should fix them.
+
+    A plain uploader failure is a *safe* failure: nothing uncertain happened, so it
+    is retryable. An uncertain outcome and edited bytes are not.
+    """
+    from photo_pipeline.services.upload_batches import BatchState, RUNNABLE_STATES
+
+    blockers: list[dict] = []
+    if batch["state"] == BatchState.UNKNOWN:
+        blockers.append(
+            {
+                "code": "requires_verification",
+                "message": "this upload's outcome is uncertain; verify it before retrying",
+            }
+        )
+    if batch.get("stale_bytes"):
+        blockers.append(
+            {
+                "code": "changed_after_upload",
+                "message": "files in this batch changed after they were uploaded; "
+                "re-approve them through a fresh preflight",
+            }
+        )
+    if not blockers and batch["state"] not in RUNNABLE_STATES:
+        blockers.append({"code": "not_runnable", "message": f"batch is {batch['state']}"})
+    return blockers
+
+
+# ── internals ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _current_bytes(item: UploadItem) -> tuple[str | None, bool]:
+    """``(hash on disk now, changed since upload)``. A missing file counts as changed."""
+    path = Path(item.path)
+    if not path.exists():
+        return None, item.sha256 is not None
+    observed = sha256_file(path)
+    return observed, bool(item.sha256 and observed != item.sha256)
+
+
+def _event(
+    batch_id: str,
+    asset_id: str,
+    *,
+    action: str,
+    source: str,
+    result: str,
+    outcome: str | None,
+    evidence: str,
+    actor: str | None = None,
+) -> UploadVerification:
+    return UploadVerification(
+        id=str(uuid.uuid4()),
+        batch_id=batch_id,
+        asset_id=asset_id,
+        action=action,
+        source=source,
+        result=result,
+        outcome=outcome,
+        evidence=evidence[:MAX_EVIDENCE_CHARS],
+        actor=actor,
+        created_at=_now(),
+    )
+
+
+def _resolve_batch(batch: UploadBatch, items: list[UploadItem]) -> None:
+    """Fold the item evidence back into the batch's own state.
+
+    An uncertain batch only leaves that state once every item is accounted for:
+    all present makes it succeeded, any absent makes it a safe failure to retry,
+    and a single inconclusive item keeps it uncertain.
+    """
+    from photo_pipeline.services.upload_batches import BatchState
+
+    batch.stale_bytes = any(item.changed_after_upload for item in items)
+    batch.verified_at = _now()
+    unresolved = [item for item in items if item.outcome in (None, report_parser.UNKNOWN)]
+    batch.outcome_state = VERIFIED if items and not unresolved else REQUIRES_VERIFICATION
+
+    if batch.state != BatchState.UNKNOWN or unresolved:
+        return
+    if any(item.outcome == report_parser.FAILED for item in items):
+        batch.state = BatchState.FAILED
+        batch.error_code = "verified_incomplete"
+        batch.error_message = "verification proved some files never reached Immich"
+    else:
+        batch.state = BatchState.SUCCEEDED
+        batch.error_code = batch.error_message = None
+
+
+def _report(
+    batch: UploadBatch,
+    items: list[UploadItem],
+    *,
+    server_reachable: bool | None,
+    detail: str | None,
+) -> dict:
+    counts: dict[str, int] = {}
+    for item in items:
+        key = item.verification or "unverified"
+        counts[key] = counts.get(key, 0) + 1
+    return {
+        "batch_id": batch.id,
+        "state": batch.state,
+        "outcome_state": batch.outcome_state,
+        "stale_bytes": batch.stale_bytes,
+        "server_reachable": server_reachable,
+        "detail": detail,
+        "counts": counts,
+        "items": [
+            {
+                "asset_id": item.asset_id,
+                "path": item.path,
+                "verification": item.verification,
+                "outcome": item.outcome,
+                "evidence": item.evidence,
+                "changed_after_upload": item.changed_after_upload,
+                "verified_at": item.verified_at.isoformat() if item.verified_at else None,
+            }
+            for item in items
+        ],
+    }

photo_pipeline/services/uploads.py

@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+"""UploadService — preflight for Immich upload (US05-01).
+
+Upload is the first stage that sends the library somewhere the app cannot take it
+back from, so nothing here uploads: preflight only *proves* a scope is safe and
+issues a token that a later start command must present (US05-02).
+
+What it proves (concept §8 "preflight"):
+
+- credentials are configured and the Immich server answers, without ever putting
+  the API key in a response, a preview, or a log line;
+- ``immich-go`` is installed and its version is recorded;
+- no rename is half-applied — the journal must not block library mutation;
+- every asset in scope is canonical, present, and decided ``sfw``/``nsfw`` with a
+  verified safety EXIF checkpoint;
+- every SFW asset also has a completed analysis EXIF checkpoint;
+- the bytes on disk right now still hash to what inventory recorded, so the album
+  preview describes the exact bytes that would be uploaded.
+
+Blocker codes are structured, never prose the UI has to parse:
+
+``no_library_root``, ``credentials_missing``, ``server_unreachable``,
+``immich_go_missing``, ``rename_pending``, ``unknown_album``, ``empty_scope``,
+``file_missing``, ``bytes_changed``, ``safety_undecided``, ``safety_deferred``,
+``safety_exif_unverified``, ``analysis_incomplete``, ``partial_scope``.
+
+**Partial scope is a blocker, not a default.** An album with any blocked asset is
+refused unless the caller passes the explicit ``allow_partial`` policy, which is
+itself part of the token — a token issued for a partial upload can never be
+replayed as a full one.
+
+The token is derived, not stored: it is a digest of the whole report (minus its
+timestamp), so any change that matters — a new decision, edited bytes, a different
+server, a resolved blocker, a different policy — produces a different token and the
+old one is stale by construction. No table, no invalidation bookkeeping.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
+
+from photo_pipeline.config import Config
+from photo_pipeline.integrations import immich_go
+from photo_pipeline.models import AnalysisResult, Asset, SafetyReview
+from photo_pipeline.services.albums import album_label
+from photo_pipeline.services.hashing import sha256_file
+from photo_pipeline.services.rename_journal import RenameJournal
+
+PREFLIGHT_VERSION = 1
+TOKEN_PREFIX = f"v{PREFLIGHT_VERSION}"
+SFW = "sfw"
+NSFW = "nsfw"
+ANALYZED = "analyzed"
+
+
+class UploadError(RuntimeError):
+    """Invalid preflight request (unknown album in the requested scope)."""
+
+
+def _now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _issue(code: str, message: str) -> dict:
+    return {"code": code, "message": message}
+
+
+class UploadService:
+    def __init__(self, session_factory: sessionmaker, *, config: Config) -> None:
+        self._session_factory = session_factory
+        self._config = config
+        self._roots = tuple(Path(root) for root in config.library_roots)
+
+    # ── preflight ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def preflight(self, albums: list[str] | None = None, *, allow_partial: bool = False) -> dict:
+        """Validate an upload scope and issue its token. Read-only, no upload."""
+        report = {
+            "schema_version": PREFLIGHT_VERSION,
+            "policy": {"allow_partial": allow_partial},
+            "blockers": [],
+            "credentials": self._credentials(),
+            "server": self._server(),
+            "uploader": self._uploader(),
+        }
+        report["blockers"] += self._environment_blockers(report)
+        report["albums"] = self._albums(albums, allow_partial=allow_partial)
+        report["totals"] = _totals(report["albums"])
+        if not report["albums"]:
+            report["blockers"].append(
+                _issue("empty_scope", "no canonical, active assets are in the selected scope")
+            )
+        report["state"] = (
+            "ready"
+            if not report["blockers"] and all(a["state"] == "ready" for a in report["albums"])
+            else "blocked"
+        )
+        report["token"] = _token(report)
+        report["generated_at"] = _now().isoformat()
+        return report
+
+    def verify_token(
+        self, token: str, albums: list[str] | None = None, *, allow_partial: bool = False
+    ) -> bool:
+        """True when ``token`` still describes the current state of that scope.
+
+        Recomputed rather than looked up, so an externally edited file or a changed
+        decision invalidates it even though nothing wrote to the database.
+        """
+        return bool(token) and token == self.preflight(albums, allow_partial=allow_partial)["token"]
+
+    # ── environment ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def _credentials(self) -> dict:
+        """Presence only — the key itself never leaves configuration."""
+        return {
+            "server_url": self._config.immich_server_url,
+            "api_key_configured": self._config.immich_api_key is not None,
+        }
+
+    def _server(self) -> dict:
+        reachable, detail = immich_go.ping(self._config.immich_server_url)
+        return {"reachable": reachable, "detail": detail}
+
+    def _uploader(self) -> dict:
+        binary = self._config.immich_go_binary
+        return {
+            "binary": binary,
+            "installed": immich_go.find_binary(binary) is not None,
+            "version": immich_go.version(binary),
+        }
+
+    def _environment_blockers(self, report: dict) -> list[dict]:
+        blockers: list[dict] = []
+        if not self._roots:
+            blockers.append(_issue("no_library_root", "no library root is configured"))
+        if not report["credentials"]["api_key_configured"] or not self._config.immich_server_url:
+            blockers.append(
+                _issue("credentials_missing", "an Immich server URL and API key are required")
+            )
+        elif not report["server"]["reachable"]:
+            blockers.append(
+                _issue(
+                    "server_unreachable", f"Immich did not respond: {report['server']['detail']}"
+                )
+            )
+        if not report["uploader"]["installed"]:
+            blockers.append(
+                _issue("immich_go_missing", f"{self._config.immich_go_binary} is not installed")
+            )
+        if RenameJournal(self._session_factory).blocks_mutation():
+            blockers.append(
+                _issue("rename_pending", "an unresolved rename must be recovered before upload")
+            )
+        return blockers
+
+    # ── scope ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def _albums(self, requested: list[str] | None, *, allow_partial: bool) -> list[dict]:
+        by_album = self._scope()
+        if requested is not None:
+            unknown = sorted(set(requested) - set(by_album))
+            if unknown:
+                raise UploadError(f"unknown album(s): {', '.join(unknown)}")
+            by_album = {name: by_album[name] for name in sorted(set(requested))}
+        return [
+            self._album(name, rows, allow_partial=allow_partial)
+            for name, rows in sorted(by_album.items())
+        ]
+
+    def _scope(self) -> dict[str, list[dict]]:
+        """Canonical, active assets grouped by album, each with its stage evidence."""
+        with self._session_factory() as session:
+            assets = list(
+                session.scalars(
+                    select(Asset).where(
+                        Asset.canonical_asset_id.is_(None),
+                        Asset.availability_state == "active",
+                        Asset.current_path.is_not(None),
+                    )
+                )
+            )
+            reviews: dict[str, SafetyReview] = {}
+            for review in session.scalars(select(SafetyReview).order_by(SafetyReview.created_at)):
+                reviews[review.asset_id] = review  # latest row per asset wins
+            analyses = {
+                result.asset_id: result for result in session.scalars(select(AnalysisResult))
+            }
+
+        by_album: dict[str, list[dict]] = {}
+        for asset in assets:
+            by_album.setdefault(album_label(asset.current_path, self._roots), []).append(
+                {
+                    "asset_id": asset.id,
+                    "path": asset.current_path,
+                    "expected_sha256": asset.current_sha256,
+                    "review": reviews.get(asset.id),
+                    "analysis": analyses.get(asset.id),
+                }
+            )
+        return by_album
+
+    def _album(self, name: str, rows: list[dict], *, allow_partial: bool) -> dict:
+        folder = Path(rows[0]["path"]).parent
+        items = sorted((self._item(row) for row in rows), key=lambda item: item["current_path"])
+        blocked = [item for item in items if item["blockers"]]
+        eligible = [item for item in items if not item["blockers"]]
+        blockers: list[dict] = []
+        if blocked and not allow_partial:
+            blockers.append(
+                _issue(
+                    "partial_scope",
+                    f"{len(blocked)} of {len(items)} asset(s) are not upload-ready; resolve them "
+                    "or approve a partial upload explicitly",
+                )
+            )
+        if not eligible:
+            blockers.append(_issue("empty_scope", "no upload-ready asset remains in this album"))
+        # Folder-as-album: Immich names the album after the leaf folder, so the
+        # preview shows exactly what the server will create.
+        album_name = folder.name
+        return {
+            "album": name,
+            "folder": str(folder),
+            "album_name": album_name,
+            "asset_count": len(items),
+            "eligible_count": len(eligible),
+            "blocked_count": len(blocked),
+            "partial": bool(blocked),
+            "state": "blocked" if blockers else "ready",
+            "blockers": blockers,
+            "assets": items,
+            "command_preview": immich_go.preview_command(
+                binary=self._config.immich_go_binary,
+                server_url=self._config.immich_server_url,
+                album_name=album_name,
+                folder=folder,
+            ),
+        }
+
+    def _item(self, row: dict) -> dict:
+        """One asset's readiness, including its hash *as it is on disk right now*."""
+        path = Path(row["path"])
+        review: SafetyReview | None = row["review"]
+        analysis: AnalysisResult | None = row["analysis"]
+        decision = review.decision if review else None
+        blockers: list[dict] = []
+        current_sha256 = None
+
+        if not path.exists():
+            blockers.append(_issue("file_missing", f"{path} is missing"))
+        else:
+            # ponytail: full re-hash every preflight. Gate on (size, mtime_ns) first
+            # if a large library makes this slow — the hash stays authoritative.
+            current_sha256 = sha256_file(path)
+            if row["expected_sha256"] and current_sha256 != row["expected_sha256"]:
+                blockers.append(
+                    _issue("bytes_changed", f"{path} changed since its last verified checkpoint")
+                )
+
+        if decision not in (SFW, NSFW):
+            code = "safety_deferred" if decision == "deferred" else "safety_undecided"
+            blockers.append(_issue(code, "a confirmed sfw/nsfw safety decision is required"))
+        elif review.exif_verified_at is None:
+            blockers.append(
+                _issue("safety_exif_unverified", "the safety EXIF checkpoint is not verified")
+            )
+        elif decision == SFW and not (
+            analysis and analysis.status == ANALYZED and analysis.exif_written_at is not None
+        ):
+            blockers.append(
+                _issue("analysis_incomplete", "SFW assets need a verified analysis EXIF checkpoint")
+            )
+
+        return {
+            "asset_id": row["asset_id"],
+            "current_path": str(path),
+            "safety_decision": decision,
+            "current_sha256": current_sha256,
+            "blockers": blockers,
+        }
+
+
+def _totals(albums: list[dict]) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "albums": len(albums),
+        "ready_albums": sum(1 for album in albums if album["state"] == "ready"),
+        "assets": sum(album["asset_count"] for album in albums),
+        "eligible": sum(album["eligible_count"] for album in albums),
+        "blocked": sum(album["blocked_count"] for album in albums),
+    }
+
+
+def _token(report: dict) -> str:
+    """Digest of everything the report asserts. Volatile fields are excluded so the
+    same state always yields the same token; every relevant change breaks it."""
+    payload = {key: value for key, value in report.items() if key not in ("generated_at", "token")}
+    digest = hashlib.sha256(
+        json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, ensure_ascii=False, default=str).encode("utf-8")
+    ).hexdigest()
+    return f"{TOKEN_PREFIX}:{digest}"

pyproject.toml

@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ test = [
 
 [tool.ruff]
 line-length = 100
+# The frozen CLI archive is evidence, not code under maintenance (US07-01).
+extend-exclude = ["legacy_cli_archive"]
 
 [tool.pytest.ini_options]
 testpaths = ["tests"]
@@ -31,4 +33,6 @@ markers = [
     "phase_b: Phase B end-to-end acceptance (US02-07) — API, worker-recovery, and browser journeys",
     "phase_c: Phase C end-to-end acceptance (US03-05) — album proposal API and browser journeys",
     "phase_d: Phase D end-to-end acceptance (US04-06) — guarded rename API, fault, and browser journeys",
+    "phase_e: Phase E end-to-end acceptance (US05-06) — upload preflight, uploader, and browser journeys",
+    "phase_f: Phase F end-to-end acceptance (US06-06) — archive destination, transfer, and restore journeys",
 ]

tests/_artifacts.py

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+"""Failure artifacts for the fault and race suites (US07-04).
+
+A randomized concurrency failure that leaves nothing behind is a failure nobody
+can diagnose: the temporary library is deleted, the database goes with it, and the
+seed that produced the interleaving is gone. So when a test fails, everything
+needed to reproduce and read it is copied out of the temporary directory:
+
+    <artifacts>/<test id>/
+        seeds.json     recorded properties (``race_seed``) and the failing test id
+        manifest.json  every file under the temporary directory: path, size, sha256
+        files/...      the databases (with -wal/-shm), journals, and logs themselves
+
+The manifest covers the whole tree — including files too large or too private to
+copy — so a missing or unexpected file is still visible afterwards. Copying is
+bounded by ``MAX_COPY_BYTES``: artifacts must not turn a failing CI run into a
+disk-full one.
+
+Set ``PHOTO_PIPELINE_TEST_ARTIFACTS`` to choose the destination; the default is
+``.artifacts/`` in the repository root.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import shutil
+from pathlib import Path
+
+REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+DEFAULT_DIR = REPO / ".artifacts"
+MAX_COPY_BYTES = 25 * 1024 * 1024
+# Databases (and their write-ahead logs), journals exported as files, and logs.
+COPY_SUFFIXES = (".db", ".db-wal", ".db-shm", ".sqlite", ".log", ".json", ".jsonl", ".argv")
+
+
+def artifacts_dir() -> Path:
+    return Path(os.environ.get("PHOTO_PIPELINE_TEST_ARTIFACTS", DEFAULT_DIR))
+
+
+def _slug(test_id: str) -> str:
+    return re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9._-]+", "_", test_id)[:120]
+
+
+def manifest(root: Path) -> list[dict]:
+    """Every file under ``root``: relative path, byte size, and SHA-256.
+
+    The filesystem state at the moment of failure — what was moved, what was left
+    behind, what was half-written.
+    """
+    entries = []
+    for path in sorted(root.rglob("*")):
+        if not path.is_file() or path.is_symlink():
+            continue
+        try:
+            body = path.read_bytes()
+        except OSError as error:
+            entries.append({"path": str(path.relative_to(root)), "error": str(error)})
+            continue
+        entries.append(
+            {
+                "path": str(path.relative_to(root)),
+                "bytes": len(body),
+                "sha256": hashlib.sha256(body).hexdigest(),
+            }
+        )
+    return entries
+
+
+def collect(root: Path, test_id: str, *, properties: dict | None = None) -> Path:
+    """Copy the evidence for one failed test out of ``root``. Returns its directory."""
+    destination = artifacts_dir() / _slug(test_id)
+    files = destination / "files"
+    files.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+
+    entries = manifest(root)
+    (destination / "manifest.json").write_text(json.dumps(entries, indent=1))
+    (destination / "seeds.json").write_text(
+        json.dumps({"test": test_id, "properties": properties or {}}, indent=1)
+    )
+
+    budget = MAX_COPY_BYTES
+    for path in sorted(root.rglob("*")):
+        if not path.is_file() or path.is_symlink():
+            continue
+        if not path.name.endswith(COPY_SUFFIXES):
+            continue
+        size = path.stat().st_size
+        if size > budget:
+            continue  # the manifest still records it; the copy is what is skipped
+        target = files / path.relative_to(root)
+        target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        shutil.copy2(path, target)
+        budget -= size
+    return destination

tests/characterization/conftest.py

@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@ import pytest
 from PIL import Image
 
 REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+# The donors are frozen in the read-only archive (US07-01). Only this suite — and
+# the parity test that compares against them — puts that directory on sys.path;
+# production never does, which tests/unit/test_legacy_archive.py enforces.
+ARCHIVED_SOURCES = REPO / "legacy_cli_archive" / "src"
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ARCHIVED_SOURCES))
 sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO))
 
 EXIFTOOL = shutil.which("exiftool")

tests/characterization/test_donor_ledger.py

@@ -1,13 +1,20 @@
-"""Ledger lint (US01-01): every donor-ledger row must carry a real source
-reference, a target location, and either existing characterization test IDs or
-a real pending backlog story."""
+"""Ledger lint (US01-01, extended by US07-01).
+
+Every donor-ledger row must carry a real source reference — now inside the frozen
+archive — a target location, and either existing characterization test IDs or a
+real pending backlog story. Since archival (US07-01) a row may also be ``resolved``:
+its replacement has shipped, ``parity`` names tests that exist and prove it, and
+``delta`` states every intentional difference. Nothing may quietly become
+"finished" without one of those two."""
 import re
 from pathlib import Path
 
 import yaml
 
 REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
-LEDGER = REPO / "donor_ledger.yaml"
+ARCHIVE = REPO / "legacy_cli_archive"
+LEDGER = ARCHIVE / "donor_ledger.yaml"
+ARCHIVED_SOURCES = ARCHIVE / "src"
 STORIES = REPO / "delivery_backlog" / "stories"
 TESTS_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
 
@@ -15,7 +22,7 @@ CLASSIFICATIONS = {"reuse", "extract", "refactor", "replace"}
 REQUIRED_AREAS = {"discovery", "hashing", "imaging", "nsfw", "vision", "exif",
                   "database", "ui", "configuration", "logging", "cancellation",
                   "error"}
-STATUSES = {"characterized", "pending"}
+STATUSES = {"characterized", "resolved", "pending"}
 
 
 def load_rows():
@@ -49,10 +56,11 @@ def test_rows_have_required_fields_and_unique_ids():
 
 
 def test_source_references_resolve():
+    """Source paths are relative to the archive: the donors moved there, whole."""
     for r in load_rows():
         src = r["source"]
-        f = REPO / src["file"]
-        assert f.is_file(), f"{r['id']}: source file {src['file']} missing"
+        f = ARCHIVED_SOURCES / src["file"]
+        assert f.is_file(), f"{r['id']}: source file {src['file']} missing from the archive"
         text = f.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
         for sym in src["symbols"]:
             assert sym in text, f"{r['id']}: symbol {sym!r} not found in {src['file']}"
@@ -63,7 +71,9 @@ def test_rows_have_tests_or_pending_story():
     for r in load_rows():
         tests = r.get("tests", [])
         pending = r.get("pending_story")
-        assert tests or pending, f"{r['id']}: neither tests nor pending_story"
+        parity = r.get("parity", [])
+        assert tests or pending or parity, \
+            f"{r['id']}: neither characterization tests, parity tests, nor a pending story"
         for t in tests:
             assert t in known_tests, f"{r['id']}: unknown test id {t}"
         if pending:
@@ -73,16 +83,58 @@ def test_rows_have_tests_or_pending_story():
             assert tests, f"{r['id']}: characterized rows need test ids"
 
 
+def test_resolved_rows_name_their_parity_or_their_delta():
+    """A resolved row is a claim that the behavior is handled. It has to say how:
+    tests that prove the replacement, or a stated difference — usually both."""
+    for r in load_rows():
+        if r["status"] != "resolved":
+            assert "parity" not in r, f"{r['id']}: parity on a non-resolved row"
+            continue
+        parity = r.get("parity", [])
+        delta = r.get("delta")
+        assert parity or delta, f"{r['id']}: resolved without parity tests or a delta"
+        if delta:
+            assert len(str(delta).strip()) >= 20, f"{r['id']}: delta too thin to be a reason"
+        for ref in parity:
+            rel, _, func = ref.partition("::")
+            path = REPO / rel
+            assert path.is_file(), f"{r['id']}: parity test file {rel} missing"
+            assert f"def {func}" in path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"), \
+                f"{r['id']}: parity test {ref} not found"
+
+
+def test_pending_rows_are_the_only_unfinished_work():
+    """The ledger is the honest list of what has not been carried over: a pending
+    row names the story that will, and that story must still be open work."""
+    for r in load_rows():
+        if r["status"] != "pending":
+            continue
+        story = r.get("pending_story")
+        assert story, f"{r['id']}: pending without a story"
+        assert list(STORIES.glob(f"{story}-*.md")), f"{r['id']}: unknown story {story}"
+
+
+def test_every_target_module_exists():
+    """A row is only finished if the thing it points at is really there."""
+    for r in load_rows():
+        if r["status"] == "pending":
+            continue
+        modules = re.findall(r"photo_pipeline/[\w/]+\.py", str(r["target"]))
+        for module in modules:
+            assert (REPO / module).is_file(), f"{r['id']}: target {module} does not exist"
+
+
 def test_all_required_areas_covered():
     covered = {r["area"] for r in load_rows()}
     assert REQUIRED_AREAS <= covered, f"uncovered areas: {REQUIRED_AREAS - covered}"
     assert covered <= REQUIRED_AREAS, f"unknown areas: {covered - REQUIRED_AREAS}"
 
 
-def test_no_legacy_file_moved():
-    # US01-01 explicitly forbids moving/archiving donors; the ledger's source
-    # files must all still exist at their original locations.
+def test_every_donor_is_in_the_archive_and_nowhere_else():
+    """US01-01 forbade archiving before characterization; US07-01 requires it after.
+    Each donor exists exactly once — frozen, in the archive."""
     for donor in ("photo_analyzer.py", "nsfwtag/scoring.py", "nsfwtag/exif.py",
                   "nsfwtag/server.py", "webapp/query.py", "webapp/runner.py",
                   "webapp/server.py"):
-        assert (REPO / donor).is_file(), f"donor moved: {donor}"
+        assert (ARCHIVED_SOURCES / donor).is_file(), f"donor missing from archive: {donor}"
+        assert not (REPO / donor).exists(), f"donor still live at the repo root: {donor}"

tests/conftest.py

@@ -1,4 +1,16 @@
-"""Make the repository root importable for the pipeline test suites."""
+"""Make the repository root importable for the pipeline test suites, give every
+suite the application session the API requires since US07-02, and keep the evidence
+of any failure (US07-04).
+
+The suites drive the API the way the browser does — module-level ``httpx`` calls and
+``TestClient`` — so instead of threading a cookie through several hundred call sites,
+both clients bootstrap the session themselves exactly like ``frontend/js/api.js``:
+fetch ``/api/v1/session`` once, then send the cookie plus the CSRF header, and
+re-bootstrap once on 401 (a restarted server issues a new session).
+
+Security tests deliberately bypass this by constructing their own ``httpx.Client``;
+only the module-level helpers are wrapped.
+"""
 
 import sys
 from pathlib import Path
@@ -6,3 +18,112 @@ from pathlib import Path
 REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
 if str(REPO) not in sys.path:
     sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO))
+
+import httpx
+import httpx._api  # httpx.get/post resolve `request` in this module
+import pytest
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+from photo_pipeline.api.security import CSRF_HEADER, SESSION_COOKIE
+
+_SESSIONS: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {}  # base url -> (session id, csrf token)
+
+
+def _base(url) -> str:
+    parts = httpx.URL(str(url))
+    return f"{parts.scheme}://{parts.netloc.decode()}"
+
+
+def _bootstrap(base: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    if base not in _SESSIONS:
+        response = httpx.Client(timeout=10).get(f"{base}/api/v1/session")
+        _SESSIONS[base] = (
+            response.cookies.get(SESSION_COOKIE, ""),
+            response.json().get("csrf_token", ""),
+        )
+    return _SESSIONS[base]
+
+
+def session_client(base_url: str, **kwargs) -> httpx.Client:
+    """An ``httpx.Client`` that has bootstrapped its own application session.
+
+    For suites that keep one client for a whole journey; it holds its own cookie, so
+    a client made after a server restart picks up the new session by construction.
+    """
+    client = httpx.Client(base_url=base_url, **kwargs)
+    client.headers[CSRF_HEADER] = client.get("/api/v1/session").json()["csrf_token"]
+    return client
+
+
+def _authorized(url, headers, cookies):
+    session_id, token = _bootstrap(_base(url))
+    headers = dict(headers or {})
+    headers.setdefault(CSRF_HEADER, token)
+    cookies = dict(cookies or {})
+    cookies.setdefault(SESSION_COOKIE, session_id)
+    return headers, cookies
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True, scope="session")
+def _api_session():
+    real_request, real_stream = httpx._api.request, httpx._api.stream
+    real_client_request, real_client_init = TestClient.request, TestClient.__init__
+
+    def request(method, url, *, headers=None, cookies=None, **kwargs):
+        sent, jar = _authorized(url, headers, cookies)
+        response = real_request(method, url, headers=sent, cookies=jar, **kwargs)
+        if response.status_code == 401:
+            _SESSIONS.pop(_base(url), None)
+            sent, jar = _authorized(url, headers, cookies)
+            response = real_request(method, url, headers=sent, cookies=jar, **kwargs)
+        return response
+
+    def stream(method, url, *, headers=None, cookies=None, **kwargs):
+        sent, jar = _authorized(url, headers, cookies)
+        return real_stream(method, url, headers=sent, cookies=jar, **kwargs)
+
+    def client_init(self, app, *args, base_url="http://127.0.0.1", **kwargs):
+        # The default "http://testserver" is not a local host, which is exactly what
+        # the Host check refuses; in-process tests are still same-origin callers.
+        real_client_init(self, app, *args, base_url=base_url, **kwargs)
+
+    def client_request(self, method, url, *, headers=None, **kwargs):
+        if CSRF_HEADER not in self.headers:
+            response = real_client_request(self, "GET", "/api/v1/session")
+            self.headers[CSRF_HEADER] = response.json()["csrf_token"]
+        return real_client_request(self, method, url, headers=headers, **kwargs)
+
+    httpx._api.request, httpx.request = request, request
+    httpx._api.stream, httpx.stream = stream, stream
+    TestClient.request, TestClient.__init__ = client_request, client_init
+    yield
+    httpx._api.request, httpx.request = real_request, real_request
+    httpx._api.stream, httpx.stream = real_stream, real_stream
+    TestClient.request, TestClient.__init__ = real_client_request, real_client_init
+
+
+@pytest.hookimpl(hookwrapper=True)
+def pytest_runtest_makereport(item, call):
+    """On failure, keep the temporary library, database, journals, logs, and seed.
+
+    ``tmp_path`` is deleted a few runs later and its contents are the only record
+    of what a randomized or fault-injected failure actually did, so they are copied
+    out while they still exist (US07-04).
+    """
+    outcome = yield
+    report = outcome.get_result()
+    if report.when != "call" or not report.failed:
+        return
+    root = item.funcargs.get("tmp_path")
+    if root is None or not Path(root).exists():
+        return
+    from tests._artifacts import collect
+
+    try:
+        destination = collect(
+            Path(root), item.nodeid, properties=dict(getattr(report, "user_properties", []))
+        )
+    except OSError as error:  # never let evidence collection mask the real failure
+        report.sections.append(("failure artifacts", f"could not be collected: {error}"))
+    else:
+        report.sections.append(("failure artifacts", str(destination)))

tests/e2e/_pipeline_harness.py

@@ -9,12 +9,18 @@ and worker, never mocked inside a test.
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import json
 import os
 import socket
+import stat
 import subprocess
 import sys
+import threading
 import time
+import uuid
 from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
 from pathlib import Path
 
 import httpx
@@ -133,15 +139,27 @@ class Server:
         self.proc = None
 
 
-def start_worker(seeded: Seeded, *, fake_vision_log: Path) -> subprocess.Popen:
-    """Launch a real durable worker wired to the recording vision fake."""
+def start_worker(
+    seeded: Seeded,
+    *,
+    fake_vision_log: Path | None = None,
+    extra_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+) -> subprocess.Popen:
+    """Launch a real durable worker wired to the recording vision fake.
+
+    ``extra_env`` carries whatever else the job under test needs — the Immich
+    credentials and uploader path, for the upload lane.
+    """
+    extra = dict(extra_env or {})
+    if fake_vision_log is not None:
+        extra["PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAKE_VISION_LOG"] = str(fake_vision_log)
     return subprocess.Popen(
         [sys.executable, "-m", "photo_pipeline", "worker", "--id", "e2e-worker"],
         cwd=str(REPO),
         env=_env(
             seeded,
             free_port(),  # unused by the worker, but keeps the env shape uniform
-            extra={"PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAKE_VISION_LOG": str(fake_vision_log)},
+            extra=extra,
         ),
         stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
         stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
@@ -159,3 +177,386 @@ def wait_until(predicate, *, timeout: float = 20, interval: float = 0.1):
             return value
         time.sleep(interval)
     raise AssertionError("condition not met before timeout")
+
+
+# ── Phase D: an analysed album, ready to be named and renamed ────────────────
+
+NOW = datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+
+
+class session_factory:
+    """Session factory against a seeded database, for the few things a test has to
+    set up or inspect below the API — journal states, mainly."""
+
+    def __init__(self, seeded: Seeded) -> None:
+        self._seeded = seeded
+
+    def __enter__(self):
+        from photo_pipeline.config import Config
+        from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory, run_migrations
+
+        config = Config.from_env(
+            {
+                "PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR": str(self._seeded.data),
+                "PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": str(self._seeded.lib),
+            }
+        )
+        run_migrations(config.database_url)
+        self._engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
+        return create_session_factory(self._engine)
+
+    def __exit__(self, *_):
+        self._engine.dispose()
+        return False
+
+
+def seed_album(tmp_path: Path, album: str = "rome", names: tuple[str, ...] = ("a.jpg", "b.jpg")):
+    """A library holding one album folder whose photos are confirmed SFW and analysed
+    — the state a naming proposal, and therefore a rename plan, is built from."""
+    from sqlalchemy import select
+
+    from photo_pipeline.models import AnalysisResult, Asset, SafetyReview
+    from photo_pipeline.services.inventory import InventoryService
+
+    seeded = seed_library(tmp_path, {}, {})
+    folder = seeded.lib / album
+    folder.mkdir(parents=True)
+    for index, name in enumerate(names):
+        image(folder / name, index + 1)
+
+    with session_factory(seeded) as sf:
+        InventoryService(sf).scan(seeded.lib)
+        with sf() as session:
+            rows = list(session.execute(select(Asset.id, Asset.current_path)).all())
+            for asset_id, path in rows:
+                session.add(
+                    SafetyReview(
+                        id=str(uuid.uuid4()), asset_id=asset_id, decision="sfw", created_at=NOW
+                    )
+                )
+                session.add(
+                    AnalysisResult(
+                        asset_id=asset_id,
+                        status="analyzed",
+                        description=f"a view of {path}",
+                        tags='["ruins", "city"]',
+                        approx_year=2019,
+                        location_hint="Rome",
+                    )
+                )
+            session.commit()
+        seeded.asset_ids.update({Path(path).stem: aid for aid, path in rows})
+    return seeded
+
+
+def approve_album(base: str, *, album: str = "rome", name: str) -> None:
+    """Generate a proposal, set its final name, and approve it over HTTP."""
+    httpx.post(f"{base}/api/v1/albums/proposals", json={}, timeout=10).raise_for_status()
+    for payload, route in (
+        ({"name": name}, "edit"),
+        ({}, "approve"),
+    ):
+        current = httpx.get(f"{base}/api/v1/albums/proposals/{album}", timeout=10).json()
+        httpx.post(
+            f"{base}/api/v1/albums/proposals/{album}/{route}",
+            json={**payload, "expected_version": current["version"]},
+            timeout=10,
+        ).raise_for_status()
+
+
+# ── Phase E: an upload-ready album, a fake Immich, and a real fake uploader ───
+
+SENTINEL_KEY = "immich-sentinel-9f3a2b"
+UPLOADER_VERSION = "immich-go 0.21.0"  # a pinned family, so reports are parsable
+
+# Uploader bodies for the pinned ``text-v1`` grammar. ``$6`` is the folder argument
+# of ``upload from-folder``.
+REPORTING_UPLOADER = (
+    'echo "INFO  uploaded $6/a.jpg"\n'
+    'echo "INFO  server has the same file $6/b.jpg"\n'
+    'echo "Uploaded 1, duplicates 1"\n'
+    "exit 0\n"
+)
+# Exits cleanly but says nothing about any file: the process succeeded, the
+# per-file outcome is unknown.
+SILENT_UPLOADER = "exit 0\n"
+
+
+def _immich_handler(state: dict):
+    class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+        def do_GET(self):  # noqa: N802 (BaseHTTPRequestHandler API)
+            self._json(200, {"res": "pong"})
+
+        def do_POST(self):  # noqa: N802
+            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", 0))
+            payload = json.loads(self.rfile.read(length) or b"{}")
+            if state["mode"] == "broken":
+                self.send_error(500, "bulk-upload-check is unavailable")
+                return
+            reject = state["mode"] == "present"
+            self._json(
+                200,
+                {
+                    "results": [
+                        {
+                            "id": asset["id"],
+                            "action": "reject" if reject else "accept",
+                            "reason": "duplicate" if reject else None,
+                        }
+                        for asset in payload.get("assets", [])
+                    ]
+                },
+            )
+
+        def _json(self, code: int, body: dict) -> None:
+            raw = json.dumps(body).encode()
+            self.send_response(code)
+            self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+            self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(raw)))
+            self.end_headers()
+            self.wfile.write(raw)
+
+        def log_message(self, *args):
+            pass
+
+    return Handler
+
+
+class FakeImmich:
+    """An Immich that answers ping, and says whether it holds the exact bytes.
+
+    ``mode`` is what the next verification will find: ``present`` (the server
+    deduplicates them, so it has them), ``absent`` (it would accept them, so it does
+    not), or ``broken`` (no usable answer at all).
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.state = {"mode": "present"}
+        self._server = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), _immich_handler(self.state))
+        threading.Thread(target=self._server.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
+        self.url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{self._server.server_port}"
+        self._running = True
+
+    def mode(self, mode: str) -> None:
+        self.state["mode"] = mode
+
+    def stop(self) -> None:
+        """Idempotent, so a test may take Immich away mid-journey."""
+        if not self._running:
+            return
+        self._running = False
+        self._server.shutdown()
+        self._server.server_close()
+
+
+def fake_uploader(tmp_path: Path, body: str) -> Path:
+    """A real executable standing in for immich-go.
+
+    ``--version`` answers like the real tool; any other invocation appends its
+    complete argv to ``immich-go.argv`` — which is how a test proves the uploader
+    ran, what folder it was handed, or that it never ran at all.
+    """
+    path = tmp_path / "immich-go"
+    path.write_text(
+        "#!/bin/sh\n"
+        f'if [ "$1" = "--version" ]; then echo "{UPLOADER_VERSION}"; exit 0; fi\n'
+        f'printf "%s\\n" "$*" >> "{tmp_path / "immich-go.argv"}"\n'
+        f"{body}"
+    )
+    path.chmod(path.stat().st_mode | stat.S_IEXEC | stat.S_IXGRP | stat.S_IXOTH)
+    return path
+
+
+def uploader_argv(tmp_path: Path) -> list[str]:
+    """Every upload invocation the fake uploader saw, oldest first."""
+    log = tmp_path / "immich-go.argv"
+    return log.read_text().splitlines() if log.exists() else []
+
+
+def mark_upload_ready(seeded: Seeded, *, unverified: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> None:
+    """Give every seeded photo the verified EXIF checkpoints upload requires.
+
+    ``unverified`` names stems whose analysis checkpoint stays incomplete, which is
+    what makes an album partially blocked.
+    """
+    from sqlalchemy import select
+
+    from photo_pipeline.models import AnalysisResult, SafetyReview
+
+    blocked = {seeded.asset_ids[stem] for stem in unverified}
+    with session_factory(seeded) as sf:
+        with sf() as session:
+            for review in session.scalars(select(SafetyReview)):
+                review.exif_verified_at = NOW
+            for analysis in session.scalars(select(AnalysisResult)):
+                analysis.exif_written_at = None if analysis.asset_id in blocked else NOW
+            session.commit()
+
+
+# ── Phase F: an archivable album and a mountable fake medium ─────────────────
+
+
+def mark_uploaded(seeded: Seeded, *, album: str = "rome") -> None:
+    """Give every seeded photo the verified upload evidence archiving requires.
+
+    Archiving refuses anything Immich is not proven to hold, and that proof is an
+    upload batch — recorded here as fixture state so the archive journeys do not
+    have to re-run an upload they are not testing.
+    """
+    from sqlalchemy import select
+
+    from photo_pipeline.models import Asset, UploadBatch, UploadItem
+    from photo_pipeline.services.hashing import sha256_file
+
+    with session_factory(seeded) as sf:
+        with sf() as session:
+            batch_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
+            session.add(
+                UploadBatch(
+                    id=batch_id,
+                    album=album,
+                    folder=str(seeded.lib / album),
+                    album_name=album,
+                    state="succeeded",
+                    preflight_token="v1:e2e",
+                    outcome_state="verified",
+                    created_at=NOW,
+                )
+            )
+            for asset in session.scalars(select(Asset)):
+                if not asset.current_path:
+                    continue
+                session.add(
+                    UploadItem(
+                        batch_id=batch_id,
+                        asset_id=asset.id,
+                        path=asset.current_path,
+                        sha256=sha256_file(asset.current_path),
+                        sha1="0" * 40,
+                        state="sent",
+                        outcome="uploaded",
+                    )
+                )
+            session.commit()
+
+
+class ArchiveStack:
+    """A seeded, archivable library plus the server, the worker, and a fake medium.
+
+    The medium is an ordinary directory whose marker file makes it identifiable;
+    ``unmount()`` takes that marker away, which is exactly what the application sees
+    when an external disk is unplugged.
+    """
+
+    MARKER = ".photo-pipeline-archive.json"
+
+    def __init__(self, tmp_path: Path, seeded: Seeded) -> None:
+        self.tmp_path = tmp_path
+        self.seeded = seeded
+        self.archive = tmp_path / "archive"
+        self.archive.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
+        self.server: Server | None = None
+        self.worker: subprocess.Popen | None = None
+        self.base = ""
+
+    def start(self, *, worker: bool = True, extra_env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> "ArchiveStack":
+        env = {"PHOTO_PIPELINE_ARCHIVE_FREE_SPACE_RESERVE_BYTES": "0", **(extra_env or {})}
+        self.server = Server(self.seeded, extra_env=env).start()
+        self.base = self.server.base
+        if worker:
+            self.worker = start_worker(self.seeded, extra_env=env)
+        return self
+
+    def register(self, name: str = "external") -> dict:
+        response = httpx.post(
+            f"{self.base}/api/v1/archive-locations",
+            json={"name": name, "root": str(self.archive)},
+            timeout=20,
+        )
+        response.raise_for_status()
+        return response.json()
+
+    def unmount(self) -> None:
+        (self.archive / self.MARKER).rename(self.archive / f"{self.MARKER}.away")
+
+    def remount(self) -> None:
+        (self.archive / f"{self.MARKER}.away").rename(self.archive / self.MARKER)
+
+    def plans(self) -> list[dict]:
+        return httpx.get(f"{self.base}/api/v1/archive-plans", timeout=20).json()["plans"]
+
+    def assets(self) -> list[dict]:
+        return httpx.get(
+            f"{self.base}/api/v1/inventory/assets", params={"limit": 200}, timeout=20
+        ).json()["items"]
+
+    def restart_server(self) -> None:
+        self.server.stop()
+        self.server.start()
+
+    def restart_worker(self, *, extra_env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> None:
+        """Replace the worker — a healthy one after a crashed one, by default."""
+        if self.worker is not None and self.worker.poll() is None:
+            self.worker.kill()
+            self.worker.wait(timeout=10)
+        self.worker = start_worker(
+            self.seeded,
+            extra_env={"PHOTO_PIPELINE_ARCHIVE_FREE_SPACE_RESERVE_BYTES": "0", **(extra_env or {})},
+        )
+
+    def stop(self) -> None:
+        if self.worker is not None:
+            self.worker.kill()
+            self.worker.wait(timeout=10)
+        if self.server is not None:
+            self.server.stop()
+
+
+class UploadStack:
+    """A seeded, upload-ready library plus the server, worker, and fake Immich."""
+
+    def __init__(self, tmp_path: Path, seeded: Seeded) -> None:
+        self.tmp_path = tmp_path
+        self.seeded = seeded
+        self.immich = FakeImmich()
+        self.server: Server | None = None
+        self.worker: subprocess.Popen | None = None
+        self.base = ""
+
+    def start(
+        self,
+        *,
+        uploader: str = REPORTING_UPLOADER,
+        worker: bool = True,
+        credentials: bool = True,
+    ) -> "UploadStack":
+        env = {
+            "PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_SERVER_URL": self.immich.url if credentials else "",
+            "PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_GO_BINARY": str(fake_uploader(self.tmp_path, uploader)),
+        }
+        if credentials:
+            env["PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_API_KEY"] = SENTINEL_KEY
+        self.server = Server(self.seeded, extra_env=env).start()
+        self.base = self.server.base
+        if worker:
+            self.worker = start_worker(self.seeded, extra_env=env)
+        return self
+
+    def restart_server(self) -> None:
+        """A genuinely fresh process against the same database and library."""
+        self.server.stop()
+        self.server.start()
+
+    def batches(self) -> list[dict]:
+        return httpx.get(f"{self.base}/api/v1/upload-batches", timeout=20).json()["batches"]
+
+    def argv(self) -> list[str]:
+        return uploader_argv(self.tmp_path)
+
+    def stop(self) -> None:
+        if self.worker is not None:
+            self.worker.kill()
+            self.worker.wait(timeout=10)
+        if self.server is not None:
+            self.server.stop()
+        self.immich.stop()

tests/e2e/test_archive_ui.py

@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
+"""Browser journeys for the archive view (US06-05).
+
+Archiving is the only stage that removes originals, so these journeys check the
+two things a browser must never get wrong about it: that the preview names exactly
+what would leave and where it would go, and that nothing offers an action the
+server would refuse. The medium is a real directory whose marker makes it
+identifiable; unmounting it is what an unplugged disk looks like from here.
+
+Nothing is mocked inside the browser: the transfer runs in the real worker process
+and the assertions read the filesystem afterwards.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+from playwright.sync_api import expect
+
+from tests.e2e._pipeline_harness import (
+    ArchiveStack,
+    mark_uploaded,
+    seed_album,
+    session_factory,
+    wait_until,
+)
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.phase_f  # part of the Phase F acceptance gate (US06-06)
+
+TIMEOUT = 10
+RUN_TIMEOUT = 30_000
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def stack(tmp_path):
+    seeded = seed_album(tmp_path)
+    mark_uploaded(seeded)
+    running = ArchiveStack(tmp_path, seeded)
+    try:
+        yield running
+    finally:
+        running.stop()
+
+
+def _open(page, stack) -> None:
+    page.goto(f"{stack.base}/app/#/archive")
+    page.get_by_test_id("archive-locations").wait_for()
+
+
+def _archive(page, stack) -> None:
+    """Confirm the archive and wait for the worker to finish the run."""
+    _open(page, stack)
+    page.get_by_test_id("start-archive").click()
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("detail-state")).to_have_text("complete", timeout=RUN_TIMEOUT)
+
+
+def _archived_paths(stack) -> list[str]:
+    return sorted(p.name for p in (stack.archive / "rome").glob("*.jpg"))
+
+
+# ── preview and confirmation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def test_the_preview_names_the_scope_destination_and_reclaimable_bytes(page, stack):
+    errors = []
+    page.on("console", lambda m: errors.append(m.text) if m.type == "error" else None)
+    stack.start(worker=False)
+    location = stack.register()
+    _open(page, stack)
+
+    row = page.get_by_test_id("location-row").first
+    expect(row.get_by_test_id("location-label")).to_have_text("external")
+    expect(row.get_by_test_id("location-media")).to_have_text(location["media_id"])
+    expect(row.get_by_test_id("location-state")).to_have_text("online")
+
+    album = page.get_by_test_id("archive-album-row").first
+    expect(album.get_by_test_id("album-name")).to_have_text("rome")
+    expect(album.get_by_test_id("album-destination")).to_have_text(str(stack.archive / "rome"))
+    expect(album.get_by_test_id("album-assets")).to_have_text("2")
+    expect(album.get_by_test_id("album-state")).to_have_text("ready")
+    # Same filesystem here, so the transfer method is the move path — and it is
+    # named, because copy-verify-remove and move fail differently.
+    expect(album.get_by_test_id("album-method")).to_contain_text("move")
+
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("destination-identity")).to_contain_text(location["media_id"])
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("capacity")).to_contain_text("reserve")
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("start-archive")).to_contain_text("Archive 1 album(s) · reclaim")
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("start-archive")).to_be_enabled()
+    assert stack.plans() == [], "previewing may not create anything"
+    assert errors == [], f"console errors: {errors}"
+
+
+def test_an_offline_medium_blocks_the_confirmation_and_says_what_to_mount(page, stack):
+    stack.start(worker=False)
+    location = stack.register()
+    stack.unmount()
+    _open(page, stack)
+
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("location-state")).to_have_text("offline")
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("preflight-blocker").first).to_have_attribute(
+        "data-code", "location_offline"
+    )
+    instruction = page.get_by_test_id("mount-instruction")
+    expect(instruction).to_contain_text("external")
+    expect(instruction).to_contain_text(location["media_id"])
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("start-archive")).to_be_disabled()
+
+
+def test_an_unuploaded_album_is_blocked_with_its_reason(page, stack):
+    # No upload evidence at all: archiving would remove the only copy.
+    seeded = stack.seeded
+    with session_factory(seeded) as sf:
+        from sqlalchemy import delete
+
+        from photo_pipeline.models import UploadItem
+
+        with sf() as session:
+            session.execute(delete(UploadItem))
+            session.commit()
+    stack.start(worker=False)
+    stack.register()
+    _open(page, stack)
+
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("album-state")).to_have_text("blocked")
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("album-blocker").first).to_have_attribute(
+        "data-code", "partial_scope"
+    )
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("start-archive")).to_be_disabled()
+
+
+# ── running, progress, reload ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def test_a_confirmed_archive_runs_and_separates_transfer_verify_and_removal(page, stack):
+    stack.start()
+    stack.register()
+    _archive(page, stack)
+
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("count-complete")).to_have_text("complete: 2")
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("count-failed")).to_have_text("failed: 0")
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("count-transfer")).to_have_text("transfer: 0")
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("count-verified")).to_have_text("verified: 0")
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("count-removing")).to_have_text("removing: 0")
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("operation-phase").first).to_have_text("complete")
+
+    # The library really lost the originals and the medium really holds them.
+    assert _archived_paths(stack) == ["a.jpg", "b.jpg"]
+    assert not (stack.seeded.lib / "rome" / "a.jpg").exists()
+    assert {a["availability_state"] for a in stack.assets()} == {"archived_online"}
+
+
+def test_the_run_survives_a_reload_because_the_state_is_the_servers(page, stack):
+    stack.start()
+    stack.register()
+    _archive(page, stack)
+
+    page.reload()
+    page.get_by_test_id("plan-detail").wait_for()
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("detail-state")).to_have_text("complete")
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("count-complete")).to_have_text("complete: 2")
+    # And the run stays addressable by its own URL.
+    plan_id = stack.plans()[0]["id"]
+    page.goto(f"{stack.base}/app/#/archive?plan={plan_id}")
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("plan-detail")).to_have_attribute("data-plan", plan_id)
+
+
+# ── recovery ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def test_an_interrupted_transfer_is_shown_with_evidence_and_a_safe_action(page, stack):
+    stack.start(worker=False)
+    stack.register()
+    _open(page, stack)
+    page.get_by_test_id("start-archive").click()
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("archive-result")).to_be_visible()
+    # No worker ran, so every item is still planned; leave one mid-transfer as a
+    # crash would: intent recorded, nothing published, source intact.
+    _interrupt(stack)
+
+    page.reload()
+    page.get_by_test_id("archive-recovery").wait_for()
+    row = page.get_by_test_id("recovery-row").first
+    expect(row).to_have_attribute("data-classification", "resumable")
+    expect(row.get_by_test_id("recovery-reason")).to_contain_text("source present")
+    page.get_by_test_id("resolve-recovery").click()
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("archive-recovery")).to_have_count(0)
+    assert (stack.seeded.lib / "rome" / "a.jpg").exists(), "recovery may not move anything"
+
+
+def test_ambiguous_evidence_offers_no_action_at_all(page, stack):
+    stack.start(worker=False)
+    stack.register()
+    _open(page, stack)
+    page.get_by_test_id("start-archive").click()
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("archive-result")).to_be_visible()
+    # Journal says the copy is verified, but the medium holds nothing: no evidence
+    # supports either finishing or retrying this item.
+    _interrupt(stack, state="verified")
+
+    page.reload()
+    page.get_by_test_id("archive-recovery").wait_for()
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("recovery-row").first).to_have_attribute(
+        "data-classification", "manual"
+    )
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("recovery-manual")).to_be_visible()
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("resolve-recovery")).to_have_count(0)
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("no-safe-recovery")).to_be_visible()
+
+
+def _interrupt(stack, *, state: str = "transferring") -> None:
+    """Leave the plan's first operation in a non-terminal journal state."""
+    with session_factory(stack.seeded) as sf:
+        from photo_pipeline.services.archive_journal import ArchiveJournal
+
+        journal = ArchiveJournal(sf)
+        plan_id = stack.plans()[0]["id"]
+        operation = journal.operations(plan_id)[0]
+        journal.begin(operation["id"], worker_id="crashed", fencing_token=1)
+        if state != "transferring":
+            journal.transition(operation["id"], state, fencing_token=1)
+
+
+# ── offline browsing and restore ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def test_archived_photos_stay_browsable_while_the_medium_is_away(page, stack):
+    stack.start()
+    stack.register()
+    _archive(page, stack)
+    stack.unmount()
+
+    page.reload()
+    page.get_by_test_id("archived-assets").wait_for()
+    row = page.get_by_test_id("archived-row").first
+    expect(row.get_by_test_id("archived-availability")).to_have_text("archived · medium away")
+    expect(row.get_by_test_id("archived-path")).to_contain_text("rome/")
+    expect(row.get_by_test_id("archived-medium")).to_have_text("external")
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("mount-instruction")).to_contain_text("external")
+    # The retained protected preview is served even though the original is gone.
+    preview = row.get_by_test_id("archived-preview")
+    assert preview.evaluate("img => img.complete && img.naturalWidth > 0")
+    # Restoring is impossible right now, and says so instead of failing later.
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("start-restore")).to_be_disabled()
+
+
+def test_restoring_brings_the_photos_back_without_losing_identity(page, stack):
+    stack.start()
+    stack.register()
+    _archive(page, stack)
+    before = {asset["id"] for asset in stack.assets()}
+
+    page.reload()
+    page.get_by_test_id("restore").wait_for()
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("restore-row").first.get_by_test_id("restore-destination")).to_contain_text(
+        str(stack.seeded.lib / "rome")
+    )
+    page.get_by_test_id("start-restore").click()
+    wait_until(
+        lambda: all(a["availability_state"] == "active" for a in stack.assets()),
+        timeout=30,
+    )
+
+    assert {asset["id"] for asset in stack.assets()} == before  # same identities
+    assert (stack.seeded.lib / "rome" / "a.jpg").exists()
+    assert _archived_paths(stack) == ["a.jpg", "b.jpg"]  # the archive copy stays
+
+
+def test_a_taken_name_is_restored_beside_it_never_over_it(page, stack):
+    stack.start()
+    stack.register()
+    _archive(page, stack)
+    squatter = stack.seeded.lib / "rome" / "a.jpg"
+    squatter.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    squatter.write_bytes(b"a different photo now lives here")
+
+    page.reload()
+    page.get_by_test_id("restore").wait_for()
+    destinations = page.get_by_test_id("restore-destination").all_inner_texts()
+    assert any("(restored)" in text for text in destinations), destinations
+
+    page.get_by_test_id("start-restore").click()
+    wait_until(
+        lambda: all(a["availability_state"] == "active" for a in stack.assets()),
+        timeout=30,
+    )
+    assert squatter.read_bytes() == b"a different photo now lives here"
+    assert (stack.seeded.lib / "rome" / "a (restored).jpg").exists()
+
+
+# ── keyboard ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def test_the_whole_archive_can_be_confirmed_from_the_keyboard(page, stack):
+    stack.start()
+    stack.register()
+    _open(page, stack)
+
+    button = page.get_by_test_id("start-archive")
+    button.focus()
+    expect(button).to_be_focused()
+    page.keyboard.press("Enter")
+
+    expect(page.get_by_test_id("detail-state")).to_have_text("complete", timeout=RUN_TIMEOUT)
+    assert _archived_paths(stack) == ["a.jpg", "b.jpg"]

tests/e2e/test_crash_recovery.py

@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+"""Process death at the newer control points (US07-04, concept §18).
+
+The rename and archive journals already prove crash safety at each of their
+transitions (tests/integration/test_rename_recovery.py,
+tests/integration/test_archive_recovery.py). The three transitions covered here
+are the remaining ones where a kill leaves the world and the database disagreeing:
+
+- ``exif:written``   — keywords are on disk, nothing about them is recorded;
+- ``upload:accepted``— the uploader finished, no outcome is stored;
+- ``job:item_done``  — one item is durably done, the job is not finished.
+
+Each test kills a real child process at the barrier and then asserts what a
+restart does: resume idempotently, or say plainly that a human has to look. Never
+"assume it worked".
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import uuid
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import numpy as np
+import pytest
+from PIL import Image
+from sqlalchemy import select
+
+from photo_pipeline.config import Config
+from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory, run_migrations
+from photo_pipeline.faults import EXIF_WRITTEN, JOB_ITEM_DONE, UPLOAD_ACCEPTED
+from photo_pipeline.integrations import exiftool
+from photo_pipeline.jobs.worker import Worker
+from photo_pipeline.models import Asset, SafetyReview
+from photo_pipeline.services import exif_checkpoint, hashing
+from photo_pipeline.services.jobs import ItemState, JobService, JobState
+from photo_pipeline.services.safety import SafetyService
+from photo_pipeline.services.upload_batches import BatchState, UploadBatchService
+from photo_pipeline.services.upload_verification import retry_blockers
+from photo_pipeline.services.uploads import UploadService
+from tests.e2e._pipeline_harness import (
+    SILENT_UPLOADER,
+    FakeImmich,
+    fake_uploader,
+    mark_upload_ready,
+    seed_album,
+)
+
+REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+NOW = datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _child(script: str, *args: str, barrier: str, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    """Run ``script`` in a child that dies at ``barrier``; assert it really died."""
+    path = tmp_path / f"child_{barrier.replace(':', '_')}.py"
+    path.write_text(script.format(repo=str(REPO)))
+    env = dict(os.environ)
+    env["PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAULT_AFTER"] = barrier
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        [sys.executable, str(path), *args], env=env, capture_output=True
+    )
+    assert result.returncode in (9, -9), (
+        f"child should have been killed at {barrier}, got {result.returncode}: "
+        f"{result.stderr.decode(errors='replace')[-400:]}"
+    )
+
+
+def _env(tmp_path, **extra):
+    (tmp_path / "data").mkdir(exist_ok=True)
+    lib = tmp_path / "lib"
+    lib.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
+    config = Config.from_env(
+        {
+            "PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR": str(tmp_path / "data"),
+            "PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": str(lib),
+            **extra,
+        }
+    )
+    run_migrations(config.database_url)
+    return config, create_session_factory(create_db_engine(config.database_url)), lib
+
+
+def _image(path: Path, seed: int = 3) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    pixels = np.random.default_rng(seed).integers(0, 256, (64, 96, 3), dtype=np.uint8)
+    Image.fromarray(pixels).save(path, quality=90)
+
+
+def _register(sf, path: Path) -> str:
+    asset_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
+    with sf() as session:
+        session.add(
+            Asset(
+                id=asset_id,
+                original_path=str(path),
+                current_path=str(path),
+                discovered_at=NOW,
+                hash_version=1,
+                byte_size=path.stat().st_size,
+                current_sha256=hashing.sha256_file(path),
+            )
+        )
+        session.commit()
+    return asset_id
+
+
+# ── EXIF written, checkpoint not recorded ────────────────────────────────────
+
+DECIDE_SCRIPT = """
+import sys
+sys.path.insert(0, {repo!r})
+from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory
+from photo_pipeline.services.safety import SafetyService
+
+db_url, asset_id = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
+sf = create_session_factory(create_db_engine(db_url))
+SafetyService(sf).decide(asset_id, "nsfw")
+"""
+
+
+@pytest.mark.skipif(shutil.which("exiftool") is None, reason="exiftool not installed")
+def test_a_crash_after_the_exif_write_leaves_nothing_verified_and_re_runs_cleanly(tmp_path):
+    config, sf, lib = _env(tmp_path)
+    path = lib / "a.jpg"
+    _image(path)
+    asset_id = _register(sf, path)
+    original_sha = hashing.sha256_file(path)
+
+    _child(
+        DECIDE_SCRIPT, config.database_url, asset_id, barrier=EXIF_WRITTEN, tmp_path=tmp_path
+    )
+
+    # The file changed, but the application claims nothing about it: no decision,
+    # no projection, and the stored hash is still the pre-write one.
+    assert "nsfw" in exiftool.read_keyword_sets([str(path)])[str(path)]
+    assert hashing.sha256_file(path) != original_sha
+    with sf() as session:
+        assert session.scalars(select(SafetyReview)).all() == []
+        assert session.get(Asset, asset_id).current_sha256 == original_sha
+    assert exif_checkpoint.state_for(sf, asset_id, "safety") is None
+
+    # Re-running is the recovery: the write is idempotent, so the second attempt
+    # verifies and records what the first one only did to the file.
+    review = SafetyService(sf).decide(asset_id, "nsfw")
+    assert review["exif_verified"] is True
+    assert exif_checkpoint.state_for(sf, asset_id, "safety") == exif_checkpoint.VERIFIED
+    keywords = exiftool.read_keyword_sets([str(path)])[str(path)]
+    assert "nsfw" in keywords and "sfw" not in keywords
+    with sf() as session:
+        asset = session.get(Asset, asset_id)
+        assert asset.current_sha256 == hashing.sha256_file(path)
+
+
+# ── uploader accepted, outcome not persisted ─────────────────────────────────
+
+UPLOAD_SCRIPT = """
+import sys
+sys.path.insert(0, {repo!r})
+from photo_pipeline.config import Config
+from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory
+from photo_pipeline.services.upload_batches import UploadBatchService
+
+db_url, data_dir, lib, binary, server, batch_id = sys.argv[1:7]
+config = Config.from_env(
+    {{
+        "PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR": data_dir,
+        "PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": lib,
+        "PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_GO_BINARY": binary,
+        "PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_SERVER_URL": server,
+        "PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_API_KEY": "sentinel",
+    }}
+)
+sf = create_session_factory(create_db_engine(db_url))
+UploadBatchService(sf, config=config).run(batch_id)
+"""
+
+
+def test_a_crash_after_the_uploader_accepted_requires_verification(tmp_path):
+    """immich-go exited cleanly and the server may hold every file, but nothing was
+    written down. Recovery must not guess success — and must not blindly retry."""
+    seeded = seed_album(tmp_path)
+    mark_upload_ready(seeded)
+    immich = FakeImmich()
+    binary = fake_uploader(tmp_path, SILENT_UPLOADER)
+    config = Config.from_env(
+        {
+            "PHOTO_PIPELINE_DATA_DIR": str(seeded.data),
+            "PHOTO_PIPELINE_LIBRARY_ROOTS": str(seeded.lib),
+            "PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_GO_BINARY": str(binary),
+            "PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_SERVER_URL": immich.url,
+            "PHOTO_PIPELINE_IMMICH_API_KEY": "sentinel",
+        }
+    )
+    engine = create_db_engine(config.database_url)
+    sf = create_session_factory(engine)
+    service = UploadBatchService(sf, config=config)
+    report = UploadService(sf, config=config).preflight(["rome"])
+    assert report["state"] == "ready", report["blockers"]
+    batch_id = service.create(["rome"], token=report["token"])[0]["id"]
+
+    try:
+        # The batch is claimed by the child, which dies once the uploader has run.
+        _child(
+            UPLOAD_SCRIPT,
+            config.database_url,
+            str(seeded.data),
+            str(seeded.lib),
+            str(binary),
+            immich.url,
+            batch_id,
+            barrier=UPLOAD_ACCEPTED,
+            tmp_path=tmp_path,
+        )
+    finally:
+        immich.stop()
+    assert service.get(batch_id)["state"] == BatchState.RUNNING  # lane still held
+
+    recovered = service.recover()
+
+    assert recovered == {"interrupted": 1}
+    batch = service.get(batch_id)
+    assert batch["state"] == BatchState.UNKNOWN and batch["error_code"] == "interrupted"
+    assert [b["code"] for b in retry_blockers(batch)] == ["requires_verification"]
+    assert all(item["state"] == "pending" for item in batch["items"]), "nothing claimed as sent"
+
+
+# ── one item done, the job unfinished ────────────────────────────────────────
+
+WORKER_SCRIPT = """
+import sys
+sys.path.insert(0, {repo!r})
+from pathlib import Path
+from photo_pipeline.db import create_db_engine, create_session_factory
+from photo_pipeline.jobs.worker import Worker
+
+db_url, log = sys.argv[1], Path(sys.argv[2])
+
+def handler(item_key, ctx):
+    with log.open("a") as handle:
+        handle.write(item_key + "\\n")
+
+sf = create_session_factory(create_db_engine(db_url))
+Worker(sf, {{"scan": handler}}, "killable", lease_seconds=1).run_once()
+"""
+
+
+def test_a_crash_between_items_resumes_without_running_the_done_item_twice(tmp_path):
+    config, sf, lib = _env(tmp_path)
+    service = JobService(sf)
+    job = service.enqueue("scan", items=["a", "b", "c"])
+    log = tmp_path / "handled.log"
+
+    _child(
+        WORKER_SCRIPT, config.database_url, str(log), barrier=JOB_ITEM_DONE, tmp_path=tmp_path
+    )
+
+    crashed = log.read_text().split()
+    assert crashed == ["a"], "the child should have died right after its first item"
+    assert service.get(job["id"])["state"] == JobState.RUNNING
+
+    # A fresh worker takes over once the dead lease expires.
+    import time
+
+    time.sleep(1.1)  # the child's lease is one second long
+    fresh = Worker(sf, {"scan": lambda item, ctx: log.open("a").write(item + "\n")}, "alive")
+    fresh.run_once()
+
+    assert service.get(job["id"])["state"] == JobState.SUCCEEDED
+    handled = log.read_text().split()
+    assert sorted(handled) == ["a", "b", "c"], f"an item ran twice or not at all: {handled}"
+    assert service.progress(job["id"])["by_state"] == {ItemState.SUCCEEDED: 3}

tests/e2e/test_phase_a_pipeline.py

@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ import numpy as np
 import pytest
 from PIL import Image
 
+from tests.conftest import session_client
+
 REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
 
 
@@ -92,7 +94,7 @@ class ServerController:
                 pytest.fail(f"server exited: {err.decode(errors='replace')}")
             try:
                 if httpx.get(f"{self.base}/api/v1/health/ready", timeout=1).status_code == 200:
-                    self.client = httpx.Client(base_url=self.base, timeout=10)
+                    self.client = session_client(self.base, timeout=10)
                     return
             except httpx.HTTPError:
                 time.sleep(0.2)

tests/e2e/test_phase_d_pipeline.py

@@ -0,0 +1,377 @@
+"""Phase D end-to-end acceptance (US04-06): guarded renaming, black box.
+
+Every journey here drives a real ``photo_pipeline serve`` child process over HTTP —
+plan, export, confirm, apply, collide, go stale, crash, recover, roll back. The
+crashes are real: the server is killed by the ``PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAULT_AFTER`` barrier
+at each persisted journal transition in turn, then a fresh process is started against
+the same database and library and has to reconcile the wreckage from evidence alone.
+
+Photos really move. After every journey the assertions read the filesystem and the
+inventory back: the asset set, the stable IDs, and the content hashes must be exactly
+what they were before, only at new paths.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import httpx
+import pytest
+
+from tests.e2e._pipeline_harness import Server, approve_album, seed_album, session_factory
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.phase_d
+
+TIMEOUT = 10
+APPROVED = "2019 Rome"
+CRASH_POINTS = ["moving", "moved", "database_updated", "verified"]
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def server(tmp_path):
+    seeded = seed_album(tmp_path)
+    running = Server(seeded).start()
+    running.seeded = seeded
+    try:
+        yield running
+    finally:
+        running.stop()
+
+
+# ── helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _plan(base) -> dict:
+    response = httpx.post(f"{base}/api/v1/rename-plans", timeout=TIMEOUT)
+    response.raise_for_status()
+    return response.json()
+
+
+def _get_plan(base, plan_id) -> dict:
+    return httpx.get(f"{base}/api/v1/rename-plans/{plan_id}", timeout=TIMEOUT).json()
+
+
+def _apply(base, plan, **body):
+    payload = {"expected_version": plan["version"], **body}
+    return httpx.post(
+        f"{base}/api/v1/rename-plans/{plan['id']}/apply", json=payload, timeout=TIMEOUT
+    )
+
+
+def _inventory(base) -> dict[str, dict]:
+    """Every asset by stable ID, so identity can be compared across a rename."""
+    items = httpx.get(
+        f"{base}/api/v1/inventory/assets", params={"limit": 200}, timeout=TIMEOUT
+    ).json()["items"]
+    return {item["id"]: item for item in items}
+
+
+def _content(root) -> dict[str, bytes]:
+    return {
+        str(path.relative_to(root)): path.read_bytes()
+        for path in sorted(root.rglob("*"))
+        if path.is_file()
+    }
+
+
+def _recovery(base) -> dict:
+    return httpx.get(f"{base}/api/v1/rename-recovery", timeout=TIMEOUT).json()
+
+
+def _journal_states(seeded, plan_id) -> list[str]:
+    from photo_pipeline.services.rename_journal import RenameJournal
+
+    with session_factory(seeded) as sf:
+        return [row["journal_state"] for row in RenameJournal(sf).operations(plan_id)]
+
+
+# ── US04-01: plan and export ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def test_plan_and_export_describe_every_move_without_touching_the_library(server):
+    before = _content(server.seeded.lib)
+    approve_album(server.base, name=APPROVED)
+    plan = _plan(server.base)
+
+    assert plan["state"] == "validated" and plan["operation_count"] == 1
+    operation = plan["operations"][0]
+    assert operation["source_path"].endswith("/rome")
+    assert operation["destination_path"].endswith(f"/{APPROVED}")
+    assert operation["asset_count"] == 2
+    assert set(operation["asset_ids"]) == set(_inventory(server.base))
+
+    export = httpx.get(
+        f"{server.base}/api/v1/rename-plans/{plan['id']}/export", timeout=TIMEOUT
+    ).json()
+    assert export["schema_version"] == 1
+    assert export["checksum"] == plan["checksum"]
+    assert [op["source_path"] for op in export["operations"]] == [operation["source_path"]]
+    # Portable evidence must not smuggle out anything sensitive.
+    assert "token" not in str(export).lower() and "key" not in str(export).lower()
+
+    # Planning is a preview: not one byte moved.
+    assert _content(server.seeded.lib) == before
+
+
+# ── US04-03: confirmation and apply ──────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def test_apply_requires_the_current_confirmation_token(server):
+    approve_album(server.base, name=APPROVED)
+    plan = _plan(server.base)
+
+    stale = _apply(server.base, {**plan, "version": plan["version"] + 7})
+    assert stale.status_code == 409 and stale.json()["error"]["code"] == "version_conflict"
+
+    wrong_checksum = _apply(server.base, plan, expected_checksum="0" * 64)
+    assert wrong_checksum.status_code == 409
+
+    assert (server.seeded.lib / "rome").is_dir(), "a refused confirmation moves nothing"
+
+
+def test_a_valid_apply_preserves_ids_hashes_and_the_asset_set(server):
+    approve_album(server.base, name=APPROVED)
+    before = _inventory(server.base)
+    before_content = _content(server.seeded.lib)
+    plan = _plan(server.base)
+
+    applied = _apply(server.base, plan, expected_checksum=plan["checksum"]).json()
+    assert applied["applied"] == 1 and applied["failed"] == 0 and applied["state"] == "applied"
+
+    after = _inventory(server.base)
+    assert set(after) == set(before), "renaming must not change asset identity"
+    assert {item["current_sha256"] for item in after.values()} == {
+        item["current_sha256"] for item in before.values()
+    }
+    assert all(APPROVED in item["current_path"] for item in after.values())
+    # Same bytes, new folder — nothing was rewritten in the move.
+    assert _content(server.seeded.lib) == {
+        key.replace("rome/", f"{APPROVED}/"): value for key, value in before_content.items()
+    }
+    assert _journal_states(server.seeded, plan["id"]) == ["complete"]
+
+
+def test_a_case_only_rename_applies_on_a_case_insensitive_filesystem(tmp_path):
+    seeded = seed_album(tmp_path, album="rome")
+    running = Server(seeded).start()
+    try:
+        approve_album(running.base, name="Rome")
+        plan = _plan(running.base)
+        assert plan["operations"][0]["case_only"] is True
+
+        assert _apply(running.base, plan).json()["applied"] == 1
+        entries = {path.name for path in seeded.lib.iterdir()}
+        assert "Rome" in entries
+        # The staged intermediate name must not survive the procedure.
+        assert not any(name.startswith(".rename-") for name in entries)
+        assert all("/Rome/" in item["current_path"] for item in _inventory(running.base).values())
+    finally:
+        running.stop()
+
+
+def test_a_collision_is_refused_and_the_occupant_survives(server):
+    approve_album(server.base, name=APPROVED)
+    occupied = server.seeded.lib / APPROVED
+    occupied.mkdir()
+    (occupied / "precious.jpg").write_bytes(b"do not lose me")
+
+    plan = _plan(server.base)
+    assert plan["state"] == "invalid" and "destination_exists" in plan["blockers"]
+
+    refused = _apply(server.base, plan)
+    assert refused.status_code == 422 and refused.json()["error"]["code"] == "cannot_apply"
+    assert (occupied / "precious.jpg").read_bytes() == b"do not lose me"
+    assert (server.seeded.lib / "rome").is_dir()
+
+
+def test_a_source_that_changed_after_planning_is_refused(server):
+    approve_album(server.base, name=APPROVED)
+    plan = _plan(server.base)
+    # The plan recorded per-asset hashes; the file changes before confirmation.
+    (server.seeded.lib / "rome" / "a.jpg").write_bytes(b"tampered")
+
+    result = _apply(server.base, plan).json()
+    assert result["failed"] == 1 and result["applied"] == 0
+    assert (server.seeded.lib / "rome").is_dir(), "a failed precondition leaves the source alone"
+    operation = _get_plan(server.base, plan["id"])["operations"][0]
+    assert operation["journal_state"] == "failed"
+    assert operation["error_code"] == "source_changed"
+
+
+# ── US04-04: crash points, recovery, rollback ────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _crash_during_apply(seeded, plan, state):
+    """Apply with the fault barrier armed: the server dies at ``state``, mid-move."""
+    crashing = Server(seeded, extra_env={"PHOTO_PIPELINE_FAULT_AFTER": state}).start()
+    try:
+        with pytest.raises(httpx.HTTPError):
+            _apply(crashing.base, plan)
+    finally:
+        crashing.stop()
+    assert crashing.proc is None
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("crash_point", CRASH_POINTS)
+def test_every_journal_crash_point_recovers_without_losing_content(tmp_path, crash_point):
+    seeded = seed_album(tmp_path)
+    first = Server(seeded).start()
+    try:
+        approve_album(first.base, name=APPROVED)
+        before = _inventory(first.base)
+        before_bytes = sorted(_content(seeded.lib).values())
+        plan = _plan(first.base)
+    finally:
+        first.stop()
+
+    _crash_during_apply(seeded, plan, crash_point)
+
+    # A brand-new process, no in-memory state: everything comes from the journal.
+    restarted = Server(seeded).start()
+    try:
+        recovery = _recovery(restarted.base)
+        assert recovery["items"], f"a crash at {crash_point} must leave visible evidence"
+        assert recovery["items"][0]["journal_state"] == crash_point
+        # Only a crash that could have left the library half-renamed blocks other
+        # work. `verified` is past every filesystem and database change — the move
+        # is done and checked, just not flagged complete — so it blocks nothing.
+        assert recovery["blocks_mutation"] is (crash_point != "verified")
+
+        resolved = httpx.post(
+            f"{restarted.base}/api/v1/rename-recovery/resolve", timeout=TIMEOUT
+        ).json()
+        assert resolved["manual"] == 0, "an interrupted rename must be decidable from evidence"
+
+        # Recovery is idempotent: running it again changes nothing.
+        assert _recovery(restarted.base)["blocks_mutation"] is False
+        httpx.post(f"{restarted.base}/api/v1/rename-recovery/resolve", timeout=TIMEOUT)
+
+        # A resumable crash is left ready to run again; finish it so every crash
+        # point converges on the same observable end state.
+        current = _get_plan(restarted.base, plan["id"])
+        if current["state"] != "applied":
+            _apply(restarted.base, current)
+
+        after = _inventory(restarted.base)
+        assert set(after) == set(before), "no asset may be lost or invented by a crash"
+        assert {item["current_sha256"] for item in after.values()} == {
+            item["current_sha256"] for item in before.values()
+        }
+        assert sorted(_content(seeded.lib).values()) == before_bytes
+        assert (seeded.lib / APPROVED).is_dir() and not (seeded.lib / "rome").exists()
+        assert all(APPROVED in item["current_path"] for item in after.values())
+        assert _journal_states(seeded, plan["id"]) == ["complete"]
+    finally:
+        restarted.stop()
+
+
+def test_ambiguous_evidence_is_kept_for_a_human_and_keeps_blocking(tmp_path):
+    seeded = seed_album(tmp_path)
+    first = Server(seeded).start()
+    try:
+        approve_album(first.base, name=APPROVED)
+        plan = _plan(first.base)
+    finally:
+        first.stop()
+
+    _crash_during_apply(seeded, plan, "moving")
+    # Someone creates the destination while the operation is unresolved: now both
+    # paths exist and nothing can tell which one holds the truth.
+    (seeded.lib / APPROVED).mkdir(exist_ok=True)
+
+    restarted = Server(seeded).start()
+    try:
+        assert _recovery(restarted.base)["items"][0]["classification"] == "manual"
+        resolved = httpx.post(
+            f"{restarted.base}/api/v1/rename-recovery/resolve", timeout=TIMEOUT
+        ).json()
+        assert resolved["manual"] == 1 and resolved["resumed"] == 0 and resolved["completed"] == 0
+        # Still blocking, and still nothing guessed.
+        assert _recovery(restarted.base)["blocks_mutation"] is True
+        assert (seeded.lib / "rome").is_dir()
+    finally:
+        restarted.stop()
+
+
+def test_an_unresolved_rename_is_the_cancellation_boundary(tmp_path):
+    """There is no cancel button once a rename starts. The boundary is that nothing
+    else may mutate the library until the interrupted work is resolved."""
+    seeded = seed_album(tmp_path)
+    first = Server(seeded).start()
+    try:
+        approve_album(first.base, name=APPROVED)
+        plan = _plan(first.base)
+    finally:
+        first.stop()
+
+    _crash_during_apply(seeded, plan, "moving")
+
+    restarted = Server(seeded).start()
+    try:
+        assert _recovery(restarted.base)["blocks_mutation"] is True
+
+        refused = httpx.post(f"{restarted.base}/api/v1/albums/proposals", json={}, timeout=TIMEOUT)
+        assert refused.status_code == 409
+        assert refused.json()["error"]["code"] == "rename_recovery_required"
+
+        # Reading stays available throughout — only mutation is paused.
+        assert httpx.get(f"{restarted.base}/api/v1/albums/evidence", timeout=TIMEOUT).status_code
+        assert len(_inventory(restarted.base)) == 2
+    finally:
+        restarted.stop()
+
+
+def test_rollback_returns_an_interrupted_move_to_its_source(tmp_path):
+    seeded = seed_album(tmp_path)
+    first = Server(seeded).start()
+    try:
+        approve_album(first.base, name=APPROVED)
+        before = _inventory(first.base)
+        plan = _plan(first.base)
+    finally:
+        first.stop()
+
+    # Crash after the content moved but before the database caught up: the operation
+    # is still reversible, which is exactly when rollback is defined.
+    _crash_during_apply(seeded, plan, "moved")
+
+    restarted = Server(seeded).start()
+    try:
+        rolled = httpx.post(
+            f"{restarted.base}/api/v1/rename-plans/{plan['id']}/rollback", timeout=TIMEOUT
+        ).json()
+        assert rolled["rolled_back"] == 1 and rolled["state"] == "rolled_back"
+
+        assert (seeded.lib / "rome" / "a.jpg").exists()
+        assert not (seeded.lib / APPROVED).exists()
+        after = _inventory(restarted.base)
+        assert set(after) == set(before)
+        assert all(item["current_path"].endswith(".jpg") for item in after.values())
+        assert _recovery(restarted.base)["blocks_mutation"] is False
+    finally:
+        restarted.stop()
+
+
+# ── durability ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def test_the_applied_state_survives_a_full_restart(tmp_path):
+    seeded = seed_album(tmp_path)
+    first = Server(seeded).start()
+    try:
+        approve_album(first.base, name=APPROVED)
+        plan = _plan(first.base)
+        _apply(first.base, plan, expected_checksum=plan["checksum"]).raise_for_status()
+        expected = _inventory(first.base)
+    finally:
+        first.stop()
+
+    restarted = Server(seeded).start()
+    try:
+        assert _inventory(restarted.base) == expected
+        after = _get_plan(restarted.base, plan["id"])
+        assert after["state"] == "applied"
+        assert after["checksum"] == plan["checksum"], "the plan's evidence is immutable"
+        assert [op["journal_state"] for op in after["operations"]] == ["complete"]
+        assert all(op["verified_at"] for op in after["operations"])
+        assert _recovery(restarted.base) == {"blocks_mutation": False, "items": []}
+    finally:
+        restarted.stop()

tests/e2e/test_phase_e_pipeline.py

@@ -0,0 +1,568 @@
+"""Phase E end-to-end acceptance (US05-06): Immich upload, black box.
+
+Every journey drives a real ``photo_pipeline serve`` child process and a real durable
+worker over HTTP — preflight, approve, upload, duplicate, upgrade, fail, retry, lose
+the acceptance response, verify, cancel, crash, restart. Nothing external is mocked
+inside the application: ``immich-go`` is a real executable that records the argv it
+was handed, and Immich is a real HTTP server answering the same ``ping`` and
+``bulk-upload-check`` endpoints the adapter calls in production.
+
+Two invariants are asserted in every relevant journey, because they are what make an
+irreversible stage safe:
+
+- **EXIF precedes upload.** An album without its verified safety and analysis
+  checkpoints cannot be approved, and the uploader's argv log proves it was never
+  even executed.
+- **The persisted hashes are the submitted bytes.** After each upload the recorded
+  SHA-256/SHA-1 of every item is recomputed from the files in the folder the uploader
+  was actually given.
+
+The API key is a sentinel string, so the last journey can prove it reached the
+uploader and nothing else that was retained.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import httpx
+import pytest
+
+from tests.e2e._pipeline_harness import (
+    SENTINEL_KEY,
+    SILENT_UPLOADER,
+    UploadStack,
+    mark_upload_ready,
+    seed_album,
+    session_factory,
+    wait_until,
+)
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.phase_e
+
+TIMEOUT = 20
+ALBUM = "rome"
+TERMINAL = {"succeeded", "failed", "cancelled", "unknown_requires_verification"}
+
+# Uploader bodies in the pinned ``text-v1`` grammar. ``$6`` is the folder argument of
+# ``upload from-folder``, so each line names the real path of a real file.
+ALL_NEW = (
+    'echo "INFO  uploaded $6/a.jpg"\n'
+    'echo "INFO  uploaded $6/b.jpg"\n'
+    'echo "Uploaded 2"\n'
+    "exit 0\n"
+)
+EXACT_DUPLICATES = (
+    'echo "INFO  server has the same file $6/a.jpg"\n'
+    'echo "INFO  server has the same file $6/b.jpg"\n'
+    'echo "Duplicates 2"\n'
+    "exit 0\n"
+)
+UPGRADES = (
+    'echo "INFO  server has an older file $6/a.jpg"\n'
+    'echo "INFO  server has an older file $6/b.jpg"\n'
+    'echo "Upgraded 2"\n'
+    "exit 0\n"
+)
+
+
+def _once_then(tmp_path: Path, first: str, rest: str) -> str:
+    """An uploader that behaves one way on its first attempt and another afterwards.
+
+    The flag file is the attempt counter, so retry and resume journeys are
+    deterministic without any test reaching into the running application.
+    """
+    flag = tmp_path / "first-attempt.flag"
+    return f'if [ ! -f "{flag}" ]; then\n  touch "{flag}"\n{first}fi\n{rest}'
+
+
+FAILING_FIRST = ('  echo "ERROR error uploading $6/a.jpg: connection reset"\n  exit 1\n', ALL_NEW)
+SLOW_FIRST = ('  echo "INFO  starting"\n  sleep 30\n  exit 0\n', ALL_NEW)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def stack(tmp_path):
+    """An analysed album whose EXIF checkpoints are already verified."""
+    seeded = seed_album(tmp_path)
+    mark_upload_ready(seeded)
+    running = UploadStack(tmp_path, seeded)
+    try:
+        yield running
+    finally:
+        running.stop()
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def unfinished(tmp_path):
+    """The same album *before* its EXIF checkpoints were written."""
+    seeded = seed_album(tmp_path)
+    running = UploadStack(tmp_path, seeded)
+    try:
+        yield running
+    finally:
+        running.stop()
+
+
+# ── helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _preflight(base: str, **body) -> dict:
+    response = httpx.post(f"{base}/api/v1/upload-preflight", json=body, timeout=TIMEOUT)
+    response.raise_for_status()
+    return response.json()
+
+
+def _create(base: str, report: dict, **body) -> httpx.Response:
+    return httpx.post(
+        f"{base}/api/v1/upload-batches",
+        json={"token": report["token"], **body},
+        timeout=TIMEOUT,
+    )
+
+
+def _get(base: str, batch_id: str) -> dict:
+    return httpx.get(f"{base}/api/v1/upload-batches/{batch_id}", timeout=TIMEOUT).json()
+
+
+def _start(base: str, batch_id: str) -> httpx.Response:
+    return httpx.post(f"{base}/api/v1/upload-batches/{batch_id}/start", timeout=TIMEOUT)
+
+
+def _start_accepted(base: str, batch_id: str) -> httpx.Response:
+    """Start, waiting out the uploader lane the previous attempt still holds.
+
+    A stopped attempt releases its job a moment after the batch itself reaches
+    ``cancelled``; ``lock_held`` is that gap, not a refusal of this batch.
+    """
+
+    def _attempt():
+        response = _start(base, batch_id)
+        if response.status_code == 409 and response.json()["error"]["code"] == "lock_held":
+            return None
+        response.raise_for_status()
+        return response
+
+    return wait_until(_attempt)
+
+
+def _verify(base: str, batch_id: str) -> dict:
+    response = httpx.post(f"{base}/api/v1/upload-batches/{batch_id}/verify", timeout=TIMEOUT)
+    response.raise_for_status()
+    return response.json()
+
+
+def _await_state(base: str, batch_id: str, states: set[str], *, timeout: float = 60) -> dict:
+    return wait_until(
+        lambda: (lambda b: b if b.get("state") in states else None)(_get(base, batch_id)),
+        timeout=timeout,
+    )
+
+
+def _await_report(base: str, batch_id: str, states: set[str] = TERMINAL) -> dict:
+    """Wait for a finished attempt *and* the report that explains it.
+
+    The batch state is recorded a moment before its report is parsed — the outcome of
+    the process and the outcome of each file are deliberately separate facts — so a
+    journey that reads per-item evidence must wait for the second one too.
+    """
+    return wait_until(
+        lambda: (lambda b: b if b.get("state") in states and b.get("parsed_at") else None)(
+            _get(base, batch_id)
+        ),
+        timeout=60,
+    )
+
+
+def _approve(stack, **body) -> dict:
+    """Preflight, approve exactly that report, and return the created batch."""
+    report = _preflight(stack.base, **body)
+    response = _create(stack.base, report, **body)
+    response.raise_for_status()
+    return response.json()["batches"][0]
+
+
+def _upload(stack, **body) -> dict:
+    """The whole approved journey, up to whatever terminal state it reaches."""
+    batch = _approve(stack, **body)
+    _start(stack.base, batch["id"]).raise_for_status()
+    return _await_report(stack.base, batch["id"])
+
+
+def _outcomes(batch: dict) -> dict[str, str]:
+    return {Path(item["path"]).name: item["outcome"] for item in batch["items"]}
+
+
+def _uploaded_folder(stack) -> Path:
+    """The folder the uploader was actually handed, from its own argv log."""
+    invocations = stack.argv()
+    assert invocations, "the uploader was never executed"
+    return Path(invocations[-1].split()[-1])
+
+
+def _assert_hashes_match_submitted_bytes(stack, batch: dict) -> None:
+    folder = _uploaded_folder(stack)
+    for item in batch["items"]:
+        submitted = folder / Path(item["path"]).name
+        raw = submitted.read_bytes()
+        assert item["sha256"] == hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest(), submitted
+        assert item["sha1"] == hashlib.sha1(raw).hexdigest(), submitted  # noqa: S324 — Immich's
+
+
+# ── credentials ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def test_missing_credentials_block_the_preflight_and_no_upload_is_attempted(stack):
+    stack.start(worker=False, credentials=False)
+
+    report = _preflight(stack.base)
+
+    assert report["state"] == "blocked"
+    assert [issue["code"] for issue in report["blockers"]] == ["credentials_missing"]
+    assert report["credentials"]["api_key_configured"] is False
+    # A blocked scope still issues a token; approving it is what is refused.
+    refused = _create(stack.base, report)
+    assert refused.status_code == 422
+    assert refused.json()["error"]["code"] == "not_ready"
+    assert stack.batches() == []
+    assert stack.argv() == [], "the uploader must not run without credentials"
+
+
+def test_a_server_that_stops_answering_blocks_the_preflight(stack):
+    stack.start(worker=False)
+    assert _preflight(stack.base)["state"] == "ready"
+
+    stack.immich.stop()  # Immich goes away between one preview and the next
+
+    report = _preflight(stack.base)
+    assert report["state"] == "blocked"
+    assert [issue["code"] for issue in report["blockers"]] == ["server_unreachable"]
+    assert report["server"]["reachable"] is False
+    assert _create(stack.base, report).status_code == 422
+    assert stack.argv() == []
+
+
+# ── EXIF precedes upload ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def test_exif_checkpoints_must_be_written_before_anything_is_uploaded(unfinished):
+    stack = unfinished
+    stack.start()
+
+    report = _preflight(stack.base)
+    assert report["state"] == "blocked"
+    codes = {
+        issue["code"]
+        for album in report["albums"]
+        for asset in album["assets"]
+        for issue in asset["blockers"]
+    }
+    assert codes == {"safety_exif_unverified"}
+    assert _create(stack.base, report).status_code == 422
+    assert stack.argv() == [], "the uploader must not run before the EXIF checkpoints"
+
+    mark_upload_ready(stack.seeded)  # the checkpoints are written
+
+    batch = _upload(stack)
+    assert batch["state"] == "succeeded"
+    assert stack.argv(), "the same scope uploads once its checkpoints exist"
+    # The recorded checkpoints predate the attempt that was allowed to run.
+    from sqlalchemy import select
+
+    from photo_pipeline.models import AnalysisResult, SafetyReview
+
+    with session_factory(stack.seeded) as sf, sf() as session:
+        checkpoints = [
+            *[row.exif_verified_at for row in session.scalars(select(SafetyReview))],
+            *[row.exif_written_at for row in session.scalars(select(AnalysisResult))],
+        ]
+    started = batch["started_at"]
+    assert checkpoints and all(stamp.isoformat() < started for stamp in checkpoints)
+
+
+def test_an_unfinished_photo_blocks_its_album_until_a_partial_upload_is_approved(tmp_path):
+    seeded = seed_album(tmp_path)
+    mark_upload_ready(seeded, unverified=("b",))
+    stack = UploadStack(tmp_path, seeded)
+    try:
+        stack.start()
+        report = _preflight(stack.base)
+        assert report["state"] == "blocked"
+        assert [issue["code"] for issue in report["albums"][0]["blockers"]] == ["partial_scope"]
+        assert report["totals"] == {
+            "albums": 1,
+            "ready_albums": 0,
+            "assets": 2,
+            "eligible": 1,
+            "blocked": 1,
+        }
+        assert _create(stack.base, report).status_code == 422
+
+        partial = _preflight(stack.base, allow_partial=True)
+        assert partial["state"] == "ready"
+        assert partial["token"] != report["token"]
+        # A full-scope approval can never be replayed as a partial one.
+        replayed = _create(stack.base, report, allow_partial=True)
+        assert replayed.status_code == 409
+        assert replayed.json()["error"]["code"] == "stale_preflight"
+
+        batch = _upload(stack, allow_partial=True)
+        assert batch["state"] == "succeeded"
+        assert batch["allow_partial"] is True
+        assert [Path(item["path"]).name for item in batch["items"]] == ["a.jpg"]
+    finally:
+        stack.stop()
+
+
+# ── outcomes ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def test_a_new_album_uploads_and_persists_the_hashes_that_were_submitted(stack):
+    stack.start(uploader=ALL_NEW)
+
+    batch = _upload(stack)
+
+    assert batch["state"] == "succeeded"
+    assert batch["outcome_state"] == "verified"
+    assert _outcomes(batch) == {"a.jpg": "uploaded", "b.jpg": "uploaded"}
+    assert batch["outcome_counts"]["uploaded"] == 2
+    assert batch["report_counts"] == {"uploaded": 2}
+    assert batch["parser"] == "text-v1"
+    _assert_hashes_match_submitted_bytes(stack, batch)
+    # One album, one invocation, scoped to that album's own folder.
+    assert len(stack.argv()) == 1
+    assert f"--album-name={ALBUM}" in stack.argv()[0]
+    assert _uploaded_folder(stack) == stack.seeded.lib / ALBUM
+
+
+def test_an_exact_duplicate_is_recorded_as_a_duplicate_not_a_new_asset(stack):
+    stack.start(uploader=EXACT_DUPLICATES)
+
+    batch = _upload(stack)
+
+    assert batch["state"] == "succeeded"
+    assert batch["outcome_state"] == "verified"
+    assert set(_outcomes(batch).values()) == {"duplicate"}
+    assert batch["outcome_counts"]["uploaded"] == 0
+    _assert_hashes_match_submitted_bytes(stack, batch)
+
+
+def test_a_better_copy_is_recorded_as_an_upgrade(stack):
+    stack.start(uploader=UPGRADES)
+
+    batch = _upload(stack)
+
+    assert batch["state"] == "succeeded"
+    assert batch["outcome_state"] == "verified"
+    assert set(_outcomes(batch).values()) == {"upgraded"}
+    assert batch["report_counts"] == {"upgraded": 2}
+
+
+# ── failure and retry ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def test_a_plain_uploader_failure_is_retryable_and_the_retry_succeeds(stack, tmp_path):
+    stack.start(uploader=_once_then(tmp_path, *FAILING_FIRST))
+
+    failed = _upload(stack)
+
+    assert failed["state"] == "failed"
+    assert failed["error_code"] == "uploader_failed"
+    assert failed["exit_code"] == 1
+    assert _outcomes(failed)["a.jpg"] == "failed"
+    # Nothing uncertain happened, so the batch is offered again rather than blocked.
+    assert failed["retry_blockers"] == []
+
+    _start_accepted(stack.base, failed["id"])
+    retried = _await_report(stack.base, failed["id"], {"succeeded"})
+
+    assert retried["attempt_count"] == 2
+    assert _outcomes(retried) == {"a.jpg": "uploaded", "b.jpg": "uploaded"}
+    assert len(stack.argv()) == 2
+
+
+# ── uncertainty ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def test_a_lost_acceptance_response_stays_uncertain_and_is_never_retried_blindly(stack):
+    stack.start(uploader=SILENT_UPLOADER)
+
+    batch = _upload(stack)
+
+    # The process succeeded; what happened to each file is simply not known.
+    assert batch["state"] == "succeeded"
+    assert batch["outcome_state"] == "requires_verification"
+    assert set(_outcomes(batch).values()) == {"unknown"}
+    refused = _start(stack.base, batch["id"])
+    assert refused.status_code == 409
+    assert refused.json()["error"]["code"] == "not_runnable"
+    assert len(stack.argv()) == 1, "a blind retry must not reach the uploader"
+
+
+def test_verification_asks_immich_and_resolves_every_uncertain_item(stack):
+    stack.start(uploader=SILENT_UPLOADER)
+    stack.immich.mode("present")  # Immich holds exactly the bytes that were sent
+    batch = _upload(stack)
+
+    result = _verify(stack.base, batch["id"])
+
+    assert result["counts"] == {"present": 2}
+    assert result["outcome_state"] == "verified"
+    verified = _get(stack.base, batch["id"])
+    assert set(_outcomes(verified).values()) == {"uploaded"}
+    history = httpx.get(
+        f"{stack.base}/api/v1/upload-batches/{batch['id']}/verifications", timeout=TIMEOUT
+    ).json()["verifications"]
+    assert {entry["source"] for entry in history} == {"immich_api"}
+
+
+def test_an_unusable_answer_stays_uncertain_until_an_operator_records_evidence(stack):
+    stack.start(uploader=SILENT_UPLOADER)
+    stack.immich.mode("broken")  # answers, but nothing this adapter will interpret
+    batch = _upload(stack)
+
+    result = _verify(stack.base, batch["id"])
+
+    # No answer is never "no": the items stay uncertain rather than being called failed.
+    assert result["counts"] == {"inconclusive": 2}
+    assert result["outcome_state"] == "requires_verification"
+    assert set(_outcomes(_get(stack.base, batch["id"])).values()) == {"unknown"}
+
+    asset_id = batch["items"][0]["asset_id"]
+    incomplete = httpx.post(
+        f"{stack.base}/api/v1/upload-batches/{batch['id']}/resolve",
+        json={"asset_id": asset_id, "outcome": "uploaded", "evidence": "", "actor": "dom"},
+        timeout=TIMEOUT,
+    )
+    assert incomplete.status_code == 422
+    assert incomplete.json()["error"]["code"] == "evidence_required"
+
+    resolved = httpx.post(
+        f"{stack.base}/api/v1/upload-batches/{batch['id']}/resolve",
+        json={
+            "asset_id": asset_id,
+            "outcome": "uploaded",
+            "evidence": "found it in Immich by checksum",
+            "actor": "dom",
+        },
+        timeout=TIMEOUT,
+    )
+    resolved.raise_for_status()
+    assert _outcomes(_get(stack.base, batch["id"]))["a.jpg"] == "uploaded"
+    manual = httpx.get(
+        f"{stack.base}/api/v1/upload-batches/{batch['id']}/verifications", timeout=TIMEOUT
+    ).json()["verifications"][-1]
+    assert manual["source"] == "operator"
+    assert manual["actor"] == "dom"
+
+
+def test_bytes_edited_after_the_upload_are_flagged_and_block_another_run(stack):
+    stack.start(uploader=ALL_NEW)
+    batch = _upload(stack)
+    assert batch["state"] == "succeeded"
+
+    (stack.seeded.lib / ALBUM / "a.jpg").write_bytes(b"edited after the upload")
+
+    result = _verify(stack.base, batch["id"])
+    assert result["stale_bytes"] is True
+    changed = [item for item in result["items"] if item["changed_after_upload"]]
+    assert [Path(item["path"]).name for item in changed] == ["a.jpg"]
+    refused = _start(stack.base, batch["id"])
+    assert refused.status_code == 409
+    assert refused.json()["error"]["code"] == "changed_after_upload"
+    # The preflight agrees: those bytes are no longer approved for any new upload.
+    report = _preflight(stack.base)
+    assert report["state"] == "blocked"
+    assert "bytes_changed" in {
+        issue["code"]
+        for album in report["albums"]
+        for asset in album["assets"]
+        for issue in asset["blockers"]
+    }
+
+
+# ── cancellation and resume ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def test_a_running_album_can_be_stopped_and_run_again_from_that_boundary(stack, tmp_path):
+    stack.start(uploader=_once_then(tmp_path, *SLOW_FIRST))
+    batch = _approve(stack)
+    _start(stack.base, batch["id"]).raise_for_status()
+    _await_state(stack.base, batch["id"], {"running"})
+
+    httpx.post(
+        f"{stack.base}/api/v1/upload-batches/{batch['id']}/cancel", timeout=TIMEOUT
+    ).raise_for_status()
+    cancelled = _await_state(stack.base, batch["id"], {"cancelled"})
+
+    # A stopped album is a clean boundary, not an uncertain one.
+    assert cancelled["retry_blockers"] == []
+    _start_accepted(stack.base, batch["id"])
+    resumed = _await_report(stack.base, batch["id"], {"succeeded"})
+    assert resumed["attempt_count"] == 2
+    assert _outcomes(resumed) == {"a.jpg": "uploaded", "b.jpg": "uploaded"}
+
+
+def test_an_interrupted_attempt_is_uncertain_after_a_restart_and_stays_blocked(stack, tmp_path):
+    """The worker vanishes mid-upload: Immich may hold the files, so the outcome is
+    unknown. Startup recovery must say so, refuse a retry, and survive the restart."""
+    stack.start(uploader=_once_then(tmp_path, *SLOW_FIRST))
+    batch = _approve(stack)
+    _start(stack.base, batch["id"]).raise_for_status()
+    _await_state(stack.base, batch["id"], {"running"})
+
+    stack.worker.kill()  # no chance to record any outcome
+    stack.worker.wait(timeout=10)
+    stack.restart_server()
+
+    recovered = _get(stack.base, batch["id"])
+    assert recovered["state"] == "unknown_requires_verification"
+    assert recovered["error_code"] == "interrupted"
+    assert recovered["attempt_count"] == 1
+    refused = _start(stack.base, batch["id"])
+    assert refused.status_code == 409
+    assert refused.json()["error"]["code"] == "requires_verification"
+
+    # Verification is the only way out, and it is what makes the batch certain again.
+    stack.immich.mode("present")
+    result = _verify(stack.base, batch["id"])
+    assert result["state"] == "succeeded"
+    assert result["outcome_state"] == "verified"
+
+    stack.restart_server()  # the resolution is durable, not in-process memory
+    after = _get(stack.base, batch["id"])
+    assert after["state"] == "succeeded"
+    assert set(_outcomes(after).values()) == {"uploaded"}
+
+
+# ── privacy ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def test_no_secret_appears_in_any_retained_artifact(stack):
+    stack.start(uploader=ALL_NEW)
+    planned = _approve(stack)
+    job = _start(stack.base, planned["id"]).json()["job"]
+    batch = _await_report(stack.base, planned["id"])
+    stack.immich.mode("present")
+    _verify(stack.base, batch["id"])
+
+    # The uploader really was given the key…
+    assert f"--api-key={SENTINEL_KEY}" in stack.argv()[0]
+    # …and it is in nothing that was kept: not the database, not the retained report,
+    # not any response the browser can read.
+    retained = [path for path in stack.seeded.data.rglob("*") if path.is_file()]
+    assert any(path.suffix == ".log" for path in retained), "the report was not retained"
+    for path in retained:
+        assert SENTINEL_KEY.encode() not in path.read_bytes(), path
+    for url in (
+        f"{stack.base}/api/v1/upload-batches",
+        f"{stack.base}/api/v1/upload-batches/{batch['id']}",
+        f"{stack.base}/api/v1/upload-batches/{batch['id']}/verifications",
+        f"{stack.base}/api/v1/jobs/{job['id']}",
+        f"{stack.base}/api/v1/jobs/{job['id']}/events",
+    ):
+        assert SENTINEL_KEY not in httpx.get(url, timeout=TIMEOUT).text, url
+    assert SENTINEL_KEY not in httpx.post(
+        f"{stack.base}/api/v1/upload-preflight", json={}, timeout=TIMEOUT
+    ).text
+    assert "--api-key=***" in " ".join(_get(stack.base, batch["id"])["command"])